To many modern people, uninitiated in religious subtleties, Islam seems to be the most monolithic religion. Indeed, today more than one and a half billion people have united under the green banner of the Prophet. Citizens in 120 countries identify themselves with Islam. Moreover, in 28 countries, this religion is the main religious movement and is considered the state one. Against this background, it cannot be said that the Muslim world is an abode of peace and tranquility. Where the place of religion in society is determined by the person himself, contradictions inevitably arise. First it concerns differences in views on questions of interpretation of the cult. Later, on this fertile soil, shoots of irreconcilable hostility grow between branches of one people and tribe, which over time turns into hatred.
The centuries-old enmity and hatred that Sunnis and Shiites have for each other is a vivid example of how different interpretations of the same dogmas and postulates can create a gulf between co-religionists. Moreover, the roots of this enmity go back to hoary antiquity, at a time when Islam was just gaining its strength.
The religious aspect of contradictions in the Muslim world
The Near and Middle East is historically a region of the planet that became the foundation for the entire Muslim world. It is here that countries and states are located, the foreign and domestic policies of which have at all times influenced Islam. Peoples also lived and continue to live here, whose social life, traditions and customs laid the foundations for the future world religion. However, history has made its own adjustments to the socio-political structure of this region of the planet, creating perhaps the most meaningless precedent for an internal split in the Muslim world.
For 13 centuries, Sunnis and Shiites, the two most pronounced and powerful branches of Islam, have been irreconcilable antagonists in matters of interpretation of Islam and differences in the interpretation of its basic tenets. If we evaluate the format of the religious doctrines on which Sunnism and Shiism are based, then we can find a lot in common. The basic pillars of Islam for the two movements are almost the same. Both interpret testimonies and prayers in the same way. In Iran, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the United Emirates, fasting issues are treated the same way. The Shiites of Iraq and Bahrain go on pilgrimage to Mecca along with the Sunnis of Iran and Syria. This was the case in ancient times, and the same situation can be observed today. However, “the devil is in the details”!
It is in the details of the government of a religious cult that discrepancies and contradictions between the two religious movements are revealed. Moreover, these discrepancies are of a radically opposite nature and cover many positions. It is no secret that any religion has always had its own directions and currents. Much depends on the ethnic factor and national traditions that have developed in a given area or region. Islam did not escape a similar fate, dividing over time into different movements. Muslims have both orthodox and marginal movements, as well as religious teachings that are quite loyal to the secular way of life. The split between the brightest branches of Islam, between Sunnism and Shiism, occurred back in the 7th century. As always, the beginning of religious strife was laid by a banal human desire to change the existing order of formation of the power vertical. Power elites used religion for internal political struggle.
Essence of the question
The beginning of the split takes its roots in the territory of modern Iran - then Persia. After the conquest of Persia by the Arabs, the territory of the country became part of a new huge state - the Arab Caliphate, in which Islam became the state religion. Even then, areas of schism emerged among Muslims. After the death of the last Caliph Ali ibn Abu Talib, whom some considered a relative and associate of the Prophet Muhammad, the question of succession to the throne arose. In some regions of the Caliphate, political groups appeared that believed that the new Caliph should be a person who was a descendant of the Prophet. Such kinship a priori allowed the new ruler to have the best spiritual and human qualities.
In opposition to this trend, groups appeared in the country that advocated that the country should be ruled by an elected person - a person with authority and worthy of the title of Caliph. The bulk of the population of the Caliphate are representatives of the poor, who have little understanding of the political situation. The people liked the idea of appointing a person directly related to the Prophet as head of state. Therefore, after the death of Caliph Ali ibn Abu Talib, his place should have been taken by a person from the same family. The emphasis was placed on the fact that Caliph Ali himself was born in Mecca and became the first of the men to convert to Islam. Those who preached this idea began to be called Shiites, from the word shiya - i.e. first. In their teaching, they relied on the Koran, as the only and indisputable source of righteous thought in Islam.
Note: among the Shiites themselves there are also contradictions about where the birthright of the ruler should be considered. Some prefer to take the account from the Prophet Muhammad himself. Others believe that they are reporting from the companions of the Prophet. The third group, the largest, considers the birthright to be from Caliph Ali ibn Talib.
The Sunnis represented another layer of civil society in the Arab Caliphate, which held completely different views on things. The significant difference between Sunnis and Shiites was that the former rejected the exclusive right of kinship between Caliph Ali and the Prophet. In their arguments, religious leaders from this camp relied on texts taken from the Sunnah, the sacred book for all Muslims. Hence the name of the new religious movement - Sunnism. It should be noted that it was precisely the discrepancies that became the stumbling block, which later became a red line that divided Islam into two irreconcilable camps.
Sunnis revere only the Prophet, Shiites canonize them as saints. Even then, contradictions on religious grounds reached their highest intensity, which quickly escalated into a bloody civil conflict that tore the caliphate apart.
However, times are changing. The Arab Caliphate disappeared, the Ottoman Empire and Persia appeared. The settlement territories of Sunnis and Shiites were either part of some states or became the territory of other countries. Rulers and political systems changed, but religious divisions between Sunnis and Shiites continued to persist, despite changing times and a different political system.
The current state of affairs in the Muslim world
The existing contradictions between the two religious movements are so deeply rooted in the Islamic world that they continue to influence the internal political processes and foreign policy of states in the Middle East.
And this despite the fact that Muslims professing Shiism account for only 10-15% of the total number of believers for whom Allah is the only God. Sunnis, on the contrary, make up the vast majority - 1.550 million people. Such a huge numerical advantage does not give Sunnis the right to have the first say in the Muslim world. Hence the constantly emerging contradictions and conflicts that arise between Islamic states.
The problem is that Shiites, who largely make up the population of Muslim countries such as Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan and Bahrain, are surrounded by a belt of states where the state religion is Sunnism. Historically, the modern borders of the states of this huge region are not a clear ethnic border for the peoples. In the process of world order, enclaves were formed in other countries of the Near and Middle East, in which populations professing Shiism live. Today, Shiites live in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Yemen and Afghanistan. Many Shiites live in the territory of modern Syria, torn apart by civil conflict.
