What is the essence of the Yukos company's business? The main enemy of the Russian government: the story of Mikhail Khodorkovsky

What is the essence of the Yukos company's case?

Editor's response

On Monday, July 28, it became known that the claim of former shareholders of the Yukos company to Russia was partially satisfied by the arbitration court in The Hague: the company's shareholders also received compensation for legal costs of 65 million (instead of the requested 114 billion).

AiF.ru explains the essence of the sensational case of the Yukos company, the largest lawsuit in the entire 60-year history of the European Court of Human Rights, and also the reasons for the bankruptcy of the company.

How and when did the Yukos company appear?

The Yukos company was formed in 1993 on the basis of state enterprises, from which its name came - Yuganskneftegaz and KuibyshevOrgSintez. The main co-owners of YUKOS were Mikhail Khodorkovsky And Platon Lebedev.

In 1995-1996, the state privatized YUKOS, after which the company entered the international market.

In 2000, YUKOS formed an international independent board of directors, which included representatives of the global business community. YUKOS also developed a corporate governance code and began publishing financial statements in accordance with generally accepted principles accounting(GAAP), be audited by an external accounting firm and was open to financial analysis. At that time, Yukos became the largest oil company in Russia.

What happened to Yukos in 2003?

In 2003, Russian authorities accused the company's management of economic crimes. The claims of the tax authorities of the Russian Federation were related to transactions for the sale of oil and petroleum products between YUKOS and 21 organizations registered in regions that provided tax benefits in 2000 (Kalmykia, Mordovia, Closed Administrative Unit Trekhgorny).

As a result, the largest fines and penalties in Russian history were imposed on the company. Their total amount for 2000-2003 amounted to 582 billion rubles, and taking into account claims against subsidiaries - 703 billion rubles or almost 25 billion dollars at the then exchange rate. According to Yukos, tax claims for 2004 significantly exceeded the company's revenue. After these events, Yukos shares fell sharply in price.

A number of company executives were also convicted (including Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Platon Lebedev and Alexey Pichugin), mainly for fraud and tax evasion.

What happened to YUKOS as a result of the tax authorities' claims?

Arbitration courts of all instances recognized the claims of the tax authorities as legitimate, all assets and accounts of YUKOS and its subsidiaries were frozen. Funds were allowed to be withdrawn only to pay taxes and salaries to employees; everything else went to the state to pay off debts.

The company began to gradually reduce staff, and after some time it stopped exporting oil due to a lack of funds for customs payments. As a result, YUKOS began to fall apart.

How did Yukos go bankrupt?

On December 14, 2004, YUKOS filed a claim for voluntary bankruptcy in court in Houston (USA) in order to avoid dismemberment of the company. By a decision of December 16, 2004, this court prohibited companies and banks from taking any action to alienate YUKOS property.

Nevertheless, on December 19, 2004, 76.79% of Yuganskneftegaz shares were sold to the FSSP at auction for $9.3 billion. The winner was the little-known company Baikalfinancegroup LLC.

On March 28, 2006, the Moscow Arbitration Court decided to begin bankruptcy proceedings for the company and appoint a temporary manager, who became Eduard Rebgun.

According to the court decision, on August 1, 2006, bankruptcy proceedings were introduced at YUKOS for a period of one year. After completion of the bankruptcy procedure based on the decision of the Moscow Arbitration Court dated November 12 in the United State Register legal entities On November 21, 2007, an entry was made regarding the liquidation of YUKOS.

Why did the “YUKOS case” end up in the European Court of Human Rights?

On April 23, 2004, the management of the Yukos company filed a complaint against Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), because the company’s management “did not believe in objectivity and fairness Russian government and judicial authorities."

On January 29, 2009, the court accepted the case for consideration, recognizing some of the arguments as justified. On September 20, 2011, the ECHR partially recognized the actions of the Russian tax authorities against the Yukos oil company as a violation of its right to protection of property.

What was the court's decision in the first and second “YUKOS case”?

According to the first Yukos case, the court in 2005 found the main co-owners of the company, Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev, guilty of fraud, tax evasion and other economic crimes, and sentenced each of them to nine years in prison. Subsequently, the Moscow City Court reduced this period to eight years.

During the consideration of the first YUKOS case, the Khamovnichesky Court also satisfied the demand of the Federal Tax Service to recover from the ex-head of YUKOS in favor of the state budget the property damage caused by him in the amount of 17.4 billion rubles, as well as the demand of Federal Tax Service No. 5 to pay income tax 52 million rubles. In addition, penalties in the amount of 12 million rubles were assessed on the unpaid amount of taxes.

While Khodorkovsky was in prison, he paid off his debt to the budget about 40 thousand rubles. The remaining amount, according to current legislation, must be paid, since debts recognized by the courts do not have a statute of limitations.

Why is the “YUKOS case” being reconsidered?

In December 2013 Supreme Court The Russian Federation began hearings on the first and second “YUKOS case” in connection with unaccounted innovations in Russian legislation about a more lenient attitude towards those who violate the law in the field of entrepreneurship.

On July 18, the court unanimously decided to satisfy the claim of Group Menatep Limited and ruled that Russia had violated the Energy Charter and expropriated the assets of Yukos. At the same time, the court agreed that YUKOS tried to evade full payment of taxes through structures in Mordovia.

According to the court decision, Russia can pay compensation until January 15, 2015, after which interest will begin to accrue. The court's decision can be appealed to a Dutch court.

OJSC NK YUKOS is a Russian oil company that existed in 1993-2007. On August 1, 2006, Yukos was declared bankrupt; until November 12, 2007, bankruptcy proceedings were carried out against the company. During 2007, the company's property was sold at auctions to cover debts. On November 21, 2007, the company was liquidated.

Yukos was one of the largest companies Russia in terms of sales volumes. In the period from 1995 to 2005, it was consistently among the 10 largest companies in Russia according to Expert magazine ( best result- 4th place in 2001-2003).

The creation of YUKOS was predetermined by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1403 of November 17, 1992, which “in order to increase the efficiency of the oil complex of the Russian Federation, ensure a reliable supply of oil and petroleum products to consumers” provided for the creation and corporatization of several oil companies (“YUKOS”, “ LUKoil”, “Surgutneftegaz”) and the assets included in them were registered. The Russian government was instructed to prepare constituent documents and appoint management for the company. The abbreviation YUKOS is formed by the abbreviation of the names of the main enterprises that were originally part of the company - Yuganskneftegaz and KuibyshevnefteOrgSintez.

