The reign of the Tatars under the Mongol yoke. Who invented the Tatar-Mongol yoke

Chronology

  • 1123 Battle of the Russians and Cumans with the Mongols on the Kalka River
  • 1237 - 1240 Conquest of Rus' by the Mongols
  • 1240 The defeat of the Swedish knights on the Neva River by Prince Alexander Yaroslavovich (Battle of the Neva)
  • 1242 The defeat of the crusaders on Lake Peipsi by Prince Alexander Yaroslavovich Nevsky (Battle of the Ice)
  • 1380 Battle of Kulikovo

The beginning of the Mongol conquests of the Russian principalities

In the 13th century the peoples of Rus' had to endure a difficult struggle with Tatar-Mongol conquerors, who ruled the Russian lands until the 15th century. (last century over soft form). Directly or indirectly, the Mongol invasion contributed to the fall of the political institutions of the Kyiv period and the rise of absolutism.

In the 12th century. There was no centralized state in Mongolia; the unification of the tribes was achieved at the end of the 12th century. Temuchin, the leader of one of the clans. On general meeting(“kurultai”) representatives of all clans in 1206 he was proclaimed great khan with the name Genghis(“limitless power”).

Once the empire was created, it began its expansion. The organization of the Mongol army was based on the decimal principle - 10, 100, 1000, etc. An imperial guard was created that controlled the entire army. Before the advent of firearms Mongol cavalry prevailed in the steppe wars. She was better organized and trained than any army of nomads of the past. The reason for the success was not only the perfection of the military organization of the Mongols, but also the unpreparedness of their rivals.

At the beginning of the 13th century, having conquered part of Siberia, the Mongols began to conquer China in 1215. They managed to capture its entire northern part. From China, the Mongols brought the newest for that time military equipment and specialists. In addition, they received a cadre of competent and experienced officials from among the Chinese. In 1219, Genghis Khan's troops invaded Central Asia. Following Central Asia there was Northern Iran captured, after which Genghis Khan’s troops made a predatory campaign in Transcaucasia. From the south they came to Polovtsian steppes and defeated the Polovtsians.

The Polovtsians' request to help them against a dangerous enemy was accepted by the Russian princes. The battle between the Russian-Polovtsian and Mongol troops took place on May 31, 1223 on the Kalka River in the Azov region. Not all Russian princes who promised to participate in the battle sent their troops. The battle ended in the defeat of the Russian-Polovtsian troops, many princes and warriors died.

In 1227 Genghis Khan died. Ögedei, his third son, was elected Great Khan. In 1235, the Kurultai met in the Mongol capital Kara-korum, where it was decided to begin the conquest of the western lands. This intention posed a terrible threat to Russian lands. At the head of the new campaign was Ogedei’s nephew, Batu (Batu).

In 1236, Batu's troops began a campaign against the Russian lands. Having defeated Volga Bulgaria, they set out to conquer the Ryazan principality. The Ryazan princes, their squads and townspeople had to fight the invaders alone. The city was burned and plundered. After the capture of Ryazan, Mongol troops moved to Kolomna. In the battle near Kolomna, many Russian soldiers died, and the battle itself ended in defeat for them. On February 3, 1238, the Mongols approached Vladimir. Having besieged the city, the invaders sent a detachment to Suzdal, which took it and burned it. The Mongols stopped only in front of Novgorod, turning south due to muddy roads.

In 1240, the Mongol offensive resumed. Chernigov and Kyiv were captured and destroyed. From here the Mongol troops moved to Galicia-Volyn Rus'. Having captured Vladimir-Volynsky, Galich in 1241 Batu invaded Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Moravia, and then in 1242 reached Croatia and Dalmatia. However, Mongol troops entered Western Europe significantly weakened by the powerful resistance they encountered in Rus'. This largely explains the fact that if the Mongols managed to establish their yoke in Rus', Western Europe only experienced an invasion and then on a smaller scale. This is the historical role of the heroic resistance of the Russian people to the Mongol invasion.

The result of Batu's grandiose campaign was the conquest of a vast territory - the southern Russian steppes and forests of Northern Rus', the Lower Danube region (Bulgaria and Moldova). Mongol Empire now included the entire Eurasian continent from the Pacific Ocean to the Balkans.

After Ogedei's death in 1241, the majority supported the candidacy of Ogedei's son Hayuk. Batu became the head of the strongest regional khanate. He founded his capital at Sarai (north of Astrakhan). His power extended to Kazakhstan, Khorezm, Western Siberia, the Volga, North Caucasus, Rus. Gradually West Side this ulus became known as Golden Horde.

The struggle of the Russian people against Western aggression

When the Mongols occupied Russian cities, the Swedes, threatening Novgorod, appeared at the mouth of the Neva. They were defeated in July 1240 by the young prince Alexander, who received the name Nevsky for his victory.