The main difficulty is that all Shiites from Syria or Yemen, from Saudi Arabia or Turkey, consider imams their spiritual guides. If Sunnis consider imams simply spiritual guides, then Shiites revere the imam on a par with the Prophet. In their opinion, the head of the Shiites is a person who is necessarily related to the legendary Caliph Ali. How one can trace the ancestry of an imam these days is a question, but in Shiism there is a special emphasis on this. Shiites believe that the appearance of each subsequent ruler and spiritual head of the community is destined from above. The authority of the imam is unquestionable, and his opinion becomes an immutable truth for Shiites. This accordingly leads to manifestations of dual power in those territories where Shiites live. Nominally, Shiites are subject to the laws of the state in which they live, but in socio-political issues and in matters of faith for Shiites, the opinion of the imam comes first.
On this basis, Muslims lack unity. The entire Muslim world is conventionally divided into spheres of influence, ruled not by heads of state, but by spiritual leaders.
Imams play a huge role among Shiites in governing the state. Now they are in charge not only of religious issues, but also of managing the secular life of the Shiite community. This feature is most clearly manifested in Iran, where the imam, also known as the ayatollah, is not only a spiritual leader, but also sometimes performs the unspoken functions of a state leader. In Iran, for a long time the Shah combined secular and spiritual power. After the Islamic revolution, secular power was established in Iran, headed by the President of the Republic, but the unofficial head of the state remains the Ayatollah, who is also the head of the Shiites. His opinion and speeches are immutable for all Shiites, regardless of where they live, in Iran or Yemen, in Afghanistan or Saudi Arabia.
Sunnis and Shiites - hostility against a political background
To say that the root of the contradictions between the two religious movements of Islam lies purely in the interpretation of issues of faith will be incorrect. The political aspect always dominates the relationship between the two faiths. The Islamic world has never been monolithic and united in its spiritual impulse. There have always been people who, to please their own political ambitions or under external influence, took advantage of the existing differences between Sunnis and Shiites on religious grounds.
History knows many examples of conflicts that arose on religious grounds between Muslims. The Ottoman Empire, in which the majority of the population professed Sunnism, was constantly in confrontation with Persia, where the Shiites represented the overwhelming majority. Modern history clearly demonstrates the role played by the contradictions between Sunnis and Shiites in the relationship between the largest and most influential states in the Middle East - Iran and Saudi Arabia.
The difference between the Sunnis in matters of faith and the correction of the cult from their co-religionists is as follows:
- Sunnis revere the Sunnah in its entirety (Shiites perceive the Sunnah as sacred scripture only in the part where the life of the Prophet is described);
- Sunnis consider the day of Ashura to be a holiday, Shiites, on the contrary, consider this day to be a memorial day;
- Sunnis, unlike Shiites, have a different attitude towards the institution of marriage. In their interpretation, marriage should be one, as the Prophet Muhammad bequeathed. Shiites do not limit the number of marriages;
- Sunnis and Shiites have their own excellent places of pilgrimage. For the first, the holy places are Mecca and Medina. Shiites go on pilgrimage to Najaf and Karbala;
- The number of namaz (time for prayer) differs for both. Sunnis are required to perform at least five prayers a day. Shiites consider performing three prayers sufficient.
Such disagreements are not critical or fundamental, but in most cases they still cannot be accepted by either one or the other. Most of the conflicts engulfing the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region today have religious roots. Shia Iran fully supports the Shia communities in Yemen and Syria. Saudi Arabia, on the contrary, strongly supports Sunni regimes. Religion is becoming a convenient tool in the hands of politicians who seek to strengthen their influence in the Muslim world and beyond.
By skillfully manipulating the religious feelings of Muslims, the current political regimes in the countries of the Near and Middle East remain a stronghold of religious discord. In most cases, modern theologians explain the contradictions that have arisen with the eternal confrontation between the Arabs and Persians. Arabs, who mainly practice Sunni Islam, tend to closely intertwine religious issues with secular laws. Shiites, who are descendants of ancient eastern dynasties, gravitate more toward orthodox Islam. The current complex military-political situation in the Islamic world was created artificially, in favor of the political interests of the ruling regimes.
In recent years, the Middle East has not left the headlines of news agencies around the world. The region is in a fever; the events taking place here largely determine the global geopolitical agenda. In this place, the interests of the largest players on the world stage are intertwined: the USA, Europe, Russia and China.
To better understand the processes taking place today in Iraq and Syria, it is necessary to look into the past. The contradictions that led to bloody chaos in the region are associated with the characteristics of Islam and the history of the Muslim world, which today is experiencing a real passionary explosion. Every day, events in Syria more and more clearly resemble a religious war, uncompromising and merciless. This has happened before in history: the European Reformation led to centuries of bloody conflicts between Catholics and Protestants.
And if immediately after the events of the “Arab Spring” the conflict in Syria resembled an ordinary armed uprising of the people against an authoritarian regime, today the warring parties can be clearly divided along religious lines: President Assad in Syria is supported by Alawites and Shiites, and the majority of his opponents are Sunnis. The units of the Islamic State (ISIS), the main “horror story” of any Westerner, are also made up of Sunnis - and of the most radical kind.
Who are Sunnis and Shiites? What is the difference? And why is it now that the difference between Sunnis and Shiites has led to armed confrontation between these religious groups?
To find answers to these questions, we will have to travel back in time and go back thirteen centuries, to a period when Islam was a young religion in its infancy. However, before that, a little general information that will help you better understand the issue.
Currents of Islam
Islam is one of the world's largest religions, which is in second place (after Christianity) in terms of the number of followers. The total number of its adherents is 1.5 billion people living in 120 countries. In 28 countries, Islam has been declared the state religion.
Naturally, such a massive religious teaching cannot be homogeneous. Islam includes many different movements, some of which are considered marginal even by Muslims themselves. The two largest sects of Islam are Sunnism and Shiism. There are other, less numerous movements of this religion: Sufism, Salafism, Ismailism, Jamaat Tabligh and others.
