Dmitry Fedorovich Polyakov(1921-1988) - Soviet intelligence officer and military teacher. Major General (according to other sources, Lieutenant General) of the GRU. For more than 20 years he was a secret agent of American intelligence. Shot on March 15, 1988.
Biography
Born in 1921 in Ukraine. After graduation high school in 1939 he entered the artillery school. Member of the Great Patriotic War from June 22, 1941, he fought on the 3rd Ukrainian, Karelian and Western fronts. For courage and heroism he was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 2nd degree, and the Red Star for the destruction of 1 anti-tank missile system, 3 artillery batteries, 1 mortar battery and 60 enemy soldiers. He ended the war with the rank of major and as senior assistant to the chief of the reconnaissance department of the artillery headquarters of the 26th Army.
Member of the CPSU(b) since 1942.
In the post-war years, he graduated from the Frunze Academy, General Staff courses and was sent to the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). From May 1951 to July 1956, with the rank of lieutenant colonel, he worked in the United States under the guise of being an officer for assignments at the USSR representation in the UN Military Staff Committee. In those years, Polyakov had a son, who three months later fell ill with an intractable disease. To save the child, a complex operation costing $400 was needed. Polyakov did not have enough money, and he applied for financial assistance to the GRU resident, Major General I. A. Sklyarov. He made a request to the Center, but the GRU leadership refused this request. The son died soon after.
In 1959, he returned to New York with the rank of colonel under the guise of the position of head of the secretariat of the USSR mission to the UN Military Staff Committee (the real position was deputy resident of the GRU for illegal work in the USA).
On November 8, 1961, on his own initiative, he offered cooperation to the FBI, naming at the first meeting six names of cryptographers who worked in Soviet foreign missions in the United States. Later he explained his action by ideological disagreement with the political regime in the USSR. During one of the interrogations, he stated that he wanted to “help Western democracy avoid the onslaught of Khrushchev’s military and foreign policy doctrine.” The FBI assigned D. F. Polyakov the operational pseudonym “Tophat” (from the English tophat - cylinder). At the second meeting with the FBI on November 26, 1961, he named 47 names of Soviet GRU and KGB intelligence officers working in the United States at that time. At a meeting on December 19, 1961, he provided information about GRU illegals and the officers who were in contact with them. At a meeting on January 24, 1962, he betrayed American GRU agents, the rest of the Soviet illegals, whom he kept silent about at the previous meeting, the officers of the New York GRU station working with them, and gave tips on some officers regarding their possible recruitment. At a meeting on March 29, 1962, he identified GRU and KGB intelligence officers known to him in photographs of Soviet diplomats and employees of Soviet missions in the United States, shown by FBI agents. At the last meeting on June 7, 1962, he betrayed the illegal immigrant Macy (GRU captain M.D. Dobrova) and handed over to the FBI a re-filmed secret GRU document “Introduction to the organization and conduct of secret work,” which was later included in tutorial FBI counterintelligence training as a separate section. He agreed to cooperate in Moscow with the US CIA, where he was assigned the operational pseudonym “Bourbon”. On June 9, 1962, Polyakov sailed for Europe aboard the Queen Elizabeth.
Soon after returning to Moscow, he was appointed to the position of senior officer of the third directorate of the GRU. From the position of the Center, he was assigned to oversee the activities of the GRU intelligence apparatus in New York and Washington. He was planning to go on his third business trip to the United States to serve as a senior assistant military attache at the USSR Embassy in Washington. Conducted several secret operations in Moscow, transferring secret information to the CIA (in particular, he copied and transferred telephone directories General Staff Armed Forces of the USSR and GRU).
After the name of Polyakov was mentioned in the Los Angeles Times newspaper in a report on the trial of the illegal immigrants Sanins, who had been extradited by him, the GRU leadership declared it impossible to further use Polyakov along the American line. Polyakov was transferred to the GRU department, which was engaged in intelligence in the countries of Asia, Africa and the Middle East. In 1965, he was appointed to the post of military attaché at the USSR Embassy (GRU resident) in Burma. In August 1969, he returned to Moscow, where in December he was appointed acting head of the department, which was involved in organizing intelligence work in the PRC and preparing illegal immigrants for transfer to this country. Then he became the head of this department.
The creators of the series “Sleepers” warned the reader before each episode that all the events in the plot were fictitious. Meanwhile, CIA “sleeper” agents are by no means fiction. Life recalls the story of the longest-serving agent from the USSR, who worked for the CIA for 25 years.
March 29, 1988. Moscow. The official visit of US President Ronald Reagan to the country, which he himself had previously called the “evil empire,” went as well as possible. The Russians demonstrated their fabulous hospitality on a grand scale, and during negotiations they were pliable, like plasticine. Only one moment darkened Reagan’s mood when, after the next round of negotiations at top level Gorbachev asked to be left alone with the American president - to talk “without protocol.”
Mr. President, I have to disappoint you,” Gorbachev sighed when they were left alone, except, of course, for the translator. - I made inquiries about the person you asked me about... I’m very sorry, but I can’t do anything - this person is already dead, the sentence has been carried out.
It’s a pity,” Reagan echoed. - My guys asked a lot for him. In a sense, he is also your Russian hero.
Perhaps,” Gorbachev shrugged, “but he was convicted in full accordance with the law.”
And Gorbachev stood up, making it clear that the conversation was over.
Who was this man, whose fate the leaders of the two world superpowers were concerned about?
CIA Director James Woolsey called the man "the jewel in the crown" and the most useful agent recruited during the Cold War. We are talking about GRU General Dmitry Polyakov, who worked for the US CIA for more than 25 years, supplying Washington the most valuable information about the Kremlin’s political, economic and military plans. He was the same “sleeping agent” who was once protected from counterintelligence by KGB chief Yuri Andropov himself.
Career of a "serviceaholic"
Dmitry Fedorovich Polyakov was born on July 6, 1921 in the town of Starobelsk, which is located in the very center of the Lugansk region. His father worked as an accountant at a local enterprise, his mother was an employee.
In 1939, Polyakov, having graduated from high school, entered the Kiev Command Artillery School. He met the Great Patriotic War as an artillery platoon commander. In the hardest battles near Yelnya he was wounded. For military exploits he was awarded two military orders - the Patriotic War and the Red Star, and many medals. The archives preserved the award list of Captain Polyakov, a battery commander from the 76th separate artillery division, who was then fighting in Karelia: “While at the line of the Kestenga direction, with the fire of his battery he destroyed one anti-tank gun with a crew of 4 people, suppressed three artillery batteries, scattered and partially destroyed a group of enemy soldiers and officers with a total number of 60 people, thereby ensuring the exit of the 3OSB reconnaissance group without losses..."
In 1943, Captain Polyakov himself transferred to artillery reconnaissance, then to military reconnaissance. After the war, he was sent to study at the intelligence department of the Frunze Military Academy, then he was transferred to work in the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff.
They immediately took Polyakov seriously and began to without haste teach him all the secret intricacies of cloak and dagger craftsmanship - how to recruit the right person, how to lay a hiding place and get rid of surveillance, how to receive coded messages from the Center and prepare an escape route for yourself.
In the service, Polyakov showed himself to be a real “service-aholic” - he studied and worked from morning to night, even spent the night in office offices. The bosses just threw up their hands in surprise: how, with such a busy life schedule, Polyakov was able to marry the beautiful Nina and have two sons - Igor and Pavlik.
In 1951, GRU leaders decided to send Polyakov - as the best of the best - on his first official trip to the United States. He went under the guise of being an employee of the Soviet mission at the UN Military Staff Committee.
He served in the position of “kryshevik” - this is how ordinary agents who supported the activities of Soviet illegal agents were called in operational slang.
These were a kind of intelligence worker ants, blindly carrying out the orders of the GRU resident: in one place one must take one container from a hiding place, disguised as an ordinary cobblestone, and put another “stone” in its place, in another place fix a prearranged signal, in a third - leave car and quietly leave for half a day. The work, although simple, was dangerous: at that time the era of “McCarthyism” had already begun in the United States and every Soviet diplomat was literally under the hood of the FBI. Sometimes Polyakov had to spend days circling around a hiding place left by an unknown agent in order to confuse surveillance. And again he proved himself to be the best agent - in five years of “watch” in New York, not a single failure!
Resident error
After serving a five-year “shift” in New York, Polyakov returned to Moscow for retraining and promotion. He returned to the USA in 1959 - already with the rank of colonel and as deputy resident of the GRU for illegal work in the USA.
And in the same year, a tragedy occurred in the Polyakov family, which crossed out his entire life. The eldest son Igor fell ill with the flu in the USA, which caused a complication - cerebral edema.
The boy could have been saved, but this required placing him in an American clinic. And to pay for treatment - Soviet intelligence officers and diplomats did not have American health insurance at that time.
Polyakov rushed to the resident, Lieutenant General Boris Ivanov:
Boris Semenovich, help! Allow me to use the funds from the special fund to encourage agents. “I’ll give everything back later, you know me,” Polyakov asked.
I can not! - snapped Ivanov, who served in the NKVD since the time of the Great Terror. - You know, I can allocate this money only by order from the Center!
So ask for the Center! Please!” Polyakov begged.
General Ivanov made a request to the Center, but the head of the GRU, Army General Ivan Serov, imposed a resolution: “Misusing the funds of the special fund is to be refused. If an operation is needed, let them take it to Moscow!”
While the boy was being prepared for the flight, the irreparable happened: Igor died.
The death of his son left a black burn in the soul of Colonel Polyakov. Moreover, resident Ivanov soon left for Moscow for a promotion. The bosses love well-trained performers.