The Yukos oil company was created on April 15, 1993 in accordance with Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 354, signed by Viktor Chernomyrdin.

Originally in authorized capital YUKOS included controlling stakes in the oil producing enterprise Yuganskneftegaz, located in Western Siberia, and oil refineries as part of KuibyshevnefteOrgSintez (Kuibyshev Oil Refinery, Syzran Oil Refinery, Samaraneftekhimproekt) and Novokuibyshev Oil Refinery in Samara region, as well as eight sales enterprises in Central Russia (Samaranefteprodukt, Bryansknefteprodukt, Lipetsknefteprodukt, Orelnefteprodukt, Penzanefteprodukt, Tambovnefteprodukt, Ulyanovsknefteprodukt, Voronezhnefteprodukt).

Sergey Muravlenko was appointed Chairman of the Board of Directors and President of the company.

Subsequently, the following oil production and oil refining assets were included in the company:

JSC Samaraneftegaz became part of YUKOS on September 1, 1995 in accordance with Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 864.
Eastern Oil Company (Tomskneft, Achinsk Oil Refinery) was absorbed in 1999
The Angarsk oil refinery of Sidanco was purchased by Yukos in 1999
In December 1995, as a result of loans-for-shares auctions, the company passed from state control to the control of the Menatep group of Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

At the beginning of 2003, the process of merging Yukos and Sibneft began, which was not completed due to the start of the so-called. "YUKOS affairs".

The main shareholders of the Yukos Oil Company owned it through the holding company Group MENATEP registered offshore (at the beginning of 2006 it owned 61% of the shares of YUKOS). Mikhail Khodorkovsky was usually considered the owner of the Yukos Oil Company.

Yukos itself also had a holding structure. The management company of YUKOS was LLC YUKOS-Moscow, and the subsidiaries of YUKOS were managed by ZAO YUKOS EP and ZAO YUKOS RM.

In February 2005, it was decided to replace management company to the president, who became Stephen Theede (remained in office until July 2006).

Yukos case

In the first half of 2002, a series of articles appeared in the Western European press incriminating Yukos executives of money laundering. The series was triggered by the discovery by French tax authorities of Elena Collong-Popova's Swiss bank accounts, through which hundreds of millions of dollars passed. According to her, she opened these accounts at the request of one of the owners of YUKOS, Alexei Golubovich.

On February 19, 2003, at a meeting of representatives of big business with Russian President V. Putin, M. Khodorkovsky accused the state company Rosneft of corruption, citing as an example the purchase of a small oil company Severnaya Neft for a fabulous sum of $600 million at that time. In response, Putin reminded Khodorkovsky that Yukos had problems with taxes (although he did not specify what they were) and asked how the oil company obtained “super reserves.”

In April 2003, Yukos announced a merger with Sibneft, which at that time was controlled by Roman Abramovich. Negotiations were held on the sale of a blocking stake in the merged company with the American ChevronTexaco and ExxonMobil. According to Leonid Nevzlin (one of the leaders and co-owners of YUKOS), Khodorkovsky was confident that the country's leadership would approve this record deal, but “Putin was convinced that Khodorkovsky was deceiving him.”

In 2003, the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Taxes and Duties (after conducting administrative reform- Federal Tax Service of Russia) opened an investigation into tax evasion by the Yukos Oil Company in 2000-2003.

In 2001, YUKOS had to pay $14.5 in various taxes for each barrel of oil produced, while all oil companies paid an average of only $5.2. In 2000, for each barrel of oil produced by YUKOS taxes were assessed at $10.50, while the other six oil majors paid an average of $6.00. For 2001 and 2002, the company was assessed taxes that amounted to 49.5% of revenue for 2001 and 58.15% for 2002, and the total amount of claims from the tax authorities, including fines, exceeded the company's revenue for these years.

total amount tax claims, taking into account fines and penalties for 2000-2003, amounted to 582 billion rubles, and taking into account claims against subsidiaries - 703 billion rubles. or almost $25 billion at the then exchange rate. According to Yukos, tax claims for 2004 significantly exceeded the company's revenue.

The Federal Bailiff Service of Russia (FSPP) ordered the sale of Yuganskneftegaz to repay the debts of the Yukos Oil Company to the federal budget. The company's management, together with shareholders, considered the possibility of declaring NK Yukos insolvent (bankrupt) in order to avoid dismemberment of the company.

In the same 2003, lawyer Igor Smykov filed a lawsuit in one of the district courts of Moscow to check the legality of the merger of the Yukos and Sibneft companies.

After the fines were imposed, Yukos shares fell sharply in price. In one of his interviews, Vladimir Putin said that the state does not intend to bankrupt YUKOS. As a result, the shares almost quadrupled in price in one day. The decision on the forced sale of Yuganskneftegaz was made two weeks later.

Despite the ban from the Houston Bankruptcy Court, the FSSP sold Yuganskneftegaz at auction in 2004. The winner was the little-known company Baikalfinancegroup LLC, whose shareholders, according to V. Putin, are “ individuals who have been in business for many years.” A few days later, this company was purchased by the state-owned Rosneft OJSC.

Yukos oil production enterprises produced 24.5 million tons of oil in 2005. YUKOS's revenue according to RAS for the nine months of 2005 amounted to 2.03 billion rubles, net loss - 2.92 billion rubles. The state's tax claims against YUKOS at the beginning of 2006 amount to $9.8 billion, and the company owes another $1.2 billion to commercial banks and Group Menatep.

As of mid-July 2006, according to information from the temporary manager of YUKOS, Eduard Rebgun, the company's confirmed debt to the budget, Yuganskneftegaz and Rosneft amounts to 491.575 billion rubles. (about $18 billion).

On March 28, 2006, the Moscow Arbitration Court decided to bankrupt the company and appoint an external manager, who became Eduard Rebgun.