History and essence of the conflict
The split of Islam into Shiites and Sunnis occurred soon after the emergence of this religion, in the second half of the 7th century. Moreover, its reasons concerned not so much the tenets of faith as pure politics, and to be even more precise, a banal struggle for power led to the split.
After the death of Ali, the last of the four Rightly Guided Caliphs, the struggle for his place began. Opinions about the future heir were divided. Some Muslims believed that only a direct descendant of the Prophet’s family could lead the caliphate, to whom all his spiritual qualities should pass.
Another part of the believers believed that any worthy and authoritative person chosen by the community could become a leader.
Caliph Ali was the cousin and son-in-law of the prophet, so a significant part of the believers believed that the future ruler should be chosen from his family. Moreover, Ali was born in the Kaaba, he was the first man and child to convert to Islam.
Believers who believed that Muslims should be ruled by people from the clan of Ali formed a religious movement of Islam called “Shiism”; accordingly, its followers began to be called Shiites. Translated from Arabic, this word means “adherents, followers (Ali).” Another part of the believers, who considered the exclusivity of this kind of doubtful, formed the Sunni movement. This name appeared because Sunnis confirmed their position with quotations from the Sunnah, the second most important source in Islam after the Koran.
By the way, Shiites consider the Koran, recognized by Sunnis, to be partially falsified. In their opinion, information about the need to appoint Ali as Muhammad's successor was removed from it.
This is the main and fundamental difference between Sunnis and Shiites. It became the cause of the first civil war that occurred in the Arab Caliphate.
However, it should be noted that the further history of relations between the two branches of Islam, although it was not too rosy, Muslims managed to avoid serious conflicts on religious grounds. There have always been more Sunnis, and a similar situation continues today. It was representatives of this branch of Islam that founded such powerful states in the past as the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates, as well as the Ottoman Empire, which in its heyday was a real threat to Europe.
In the Middle Ages, Shiite Persia was constantly at odds with the Sunni Ottoman Empire, which largely prevented the latter from completely conquering Europe. Despite the fact that these conflicts were rather politically motivated, religious differences also played an important role in them.
The contradictions between Sunnis and Shiites reached a new level after the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979), after which a theocratic regime came to power in the country. These events put an end to Iran's normal relations with the West and its neighboring states, where mostly Sunnis were in power. The new Iranian government began to pursue an active foreign policy, which was regarded by the countries of the region as the beginning of Shiite expansion. In 1980, a war began with Iraq, the vast majority of whose leadership was occupied by Sunnis.
Sunnis and Shiites reached a new level of confrontation after a series of revolutions (known as the “Arab Spring”) that swept across the region. The conflict in Syria has clearly divided the warring parties along religious lines: the Syrian Alawite president is protected by the Iranian Islamic Guard Corps and the Shiite Hezbollah from Lebanon, and is opposed by detachments of Sunni militants supported by various states in the region.
How else do Sunnis and Shiites differ?
Sunnis and Shiites have other differences, but they are less fundamental. So, for example, the shahada, which is a verbal expression of the first pillar of Islam (“I testify that there is no God but Allah, and I testify that Muhammad is the Prophet of Allah”), sounds somewhat different among the Shiites: at the end of this phrase they add “... and Ali - friend of Allah."
There are other differences between the Sunni and Shia branches of Islam:
- Sunnis exclusively revere the Prophet Muhammad, while Shiites, in addition, glorify his cousin Ali. Sunnis revere the entire text of the Sunnah (their second name is “people of the Sunnah”), while Shiites only respect the part that concerns the Prophet and his family members. Sunnis believe that strictly following the Sunnah is one of the main duties of a Muslim. In this regard, they can be called dogmatists: the Taliban in Afghanistan strictly regulate even the details of a person’s appearance and behavior.
- If the largest Muslim holidays - Eid al-Adha and Kurban Bayram - are celebrated equally by both branches of Islam, then the tradition of celebrating the day of Ashura among Sunnis and Shiites has a significant difference. For Shiites, this day is a memorial day.
- Sunnis and Shiites have different attitudes towards such a norm of Islam as temporary marriage. The latter consider this a normal phenomenon and do not limit the number of such marriages. Sunnis consider such an institution illegal, since Muhammad himself abolished it.
- There are differences in the places of traditional pilgrimage: Sunnis visit Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia, and Shiites visit Najaf or Karbala in Iraq.
- Sunnis are required to perform five namaz (prayers) a day, while Shiites can limit themselves to three.
However, the main thing in which these two directions of Islam differ is the method of electing power and the attitude towards it. Among Sunnis, an imam is simply a clergyman who presides over a mosque. The Shiites have a completely different attitude to this issue. The head of the Shiites, the imam, is a spiritual leader who governs not only matters of faith, but also politics. He seems to stand above government structures. Moreover, the imam must come from the family of the Prophet Muhammad.
A typical example of this form of governance is today's Iran. The head of Iran's Shiites, the Rahbar, is higher than the president or the head of the national parliament. It completely determines the policy of the state.
Sunnis do not at all believe in the infallibility of people, and Shiites believe that their imams are completely sinless.
Shiites believe in twelve righteous imams (descendants of Ali), the fate of the last of whom (his name was Muhammad al-Mahdi) is unknown. He simply disappeared without a trace at the end of the 9th century. Shiites believe that al-Mahdi will return to the people on the eve of the Last Judgment to restore order in the world.
Sunnis believe that after death a person’s soul can meet with God, while Shiites consider such a meeting impossible both in a person’s earthly life and after it. Communication with God can only be maintained through an imam.
It should also be noted that Shiites practice the principle of taqiyya, which means pious concealment of one's faith.
Number and places of residence of Sunnis and Shiites
How many Sunnis and Shiites are there in the world? The majority of Muslims living on the planet today belong to the Sunni branch of Islam. According to various estimates, they make up from 85 to 90% of the followers of this religion.
Most Shiites live in Iran, Iraq (more than half the population), Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Yemen and Lebanon. In Saudi Arabia, Shiism is practiced by approximately 10% of the population.