And then Colonel Polyakov decided to take revenge. And to his bosses, and to the entire soulless system that doomed his child to death because of reporting rules.
Recruitment
On November 16, 1961, during a social reception organized in the house of the head of the American military mission to the UN Military Staff Committee, General O'Neilly, Colonel Polyakov himself turned to the owner of the house with a request:
Could you arrange for me to have a secret one-on-one meeting with any American intelligence official?
For what? - General O'Neilly looked into the eyes of the Soviet intelligence officer, about whom there were rumors in the American mission that he was the most inveterate Stalinist.
To transmit important military-political information,” he snapped.
They’ll come to you in an hour,” the admiral answered. - Drink some champagne for now.
CIA agent Sandy Grimes, who worked with Polyakov, recalls that he always emphasized that he volunteered to work for the Americans, and not for the sake of money, but purely for ideological reasons.
Of course, he received fees from us, but these were very meager amounts - about a tenth of the money that we usually paid to agents of a much lower level. But Polyakov emphasized that he did not need money. I think he believed that the US was not strong enough to fight Soviet system that we wouldn't have a chance if he didn't participate on our side,” Grimes recalled.
According to the Americans, over 25 years of working for the American intelligence services, Polyakov received only 94 thousand dollars - however, not counting expensive gifts and souvenirs. Being a passionate hunter, he adored expensive guns, which he managed to export to Moscow by diplomatic mail, not paying any attention to the sidelong glances of his colleagues. Polyakov also loved making furniture with his own hands; he often ordered American intelligence officers to bring him either expensive American tools or bronze nails for upholstering sofas. He ordered it for his wife Jewelry, but not too expensive.
In the service of the FBI
But no matter how humanly understandable Polyakov’s motives may be, nevertheless, betrayal remains a betrayal, because the decision to go into the service of the enemy affected not only Polyakov himself and his family, but also colleagues, comrades and subordinates of the deputy resident who risked their lives for the sake of their country.
It was the lives of his colleagues that the defector sacrificed. Of course, tall political motives- this is good, his new masters reasoned, but it is best to immediately bind the traitor-defector with the blood of his colleagues.
And at the very first meeting, FBI representatives demanded that Polyakov name six names of the embassy codebreakers - this is the most main secret any station that is constantly being hunted by counterintelligence.
Polyakov named. Then the Americans set a date for the second meeting - at a hotel with the intriguing name The Trotsky.
At this meeting, at the request of the chief of the Soviet department of the FBI, Bill Branigan, Polyakov dictated a text into a tape recorder with Soviet military intelligence officers known to him working in New York. Then he signed an agreement to cooperate with the FBI.
Bill Branigan later recalled that at first the FBI, where Polyakov was given the nickname Tophat, that is, “top hat,” did not really trust the Soviet “defector.” The Americans believed that Polyakov deliberately portrayed himself as a traitor in order to reveal the existing scheme of work of counterintelligence units in the US intelligence services.
Therefore, the FBI agents who talked with Polyakov demanded from him more and more secret information about American agents recruited by Soviet intelligence, expecting that sooner or later he would give himself away.
Polyakov's first victim was a particularly valuable GRU agent, David Dunlap, a staff sergeant at the National Security Agency (NSA). Feeling that he was being watched, Dunlap realized that he had been betrayed. And at the very moment when the capture group was breaking into his apartment, the sergeant committed suicide.
Next, Polyakov betrayed Frank Bossard, a high-ranking employee of the British Ministry of Aviation, whose information went to the very top. Bossard was recruited back in 1951, when he served in the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Department of British intelligence MI6. He worked in Bonn, where he interviewed scientists who had fled the GDR and the USSR. For a long time, Frank supplied Soviet intelligence officers with important information about the state of air force Great Britain, handed over drawings of the latest aircraft and plans for individual combat operations. As a result, Bossard was caught red-handed while photographing secret documents. He was sentenced to 21 years in prison.
The third victim of the traitor is Staff Sergeant Cornelius Drummond, the first black soldier to rise to the position of assistant to the head of the secret part of the US Navy headquarters. He himself went to Soviet intelligence and for five years actually transferred to the GRU for free all the more or less significant documents from the boss’s desk. According to American experts, Staff Sergeant Drummond caused such material damage that the United States had to spend several hundred million dollars to restore the necessary state of secrecy.
It is interesting that FBI leaders specifically timed Drummond’s arrest to coincide with the arrival of then Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in the United States. One can only imagine how Gromyko felt when, after speaking at the UN General Assembly, he was bombarded with questions about the arrests of Soviet spies. As a result, Drummond was sentenced to life imprisonment without the right of appeal.
Polyakov also betrayed Air Force Sergeant Herbert Bockenhaupt, who worked in the secret part of the headquarters of the US Strategic Air Command and transmitted to the GRU all the information about the ciphers, codes, and cryptographic systems of the US Air Force. As a result, Bockenhaupt was sentenced to 30 years in prison.
The price of betrayal
Following this, Polyakov began to hand over Soviet intelligence officers. The FBI was the first to arrest agent Cornelius Drumont's contacts - GRU officers Yevgeny Prokhorov and Ivan Vyrodov. Despite their status as diplomats, the FBI beat the Soviet agents to a pulp and brought them to a secret prison. When the Americans saw that it was impossible to achieve anything from GRU officers through torture and intimidation, they were thrown out half-dead near the Soviet embassy. On the same day they were declared “persona non grata” and given 48 hours to get ready.
Polyakov also betrayed a married couple of illegal intelligence officers, known by the name Sokolovs, who had just gone through the difficult process of legalization. After this, the FBI even gained confidence in the traitor and did so to divert possible suspicions from Polyakov - literally on the eve of the arrest of the illegal immigrants, FBI agents arrested a married couple - Ivan and Alexandra Egorov, Soviet employees of the UN Secretariat, who did not have diplomatic immunity. The Egorovs went through the interrogation conveyor, but did not break. Nevertheless, in the press everything was presented exactly as if they were the ones who handed over the illegal immigrants. As a result, the Egorovs served several years in prison, their careers were ruined.
The fate of illegal immigrant Karl Tuomi, who was also extradited by Polyakov, turned out differently. Tuomi was the son of those who arrived in 1933 Soviet Union American communists who became employees of the Foreign Department of the NKVD. Karl also became an employee of the USSR Ministry of State Security, and in 1957 he was transferred to assist the GRU to carry out a responsible assignment in the USA. He legalized in 1958 as Robert White, a successful Chicago businessman interested in the latest developments in aviation and electronics. In 1963, he was arrested on a tip from Polyakov and, under threat of the electric chair, agreed to become " double agent"However, the GRU suspected something and called Tuomi to Moscow. But he categorically refused to return, leaving his wife and children in the Soviet Union.
Very Important Miss Macy
But the biggest blow for the GRU was the betrayal of the legendary Soviet intelligence officer Macy - Maria Dobrova. She was born in 1907 into a working-class family in Petrograd, received a good education - in 1927 she graduated from a music college in vocal and piano classes, as well as Higher Courses foreign languages at the Academy of Sciences. Soon she married border guard officer Boris Dobrov and gave birth to a son, Dmitry. But in 1937, the well-established life seemed to fall into disarray. First, the husband died - in battles with the Japanese on Far East, where he was sent on a business trip. In the same year, son Dmitry also died of diphtheria.
To somehow get away from grief, she went to the military registration and enlistment office and asked to volunteer for civil war to Spain.
Maria Dobrova spent more than a year in battles with Franco’s fascists, earning the Order of the Red Star. Having returned, she entered Leningrad University, where the Great Patriotic War and the blockade found her. And Maria got a job as a nurse in a hospital, where she worked until the Victory. Then her fate takes a sharp turn: she goes to work at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and goes to work at the Soviet embassy in Colombia as a translator. Returning home after 4 years, she becomes full-time employee GRU, or rather illegal military intelligence.
women's club" for ladies from the New York establishment and artistic bohemia. The wives of congressmen, generals, famous journalists and businessmen shared secrets with her. And more often than not, the information received by "Miss Macy" in women's conversations was more complete than all other data obtained from other channels. For example, a friend of “Miss Macy” was Marilyn Monroe, who, as if by chance, talked with President Kennedy about the limits of the concessions that she could make The White house during negotiations with Moscow. The very next day, a printout of this conversation was on Nikita Khrushchev’s desk.
Having received a tip from Polyakov, American counterintelligence established surveillance of the beauty salon, but Maria Dobrova somehow sensed danger. Having warned the station, she decided to flee the country. And she would have succeeded, but her evacuation route was drawn up by Colonel Polyakov himself.
In Chicago, where she was staying at one of the respectable hotels, FBI agents tried to detain her.
When an uninvited “maid” knocked on her room, she understood everything.
Wait, I’m not ready yet,” Maria answered calmly, retreating to the window. Below there were cars with flashing lights and armed agents, all exits from the hotel were blocked.
Open immediately, it’s the FBI,” the door cracked from the powerful blows of the ram. - Open it quickly!
But before the door could collapse, Maria threw herself down from the window.
Many years later, KGB officers interrogating General Polyakov asked if he felt sorry for Maria Dobrova and other illegal immigrants loyal to him, whose lives he had ruined. Polyakov drew his head in as if struck, and then calmly said:
This was our job. Can I have another cup of coffee?
With a stone in his bosom
In 1962, Colonel Polyakov was recalled to Moscow and appointed to a new position in the central apparatus of the GRU General Staff. And FBI agents handed him over to American intelligence officers from the CIA, who assigned the colonel a new operational pseudonym - Bourbon.