By decision of the court, on August 1, 2006, bankruptcy proceedings were introduced at YUKOS for a period of one year. The size of the claims made by creditors to YUKOS is about $29.5 billion, including tax claims for $11.5 billion, $14 billion - claims of companies affiliated with YUKOS, $700 million - debt to friendly GML Moravel, $485 million - bank claims which were bought by Rosneft, another $2.4 billion in debt to Yuganskneftegaz and $90 million in other commercial claims.

During the monitoring period introduced at YUKOS on March 28, 43 creditors went to court with claims worth about 630 billion rubles, but the court recognized the claims of 30 creditors for 491.6 billion rubles. The largest are the Federal Tax Service (353.8 billion rubles), Rosneft and Yuganskneftegaz (122 billion rubles).

On November 21, 2007, based on the decision of the Moscow Arbitration Court dated November 12, in accordance with which the court completed bankruptcy proceedings in the company, a record of the liquidation of NK Yukos was made in the Unified State Register of Legal Entities.

January 19, 2016 constitutional Court The Russian Federation allowed Russia not to pay the former shareholders of Yukos almost €1.9 billion according to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in 2014. The court came to the conclusion that the ECHR ruling in the Yukos case contradicts the norms of the Russian Constitution.

Short story Yukos affairs

The YUKOS case began with the arrest of the main owners of the company on a number of charges - fraudulent seizure of shares in OJSC Apatit and the Research Institute of Fertilizers and Insectofungicides, failure to comply with court decisions on the return of these shares, tax evasion (in total under seven articles of the Criminal Code).

On July 2, 2003, the head of the MFO MENATEP Platon Lebedev was detained, and on October 25 of the same year, the chairman of the board of YUKOS, Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

In May 2005, the Meshchansky Court sentenced each to nine years in prison; the Moscow City Court reduced the sentences to eight years. In 2009, the convicts were returned to Moscow from the colonies to face charges in the second case - the theft of shares of YUKOS subsidiaries and oil produced by the company in the amount of more than 890 billion rubles, as well as the legalization of part of these funds. In December 2010, the businessmen were found guilty and sentenced to 14 years in prison, taking into account the punishment in the first case; the Moscow City Court reduced the sentences to 13 years. On December 20, 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree pardoning Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who was released the same day and left the country. Platon Lebedev was released in January 2014 after a Supreme Court ruling that reduced his sentence to the time actually served.

How Yukos property was sold off

The sale of YUKOS assets took place in parallel with the consideration in court of the cases of the company's ex-owners. The first asset of the company sold at the auction was OJSC Yuganskneftegaz, 79.79% of whose shares were transferred to Baikal Finance Group LLC, later acquired by Rosneft.

In March 2006, YUKOS's creditor banks began the bankruptcy process, and in November 2007, a decision was made to liquidate the company. Later, as part of the sale of assets, Rosneft was able to absorb Tomskneft, Samaraneftegaz, all refineries owned by Yukos and the main part of gas stations, and also gained access to subsoil areas.

Trial at the Hague Arbitration Court

In February 2005, former shareholders Yukos International, Hulley Enterprises and Veteran Petroleum filed a lawsuit at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, alleging that Russia violated the Energy Charter's provisions protecting investors from discrimination and unfair and biased proceedings. The amount of claims was initially $28.3 billion, but was later increased to $114.2 billion.

On July 18, 2014, the Hague Arbitration ruled that Russia had violated the Energy Charter and Hulley Enterprises could claim compensation in the amount of $39.97 billion, Yukos International - $1.85 billion, Veteran Petroleum - $8.2 billion. The court also decided that Russia should reimburse $65 million in legal costs. According to the court decision published on July 28, Russia was obliged to pay this amount by January 15, 2015. Then, in case of non-payment, additional interest would be charged (3.3–3.5% per annum). This compensation - $50 billion - became a record amount in the history of the court. Russia challenged this decision by filing a petition in January 2015 with the District Court of The Hague.

On April 20, 2016, the District Court of The Hague decided that the Hague arbitration, which in July 2014 decided to recover $50 billion from Russia in favor of former Yukos shareholders, did not have jurisdiction over this case. Thus, the court upheld Russia’s complaint, declaring the decision to recover funds illegal, and decided to pay the costs incurred by the Russian Federation during these proceedings and preliminary estimated at €16.8 thousand. The Kremlin stated that an immediate process of terminating enforcement proceedings will begin in all countries in the case of former Yukos shareholders. The former head of the oil company, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, explained the decision taken in favor of Russia by saying that “the West decided to ease the pressure.”

Russia's position

The official position of the Russian authorities in disputes with ex-YUKOS shareholders was unchanged: the arbitration court in The Hague did not have the authority to consider this dispute, since the Energy Charter was not ratified by Russia.

The shareholders of the bankrupt oil company, according to the Russian Federation, are not foreign investors, but Russian citizens using shell companies to own shares. In addition, the Russian Federation insisted that procedural norms were violated during the consideration of the dispute: the Hague Arbitration went beyond its mandate, since in addition to the arbitrators, Martin Valasek, the secretary and administrative employee of the court, took the most active part in the case and in drawing up the decisions. Russia also criticized the methodology for calculating the amount of compensation, considering the final amount to be overstated by at least $20 billion.

March 25, 2016 investigative committee The Russian Federation reported that as part of the investigation into the underlying Yukos case, violations were established during its privatization, and this, in turn, casts doubt on the legality of the arbitration decision in The Hague.

How Yukos sued Russia

On October 31, 2007, the District Court of Amsterdam, in a lawsuit filed by former directors of the Dutch subsidiary of Yukos Finance, Bruce Misamore and David Godfrey, declared their dismissal by YUKOS bankruptcy trustee Eduard Rebgun unlawful and ruled that the bankruptcy of the Russian company was contrary to the standards of justice accepted in Holland.

On October 19, 2010, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal confirmed that the Yukos Finance shares were sold illegally during the bankruptcy of Yukos, and did not recognize their buyer, Promneftstroy LLC, Stephen Lynch, as the new owner. In addition, in a separate decision in 2009, the Amsterdam court decided to fine bankruptcy trustee Eduard Rebgun €500 thousand for failure to comply with the decision to reinstate the directors of Yukos Finance.

On April 28, 2009, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal on the claim of Yukos Capital S.a.r.l., controlled by ex-YUKOS managers. decided to enforce the decision of the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry to recover about 13 billion rubles from Rosneft. for the debts of Yuganskneftegaz, which it absorbed. The Russian state-owned company tried to challenge this decision, but the Supreme Court of the Netherlands refused to consider the complaint.