Sunnis are in the majority in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Afghanistan and the rest of Central Asia, Indonesia and the North African countries of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. In addition, the majority of Muslims in India and China belong to the Sunni branch of Islam. Russian Muslims are also Sunnis.
As a rule, there are no conflicts between adherents of these movements of Islam when living together in the same territory. Sunnis and Shiites often attend the same mosques, and this also does not cause conflicts.
The current situation in Iraq and Syria is rather an exception caused by political reasons. This conflict is associated with the confrontation between the Persians and Arabs, which has its roots in the dark depths of centuries.
Alawites
In conclusion, I would like to say a few words about the Alawite religious group, to which Russia’s current ally in the Middle East, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, belongs.
Alawites are a movement (sect) of Shiite Islam, with which it is united by the veneration of the Prophet’s cousin, Caliph Ali. Alawism originated in the 9th century in the Middle East. This religious movement absorbed the features of Ismailism and Gnostic Christianity, and the result was an “explosive mixture” of Islam, Christianity and various pre-Muslim beliefs that existed in these territories.
Today, Alawites make up 10-15% of the Syrian population, their total number is 2-2.5 million people.
Despite the fact that Alawism arose on the basis of Shiism, it is very different from it. Alawites celebrate some Christian holidays, such as Easter and Christmas, perform only two prayers a day, do not attend mosques, and may drink alcohol. Alawites revere Jesus Christ (Isa), the Christian apostles, the Gospel is read at their services, they do not recognize Sharia.
And if radical Sunnis from among the fighters of the Islamic State (ISIS) do not have a very good attitude towards Shiites, considering them “wrong” Muslims, then they generally call Alawites dangerous heretics who must be destroyed. The attitude towards Alawites is much worse than towards Christians or Jews; Sunnis believe that Alawites insult Islam by the mere fact of their existence.
Not much is known about the religious traditions of the Alawites, since this group actively uses the practice of taqiya, which allows believers to perform the rituals of other religions while maintaining their faith.
If you have any questions, leave them in the comments below the article. We or our visitors will be happy to answer them
The conflict in Syria does not disappear from news feeds for the fifth year in a row. One might get the impression that they have been fighting there for an eternity without any good reason. There are many reasons for the escalation of the conflict and its duration. Today we will talk about ethno-confessional differences and contradictions - a key catalyst for the civil war in Syria.
Syria can hardly be called a multi-ethnic country - 90% of its population are Arabs, and only the remaining 10% are Kurds and other minorities. However, this does not apply to its religious composition: at least five large communities can be distinguished, and six if we take into account the ethnic factor.
Basic split
Sunnis and Shiites on the map of the Islamic world
The Islamic world is traditionally divided into Sunnis and Shiites. The issue of differences between these two movements is regularly raised on the Internet, and especially actively in connection with the current conflicts in the Middle East, which some experts place in the context of intra-Islamic confrontation.
Initially, the split occurred due to political reasons - the division occurred on the issue of who has the right to inherit the title of caliph: the Shiites believed that it should be inherited among the descendants of one of the so-called. "Righteous Caliphs" - Ali. The Sunnis, in turn, believed that the title of caliph should be transferred with the consent of the Ummah - the Islamic community.
However, over time, the schism intensified in matters of religious practice. In the territories conquered by the Arabs, a fairly significant layer of pre-Islamic heritage was located and functioned, the adherents of which tried to introduce a certain vision of religious issues into Islam. Sectarianism began to develop, especially among the Shiites, who were in a much less advantageous position than the Sunnis - primarily due to their small numbers. Among isolated groups of representatives of Shiism, new teachings arose, which over time diverged so much from the original interpretation that they turned into independent movements of Islam. As a result of the proliferation of individual religious sects, various groups within Shiism arose, many of which are represented by minorities living in Syria: Alawites, Ismaili Shiites, Druze, etc.
Alawites
Settlement of Alawites in Syria
Alawites play perhaps the most important role among Syrian minorities. The country's president, Bashar al-Assad, belongs to this group of the population.
Data on the size of this religious group in Syria vary greatly - from 12% to 18%, which, in general, is not surprising in a multi-religious country, where until recently representatives of many communities coexisted peacefully and the boundaries of self-identification could shift. The traditional principle of “taqiyya” also plays an important role, according to which an Alawite can perform the rituals of other religions while maintaining faith in his soul. This approach was formed during the period of Ottoman rule in Syria, which was accompanied by persecution of representatives of this cult. Provided that it is impossible to establish the exact size of the community, we can outline the boundaries of its settlement - these are the coastal regions of the country, the provinces of Tartus and Latakia, where since the 19th century. ruled by Alawite sheikhs.
The boundaries of the Alawite religious doctrine are blurred. This is a fairly closed group, and within the community itself there are various currents, the ideas of which are not codified in any way. For example, Alawites are divided into those who worship light and those who worship darkness; those who identify Ali (a key figure in Shiism) with the Sun, and those who identify him with the Moon. There are many small nuances in their religious system that are unlikely to become clear to an outsider even with a deeper study of the issue.
It is known that Alawites are united by the idea of the “Eternal Trinity”: Ali, Muhammad and Salman al-Farsi, each of whom embodies certain concepts in the Alawite system. There are also elements in Alawism borrowed from Christianity: they celebrate both Easter and Christmas, read the Gospel at services, honoring not only Isa (Jesus), but also the apostles.
Everything indicates that Alawism is not even a movement within Shiite Islam, but a separate religion - so many aspects of the doctrine diverge from what is traditionally understood as Islam. For this reason, the Alawites were not recognized as part of their movement for a long time, even in the recognized center of Shiism - Iran. There, the Alawites were recognized as Muslims and Shiites only in 1973, and then - more for political reasons, in order to improve relations with the new regime, the leader of which was the Alawite Hafez Assad.