CIA agents also gave him a special spy microcamera and taught him how to use special containers for transmitting microfilms.
The first laying of the cache took place in October 1962 - on instructions from the Americans, Polyakov copied the secret telephone directory of the General Staff right in his office. He put the film in an iron container, which he covered on all sides with orange plasticine, and then rolled it in brick chips - the result was an ordinary piece of brick, completely indistinguishable from thousands of others. He placed the container under a bench in a conventional place in the Gorky Central Park of Culture and Leisure - as it turned out, in a very crowded place, but, apparently, the Americans simply did not know about the existence of other parks in Moscow.
Idiots! - Colonel Polyakov muttered under his breath, dying of fear. “We ought to send these Tsar’s poor students to our intelligence courses, so that they can at least learn how to work!”
Having laid the cache, he - literally in front of the police - left symbol on the pillar there is an ink stain, as if accidentally splashed out from a broken fountain pen.
The Americans asked to leave the next cache in an old telephone booth near a house on Lesteva Street - directly opposite the dormitory for cadets of the KGB Higher School. F. E. Dzerzhinsky. It was here that the cadets ran to call home, but the American agent did not know this - there was no sign on the building.
Hunting and game management", of which he was a regular author.
The Americans agreed to new rules of the game - just the day before, GRU Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, who also worked for the CIA, was arrested in Moscow. As it later turned out, Penkovsky was accidentally surrendered by the Americans themselves, who held secret meetings with him once a week in the most public places.
Polyakov took into account all Penkovsky's mistakes, and this allowed him for a long time to remain above suspicion - especially when purges and searches for Penkovsky’s accomplices began in the GRU. Counterintelligence officers then literally filtered out hundreds of personal files of officers under a microscope, but the GRU could not even imagine that the traitor himself would coordinate the search for the “mole.”
Nixon's personal agent
But even Polyakov’s most careful instructions could not save him from the Americans’ amateur activities. Wanting to help Bourbon, they published an article in American newspapers about the beginning of the trial of the Egorovs, in which Polyakov’s surname was mentioned, they say, and some traitor betrayed him. After this article, Polyakov was removed from the American line and transferred to the GRU department, which was engaged in intelligence in the countries of Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Not wanting to incur even greater suspicion, he announced to his CIA handlers that he was going into “sleep” mode.
Soon Polyakov passed all the checks and even received a promotion - he was sent to the USSR Embassy in Burma as a GRU resident. After working in this country for 4 years, he moves to a department related to illegal intelligence in China. During all this time, he only broke the “sleeping” regime once, when he handed over to the CIA a report on the contradictions in relations between the USSR and the PRC, just on the eve of President Nixon’s visit to Beijing, which became a brilliant diplomatic success for the Americans and a turning point in the Cold War.
After this, the CIA’s attitude towards Bourbon changed most radically: from a source of secret information, Polyakov turned into a figure of influence and a particularly valuable agent. And the Americans began to help him make his career. So, when Polyakov served as a GRU resident in India, American handlers began to guide him to recruit Americans. For example, one of the first to be recruited this way was Sergeant Robert Marcinowski from the office of the American attaché. Next, in the interests of the cause, the CIA “sacrificed” several more military personnel - later all of them were sentenced to death for espionage in favor of the USSR.
Thanks to the help of the Americans, Polyakov soon gained fame as almost the most successful intelligence officer in the entire GRU system. His career grew by leaps and bounds - he soon received the rank of major general, a new position - at the Military Diplomatic Academy, while remaining in the elite personnel reserve GRU.
The Americans also appreciated him. For example, Bourbon was given an experimental model of a pulse radio transmitter - this device is slightly larger in size matchbox made it possible to transmit a packet of encrypted information to a special receiver in a second. Having received this device, Polyakov began to simply ride a trolleybus past the American embassy, “shooting” information at the right moment. He was not afraid of direction finding from the KGB radio technical service - how could he guess where exactly the agent was “shooting” from?
Polyakov believed in his safety so much that he even began using confiscated spy equipment from GRU warehouses. For example, when a Minox camera sent from the USA unexpectedly broke down, Polyakov simply took exactly the same camera from the GRU archive and calmly re-photographed the documents. But soon the American owners showed that even such work was not enough for them.
Under the hood
The year 1979 began with the Islamic Revolution in Iran, when power in the country passed to Islamic fanatics - the Revolutionary Council led by Ayatollah Khomeini. Diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran were terminated, and the countries were actively preparing for war. And US President Jimmy Carter ordered the CIA to use all Soviet agents to find out details about the relationship between Moscow and Tehran.
But just at that moment Polyakov was preparing for a new foreign business trip to India. He considered urgent contact with the CIA resident a suicidal risk. Therefore, he ignored the signal about the meeting.
It was then that the Americans used the whip, wanting to teach a lesson about who is really the boss here. One of the American magazines published a chapter from John Barron's upcoming book "KGB", dedicated to Carl Tuomey. In the entire text, Polyakov’s name was not mentioned even once, although everyone knew that Polyakov was Tuomi’s immediate superior. But the magazine publication was illustrated with a photograph that could not have ended up in the United States - a photograph from the personal file of Tuomi in military uniform. That is, the authors seemed to hint that someone in Moscow stole this photograph from a secret file and handed it over to the Americans.
This was a transparent hint to Polyakov: if you do not cooperate, then we will simply hand you over to your colleagues at Lubyanka.
But the Americans overdid it. The publication was also noticed in Moscow. Soon, after going through all the candidates, the security officers came to the conclusion that the only one who could inform the Americans about Agent Tuomi was General Polyakov.
Soon it lay on the table of the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Yuri Andropov brief information on D.F. Polyakov, suspected of being a CIA agent. And on the same day, an order went to Delhi: the GRU resident had to urgently arrive in Moscow for some important meeting.
But Polyakov understood with animal instinct: he had fallen under the hood of counterintelligence.
CIA agent Jeanne Vertefeuille, who worked with Bourbon in Delhi, recalls how that evening he called her for an urgent conversation.
“I’m being called to Moscow,” he said briefly. - I guess this is the end, they figured me out.
You know, if something happens, we will always be glad to see you in our country,” Zhanna began.
But Polyakov politely stopped her - apparently, he was not sure that the Americans, who had actually betrayed him, really wanted to save his life and not organize a high-profile murder, which, of course, would be blamed on the KGB.
Thank you, but I will never go to the United States,” Polyakov sighed. - I was born in Russia and I want to die in Russia, even if it is an unmarked mass grave.
However, that time Polyakov escaped with only a slight fright - Andropov forbade him to be touched without clear evidence of guilt.
If you now start imprisoning generals without evidence, then who will work?! - he said.
In addition, Andropov was already preparing for the upcoming battle for the throne and did not want to quarrel with the army clans ahead of time.
As a result, Polyakov was simply dismissed, having read out the order of dismissal from service. They say that a new, younger candidate for the position of resident has been prepared.
Arrest and execution
The Iran crisis ended badly for Jimmy Carter, and soon new president USA Ronald Reagan ordered intelligence officers to forget about Iran and return to the fight against “world communism” represented by the USSR. And Polyakov was “awakened” again, although he, being a pensioner, could no longer transmit secret documents. But the White House valued his political reviews.
It is difficult to say how much longer Polyakov would have worked for the Americans, but in the spring of 1985, one of the leaders of the Soviet station in Washington, Aldrich Hazen Ames himself, the former head of the Soviet department of the CIA's foreign counterintelligence department, was recruited. Ames, who gave out huge sums to encourage Soviet defector agents, also wanted to swim in money, have a luxurious house and a Jaguar sports car. And then he decided to get money in Moscow, offering the KGB to buy a list of 25 names of “sleeping” agents in the leadership of the Soviet intelligence services. And the first number on the list was General Polyakov.
Polyakov was arrested on July 7, 1986, the day after celebrating his 65th birthday. When Polyakov celebrated his anniversary in a restaurant, a secret search was carried out at his home - in a dozen hiding places, operatives found American spy equipment, microfilms, and CIA official instructions.
After the banquet ended, he was tied up - and so carefully that for several years the Americans simply did not know what happened to him. Agent Bourbon seemed to disappear into the bustle of Moscow, cutting off all contacts behind him.
Only after negotiations with Gorbachev did it become known that the Military Collegium Supreme Court In February 1987, the USSR sentenced Polyakov to death by firing squad. On March 15, 1987, the sentence was carried out.
The burial place of his body is unknown.
Polyakov Dmitry Fedorovich - legendary intelligence officer of the GRU of the Soviet Union. He went from an artilleryman to an experienced staff officer. At the age of 65, while retired, he was arrested and sentenced to death for twenty-five years of cooperation with the American government.
Carier start
Little is known about this man's childhood. He is a native of Ukraine. His father was an accountant. After graduating from school, Dmitry Polyakov entered the First Artillery School. In 1941 he went to the front. He served as a platoon commander in Zapadny and during two years of war became a battery commander. In 1943, he received the rank of officer. For successful military operations and excellent service, he was awarded a large number of medals and orders. In 1945, he decided to enter the intelligence department of the Frunze Academy. Then he graduated from the General Staff Course and was enrolled in the GRU staff.
Work in the USA
Almost immediately after completing his training and drawing up the necessary legend, Dmitry Polyakov was sent to New York as an employee of the Soviet UN mission. His true occupation was covering and placing illegal immigrants (agents) of the GRU in the USA. The resident's first mission was successful, and in 1959 he again went to the United States as an employee of the UN military headquarters. On the second mission, military intelligence assigned Polyakov the duties of deputy resident. The Soviet agent did his job perfectly, strictly followed instructions, obtained the required data, and coordinated his intelligence officer.