On September 17, 2010, the Stockholm Arbitration Court ruled to recover $3.5 million in damages from Russia in favor of the former minority shareholder of YUKOS, RosinvestCo UK Ltd. The British, referring to the Russian-British agreement on the protection of investments, demanded compensation first of $75 million, and then $200 million. On November 9, 2011, Russia challenged the jurisdiction of the Stockholm Arbitration Court in the courts of Sweden. In January 2016, the Swedish Court of Appeal recognized that the Stockholm Arbitration Court did not have the competence to recover compensation from the Russian Federation.

On August 1, 2014, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ordered Russia to pay €1.866 billion in fair compensation to former Yukos shareholders instead of the $38 billion they demanded. Despite the fact that the amount was significantly reduced, this compensation became the largest in the history of the Strasbourg court.

How Russian property was seized abroad

In June 2015, in Belgium, the property of Russian banks registered in Belgium, Russian representative offices, branches of non-governmental organizations, media, as well as the assets of the organization Eurocontrol regulating air traffic over Europe were arrested.

As reported, in total the assets of 47 institutions were under arrest. The Russian Federation responded by summoning Belgian Ambassador Alex van Meeuwen to the Foreign Ministry to present a protest. Mikhail Khodorkovsky then said that he was “glad about the arrests of the property of our bureaucracy in Belgium.” Russia has already appealed this: hearings are expected to take place in October-November 2016.

At the same time, the head of VTB Andrei Kostin reported that the country's law enforcement agencies had seized the accounts Russian companies in the French subsidiary bank. In violation of international treaties, French bailiffs even froze the accounts of diplomatic missions, but soon lifted these restrictions. In France, the accounts of MIA Rossiya Segodnya were also arrested.

In winter, it became known that YUKOS shareholders managed to arrest payments from the French Arianespace, Eutelsat and Air France to their Russian counterparties, an area of 4.7 thousand square meters. m in the center of Paris, where an Orthodox center is being built, 7.5% shares of Euronews (owned by VGTRK), funds from the Federal State Unitary Enterprise Goszagranobstvo, financial guarantees to Rosoboronexport for the disruption of the delivery of the Mistral ships and shares of Eutelsat (more than 3%) owned by the Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Space Communication". According to various information, a total of about 150 arrests were made in France, which the Russian Federation appealed.

Evgenia Chernysheva, Evgeniy Kozichev

Where “in order to increase the efficiency of the oil complex of the Russian Federation, ensure a reliable supply of oil and petroleum products to consumers” provided for the creation and corporatization of several oil companies (YUKOS, LUKoil, Surgutneftegaz) and the assets included in them were specified. The Russian government was tasked with preparing constituent documents and appointing management for the company. The abbreviation YUKOS is formed by the abbreviation of the names of the main enterprises that were originally part of the company - Yuganskneftegaz (Nefteyugansk - oil - gas) and KuibyshevnefteOrgSintez (Kuibyshev (now Samara) - oil - organic synthesis).

The Yukos oil company was created on April 15 in accordance with Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 354, signed by Viktor Chernomyrdin.

Initially, controlling stakes in the oil producing enterprise Yuganskneftegaz, located in Western Siberia, and oil refineries as part of KuibyshevnefteOrgSintez (Kuibyshev Oil Refinery, Syzran Oil Refinery, Samaraneftekhimproekt) and Novokuibyshev Oil Refinery in Samara were included in the authorized capital of YUKOS. region, as well as eight sales enterprises in Central Russia (“Samaranefteproduct”, “Bryansknefteproduct”, “Lipetsknefteproduct”, “Orelnefteproduct”, “Penzanefteproduct”, “Tambovnefteproduct”, “Ulyanovsknefteproduct”, “Voronezhnefteproduct”).

Sergey Muravlenko was appointed Chairman of the Board of Directors and President of the company. In 2001, Mikhail Khodorkovsky named Muravlenko among the real co-owners of the YUKOS company. In 2002, YUKOS named Muravlenko among the beneficiaries of Group MENATEP Ltd, which owns 61% of YUKOS shares.

Gas station "YUKOS"

Further history

Subsequently, the following oil production and oil refining assets were included in the company:

In December 1995, as a result of loans-for-shares auctions, the company passed from state control to the control of the Menatep group of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. At the same time, the government previously placed $120 million in Menatep Bank, which the bank then lent to the state.

On December 23, 1996, the state-owned 33.3% stake in YUKOS was put up for competition at a starting price of $160 million with an investment condition - during 1996-1998, the winner of the competition was obliged to invest $200 million. The winner of the competition was ZAO Mont Blanc, part of the Menatep group. The price offered by Mont Blanc for the stake was $160.1 million, which exceeded the starting price by only $100 thousand.

On February 19, 1997, the meeting of Yukos shareholders voted for a merger with the Rosprom group.

In the early 2000s, YUKOS actively opposed the taxation reform of the oil industry being carried out in Russia at that time, which consisted of the abolition of poorly administered taxes (fees for the use of subsoil, the tax on the reproduction of the mineral resource base and excise taxes on crude oil), and also in the introduction of a tax on the extraction of mineral resources and in the fixation of export duties on oil as a permanent tax institution. .

At the beginning of 2003, the process of merging Yukos and Sibneft began, which was not completed due to the start of the so-called. "YUKOS affairs".

Owners and management

The main shareholders of the Yukos Oil Company owned it through the offshore holding company Group MENATEP Limited, registered in Gibraltar (established in 1997, at the beginning of 2006 it owned 61% of the shares of YUKOS). As of 2001, the beneficiaries of the company “Group MENATEP Limited” were: M. B. Khodorkovsky (controlled 59.5% of its shares), M. B. Brudno (7%), P. L. Lebedev (7%), Dubov V. M. (7%), Nevzlin L. B. (8%), Golubovich A. D. (4.5%), Shakhnovsky V. S. (7%). Mikhail Khodorkovsky was usually considered the owner of the Yukos oil company.