As for relations with other faiths, the radicals, represented by the spiritual authority of the current religious fundamentalists - the Salafis (Wahhabis) Sheikhul-Islam Ibn Taymiyya - clearly outlined their attitude towards the Alawites (Nusayris) back in the 13th century:
“These people who call themselves Nusayris... are worse for their unbelief than Christians and Jews! Moreover, even worse unbelief than many polytheists! Their harm to the community of Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) is worse than the harm of the infidels fighting with Muslims.”
Radicals still maintain a similar attitude towards Alawites. The thesis that this community does not belong to Islam is used throughout the entire conflict in Syria. Islamists explained to Sunni Muslims that the fight against the regime of President Assad is a “jihad” both against Alawite unbelievers and against a ruler who is not a Muslim.
However, religious contradictions did not prevent Sunnis and Alawites from coexisting peacefully within the framework of one state. There was no obvious imbalance in the form of excessively disproportionate representation of Alawites in the circles of the political elite. A kind of parity is also observed in the family of Bashar Assad, who is married to a Sunni Muslim woman, Asma Assad. At the same time, the majority of the government is also Sunni. Nothing prevents Assad from taking part in the celebration of both Eid al-Adha (Eid al-Fitr) together with Sunni Muslims and Easter together with Christians, remaining the leader of a multi-religious country.
Depiction of a key figure in Shiism - Ali
Twelver Shia
As mentioned above, in Shiism, despite the fact that the Shiites themselves are a minority in the Islamic world, there are a huge number of sects and branches. But even among the Shiites there is a majority - these are the Twelver Shiites. They got their name because they recognize twelve imams from the family of Ali ibn Abu Talib as spiritual authorities, believing that the last of the imams disappeared in childhood. They are still waiting for his return under the name of Mahdi. Twelver Shiites make up the majority of Iran's population, also living in Iraq, Azerbaijan, Lebanon and Bahrain. They are also present in Syria - however, in the amount of 750 thousand people - 3% of the population.
The Shiite area is marked in light red.
The main area of residence of Twelver Shiites is in the suburbs of Damascus and along the border with the equally multi-religious Lebanon. There, not far from Damascus, the main Shiite shrines of Syria are located - for example, the Saida Zeinab Mosque, which is believed to have been built on the burial site of Zeinab, the granddaughter of the Prophet Muhammad. This shrine is very revered among Shiites and relatively recently became a place of mass pilgrimage. In addition, the defense of the Saida Zeinab Mosque from Sunni jihadists became the formal reason for the participation of the Shiite Hezbollah and the Iranian IRGC in the Syrian conflict on the side of Bashar al-Assad.
Undoubtedly, the reason for the participation of Iran and its satellite group in the Syrian conflict does not lie in the religious field. We are talking about the struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which, in turn, supports Islamists in Syria, for influence in the region. Syria represents a key point of confrontation, because Iran cannot just abandon the friendly Assad regime, and Saudi Arabia has its own designs on Syria.
The leadership of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia believes that a country with a predominantly Sunni population cannot be ruled by a representative of another faith. Moreover, the dominant denomination in the Gulf monarchies is the so-called. Salafia is what in Russian is usually understood as Wahhabism. Representatives of this branch of Sunni Islam are religious fundamentalists, many of whom do not even consider Twelver Shiites, let alone Alawites, to be Muslims. Salafis call Shiites apostates, who in their view are equated with polytheists, and therefore certainly deserve death. All this is linked to the desire to reduce the sphere of influence of Iran as much as possible, which has recently strengthened its influence in the region - primarily at the expense of Iraq, whose elite, after the transformations carried out during the American occupation, consists predominantly of Shiites (paradoxically, the Americans helped Iran).
The Twelver Shiites themselves, like all other minorities, unconditionally support Bashar al-Assad, because not only their well-being, but also their physical survival depends on the outcome of the current confrontation.
Bloody ritual of self-torture on the Shiite holiday of Ashura
Shia Ismailis
This group of Syrian Shiites differs from the Twelvers in that they recognize not twelve imams, but only seven. Their area of residence in Syria is the districts of the city of Salamiyah, south of Hama. The total number is 200 thousand people, which is only 1% of the country's population.
Druze
During the French Mandate over Syria, the Druze had their own state - marked in blue on the map
The Druze stand apart from other Shiite branches of Islam. This is the same mystical cult as Alawism, with its own practices and nuances. The main feature of the Druze is the principle of blood: only one whose parents were Druze can be considered a Druze. There are no rituals for converting to the Druze religion. They make up approximately 3% of the Syrian population and almost all live compactly in the Jabal al-Druz region in southwestern Syria.
In the relationship between the current regime and the Druze, everything is not so simple, because historically, a fierce struggle has constantly flared up between them and the Alawites, often incited first by the Ottoman intelligence services, and then by the French. As a result, the Druze are maneuvering between supporting Assad and emphasizing neutrality.
Christians
Christian temple in the city of Hama
All possible branches are represented in the Christian community in Syria: there is a community of the Antiochian Orthodox Church (about half of all Christians in Syria), and Catholics (18%), as well as a large number of parishioners of the Armenian Apostolic Church and even the Russian Orthodox Church. The total number of adherents of Christianity in the country is about 1.8 million people (about 12% of the population), which exceeds the combined number of Twelver Shiites and Ismaili Shiites. The main areas of residence are large cities: Damascus, Hasakah, Deir az-Zor, Suwayda, Hama, Homs, Tartus.
Since the beginning of the conflict, Christians have suffered greatly. Their main centers of residence were destroyed by the war, and the province of Deir az-Zor fell under almost complete control of the Islamic State. Islamists in the occupied territories force Christians to pay a special tax - jizya, and in many cases they simply kill them. The majority of Christians support the legitimate government of Syria - there is simply no other way out for the survival of this community in the country.
Sunni Kurds
Kurdish settlement area in Syria
The Kurds have been increasingly making headlines about Syria lately, primarily due to the fight against the Islamic State. The Kurds live in the northeastern regions of the country, where they intend to create autonomy within Syria.