In November 1961, Dmitry Polyakov continued to work at the New York GRU agency. At this time, the flu was raging in the States. His youngest son caught the virus, the disease caused complications in his heart. An expensive operation was required to save the child. An experienced staff officer asked management for financial assistance, he was denied money, and the child died.
Cooperation with the FBI and CIA
After interrogating witnesses, the spy’s American colleagues and his inner circle, it became clear that Polyakov came to betrayal consciously. After the debunking of the cult of Stalin and the beginning of the Khrushchev Thaw, the intelligence officer became disillusioned with the new leadership and believed that Stalin’s ideals, those for which he fought on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War, were completely lost. The Moscow elite is mired in corruption and political games. Dmitry Polyakov felt that he had lost faith in the political guidelines of his country and its leaders. The death of his son was the catalyst that accelerated events. An embittered and defeated Soviet agent contacted a high-ranking American officer and offered his services.
The FBI leadership perceived the betrayal of such an experienced intelligence officer from the USSR as a gift of fate, and they were right. Dmitry Polyakov established contact with an FBI recruiter who established contacts with traitors from the GRU and the KGB. The Soviet agent received the pseudonym Tophet.
In 1962, the head of the CIA turned to President Kennedy with a request to transfer his most valuable “mole” to the disposal of his department. Polyakov began working for the CIA and received the call sign Bourbon. The central administration considered him their “diamond.”
In almost 25 years of cooperation with foreign intelligence services, the Soviet traitor managed to send 25 boxes of documents and photo reports to the United States. The spy's American "colleagues" counted this number after his exposure. Dmitry Polyakov caused damage to his country amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars. He conveyed information regarding the development of secret weapons in the Union, thanks to him Reagan began to more closely control the sale of his military technologies, which the USSR bought up and improved. On his tip, 19 Soviet residents, 7 contractors and more than 1,500 ordinary GRU staff officers working abroad were killed.
During his years of service, Polyakov managed to work in the USA, Burma, India and Moscow. Since 1961, he has constantly collaborated with the CIA and FBI. After retiring, the traitor did not stop his activities: he worked as a secretary of the party committee, had access to the personal files of illegal agents in the United States and willingly “shared” this information.
Exposure
In 1974 Soviet officer intelligence officer received a promotion. From that time on, General Dmitry Fedorovich Polyakov had full access to secret materials, diplomatic relations, developments and plans of his government.
Surprisingly, the first suspicions fell on Polyakov back in 1978, but his crystal clear reputation, excellent track record and patron in the person of General Izotov played a role - no investigations were carried out. Experienced Bourbon lay low for a long time, but, having finally settled in Moscow, he again declared his readiness to cooperate with his Western colleagues.
In 1985, Dmitry Polyakov was exposed by the American mole Alridge Ames. The entire military intelligence of the Union was in a state of shock: such a high-ranking spy had never been exposed. In 1986, the talented resident was arrested and sentenced to deprivation of his titles and execution. In 1988, the sentence was carried out.
Dmitry Fedorovich Polyakov was born in 1921 in Ukraine. After graduating from high school in 1939, he entered the artillery school. A participant in the Great Patriotic War, he fought on the Karelian and Western fronts. For courage and heroism he was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War and the Red Star.
In the post-war years, he graduated from the Frunze Academy, General Staff courses and was sent to the Main Intelligence Directorate. From May 1951 to July 1956, with the rank of lieutenant colonel, he worked in the United States under the guise of being an officer for assignments at the USSR representation in the UN Military Staff Committee. In those years, Polyakov had a son, who three months later fell ill with an intractable disease. To save the child, a complex operation costing $400 was needed.
Polyakov did not have enough money, and he turned to GRU resident Major General I. A. Sklyarov for financial assistance. He made a request to the Center, but the GRU leadership refused this request. The Americans, in turn, offered Polyakov to operate on his son in a New York clinic “in exchange for some services” from the United States. Polyakov refused, and his son soon died.
In 1959, he returned to New York with the rank of colonel under the guise of the position of head of the secretariat of the USSR mission to the UN Military Staff Committee (the real position was deputy resident of the GRU for illegal work in the USA).
On November 8, 1961, on his own initiative, he offered cooperation to the FBI, naming at the first meeting six names of cryptographers who worked in Soviet foreign missions in the United States. Later he explained his action by ideological disagreement with the political regime in the USSR. During one of the interrogations, he stated that he wanted to “help Western democracy avoid the onslaught of Khrushchev’s military and foreign policy doctrine.”
The FBI assigned D. F. Polyakov the operational pseudonym “Tophat” (“Cylinder”). At the second meeting with the FBI on November 26, 1961, he named 47 names of Soviet GRU and KGB intelligence officers working in the United States at that time. At a meeting on December 19, 1961, he provided information about GRU illegals and the officers who were in contact with them. At a meeting on January 24, 1962, he betrayed American GRU agents, the rest of the Soviet illegals, whom he kept silent about at the previous meeting, the officers of the New York GRU station working with them, and gave tips on some officers regarding their possible recruitment.
At a meeting on March 29, 1962, he identified GRU and KGB intelligence officers known to him in photographs of Soviet diplomats and employees of Soviet missions in the United States, shown by FBI agents. At the last meeting on June 7, 1962, he betrayed the illegal immigrant Macy (GRU captain Maria Dmitrievna Dobrova) and handed over to the FBI the re-filmed secret document “GRU. An Introduction to the Organization and Conduct of Secret Work,” later included in the FBI counterintelligence training manual as a separate section. He agreed to cooperate in Moscow with the US CIA, where he was assigned the operational pseudonym “Bourbon”. On June 9, 1962, Colonel D. F. Polyakov sailed from the shores of the United States on the steamship Queen Elizabeth.
Soon after returning to Moscow, Polyakov was appointed to the position of senior officer of the 3rd Directorate of the GRU. From the position of the Center, he was assigned to oversee the activities of the GRU intelligence apparatus in New York and Washington. He was planning to go on his third business trip to the United States to serve as a senior assistant military attache at the USSR Embassy in Washington. Conducted several secret operations in Moscow, transferring secret information to the CIA (in particular, he copied and transferred telephone directories of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the GRU).
After Polyakov’s name was mentioned in the Los Angeles Times newspaper in a report on the trial of the illegal immigrants Sanins, who had been extradited to them, the GRU leadership declared it impossible to further use Polyakov along the American line. Polyakov was transferred to the GRU department, which was engaged in intelligence in the countries of Asia, Africa and the Middle East. In 1965, he was appointed to the post of military attaché at the USSR Embassy (GRU resident) in Burma. In August 1969, he returned to Moscow, where in December he was appointed acting head of the department, which was involved in organizing intelligence work in the PRC and preparing illegal immigrants for transfer to this country. Then he became the head of this department.
In 1973 he was sent as a resident to India, and in 1974 he was promoted to the rank of major general. In October 1976, he returned to Moscow, where he was appointed to the post of head of the third intelligence department of the VDA, remaining on the approved reserve list for appointments to the positions of military attaché and GRU resident. In mid-December 1979, he again left for India to take up his previous position as a military attache at the USSR Embassy (senior operational chief of the intelligence apparatus of the GRU General Staff in Bombay and Delhi, responsible for strategic military intelligence in the South-Eastern region).
In 1980, due to health reasons, he retired. After retiring, General Polyakov began working as a civilian in the GRU personnel department, gaining access to the personal files of all employees.
He was arrested on July 7, 1986. On November 27, 1987, he was sentenced to death by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. The sentence was carried out on March 15, 1988. Official information about the sentence and its execution appeared in the Soviet press only in 1990. And in May 1988, US President Ronald Reagan, during negotiations with M. S. Gorbachev, voiced a proposal from the American side to pardon D. Polyakov, or exchange him for one of the Soviet intelligence officers arrested in the United States, but the request was late.
According to the main version, the reason for Polyakov’s exposure was information from the then CIA officer Aldrich Ames or FBI officer Robert Hanssen, who collaborated with the KGB of the USSR.
According to available open sources information during the period of cooperation provided the CIA with information about nineteen Soviet illegal intelligence officers operating in Western countries, about one hundred and fifty foreigners who collaborated with the intelligence services of the USSR and about approximately 1,500 active employees of the intelligence services of the USSR. In total - 25 boxes of secret documents from 1961 to 1986.
Polyakov also gave away strategic secrets. Because of his information, the United States learned about the contradictions between the CPSU and the CPC. He also gave away the secrets of ATGMs, which helped the US Army during Operation Desert Storm to successfully counter anti-tank guided missiles that were in service with the Iraqis.
The retired general was arrested by Alpha fighters, one of the best security forces in the world. The detention took place according to all the rules of the special services. It was not enough to put handcuffs on the spy; he had to be completely immobilized. FSB officer, writer and intelligence service historian Oleg Khlobustov explains why.
“A harsh detention, because they knew that he could be provided with, say, poison for self-destruction at the time of detention, if he preferred to take such a position. He was immediately changed, things were already prepared in advance to confiscate everything he had: a suit, a shirt, and so on,” says Oleg Khlobustov.
But isn't it too much noise to detain a 65-year-old man? The KGB did not think so. There has never been a traitor of this magnitude in the USSR. The material damage caused by Polyakov over the years of espionage activities amounts to billions of dollars. None of the traitors reached such heights in the GRU, and no one worked for so long. For half a century, the veteran of the Great Patriotic War waged a secret war against his own people, and this war was not without human losses.
Polyakov understood that for such crimes he faced execution. However, being arrested, he did not panic and actively cooperated with the investigation. Probably, the traitor hoped that his life would be spared in order to play a double game with the CIA. But the scouts decided otherwise.