YUKOS itself also had a holding structure:

In December 1998, the Cyprus company Asirota Limited, a minority shareholder of the Yukos-controlled Tomskneft company, made accusations against Yukos of violations of the rights of small shareholders. In particular, it was stated that such a violation was the use of transfer prices for oil at the level of 250 rubles per ton, which was 50 rubles lower than the cost of oil and 2 times lower than its market price. Asirota Limited noted that in January 1998, the selling price of oil at Tomskneft was 430 rubles/ton, which led to “the diversion of profits to preferential tax zones and an increase in accounts payable to YUKOS structures.”

In January 1999, Novaya Gazeta wrote that the holes in the Russian state budget are due to the fact that the giants of the Russian fuel and energy sector, including the Rosprom - YUKOS alliance, are in no way willing to pay taxes to the budget. The newspaper described the leaders of the Rosprom - YUKOS alliance as incredibly influential people and reported that they “invented a scheme that made it possible, without straining, to cover their debts to the state, avoid the due penalties and fines, and, moreover, get budget funds at their disposal.” funds: either in the form of an interest-free unregistered loan, or completely free of charge.” This scam was uncovered by the prosecutor's office of the Volgograd region. To implement the scheme, a fictitious debt of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation was formalized to the administration of some region of the country, and a fictitious debt of the region was formalized to one of the Rosprom-YUKOS enterprises. Such a forgery allowed the regional administration to obtain federal budget funds that were then sent to YUKOS, and YUKOS, in turn, paid the budget for its own debts with budget money. Moreover, YUKOS received real money, and gave offsets to the budget. According to Novaya Gazeta, the total amount of such mutual settlements was carried out in the amount of 1.9 trillion rubles in 1997 prices.

In 1999, per ton of oil produced, Yukos paid 10 times less taxes than the oil company Surgutneftegaz and 5 times less than the oil company LUKOIL. In August 2000, an article in Novaya Gazeta noted that the Ministry of Taxes and Duties of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation “complain to Putin in unison that Sibneft and Yukos pay indecently little to the budget.” According to the newspaper, YUKOS paid 86 rubles in taxes per ton of oil produced (for comparison, the oil company SIDANKO paid 173 rubles, Surgutneftegaz - 141 rubles, Sibneft - 49 rubles). According to the same article, Yukos purchased oil from its subsidiaries at reduced corporate prices (in particular, from Yuganskneftegaz at a price of $2.9 per barrel, with a world price of almost $30), as a result of which Yukos subsidiaries had meager profits. on which they paid meager taxes.

Yukos case

Background to the Yukos Case

In the first half of 2002, a series of articles appeared in the Western European press incriminating Yukos executives of money laundering. The series was triggered by the discovery by French tax authorities of Elena Collong-Popova's Swiss bank accounts, through which hundreds of millions of dollars passed. According to her statements, she opened these accounts at the request of one of the owners of YUKOS, Alexei Golubovich.

In April 2003, Yukos announced a merger with Sibneft, at that time controlled by Roman Abramovich. Negotiations were held on the sale of a blocking stake in the merged company with the American ChevronTexaco and ExxonMobil. According to Leonid Nevzlin (one of the leaders and co-owners of YUKOS), Khodorkovsky was confident that the country's leadership would approve this record deal, but “Putin was convinced that Khodorkovsky was deceiving him.”

Also, one of the reasons for the beginning of the defeat of the company, a number of analysts called Putin’s dissatisfaction with the financing by Khodorkovsky and other Yukos shareholders of Russian parties that were in opposition to the government in force at that time - Yabloko, SPS, Communist Party of the Russian Federation. A number of experts have suggested that one of the factors in the Khodorkovsky case was Khodorkovsky's lobbying for a reduction in the tax burden on oil companies.

In July 2009 former prime minister Russia's Mikhail Kasyanov submitted written testimony to the European Court of Human Rights, according to which during an informal meeting with then Russian President Vladimir Putin, he said that Khodorkovsky "crossed the line" by financing the Communist Party without the Kremlin's permission.

Developments

In 2001, YUKOS had to pay $14.5 in various taxes for each barrel of oil produced, while all oil companies paid an average of only $5.2. In 2000, for each barrel of oil produced by YUKOS taxes were assessed at $10.50, while the other six oil majors paid an average of $6.00. For 2001 and 2002, the company was assessed taxes that amounted to 49.5% of revenue for 2001 and 58.15% for 2002, and the total amount of claims from tax authorities, including fines, exceeded the company's revenue for these years.

The total amount of tax claims, taking into account fines and penalties for 2000-2003, amounted to 582 billion rubles, and taking into account claims against subsidiaries - 703 billion rubles. or almost $25 billion at the then exchange rate. According to Yukos, tax claims for 2004 significantly exceeded the company's revenue.

Yukos oil production enterprises produced 24.5 million tons of oil. YUKOS's revenue according to RAS for the nine months of 2005 amounted to 2.03 billion rubles, net loss - 2.92 billion rubles. The state's tax claims against YUKOS at the beginning of 2006 amount to $9.8 billion, and the company owes another $1.2 billion to commercial banks and Group Menatep.

As of mid-July 2006, according to information from the temporary manager of YUKOS, Eduard Rebgun, the company’s confirmed debt to the budget, Yuganskneftegaz and Rosneft amounts to 491.575 billion rubles. (about $18 billion).

Sale of Yukos assets

From March to August 2007, the sale of Yukos property was carried out as part of bankruptcy proceedings. The largest buyers as of August 16, 2007 were:

Neft-Aktiv LLC - 348.964 billion rubles.
JSC "RN - Development" - 197.840 billion rubles.
EniNeftegaz LLC - 151.536 billion rubles.
Prana LLC - 100.092 billion rubles.
OJSC NK Rosneft - 35.979 billion rubles.
Unitex LLC - 12.464 billion rubles.
Promneftstroy LLC - 7.838 billion rubles.
LLC "Monte Valle" - 3.562 billion rubles.
LLC JVP Invest - 0.333 billion rubles.
VTB Bank Europe plc - RUB 0.231 billion.
CenterInvest Trading LLC - RUB 0.205 billion.

The total amount of money raised is 859.044 billion rubles.

One of the buyers, Promregion Holding CJSC, which won lot No. 9, was unable to pay the stated amount of 4.9 billion rubles. The lot was offered by Neft-Aktiv LLC and Versar LLC that participated in the auction. On June 18, 2007, lot No. 9 was purchased by Neft-Aktiv LLC for the specified amount.