In their self-determination, religious affiliation plays a secondary role; they consider themselves first of all Kurds, and only then Muslims. Moreover, leftist views are widespread among Kurds - for example, a very specific “Kurdish” communism is popular. There were different periods in the relationship between the Kurds, whose main striking force in Syria is the YPG/PKK, and Assad during the war - most often they acted in alliance against particularly dangerous groups in the north of the country, but conflicts also occurred periodically. Now Assad’s army and YPG/PKK are jointly operating against IS in the area of the city of Hasakah in the northeast of the country.
A typical picture among Syrians of a healthy person: a Christian priest and an imam are friends
Sunnis
Sunni Muslims are the largest community in Syria. According to various estimates, they make up about 70% of the country's population. The settlement area is almost all of Syria, except for areas that were historically inhabited by Alawites - for example, the coastal province of Latakia.
As already mentioned, the war in Syria is presented by some experts as a local manifestation of the Sunni-Shiite conflict, but one must understand between which Shiites and which Sunnis the conflict is unfolding.
Assad’s main opponents in this war are for the most part not ordinary Sunni Muslims, of whom, by the way, there are up to 20 million people in Russia, but fundamentalist radicals who dream of introducing Sharia law in Syria. Even those few who claim to be “fighting for democracy” in Syria are actually fighting either for the same Sharia, or, at best, for the dominance of their community. Can fundamentalists speak for all Sunni Muslims, many of whom are obviously unlikely to want to return to the Middle Ages? The reality of the current Middle East is such that it is very easy for radical preachers to explain to young people that the root of all their problems is one “infidel” who rules Syria, and if he is replaced by a “true” ruler, or even establish a Caliphate, then life will improve and the most pressing problems will disappear.
The ideas of Islamists find fertile ground precisely in societies that are experiencing socio-economic problems, which is common in the Middle East. But in some places the authorities are coping with the Islamist threat, and in other cases the radicals are persistently and abundantly helped from abroad, trying to overthrow the legitimate regime. Those Syrian Sunni Muslims who have not been swallowed up by radical Islamist ideas either support Assad or simply leave the country, which has become a breeding ground for international terrorism.
If the current government succeeds in reuniting the torn country, it will have to face the problem of radicalized Sunnis, who will effectively become a powder keg ready to explode at any moment.
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad took office as head of state in June 2000. His father, Hafez al-Assad, did everything in his power to preserve the mechanisms of the power structure he created. However, as experts note, Assad the father clearly did not have enough health and time to give his son the opportunity to surround himself with devoted people.
Today in Syria, the real levers of power are still in the hands of the ruling elite, the majority of which are Alawites. The Assad family belongs to them. But Alawites are a minority - they make up 12% of the country's population. By the way, Assad Jr.’s wife is a Sunni.
What is curious: in Syria, according to the Constitution, the post of president can only belong to a Sunni. Nevertheless, the Alawites almost completely control the government, the top of the army, and occupy key positions in the economic sector. Although the country is officially ruled by the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (Baath), the preponderance of forces within it is in favor of the Alawites.
The position of the Alawites, who are more often called Nusayris (named after the founder of the sect, Muhammad ibn Nusayr, who lived in the second half of the 9th century), has always been unenviable. Sunni and Shiite orthodoxies perceived them as heretics and outsiders. Tensions have always existed between the Nusayris and other communities. It still exists today...
Nusayri teaching is filled with elements of Shiism, Christianity and pre-Muslim astral cults. Alawites deify Jesus and celebrate Christian Christmas and Easter. At the same time, the Nusayris preserved the cult of the sun, stars and moon. Observance of the basic Muslim commandments - prayer, pilgrimage, fasting, circumcision and dietary prohibitions - is not recognized. During the service, Nusayris partake of bread and wine and read the Gospel.
It is easy to imagine how suspicious and distrustful the Alawites are viewed by the orthodox Muslim majority when the imams gather in their domed prayer houses (qubbat) built on the tops of the hills in the dead of night. Sunni and religious leaders accuse Nusayri imams of divination, magic and witchcraft, and their temples are considered the haven of Satan.
Of course, during the three decades of the rule of Assad the father, the facts of open manifestations of hostility and hostility towards the Nusayris sharply declined, or even disappeared altogether. But the internal social cauldron undoubtedly continues to boil. The fire is fueled by the rejection of the privileges granted to the Alawite community by the late Nusayri president. Naturally, hostility towards the Alawites in general is transferred to the new president of Syria.
But belonging to the Nusayri minority is not the only problem preventing Bashar from sleeping peacefully. An equally serious problem for him is his position as an individual in his native community. The fact is that the Nusayris are divided into two far from equal groups. The privileged HASSA (“initiated”) and the bulk - AMMA (“uninitiated”). The first have sacred books and special knowledge, which gives them power over the uninitiated masses. The latter are assigned the role of novices-performers.
The new Syrian leader was never a member of HASSA by birth, membership of which is the longed-for dream of every Nusayri. Therefore, he must not forget how low his origin is. And everyone else (including the Alawite community) does not forget about this either.
Having taken the presidency, Bashar resolutely set about reshuffling personnel in order to strengthen his own positions. According to Western sources, from 2000 to 2004 he changed about 15% of high-ranking officials. Not only civilians, but especially military ones.
It is appropriate to recall here that 90% of the senior command staff of the army and intelligence services traditionally represented the Alawite minority. This situation arose at the stage of formation and strengthening of the Syrian state in the first years of the reign of Hafez al-Assad. It remained that way throughout the following years.
However, long before ascending to the Syrian “throne,” Bashar demonstrated his character. So, in May 1995, he arrested Mohammed Duba. This man was caught illegally importing cars into the country and selling them on the black market. This news would not have aroused any interest if it had not been for the son of one of the most senior Syrian officials - a close associate of President Assad, the head of military intelligence and at the same time, as Western journalists found out, a major drug dealer, General Ali Duba. But in reality, this arrest was intended not so much to strike a blow at the smugglers, but to undermine the source of income of the general and his entourage and thereby deprive him of the economic basis for a possible fight for the presidency. The episode with Mohammed Duba showed that the young “lion” (as the president’s surname is translated from Arabic) is not only gaining political weight, but also deftly getting rid of potential competitors.