“We had no guarantees that when it started big game, somewhere between the lines, Polyakov will not put an extra dash. This will be a signal to the Americans: “Guys, I’m caught, I’m telling you misinformation, don’t believe it,” says Colonel Viktor Baranets.
The court sentenced Dmitry Polyakov to capital punishment and deprived him of his shoulder straps and orders. The case is closed forever, but remains main question: Why did Polyakov trample his name in the mud and cross out his entire life?
One thing is clear: he was rather indifferent to money. The traitor received about 90 thousand dollars from the CIA. If you divide them by 25 years, it’s not that much.
“The main and pressing question is what pushed him to do this, what inspired him? Why did such a metamorphosis occur in a person who, in general, began his life as a hero, and one might say was favored by fate,” argues Oleg Khlobustov.
Polyakov told the Americans the names of Soviet intelligence officers, trying to convince them of his sincerity, he said: “For more than six years I have not been promoted.” So, maybe this is the motive for revenge?
“Still, there was terrible rot, he had envy of other people, there was, it seems to me, a misunderstanding of why he is only a general, but others are already there, or why he is only a colonel, and others are already here, and there was envy this one,” says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
Polyakov returned to Moscow with spy equipment and a whole suitcase of expensive gifts. Entering the bosses' offices, he generously handed out gold watches, cameras, and jewelry. Realizing that he was beyond suspicion, he again contacted the CIA. As he drove past the US Embassy, he sent encrypted information using a tiny transmitter.
In addition, Polyakov arranged hiding places in which he left microfilms with secret documents copied on them. Gorky Cultural Park is one of the hiding places called “Art”. Having sat down supposedly to rest, the spy, with an imperceptible movement, hid a container disguised as a brick behind the bench. The conventional signal that the container had been taken away should have been a strip of lipstick on the notice board near the Arbat restaurant.
Military journalist Nikolai Poroskov writes about intelligence. He met with many people who personally knew the traitor, and accidentally discovered little known fact his biography, and talks about it for the first time.
“Most likely, there is unconfirmed information that his ancestors were wealthy, his grandfather was there, maybe his father. The revolution disrupted everything; he had a genetic hostility to the existing system. I think he worked on an ideological basis,” Poroskov said.
But even if so, this hardly explains the betrayal. Alexander Bondarenko is a writer and historian of special services, winner of the Foreign Intelligence Service Award. He studied in detail the various motives for betrayal and confidently declares that ideology has nothing to do with it.
“Sorry, he fought against specific individuals. It is enough, after all, to be a prepared, educated person who understands that the system, by and large, is neither cold nor hot. He ratted out specific people,” Bondarenko claims.
Continuing to spy for the CIA, Polyakov tried to get him sent abroad again. It will be easier to work there. However, someone was nullifying all his efforts, and this someone, apparently, was General Ivashutin, who led military intelligence in those years.
“Peter Ivanovich said that he didn’t like Polyakov right away, he said: “He sits, looks at the floor, doesn’t look him in the eye.” Intuitively, he felt that this man was not very good, and he transferred him from the sphere of human strategic intelligence, transferring him first to the selection of civilian personnel. That is, where there were not many state secrets, and therefore Polyakov was cut off from them,” says Nikolai Poroskov.
Polyakov, apparently, guessed everything, and therefore bought the most expensive and impressive gifts for Ivashutin.
“To Peter Ivanovich Ivashutin, Polyakov once brought from India two colonial English soldiers carved from rare wood. Beautiful figures,” says Poroskov.
Alas, the bribery attempt failed. The general was not there. But Polyakov instantly figured out how to turn the situation in his favor. He got him sent abroad again. He knocked out this decision, bypassing Ivashutin.
“When Pyotr Ivanovich was somewhere on a long business trip, or on vacation, there was an order to transfer him, again, back. Someone took responsibility, and in the end Polyakov, after the USA there was a long break, then he was sent as a resident to India,” explains Nikolai Poroskov.
In 1973, Polyakov went to India as a resident. There he again launches active espionage activities, convincing his colleagues that he is taking on the American diplomat James Flint, and is actually transmitting information through him to the CIA. At the same time, not only does no one suspect him, he also receives a promotion.
"How else? He has a safe conduct certificate - 1419 days at the front. Wounds, military awards - medals, and the Order of the Red Star. Plus, by that time, he had already become a general: in 1974 he was awarded the rank of general,” says Igor Atamanenko.
In order for Polyakov to receive the rank of general, the CIA had to spend money. The criminal case involves expensive gifts he made to the head of the personnel service, Izotov.
“This was the head of the personnel department of the “all GRU” named Izotov. Polyakov communicated with him because promotions and so on depended on him. But the most famous gift that has come to light is the silver service. By Soviet times, it was God knows what. Well, he also gave him a gun, because he himself was fond of hunting, and Izotov seemed to be fond of it,” says Nikolai Poroskov.
The rank of general provided Polyakov with access to materials that were not related to his direct duties. The traitor received information about three American officers working for the Soviet Union. And one more valuable agent - Frank Bossard, an employee of the British Air Force.
“There was a certain Frank Bossard - he was an Englishman. This is not an American, this is an Englishman who was involved in the implementation and testing of guided missiles. At one time he handed over, again, not to Polyakov, he handed over to another officer of the Main Intelligence Directorate, photographs technological processes: how the tests are carried out - in short, he conveyed a set of secret information,” says Igor Atamanenko.
Polyakov re-took the photographs sent by Bossard and forwarded them to the CIA. The agent was immediately identified. Bossard received a 20-year prison sentence. But Polyakov did not stop there. He pulled out a list of military technologies that were being obtained through intelligence efforts in the West.
“In the late 70-80s, the United States imposed a ban on the sale of all kinds of military technologies to the Soviet Union, of any kind. And even some small parts that fell under this technology were blocked by the Americans and were not sold. Polyakov said that there are five thousand directions that help the Soviet Union buy this secret technology from countries through dummies, through third states. And so it was, indeed, and the Americans immediately cut off the oxygen,” says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
There is an essential question in this story: who and when first got on the trail of the “mole”? How and with what help was Polyakov managed to expose? There are many versions on this matter. The well-known historian of the special services, Nikolai Dolgopolov, is sure that Leonid Shebarshin was the first to suspect Polyakov; he was the deputy KGB resident in India just when Dmitry Fedorovich was working there.
“Their meeting took place in India, in 1974, and if Shebarshin’s remarks had been paid attention to then, perhaps the arrest would have occurred not in ’86, but much earlier,” says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
Shebarshin drew attention to the fact that in India Polyakov did much more than his position required of him.
“A man of his profession, in fact, should be doing this - meeting with diplomats, and so on - but Colonel Polyakov had a lot of sources. There were a lot of meetings. Often these meetings lasted a very long time, and the external intelligence of the PSU drew attention to this,” explains Dolgopolov.
But this was not the only thing that worried Shebarshin. He noticed that Polyakov did not like his colleagues from foreign intelligence, and on occasion tried to expel them from India. It seemed that they were bothering him in some way, but in public he was very friendly with them and loudly praised them.
“Another point that Shebarshin found rather strange (I’m not saying suspicious - strange) is that always and everywhere and with everyone, Polyakov, except his subordinates, tried to be a close friend. He literally imposed his relationship, he sought to show that he was kind and good man. Shebarshin could see that this was a game,” says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
Finally, Shebarshin decided to talk frankly about Polyakov with his leadership. However, his suspicions seemed to hit a wall. They didn’t even think of arguing with him, but no one gave any progress to the matter.
“Yes, there were people in the GRU structures, they occupied small positions there, majors, lieutenant colonels, who also more than once came across certain facts in Polyakov’s work, which raised doubts. But again, this damned self-confidence of the leadership of the then Main Intelligence Directorate, it often, I emphasize this word, often forced the then leadership of the GRU to brush aside these suspicions,” says Viktor Baranets.
Polyakov acted like a high-class professional and made almost no mistakes. Instantly destroyed all evidence. He had ready answers to all questions. And who knows, perhaps he would have gotten away with it if not for the mistakes made by his masters in the CIA. At the end of the 70s, a book by counterintelligence director James Angleton was published in America.
“He suspected every person who worked in his department. He didn’t believe that there were people like Polyakov who did this out of absolutely some kind of conviction,” says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
James Angleton did not even consider it necessary to hide information about Polyakov, because he was sure: agent “Bourbon” - as the agent was called in the CIA - was a setup Soviet intelligence. Naturally, Angleton’s literary opus was read to the gills at the GRU.
“He completely, I think, accidentally, set up Polyakov, saying that there is such an agent in the Soviet UN mission or there was such an agent, and another one is an agent, that is, two agents at once. This, of course, could not but alarm people who must read such things as part of their duty,” explains Dolgopolov.
Was Angleton's book the last straw that overflowed the cup of patience, or rather trust? Or maybe the GRU received some more evidence against Polyakov? Be that as it may, in 1980 his prosperity ended. The traitor is urgently summoned from Delhi to Moscow, and here he is allegedly diagnosed with a heart disease, due to which foreign travel is contraindicated.
“We had to somehow get Polyakov out of Delhi. A commission was created. This did not surprise him, because all the time those who work abroad are checked quite regularly. They also checked him and found out that his health was not good. Polyakov immediately suspected something was wrong, and in order to return back to India, he passed another commission, and this made people even more wary. He wanted to return so badly. And in fact, at that very moment, it was decided to part with him,” says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
Polyakov is unexpectedly transferred to the Pushkin Institute of Russian Literature. His task is to take a closer look at the foreigners who study there. In fact, they simply decided to keep the spy away from state secrets.