Since Neft-Aktiv LLC and RN-Razvitie OJSC are companies controlled by Rosneft Oil Company OJSC, the total amount paid by Rosneft for YUKOS assets is 582.783 billion rubles (68% of the total amount received by YUKOS Later, Rosneft acquired the bulk of the purchased assets of YUKOS from Prana LLC (announced on July 2, 2007) and from Unitex LLC (announced on June 26, 2007, the purchase was carried out through Neft-Aktiv LLC). According to the calculations of the newspaper’s specialists " Vedomosti ", the assets of Yukos, purchased by Rosneft at auctions organized by the state, went to it at a discount of 43.4% from the market price of this property. At the same time, in 2007, the former assets of Yukos provided 72.6% of production oil and gas condensate and 74.2% of primary hydrocarbon processing of Rosneft.

On November 12, 2007, by decision of the Moscow Arbitration Court, bankruptcy proceedings in the company were completed. The total amount of the bankruptcy estate received into the accounts of YUKOS as of November 1, 2007 amounted to 877,063,556.7 thousand rubles. During the period of bankruptcy proceedings, the register of creditors’ claims included 146 claims from 71 creditors; in total they were paid 873,084,862.8 thousand rubles.

Shareholder claims in international courts

YUKOS shareholders filed a complaint against the actions of the Russian authorities with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg, which was accepted for consideration on January 30, 2009. In their complaint, Yukos shareholders asked that the actions of the Russian authorities be declared illegal, claiming that their property was illegally taken away, citing a violation of the provisions of the Convention for the Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms regarding the right to a fair trial and the protection of property. The applicants demanded compensation for their damages from these actions in the amount of $98 billion. According to former Yukos financial director Bruce Misamore, “this is the largest lawsuit in the entire 60-year history of the European Court of Human Rights, without precedent.”

Hearings on this case opened on March 4, 2010, the hearings were postponed twice for reasons presented by the Russian side. The decision was made public on September 20, 2011, the claim was partially satisfied:

The ECHR found that the Russian state violated the company’s right to protect property. In particular, the amount of tax claims against the company for 2000-2001 was calculated with violations (however, the court considered similar calculations for the tax period for 2001-2003 to be legal and correct). Also, according to the court, a violation of the right to protect property was that the company was not given enough time to pay off the additional tax assessments. The court explained that this was “partly explained by the requirements” of Russian laws.
According to the decision, the authorities allowed a restriction of the rights of Yukos in relation to a fair trial in the framework of the trial regarding tax payments for 2000: Yukos lawyers were not given enough time to familiarize themselves with the case materials in the first instance (to study 43,000 pages from the party there was only 4 days of protection). In the remaining trials in the Yukos case, the ECHR did not find any procedural violations.
The ECHR did not find a discriminatory or political component in the Yukos case. According to the ECHR, the tax optimization schemes used by Yukos have never been legal in Russia. Also, the ECHR found no evidence that such techniques were generally accepted in Russian business.
Sum material compensation was not defined in the decision; it was stated that this issue would be specifically discussed.

The plaintiffs and defendants assessed the ECHR decision differently, and both actually declared their victory. The press service of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation stated that the ECHR rejected most of Yukos' claims against Russia, recognizing only some procedural violations. A Ministry of Justice spokesman said: “The court completely rejected the accusations against the Russian Federation in „ political motivation“and the “repressive nature” of the persecution of the Yukos company, as well as the alleged discrimination against it by the Russian authorities.”. . On the other hand, plaintiffs' lawyer Piers Gardner said that “the court's decision contains three major victories for Yukos: it was recognized that the company could not prepare for the trial; that property rights have been violated; that the fines were imposed illegally.”

Outside commentators also assessed the outcome of the case differently. The former chief lawyer of YUKOS, Dmitry Gololobov, said that in its decision the ECHR actually recognized that YUKOS optimized taxes illegally, and the Russian state, while fighting YUKOS, although it “went too far” in some places, generally acted reasonably and legally goals. . Representatives of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, noting that the entrepreneur was not among the plaintiffs and did not play any role in court case, nevertheless stated that they “welcome the findings of the ECtHR on serious violations of the right to a fair trial and property rights committed by the Government of the Russian Federation in its handling of Yukos.”

This decision of the ECHR came into force on March 8, 2012, when the Grand Chamber of the ECHR did not satisfy the request of the Yukos oil company to transfer its complaint to the court for consideration by the Grand Chamber.

Yukos Capital claims

Repayment of Yuganskneftegaz debts

The former subsidiary of Yukos Oil Company is Luxembourg-based Yukos Capital S.a.r.l., controlled by former managers YUKOS, - in court, sought from Rosneft to return the loan debt. Yukos Capital's complaints relate to old loans from Yuganskneftegaz worth 12.9 billion rubles. (about $440 million at the exchange rate as of March 2010). They were issued back in 2004, and then control over the asset passed to Rosneft. In 2009, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal ruled in favor of Yukos Capital, and now it is trying to enforce it, including in US and UK courts. Russian courts of all levels overturned this decision.

Repayment of Tomskneft debts

Having achieved through an international court the return of a debt of 12.9 billion rubles from Rosneft, Yukos Capital s.a.r.l. (YC) did not stop there. The next lawsuit is related to the Tomskneft company, after the sale of Yukos assets owned by Rosneft and Gazprom Neft.

On August 16, 2010, YC filed a cassation appeal with the Federal Arbitration Court of the West Siberian District against the decision of the Arbitration Court of the Tomsk Region to refuse to recover more than 7 billion rubles from Tomskneft under loan agreements. There is already one decision in this case in favor of the plaintiff - previously YC applied to international arbitration at the International Chamber of Commerce, and he ordered Tomskneft to pay it 7 billion 254.2 million rubles, $275.2 thousand, 52.96 thousand British pounds sterling, as well as interest at a rate of 9% per annum in the amount of 4 billion 350 million rubles, starting from February 12, 2007 until the date of payment of the debt. The Russian court had to enforce the court decision on Russian territory. However, the arbitration court of the Tomsk region, having considered the claim, decided to refuse YC to collect the debt.