In the same year, the “heir to the throne” once again demonstrated his character by dismissing the commander of the Syrian special forces, General Ali Heidar. Only because he “allowed himself to disobey.” To understand the meaning of this act, it is necessary to recall who Heidar is. Like the late President Assad, he joined the Ba'ath while still in school and took part in the party's coup d'état in 1963. Subsequently, having led the special forces, he played one of the main roles in suppressing protests by supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood organization in the city of Hama in 1982. And so Bashar fired him for... “insufficient respect.” For the honored general, who was part of the president’s inner circle, this is a painful blow. For everyone else, this is an instructive lesson.
It is quite noteworthy that the anti-corruption campaign also affected the Assad clan. In November 1996, following an investigation into high-level corruption by Bashar and his men, one of the largest restaurants in Damascus was closed. It belonged to the eldest son of President Rifaat Assad's brother, who, according to Western intelligence services, was one of the largest drug traffickers in the Middle East. Bashar admitted then that he took this step because he was tired of the behavior of his uncle and cousins (Fares and Darid) and decided to put an end to them once and for all. At the same time, the “heir to the throne” managed to oversee investment policy issues. He became friends with young businessmen (“new Syrians”), which included the offspring of many representatives of the highest echelons of power. From time to time he lobbied for their interests, counting on their support in the future.
But let's go back to the beginning of Bashar al-Assad's presidency. On December 10, 2001, he accepted the government's resignation. It was headed by Mustafa Miro, and he was also tasked with forming a new cabinet. The new government consisted mainly not of officers, but of civil servants under the age of 50. This was the first civilian government in Syria in recent times.
During the personnel changes made by the young president in the new government, General A. Hammoud was appointed to the post of Minister of Internal Affairs instead of the dismissed M. Harb (another of the old associates of the late Assad). Prior to this, he (a representative of the Alawite community) headed the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate for several months. Sunni general H. Al-Bakhtiar was appointed in his place.
In January 2002, the Chief of the General Staff, A. Aslan, an Alawite and one of the high-ranking military men close to the late Assad, was dismissed. In the army, Aslan enjoyed a reputation as a leader who significantly strengthened the combat capability of the Syrian armed forces. Appointed to this post after the resignation of Hikmat Shehabi in 1998, he, as analysts noted, could not find a common language with Bashar’s brother-in-law, General Asaf Shaukat, who, after the death of Assad Sr., actually managed all personnel issues in the security forces of Syria.
Aslan's resignation from the post of chief of the general staff was also explained by the fact that for 24 years this post was held by a representative of the Sunni community of Aleppo. When Aslan arrived, the army started talking about further “Alawitization” of the command staff of the Syrian armed forces. Aslan's deputy, 67-year-old Sunni general Hasan Turkmani, was appointed to replace Aslan. In the Syrian army, he was known as one of the faithful and consistent supporters of strengthening military-technical cooperation with Russia. At the same time, the head of counterintelligence of the Air Force/Air Defense (one of the most “closed” Syrian intelligence services and closest to the late Assad), General I. Al-Khoweiji, resigned.
In early March of the same year, Bashar fired “for gross violations of standards of conduct and abuse of authority” about thirty high-ranking intelligence officers. Basically, these were employees of the territorial departments of the political security department of the Syrian Ministry of Internal Affairs, which was also headed by one of the closest associates of the former president, General A. Hassan. In October 2002, he was dismissed. Instead, Bashar appointed the head of the department as the commander of the intelligence of the Syrian troops in Lebanon, Ghazi Kanaan (who committed suicide in February 2005 after the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri).
In September 2003, Bashar dismissed the government headed by Mustafa Miro. The new cabinet was tasked with forming the Chairman of Parliament, Mohamed Naji Atari. Arab analysts noted then that the change of government was associated with a new impetus that the young president wanted to give to the process of liberal reforms. Atari is a representative of a radical faction advocating an accelerated transition of the Syrian economy to a market economy.
On May 11, 2004, the Minister of Defense, corps general of the first degree, Mustafa Tlas, who held this post for 30 years, lost his post. By the way, for the last 20 years he has been engaged not so much in the armed forces as in literary creativity. The already mentioned Turkmani was appointed in his place.
The next candidate for resignation could be Foreign Minister Farouk Sharaa, the head of the Foreign Ministry since 1984. According to the Arab press, the current president believes that the head of the foreign policy department is failing to cope with his responsibilities and cannot defend the country’s position in the international arena.
In July 2004, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Corps General A. Sayyad, resigned. Another Deputy Chief of the General Staff, F. Issa, as well as the Deputy Minister of Defense, Corps General A. Nabbi, retired after him.
On October 4, 2004, Bashar made a major reshuffle in the government, dismissing the ministers of interior, economy, information, justice, industry, labor, health and religious affairs. Ghazi Kanaan was appointed head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Mahdi Dakhlallah, editor-in-chief of the government newspaper Baath, was appointed minister of information.
The situation is more difficult with the Syrian intelligence services. There, permutations (more precisely, their consequences) are weighed and, if possible, predicted. It must be admitted that deciding to make such a reshuffle in Syria is a very risky business. But, obviously, being in power for more than five years, Assad Jr. learned to navigate the Middle Eastern reality.
It is worth recalling that under Hafez al-Assad, broad powers of power were concentrated in the hands of the Sunnis. Tlas served as Minister of Defense, the now disgraced Abdel Halim Khaddam became first vice president, Shehabi became chief of the general staff.
However, the late Assad preferred to rely primarily on his Alawite relatives and friends. The president's siblings (Rifaat, Jamil, Ismail, Muhammad, Ali Suleiman) received responsible positions in the army, state and party bodies.
It is not surprising that the Alawites formed a “shadow club of the elite” (“Supreme Alawite Council”), which made decisions on all fundamental and socio-economic issues. The Alawites took strict control not only of the law enforcement agencies, but also of government agencies, economic institutions, and part of large businesses.
What awaits the current president, given his belonging to the Alawite minority? The question is very relevant, given that in Syria there really is a significant potential for dissatisfaction with the current government, which could burst to the surface when a suitable reason appears.