“He is worn out, his nerves are strained to the limit. Every sneeze and whisper behind your back is already turning into the rattling of handcuffs. It already seems that they are rattling handcuffs. Well, then, when he was sent to the Russian Language Institute, everything became clear to him,” says Igor Atamanenko.
And yet, there was not a single convincing evidence against Polyakov. He continued to work in the GRU as secretary of the party committee. Here the retiree easily identified illegal intelligence officers who had gone on long business trips. They were absent from party meetings and did not pay dues. Information about such people was immediately sent to the CIA. Polyakov was sure that this time suspicions passed him by. But he was wrong. The counterintelligence of the USSR State Security Committee was forced to intervene in the matter.
“In the end, it turned out that the documents ended up on the desk of the then head of the KGB, and he set the matter in motion. External surveillance was established, all counterintelligence agencies of all departments worked together. The technicians were working. And the outdoor surveillance discovered some things. I think it seems to me that some hiding places have also been discovered in country house Polyakov, otherwise they wouldn’t have taken him so confidently,” says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
In June 1986, Polyakov noticed a chipped tile in his kitchen. He realized that the house had been searched. After some time, the phone rang in his apartment. Polyakov picked up the phone. The rector of the Military Diplomatic Academy personally invited him to speak to the graduates - future intelligence officers. The traitor sighed with relief. Yes, they looked for hiding places in his apartment, but they didn’t find anything, otherwise he wouldn’t have been invited to the academy.
“Polyakov immediately began calling back and finding out who else had received an invitation. Because, who knows, maybe they are going to tie him up under this pretext. When he called several of his colleagues, among whom were also participants in the Great Patriotic War, and established that yes, they were all invited to the celebration at the Military Diplomatic Academy, he calmed down,” says Igor Atamanenko.
But in the building of the Military Diplomatic Academy at the checkpoint, a capture group was waiting for him. Polyakov realized that this was the end.
“And then they took him to Lefortovo, and immediately put him in front of the investigator. This is what is called shock therapy in Alpha. And when a person is in such shock, he begins to tell the truth,” says Atamanenko.
So what prompted Polyakov to commit a monstrous betrayal? None of the versions sounded convincing enough. The general did not seek to enrich himself. Khrushchev was, by and large, indifferent to him. And he hardly blamed his colleagues for the death of his son.
“You know, having spent a long time analyzing the origins of betrayal, the root causes of betrayal, these starting psychological platforms that force a person to betray his homeland, I came to the conclusion that there is one side to betrayal that has not yet been studied by either journalists or by the intelligence officers themselves, not by psychologists, not by doctors, and so on,” says Viktor Baranets.
Viktor Baranets carefully studied the investigation materials in the Polyakov case. In addition, based on personal observations, he was able to make an interesting discovery.
“It is the desire to betray, to have two faces, and to enjoy even this. Today you are in the service, such a gallant officer, a patriot. You walk among people, but they do not suspect that you are a traitor. And a person experiences the highest concentration of adrenaline in the consciousness, in the body in general. Betrayal is the whole complex reasons, one of which serves as a kind of small mental reactor that triggers this vile complex of human actions that makes a person betray,” Baranets believes.
Perhaps this version explains everything: the thirst for risk, hatred of colleagues, and inflated self-esteem. Over the years of his espionage activities, the general was repeatedly offered to flee to America, but Polyakov invariably refused Uncle Sam’s invitation. Why? This is another unsolved mystery.
Dmitry Polyakov is a hero of the Great Patriotic War, a retired GRU major general, who was an American spy for more than twenty years. Why did the Soviet intelligence officer betray the USSR? What prompted Polyakov to betray him, and who was the first to track down the mole? Unknown facts and new versions of the most notorious story of betrayal in the documentary investigation of the Moscow Trust TV channel.
Traitor in general's uniform
A retired general is arrested by members of Alpha, one of the best security forces in the world. The detention takes place according to all the rules of the special services. It is not enough to handcuff a spy; he must be completely immobilized. FSB officer, writer and intelligence service historian Oleg Khlobustov explains why.
“A harsh detention, because they knew that he could be supplied, say, with poison for self-destruction at the time of detention, if he preferred to take such a position. He was immediately changed, things were already prepared in advance to confiscate everything he had : suit, shirt, and so on,” says Oleg Khlobustov.
Dmitry Polyakov
But isn't it too much noise to detain a 65-year-old man? The KGB did not think so. There has never been a traitor of this magnitude in the USSR. The material damage caused by Polyakov over the years of espionage activities amounts to billions of dollars. None of the traitors reached such heights in the GRU, and no one worked for so long. For half a century, the veteran of the Great Patriotic War waged a secret war against his own people, and this war was not without human losses.
“He gave out one thousand five hundred, note this figure, GRU employees, and foreign intelligence too. This figure is huge, I don’t know what to compare it with,” says intelligence services historian Nikolai Dolgopolov.
Polyakov understands that for such crimes he faces execution. However, being arrested, he does not panic and actively cooperates with the investigation. The traitor probably expects that his life will be spared in order to play a double game with the CIA. But the scouts decide differently.
“We had no guarantees that when the big game started, somewhere between the lines, Polyakov would put an extra dash. This would be a signal to the Americans: “Guys, I’m caught, I’m telling you misinformation, don’t believe it,” says the military man Victor Baranets.
"Rotten" initiative
The court sentences Polyakov to capital punishment and deprives him of his shoulder straps and orders. On March 15, 1988, the sentence was carried out. The case is closed forever, but the main question remains: why did Polyakov trample his name in the mud and cross out his entire life?
One thing is clear: he was rather indifferent to money. The traitor received about 90 thousand dollars from the CIA. If you divide them by 25 years, it’s not that much.
“The main and pressing question is what pushed him to do this, what inspired him? Why did such a metamorphosis occur in a man who, in general, began his life as a hero, and one might say was favored by fate,” argues Oleg Khlobustov.
October 30, 1961, New York. The phone rings in US Colonel Fahey's office. The person on the other end of the line is visibly nervous. He demands a meeting with the head of the American mission to the UN Military Staff Committee and gives his name: Colonel Dmitry Polyakov, military attaché at the Soviet embassy. That same evening, Fahey calls the FBI. Instead of the military, the feds will come to meet Polyakov, and this will suit him quite well.
“When, for example, someone comes to the embassy and says that “I have such intelligence capabilities, let me work for you,” what are the first thoughts of intelligence? That this is a provocation, that he is crazy, that he is a swindler, who wants to run what is called a paper mill, and this person is checked for a long time and carefully,” explains special services historian Alexander Bondarenko.
At first, the FBI does not believe Polyakov; they suspect him to be a double agent. But an experienced intelligence officer knows how to convince them. At the first meeting, he gives out the names of the cryptographers working at the Soviet embassy. These are the people through whom all secrets pass.
“They already had suspicions about a number of people who could be cryptographers. Here’s a check to see if he would name these names or would be bluffing. But he named the true names, everything coincided, everything came together,” says KGB counterintelligence veteran Igor Atamanenko .
After the ransomware was issued, there is no longer any doubt. The FBI agents understand that this is an “initiative” in front of them. This is what intelligence calls people who voluntarily cooperate. Polyakov receives the pseudonym Top Hat, that is, “Cylinder”. Later, the feds will hand it over to their colleagues at the CIA.
“To prove that he is not a setup, that he is a sincere “initiator,” he crossed what is called the Rubicon. The Americans understood this, because he gave away the most valuable thing that is in military intelligence and the foreign intelligence service. The Americans then understood: yes , hand over the cryptographers – there is no turning back,” explains Nikolai Dolgopolov.
Beyond foul
Having crossed the line, Polyakov feels a pleasant chill from the danger, from the fact that he is walking on the edge of a knife. Later, after his arrest, the general admits: “At the heart of everything was my constant desire to work on the verge of risk, and the more dangerous, the more interesting my work became.” KGB Lieutenant Colonel Igor Atamanenko has written dozens of books about intelligence. He studied Polyakov’s case thoroughly, and this motive seems quite convincing to him.
“When he worked, his first business trip, he was a bureaucrat, he was not an intelligence officer. He took the most risks when he pulled chestnuts out of the fire for the central intelligence agency. That’s when the risk appeared, that’s when the adrenaline, that’s when this drive, you know, what is called now,” says Atamanenko.
Indeed, in New York Polyakov works under the cover of the Soviet embassy. He is not in danger, unlike the illegal immigrants whom he supervises, and who, if they fail, will lose everything. But is Polyakov really not enough of a risk, because in case of danger, he is obliged to cover his employees, if necessary - at the cost of his own life.
In the meeting room of the XX Congress of the CPSU in the Kremlin. First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Nikita Khrushchev speaks. Photo: ITAR-TASS
“This happened when they rescued agents, when they rescued illegal employees, so there is every risk in intelligence, and to think that he had an bureaucratic job, when he had to work with intelligence officers, in intelligence - this no longer stands up to criticism,” says Alexander Bondarenko.
Polyakov does exactly the opposite. He turns over illegal immigrants unknown to him to the FBI. For a whole hour, Polyakov calls the names of Soviet intelligence officers, trying to convince of his sincerity, he drops the phrase: “I have not been promoted in more than six years.” So maybe this is the motive for revenge?
“Still, there was terrible rot, there was envy of other people, there was, it seems to me, a misunderstanding of why I am only a general, but others are already there, or why I am only a colonel, and others are already here, and there was this envy ", says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
Homecoming"
Six months after recruitment, Polyakov’s stay in the United States ends. American counterintelligence offers to continue his work in the USSR and he agrees. June 9, 1962, a recruited GRU colonel returns to Moscow. But at home he panics, he flinches at every sound, and thinks about confessing everything.