Notes

YUKOS was excluded from the register of legal entities (Lenta.ru, 11/22/2007)
Indictment in the case of M. B. Khodorkovsky and P. L. Lebedev, 02/14/2009, volume 1, pp. 1-293
2.2.3. Unreasonable undervaluation of the price of sold state assets, sham competitions, low sales performance // Analysis of the processes of privatization of state property in the Russian Federation for the period 1993-2003 (expert analytical event) / Head working group- Chairman Accounts Chamber Russian Federation S. V. Stepashin. - M.: Olita Publishing House, 2004.
Review of the Russian economy
Dmitry Butrin, Vadim Visloguzov. Permanently temporary export duties. // kommersant.ru. Archived from the original on February 3, 2012. Retrieved September 12, 2011.
Arrested oil tycoon passed shares to banker . // washingtontimes.com. Archived from the original on June 22, 2012. Retrieved June 6, 2012.
RELP. Brief biography of V. A. Rybakov // law.edu.ru (Retrieved November 20, 2010)
V. A. Rybakov “Tax activity is a function of the Russian state” // Bulletin of Omsk University, 1997, Vol. 2. pp. 83-85.
Petukhov, Vladimir // Lentapedia
NewsLine of FIS-Courier
Irina Chernova“How to make the state budget the income of your company. The Yukos experience" // Novaya Gazeta, January 31, 1999;
“YUKOS: based on the annual report” // “Oil and Gas Vertical”, No. 7-8, 2000; Copy of the article on Peeep.us

The Company's net profit for 1999 according to Russian and international standards differs by 4.6 times. According to Russian reports, per ton of oil produced, YUKOS paid 10 times less taxes than Surgutneftegaz and 5 times less than LUKOIL.
Bulat Stolyarov Creativity of oil barons // Novaya Gazeta, August 7, 2000
Assessment of the tax burden on Russian vertically integrated oil companies in 2000-2001. // , November 23, 2002
Biography - Dmitry Tulin - Bloggers - Slon.ru
Slon.ru - Technical work
S. Besson Switzerland - a refuge for exported Yukos funds (“Le Temps”, Switzerland, 03/04/2002) (translation by www.inosmi.ru)
S. Besson How the new Russian oil kings built a secret financial empire in Geneva (“Le Temps”, Switzerland, 06/21/2002) (translation by www.inosmi.ru)
Irina Reznik. Prosecutor's discount // Vedomosti, No. 180 (1954), September 25, 2007
Why Mikhail Khodorkovsky is imprisoned (part 3) // Izvestia
RBC - RosBusinessConsulting
Catherine Belton. Europe - Kasyanov reveals Putin’s pursuit of tycoon // Financial Times, July 20 2009 (Retrieved July 22, 2009)
Anastasia Kornya, Vera Kholmogorova. Pointed to Putin // Vedomosti, No. 134 (2404), July 22, 2009
According to the Yukos scenario, oil companies may be required to pay $6 billion
Problems of taxation of the Russian oil industry
Tax claims against Yukos exceed the company's revenue
YUKOS
Tax legislation of the Russian Federation, tax benefits for large and medium-sized companies
The Federal Tax Service has filed new major claims against Yukos.
Putin: the government must preserve Yukos
Ytro.ru The buyer of Yugansk does not even have an office (December 20, 2004). Archived from the original on August 22, 2011. Retrieved June 14, 2007.
Russian newspaper (December 22, 2004). Retrieved June 14, 2007.
V. Putin said that state-owned companies are not behind Baikalfinance Group
An entry on the liquidation of YUKOS was entered into the Unified State Register of Legal Entities // Vedomosti, November 22, 2007

In 2003, the defining event of the new Russian energy geopolitics under Vladimir Putin took place. It was carried out entirely in the spirit of Washington, which very clearly demonstrated its intention to station troops in Iraq and the Middle East, regardless of the protests in the world or the diplomatic subtleties of the UN.

To understand Russian energy geopolitics, it is necessary to take a brief look at the spectacular October 2003 arrest of Russian billionaire "oligarch" Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the state takeover of his giant oil group Yukos.

Khodorkovsky was arrested at the Novosibirsk airport on October 25, 2003, on charges of tax evasion by the Russian Prosecutor General's Office. Putin's government froze Yukos Oil shares due to tax charges. Then measures were taken against YUKOS next steps, leading to the collapse of stock prices.

What got little mention in Western media narratives, which tended to portray Putin's government's actions as a return to Soviet-era methods, was what actually provoked Putin's decisive actions.

Khodorkovsky was arrested just four weeks before important elections to the Russian Duma (lower house of parliament), in which Khodorkovsky managed to buy majority votes using his enormous wealth. Control of the Duma was Khodorkovsky's first step in his plans to run against Putin in the presidential elections in next year. Victory in the Duma would allow him to change the electoral law in his favor, as well as change the controversial law “Law on Subsoil” being prepared in the Duma. This law would prevent Yukos and other private companies from controlling raw materials underground, or from creating private pipelines independent of Russian state ones.

Khodorkovsky broke the promise made to Putin by the oligarchs that they would be allowed to keep their wealth (effectively stolen from the state in rigged auctions under Yeltsin) if they stayed out Russian politics and return part of the stolen money to the country. As the most powerful oligarch of the time, Khodorkovsky served as the engine of what was increasingly becoming a Washington-backed plot against Putin.

Khodorkovsky was arrested after a little-reported meeting that took place a little earlier (July 14) that year between him and Vice President Cheney.

After the meeting with Cheney, Khodorkovsky began negotiations with ExxonMobil and ChevronTexaco, Condie Rice's former firm, about acquiring a large stake in Yukos, some say between 25 and 40%. This was intended to give Khodorkovsky de facto immunity from the possible influence of the Putin government, by tying Yukos to the US oil giants, and therefore to Washington. It would also give Washington, through the US oil giants, a virtual veto over future Russian oil and gas pipelines and oil deals. A few days before his arrest in October 2003 on tax evasion charges, Khodorkovsky hosted George H. W. Bush, now the Moscow representative of the powerful and mysterious Carlyle Group. They discussed final details purchase of Yukos shares by American oil companies.