Analysts do not rule out the possibility of a coup attempt by Sunni Muslims. Representatives of the Sunni majority are dissatisfied with the omnipotence of the Alawite minority. The struggle for power with clan undertones does not subside in the state apparatus and generals, and representatives of the new business elite are also striving for power. Hostile to the current regime are Islamic fundamentalists, whose uprising the late President Assad brutally suppressed in the early 80s.
A conspiracy by Alawite generals in the army, dissatisfied with Bashar, who, in their opinion, does not have a “military bone”, is also quite likely. They (including Sunni generals) are also unhappy that the young president has withdrawn most of the Syrian troops from Lebanon. Until now, this country has been an appetizing feeding trough for them. And Bashar, with one order, eliminated sources of income and well-run business for many influential generals - first of all, smuggling trade.
Not all is well within the Assad family itself. Bashar’s uncle Rifaat, who lives abroad, put forward his claims to power and still lays claim to “the throne.” He, a former curator of the Syrian intelligence services, is well versed in all the nuances of the internal political struggle in Syria and has many supporters in the intelligence services and army.
Therefore, the likelihood of a radical reshuffling of forces within the Syrian establishment in favor of the Sunni majority should not be downplayed. The fate of peaceful coexistence in Syria largely depends on how flexibly Bashar al-Assad will pursue his religious policy...
Is Russia seriously risking turning the Sunni Islamic world against itself in Syria? While the Russian Ministry of Defense documents the bombing of territories that, according to the West, are controlled by opponents of President Bashar al-Assad, extremists in the Middle East are reacting no less expectedly. This week, two terrorist groups, the al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State (IS), declared jihad against Russia. Both adhere to Sunni Islam, while the regime of Bashar al-Assad relies heavily on the Alawite (Shiite) minority in the country.
Russia's intervention in the Syrian civil war has angered influential Sunni players, primarily Turkey and Saudi Arabia, who are insisting on Assad's departure. However, the Kremlin is trying to dispel the impression that Russia has taken a position in the confrontation between Shiites and Sunnis. “This is a false thesis,” Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized in a recent interview.
“It’s not that he’s Shiite”
The Russian leadership was aware that its intervention in Syria would be viewed in the context of tensions between Sunnis and Shiites, but for it this did not matter, said Georgy Mirsky, chief researcher at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
According to Mirsky, the presence of military ties between Syria and Russia, the fact that Assad is an ally of Iran and Moscow’s reluctance to surrender an ally played a role. “Putin backed the wrong horse, and now, under American pressure, like a weakling, like a loser, he’s retreating? Knowing Putin even a little, can you imagine him doing such a thing?” - said Professor Mirsky.
In the Kremlin, he said, they understand that “Sunnis are against them throughout the Arab world, where out of 21 countries, Sunnis make up the overwhelming majority in twenty. But they hope that ultimately the positives will outweigh the negatives." Mirsky formulated what he sees as a typical reaction to the Russian military operation in Syria in the Sunni world: “If you take a person from the street and ask how he feels about ISIS, he will say that they are too cruel and do things that a Muslim should not do. But they are their own, you know, Sunnis, and Russia is now killing them. Why is it better for them than America or Israel? Not much better."
Main risks
The main risks for the Russian Federation in the context of the Sunni-Shiite confrontation are terrorist attacks, but also the risk of an increase in the cost of military operations in Syria, believes Yazid Saig, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut.
“It is not clear to me whether Russia’s military intervention will cause a new wave of volunteers from the Arab East who will want to fight the Assad regime. This phenomenon has been observed for several years and may not be repeated after Moscow enters the conflict. Most likely, there will be a reaction from major political players “on the ground,” Saig suggested.
According to him, the United States may allow the supply of guided anti-aircraft missiles to the Syrian opposition directly or through Saudi Arabia. “It won't necessarily change the balance of power, but it will increase costs. The Russians may be faced with a choice: strengthen their military presence or stop.”
Big players are not dangerous yet
But so far there are no immediate risks, which is quite satisfactory for Moscow, which plans everything only for the short term, Mirsky believes: “The mistake of all commentators is to think that someone there (in the leadership of the Russian Federation - Ed.) is planning for many years to come. Today Putin is a huge success - he is on horseback, read the foreign press, it’s the same everywhere. At the same time, he did not lose a single soldier or plane. This is the main thing for them - not the essence of the matter, but how it looks.”
Currently, Saudi Arabia, according to Yezid Saig, has little leverage over Moscow - Riyadh is constrained by high budget costs, low oil prices and an expensive operation in Yemen.
“Representatives of the Saudi authorities visited Moscow unusually often this summer, offering investments and purchases of Russian weapons, apparently hoping to persuade Moscow to weaken its support for the Assad regime. But either the offer was frivolous, or the Kremlin decided that potential deals with the Saudis were not so interesting as to change its bet on Syria,” says Yazid Saig.
Turkey’s ability to put pressure on Russia is greater, but the degree of interdependence, as Saiga puts it, is high: “You can refuse Russian help for the construction of a nuclear power plant, but this will require long negotiations. There is nothing to immediately replace gas supplies from Russia unless you turn to Iran for help. Turkey has many gas projects, but they have not yet started operating. Potentially, losses for Russia here could be significant, but it will take Ankara years to implement the threats.”
"The only plus"
In general, reducing the Syrian issue to the main conflict in Islam will not help much in the analysis of events, Yezid Saig is sure: “There are many Sunnis and they are under the control of the Assad regime. I don’t think we can reduce everything to Russia’s support for the Shiites.” However, this does not negate the fact that Russian interests in Syria, according to Saig, converge in some aspects with the political course of the Shiite Hezbollah and Iran.
One of these points of contact was the protection of the Alawite minority in Syria, Grigory Mirsky specified. “I don’t believe that our aviation will win this war and that ISIS will be destroyed. But it is absolutely clear to me that Damascus and Latakia have been saved. Shiites must pray for them all their lives (Russian pilots - editor's note). But this is the only plus, everything else is a minus.”