“There were people who, in general, came out of such difficult life situations with honor and dignity, who found the courage to come and say: “Yes, I behaved wrongly, I found myself in such a compromising situation, but, “Nevertheless, here I am, declaring that there was a recruitment approach, that there was an attempt to recruit me,” to the point that people were exempted from criminal liability,” claims Oleg Khlobustov.
However, the FBI seems to be reading his thoughts. If he hopes for forgiveness, he is informed that Agent Macy committed suicide. This is GRU captain Maria Dobrova. Polyakov handed it over just before his departure, as a parting gift. The traitor understands: he has gone too far, and there is no turning back.
“Only after Polyakov was exposed, he said that “I, too, turned her in, and then the FBI and the Americans told me that it means she chose to commit suicide,” maybe in order to make such a sting, and vice versa, tie it directly with blood, the blood of a devoted intelligence officer,” says Oleg Khlobustov.
Polyakov returns to Moscow with spy equipment and a whole suitcase of expensive gifts. Entering the bosses' offices, he generously hands out gold watches, cameras, and pearl jewelry. Realizing that he is beyond suspicion, he again gets in touch with the CIA. As he passes the US Embassy, he sends encoded information using a tiny transmitter.
In addition, Polyakov arranges hiding places in which he leaves microfilms with secret documents copied on them. Gorky Cultural Park - one of the caches, called "Art", was located here. Having sat down supposedly to rest, the spy, with an imperceptible movement, hid a container disguised as a brick behind the bench.
“Here is a park of culture and recreation, a lot of people are relaxing, noisy and cheerful crowds - then they came there to drink beer, relax, ride on a wheel - a respectable man sits, and on the bench he falls off and puts his hand, and the Americans receive a report,” says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
A conventional signal that the container has been taken away should be a strip of lipstick on the notice board near the Arbat restaurant, but there is none. Polyakov is overcome with horror. And only after several days, looking through the New York Times, he sees an advertisement in the private column.
The encrypted message says the following: "Letter from Art received." The spy breathes a sigh of relief. And yet, for what purpose is all this risk, all this effort?
It's all Khrushchev's fault
“The version is that Polyakov was an ardent “Stalinist,” and after the well-known persecution of Stalin began, when Khrushchev, whose hands were not only up to the elbows, but up to the shoulders in blood after the Ukrainian executions, he decided this in a way to wash off the image of Stalin, you know, and this allegedly became such a powerful psychological blow to Polyakov’s political worldview,” says Viktor Baranets.
When Polyakov called the enemy headquarters, Nikita Khrushchev was in power in the USSR. His impulsive actions strain relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Khrushchev intimidates the West with his catchphrase: “We make rockets like sausages on an assembly line.”
“Under Khrushchev, the so-called “nuclear diplomacy” began. This is the development of missile weapons, this is a transition, a refusal, as it were, from surface ships and a transition, reliance on submarines, armed nuclear weapons. And so a certain bluff of Khrushchev began, in the sense that the Soviet Union has a very powerful nuclear potential,” says Natalia Egorova.
Nikita Khrushchev on the podium, 1960. Photo: ITAR-TASS
But few people realize that this is a bluff. Adding fuel to the fire are Nikita Sergeevich’s crazy speeches at the UN in October 1960, during which he allegedly knocked on the table with his shoe, expressing disagreement with one of the speakers.
Doctor of Historical Sciences Natalia Egorova heads the Center for the Study of the Cold War in Russian Academy Sci. Having studied the facts about Khrushchev’s speech, she came to the conclusion that there was no shoe on the table, but there was an international scandal, and not a small one at that.
“In general, there were fists, a watch, but since Gromyko, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was sitting next to him, he did not know how to behave in this situation, he supported Khrushchev, so the knocking was powerful. Plus, Khrushchev shouted all sorts of words of indignation,” - says Natalia Egorova.
According to some reports, during this speech, Polyakov stood behind Khrushchev. At that time he was working at the UN Military Staff Committee. The world is on the brink of a third world war, and all because of the quarrelsome secretary general. Perhaps it was then that the future spy became imbued with contempt for Khrushchev.
But Nikita Sergeevich will be dismissed in just a few years, and the activities of the record-breaking mole will not stop there. What if Polyakov hates not so much Khrushchev, but the entire Soviet ideology.
Genetic aversion
Military journalist Nikolai Poroskov writes about intelligence. He met with many people who personally knew the traitor, and accidentally discovered a little-known fact of his biography, and talks about it for the first time.
“Most likely, there is unconfirmed information that his ancestors were wealthy, his grandfather was there, maybe his father. The revolution disrupted everything, he had a genetic hostility to the existing system. I think that he worked on an ideological basis,” Poroskov believes.
But even if so, this hardly explains the betrayal. Alexander Bondarenko is a writer and historian of special services, winner of the Foreign Intelligence Service Award. He studied in detail the various motives for betrayal and confidently declares that ideology has nothing to do with it.
Peter Ivashutin
“Sorry, he fought against specific individuals. He was quite a prepared, educated person who understands that the system, by and large, is neither cold nor hot. He ratted out specific people,” Bondarenko claims.
Continuing to spy for the CIA, Polyakov tries to get him sent abroad again. It will be easier to work there. However, someone is nullifying all his efforts, and this someone, apparently, is General Ivashutin, who led military intelligence in those years.
“Peter Ivanovich said that he didn’t like Polyakov right away, he said: “He sits, looks at the floor, doesn’t look him in the eye.” Intuitively, he felt that the person was not very good, and he transferred him from the sphere of human strategic intelligence, transferred him first in the selection of civilian personnel. That is, there weren’t very many state secrets there, and therefore Polyakov was cut off from them,” says Nikolai Poroskov.
Polyakov, apparently, guesses everything, and therefore buys the most expensive and impressive gifts for Ivashutin.
“Polyakov once brought Pyotr Ivanovich Ivashutin, from India, two colonial English soldiers carved from rare wood. Beautiful figures,” says Poroskov.
Alas, the bribery attempt fails. The general is not there. But Polyakov instantly figures out how to turn the situation in his favor. He is seeking to be sent abroad again. He knocks out this decision bypassing Ivashutin.
“When Pyotr Ivanovich was somewhere on a long business trip, or on vacation, there was an order to transfer him, again, back. Someone took responsibility, and in the end Polyakov, after the US there was a long break, then he was sent resident in India,” explains Nikolai Poroskov.
Double game
In 1973, Polyakov went to India as a resident. There he again launches active espionage activities, convincing his colleagues that he is taking on the American diplomat James Flint, and is actually transmitting information through him to the CIA. At the same time, not only does no one suspect him, he also receives a promotion.
“And how? He has a safe conduct - 1,419 days at the front. Wounds, military awards - medals, and the Order of the Red Star. Plus, by that time, he had already become a general: in 1974 he was awarded the rank of general,” says Igor Atamanenko .
In order for Polyakov to receive the rank of general, the CIA had to spend a little money. The criminal case involves expensive gifts he made to the head of the personnel service, Izotov.
“This was the head of the personnel department of the entire GRU, named Izotov. Polyakov communicated with him, since promotions and so on depended on him. But the most famous gift that was discovered was the silver service. In Soviet times, this was God knows what. Well, a gun he gave it to him because he himself was fond of hunting, and Izotov seemed to be fond of it,” says Nikolai Poroskov.
The rank of general provides Polyakov with access to materials that are not related to his direct duties. The traitor receives information about three American officers working for the Soviet Union. And one more valuable agent - Frank Bossard, an employee of the British Air Force.
“There was a certain Frank Bossard - this is an Englishman. This is not an American, this is an Englishman who was involved in the implementation, testing of guided missiles. At one time, he handed over, again, not to Polyakov, he handed over to another officer of the main intelligence department, pictures of technological processes: how tests are being carried out - in short, he transferred a set of secret information,” says Igor Atamanenko.
Polyakov retakes the photographs sent by Bossard and forwards them to the CIA. The agent is immediately identified. Bossard receives 20 years in prison. But Polyakov doesn’t stop there. He pulls out a list of military technologies that are being obtained through intelligence efforts in the West.
“In the late 70-80s, a ban was imposed on the sale to Russia, the Soviet Union, of all kinds of military technologies, of any kind. And even some small parts that fell under this technology were blocked by the Americans and were not sold. Polyakov said that there are five thousand directions that help the Soviet Union buy this secret technology from countries through dummies, through third states. And so it was, indeed, and the Americans immediately cut off the oxygen," says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
Death of a son
What is Polyakov trying to achieve? To whom and for what does he take revenge? His career is going well: he has a wonderful family, a beloved wife, and a couple of sons. But few people know that this family experienced great pain.
In the early 50s, Dmitry Fedorovich works undercover in New York. During these years, his first child is born. But soon after birth, the boy finds himself near death. Only an urgent and expensive operation can save him. Polyakov turns to the station management for help. But no money is sent, and the child dies.
“And you understand, here it is clear that under the influence of the waters of these negative emotions, the person himself decided: “You are like this with me, there is no money for the operation, which means there is no one to save. What kind of native organization is this, the main intelligence department, which cannot give me some crumbs, especially knowing the budget of this monster. “Of course, the indignation knew no bounds,” says Igor Atamanenko.
It turns out that, wanting to avenge his son, Polyakov offers his services to the American intelligence services. But the child died in the early 50s, many years before recruitment.