Also, shortly before this, YUKOS announced its intention to buy rival Sibneft from Boris Berezovsky, another oligarch of the Yeltsin era. Yukos-Sibneft, with its 19.5 billion barrels of oil and gas, would then own the world's second largest oil and gas reserves, after ExxonMobil. Yukos-Sibneft would be fourth in the world in production, pumping 2.3 million barrels of oil per day. A purchase of Yukos-Sibneft shares by Exxon or Chevron would literally be an energy coup d'etat. Cheney knew it, Bush knew it, Khodorkovsky knew it.

But most importantly, Vladimir Putin knew this and resolutely prevented it.

Khodorkovsky maintained a number of very impressive contacts in the Anglo-American establishment. He created a charity, the Open Russia Foundation, modeled on the Open Society Foundation founded by his close friend George Soros. The elected board of the Open Russia Foundation included Henry Kissinger and Kissinger's friend, Jacob Lord Rothschild, the London heir to a banking family. Arthur Hartman, the former American ambassador to Moscow, also joined the foundation’s board.

After Khodorkovsky's arrest, the Washington Post reported that Russian billionaire while incarcerated, he continued to use the services of Stuart Eizenstat (former Under Secretary of the Treasury, Under Secretary of State, and Under Secretary of Commerce during the Clinton Administration) to lobby Washington for his release. Khodorkovsky was completely tied to the Anglo-American establishment.

Subsequently, Western media and officials, who accused Russia of returning to communist methods and brute force politics, did not notice the fact that Khodorkovsky himself was hardly white and fluffy. Previously, Khodorkovsky unilaterally terminated the contract with British Petroleum. BP was a partner of Yukos and managed to invest $300 million in drilling the very promising Priobskoye oil field in Siberia.

As soon as BP completed drilling, Khodorkovsky kicked BP out using gangster methods that would be illegal in most countries of the developed world. By 2003, production at Priobskoye reached 129 million barrels, equivalent to $8 billion market value. Earlier, in 1998, after the IMF gave billions to Russia to support the ruble, Khodorkovsky’s bank Menatep redirected a “pathetic” $4.8 billion of IMF money to the accounts of selected crony banks, including American ones. Washington's howls of protest about Khodorkovsky's arrest in October 2003 were at least insincere, if not completely hypocritical. From the Kremlin's point of view, Washington has been caught by the hand, thrust into Russia's pocket.

The Putin-Khodorkovsky showdown marked a decisive turn by the Putin government to rebuild Russia and erect strategic barriers to the foreign offensive led by Cheney and his British friend Tony Blair. This reversal occurred in the context of the brazen American takeover of Iraq in 2003 and the Bush administration's unilateral announcement that the United States was abandoning its unbreakable obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty with Russia in order to build a US missile shield. This statement could be perceived in Russia only as an unfriendly act aimed at its security.

By 2003, it did not take a strategic military acumen to realize that Pentagon hawks and their allies in the military industry and Big Oil envisioned the United States as a country unbound by international obligations and unilaterally pursuing its own interests, which in turn , of course, are determined by hawks. Their recommendations were published by one of Washington's many conservative think tanks. In January 2001, the National Institute Public Policy(NIPP) published "the rationale and requirements for the control of US nuclear forces and weapons" just at the beginning of the Bush-Cheney administration. The report, demanding a unilateral American end to the nuclear drawdown, was signed by 27 senior officials from the previous and current administrations. The list included a man who is now Bush's advisor on national security, Stephen Hadley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Stephen Cambone and Admiral James Woolsey, former head CIA and chairman of the Washington NGO Freedom House. Freedom House played a central role in the US-sponsored Orange Revolution in Ukraine and all other color revolutions in the former Soviet Union.

These events were quickly followed by a series of Washington-financed covert destabilizations of governments on Russia's borders that had close relations with Moscow. This series includes the Rose Revolution of November 2003 in Georgia, which led to the resignation of Eduard Shevardnadze in favor of a young, US-educated, pro-NATO president, Mikheil Saakashvili. 37-year-old Saakashvili kindly agreed to support the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which would avoid Moscow's control over the Caspian oil pumped by Azerbaijan. The US has maintained close ties with Georgia since Mikheil Saakashvili came to power. American military trainers are training Georgian troops, and Washington has poured millions of dollars into preparations for Georgia's entry into NATO.

Following the Rose Revolution in Georgia, Woolsey's Freedom House, the National Endowment for Democracy, the Soros Foundation, and other Washington-backed NGOs organized Ukraine's controversial Orange Revolution in November 2004. The goal of the Orange Revolution was to establish a pro-NATO regime under the controversial presidency of Viktor Yushchenko, in a country strategically capable of interrupting the main pipeline flows of Russian oil and gas to Western Europe. Washington-backed "democratic opposition" movements in neighboring Belarus have also begun receiving millions of dollars from the Bush administration's bounty, as have opposition groups in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and more distant former Soviet states that happen to be in the path of potential energy pipelines connecting China to Russia. and former Soviet republics, such as Kazakhstan.

Once again, control of energy and oil and gas pipelines is the root cause of US moves. It should probably not be surprising that some people in the Kremlin, in particular Vladimir Putin, began to wonder whether the renewed Christian, George W. Bush Jr., was speaking to Putin with a “forked tongue,” as the Indians would say.

By the end of 2004, it became clear in Moscow that a new Cold War had long been underway, this time over strategic control of energy and unilateral nuclear superiority. It was also very clear, judging by the nature of Washington's actions since the collapse Soviet Union in 1991, that the Ultimate Goal, the endgame for US policy in Eurasia is neither China, nor Iraq, nor Iran.

Washington's geopolitical "Endgame" was the complete destruction of Russia, a state in Eurasia that would be able to organize an effective combination of alliances based on its vast oil and gas reserves. Of course, this goal could never be declared openly.

After 2003, Putin and the Russian foreign policy, especially energy policy, has returned to the original response to Sir Halford Mackinder's 'Heartland' geopolitics, the policy that underpinned Soviet Cold War strategy since 1946.

Putin began to make a series of defensive moves to restore some degree of reliable balance in the face of Washington's increasingly obvious policies aimed at encircling and weakening Russia. Subsequent US strategic blunders made Russia's job a little easier. Now that the stakes have increased on both sides—NATO and Russia—Putin's Russia has moved from mere defense to a new dynamic offensive to maintain a more active geopolitical position, using its energy as leverage.