"Polyakov himself did not focus attention on this circumstance, and I think that it did not play a dominant role. Why? Because at the moment when he committed an act of betrayal at the age of 40, he already had two children, and probably he should have think about their future, about their fate, and probably, after all, this was not the dominant motive,” says Oleg Khlobustov.
In addition, he cannot help but understand the GRU's motives for refusal, which were far from ordinary greed. A well-known military observer, retired colonel Viktor Baranets, seriously studied the events of Polyakov’s first trip to the United States and made his own conclusions.
“The situation arose that precisely at the time when Polyakov’s son’s illness reached its peak, Polyakov was in charge of one very important operation. And the need arose either to send him to the Soviet Union with his wife and child, and distract this work, or to allow him to undergo treatment son in the USA,” explains Baranets.
While the child is in serious condition, the Soviet intelligence agency is faced with a dilemma: to operate on the baby in Moscow or in the States. Both threaten to disrupt the intelligence operation in which Polyakov is participating. Most likely, the GRU calculated and prepared safe ways for him to save the child.
“And if you are treated in New York, it means that the father and mother will go to the New York clinic, and this means that contacts there are inevitable, there may be a substitute doctor there. You understand, everything needs to be calculated here, and so far Moscow has put up these subtle chess – time passed,” says Viktor Baranets.
Unfortunately, the child dies. However, Polyakov, apparently, understands very well that this death is a tribute to his dangerous profession. There is another important fact: in the 50s, having learned about the death of a boy, the FBI pursued Polyakov, trying to recruit him. He is under close surveillance. They create unbearable working conditions for him. Even the police issue huge fines for no reason.
“The first business trip was indicative. The Americans tried to make a recruiting approach to him. That’s why - it’s very difficult to say, because recruiting approaches are made only to those who gave the reason for recruitment. This is such an iron rule. That means they watched, that means they looked, that means They probably knew about the incident with their son,” says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
But then, in the 50s, Polyakov resolutely rejected recruitment attempts. He is forced to ask to be sent home, and in 1956 he leaves New York.
“Yes, his child died. Yes, someone didn’t give money for this. This is the official version, that is, all it takes is just one piece of paper to disappear from the boss’s desk or from the safe, and the boss could be very far away. Or a car accident , or anything, but you can come up with anything if you really want to take revenge. But to take revenge completely on those people who did nothing to you is clearly a different reason,” says Alexander Bondarenko.
Around and around
However, there is another equally significant question in this story: who and when first got on the trail of the “mole”? How and with what help was Polyakov managed to expose? There are many versions on this matter. The well-known historian of the special services, Nikolai Dolgopolov, is sure that Leonid Shebarshin was the first to suspect Polyakov; he was the deputy KGB resident in India just when Dmitry Fedorovich was working there.
“Their meeting took place in India, and in 1974, if Shebarshin’s remarks had been paid attention to then, perhaps the arrest would have occurred not in ’87, but much earlier,” says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
President of the Russian National Economic Security Service Leonid Shebarshin. Photo: ITAR-TASS
Shebarshin draws attention to the fact that in India Polyakov does much more than his position requires of him.
“A man of his profession, in fact, should be doing this - meeting with diplomats, and so on - but Colonel Polyakov had a lot of sources. There were a lot of meetings. Often these meetings lasted a very long time, and the external intelligence of the PSU drew attention to this ", explains Dolgopolov.
But this is not the only thing that worries Shebarshin. He notices that Polyakov does not like his colleagues from foreign intelligence, and on occasion tries to expel them from India. One gets the impression that they are somehow bothering him, but in public he is very friendly with them and loudly praises them.
“Another point that Shebarshin found rather strange (I’m not saying suspicious - strange) is that always and everywhere and with everyone, Polyakov, except his subordinates, tried to be a close friend. He literally imposed his relationship, he tried to show "that he is a kind and good person. Shebarshin could see that this was a game," says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
Finally, Shebarshin decides to talk frankly about Polyakov with his leadership. However, his suspicions seem to hit a wall. They don’t even think of arguing with him, but no one is letting things move forward.
“Yes, there were people in the structures of the GRU, they occupied small positions there, majors, lieutenant colonels, who more than once came across certain facts in Polyakov’s work that raised doubts. But again, this damned self-confidence of the leadership of the then Main Intelligence Directorate, it often , I will emphasize this word - often forced the then leadership of the GRU to brush aside these suspicions,” says Viktor Baranets.
Unexpected puncture
So far it is impossible to expose Polyakov. He acts like a high-class professional and does not make mistakes. Instantly destroys evidence. He has ready answers to all questions. And who knows, perhaps he would have gotten away with it if not for the mistakes made by his masters in the CIA. At the end of the 70s, a book by counterintelligence director James Angleton was published in America.
James Angleton
“He suspected every person who worked in his department. He did not believe that there were people like Polyakov who did this out of absolutely some kind of conviction,” says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
Angleton did not even consider it necessary to hide information about Polyakov, because he was sure: agent “Bourbon” - as the agent was called in the CIA - was a setup for Soviet intelligence. Naturally, Angleton’s literary opus is read to the gills at the GRU.
“He set up and, completely, I think, by accident, Polyakov, said that there was such an agent in the Soviet UN mission or there was such an agent, and there was another agent, that is, two agents at once. This, of course, could not but alarm people who such things should be read as a matter of duty,” explains Dolgopolov.
Was Angleton's book the last straw that overflowed the cup of patience, or rather trust? Or maybe the GRU received some more evidence against Polyakov? Be that as it may, in 1980 his prosperity ended. The traitor is urgently summoned from Delhi to Moscow, and here he is allegedly diagnosed with a heart disease, due to which foreign travel is contraindicated.
“It was necessary to somehow get Polyakov out of Delhi. They created a commission. This did not surprise him, because all the time those who work abroad are checked quite regularly. And he was also checked and found out that his health was not good. Polyakov immediately became suspicious something was wrong, and in order to return back to India, he passed another commission, and this alarmed people even more. He wanted to return so badly. And in fact, at that very moment, it was decided to part with him, "says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
Polyakov is unexpectedly transferred to the Pushkin Institute of Russian Literature. His task is to take a closer look at the foreigners who study there. In fact, they simply decided to keep the spy away from state secrets.
“He is worn out, his nerves are strained to the limit. Every sneeze, whisper behind his back is already turning into the rattling of handcuffs. It already seems that they are handcuffs rattling. Well, then, when he was sent to the Institute of the Russian Language, well, everything became clear to him.” , says Igor Atamanenko.
And yet, there is not a single convincing evidence against Polyakov. He continues to work in the GRU as secretary of the party committee. Here the retiree can easily identify illegal intelligence officers who have gone on long business trips. They are absent from party meetings and do not pay dues. Information about such people is immediately sent to the CIA. Polyakov is sure that this time suspicions passed him by. But he is wrong. The State Security Committee is forced to intervene in the matter.
“In the end, it turned out that the documents ended up on the desk of the then head of the KGB, and he set the matter in motion. External surveillance was installed, all the counterintelligence services of all departments worked together. The technicians worked. And the “surveillance” discovered some things. I think that “It seems to me that some hiding places were also discovered in Polyakov’s country house, otherwise they would not have taken him so confidently,” says Nikolai Dolgopolov.
"Spy, get out!"
In June 1986, Polyakov noticed a chipped tile in his kitchen. He understands that the house was searched. After some time, the phone rings in his apartment. Polyakov picks up the phone. The rector of the Military Diplomatic Academy personally invites him to speak to the graduates - future intelligence officers. The traitor breathes a sigh of relief. Yes, they looked for hiding places in his apartment, but they didn’t find anything, otherwise he wouldn’t have been invited to the academy.
"Polyakov immediately began to call back and find out who else had received an invitation. Because, who knows, maybe they are going to tie him up under this pretext. When he called several of his colleagues, among whom were also participants in the Great Patriotic War , and established that yes, they were all invited to the celebration at the Military Diplomatic Academy, he calmed down,” says Igor Atamanenko.
Detention of Dmitry Polyakov
But in the building of the military-diplomatic academy at the checkpoint, a capture group is waiting for him. Polyakov understands that this is the end.
“And they immediately took me to Lefortovo, and immediately put me in front of the investigator. This is what they call in Alpha - they call it “shock therapy”. And when a person is in such shock, he begins to tell the truth,” - says Atamanenko.
So what prompted Polyakov to commit a monstrous betrayal? None of the versions sounded convincing enough. The general did not seek to enrich himself. Khrushchev was, by and large, indifferent to him. And he hardly blamed his colleagues for the death of his son.
“You know, having spent a long time analyzing the origins of betrayal, the root causes of betrayal, these starting psychological platforms that force a person to betray his homeland, I came to the conclusion that there is one side to betrayal that has not yet been studied by either journalists or by the intelligence officers themselves, not by psychologists, not by doctors, and so on,” says Viktor Baranets.
Viktor Baranets carefully studied the investigation materials in the Polyakov case. In addition, based on personal observations, he was able to make an interesting discovery.
“It is the desire to betray, to have two faces, and to enjoy even this. Today you are in the service of such a gallant officer, a patriot. You walk among people, and they do not suspect that you are a traitor. And a person experiences the highest concentration of adrenaline in his consciousness, in general in the body. Betrayal is a whole complex of reasons, one of which serves as a small mental reactor, which turns on this vile complex of human actions that makes a person betray,” Baranets believes.
Perhaps this version explains everything: the thirst for risk, hatred of colleagues, and inflated self-esteem. However, even the most inveterate Judas can turn out to be a faithful and devoted family man. Over the years of his espionage activities, the general was repeatedly offered to flee to America, but Polyakov invariably refused Uncle Sam’s invitation. Why? This is another unsolved mystery.