At the same time, the Roman Church made acquisitions in the Baltic Sea countries. Back in the 12th century, German knighthood began to seize lands belonging to the Slavs beyond the Oder and in the Baltic Pomerania. At the same time, an attack was carried out on the lands of the Baltic peoples. The Crusaders' invasion of the Baltic lands and North-Western Rus' was sanctioned by the Pope and German Emperor Frederick II. German, Danish, Norwegian knights and troops from other northern European countries also took part in the crusade. The attack on Russian lands was part of the doctrine of “Drang nach Osten” (pressure to the east).

Baltic states in the 13th century.

Together with his squad, Alexander liberated Pskov, Izborsk and other captured cities with a sudden blow. Having received news that the main forces of the Order were coming towards him, Alexander Nevsky blocked the path of the knights, placing his troops on the ice of Lake Peipsi. The Russian prince showed himself to be an outstanding commander. The chronicler wrote about him: “We win everywhere, but we won’t win at all.” Alexander placed his troops under the cover of a steep bank on the ice of the lake, eliminating the possibility of enemy reconnaissance of his forces and depriving the enemy of freedom of maneuver. Considering the formation of the knights in a “pig” (in the form of a trapezoid with a sharp wedge in front, which was made up of heavily armed cavalry), Alexander Nevsky arranged his regiments in the form of a triangle, with the tip resting on the shore. Before the battle, some of the Russian soldiers were equipped with special hooks to pull knights off their horses.

On April 5, 1242, a battle took place on the ice of Lake Peipsi, which became known as the Battle of the Ice. The knight's wedge pierced the center of the Russian position and buried itself in the shore. The flank attacks of the Russian regiments decided the outcome of the battle: like pincers, they crushed the knightly “pig”. The knights, unable to withstand the blow, fled in panic. The Russians pursued the enemy, “flogged, rushing after him as if through the air,” the chronicler wrote. According to the Novgorod Chronicle, in the battle “400 Germans and 50 were captured”

Persistently resisting Western enemies, Alexander was extremely patient with regard to the eastern onslaught. Recognition of the Khan's sovereignty freed up his hands to repel the Teutonic Crusade.

Tatar-Mongol yoke

Persistently resisting Western enemies, Alexander was extremely patient with regard to the eastern onslaught. The Mongols did not interfere in the religious affairs of their subjects, while the Germans tried to impose their faith on the conquered peoples. They pursued an aggressive policy under the slogan “Whoever does not want to be baptized must die!” Recognition of the Khan's sovereignty freed up forces to repel the Teutonic Crusade. But it turned out that the “Mongol flood” is not easy to get rid of. RThe Russian lands, devastated by the Mongols, were forced to recognize vassal dependence on the Golden Horde.

During the first period of Mongol rule, the collection of taxes and the mobilization of Russians into the Mongol troops was carried out on the orders of the Great Khan. Both money and recruits were sent to the capital. Under Gauk, Russian princes went to Mongolia to receive a label to reign. Later, a trip to Sarai was enough.

The continuous struggle waged by the Russian people against the invaders forced the Mongol-Tatars to abandon the creation of their own administrative authorities in Rus'. Rus' retained its statehood. This was facilitated by the presence in Rus' of its own administration and church organization.

To control the Russian lands, the institution of Baskaq governors was created - leaders of military detachments of the Mongol-Tatars who monitored the activities of the Russian princes. Denunciation of the Baskaks to the Horde inevitably ended either with the prince being summoned to Sarai (often he was deprived of his label, or even his life), or with a punitive campaign in the rebellious land. Suffice it to say that only in the last quarter of the 13th century. 14 similar campaigns were organized in Russian lands.

In 1257, the Mongol-Tatars undertook a population census - “recording the number.” Besermen (Muslim merchants) were sent to the cities, who were in charge of collecting tribute. The size of the tribute (“output”) was very large, only the “tsar’s tribute”, i.e. the tribute in favor of the khan, which was first collected in kind and then in money, amounted to 1,300 kg of silver per year. The constant tribute was supplemented by “requests” - one-time exactions in favor of the khan. In addition, deductions from trade duties, taxes for “feeding” the khan’s officials, etc. went to the khan’s treasury. In total there were 14 types of tribute in favor of the Tatars.

The Horde yoke slowed down the economic development of Rus' for a long time, destroyed its agriculture, and undermined its culture. The Mongol invasion led to a decline in the role of cities in the political and economic life of Rus', suspended urban construction, fine and applied arts fell into decline. A serious consequence of the yoke was the deepening disunity of Rus' and the isolation of its individual parts. The weakened country was unable to defend a number of Western and southern regions, captured later by Lithuanian and Polish feudal lords. A blow was dealt to Rus''s trade relations with the West: trade relations with foreign countries preserved only in Novgorod, Pskov, Polotsk, Vitebsk and Smolensk.

The turning point came in 1380, when Mamai’s army of thousands was defeated on the Kulikovo Field.

Battle of Kulikovo 1380

Rus' began to strengthen, its dependence on the Horde weakened more and more. The final liberation occurred in 1480 under Emperor Ivan III. By this time the period had ended, the gathering of Russian lands around Moscow and.

MONGOL YOKE(Mongol-Tatar, Tatar-Mongol, Horde) - the traditional name for the system of exploitation of Russian lands by nomadic conquerors who came from the East from 1237 to 1480.

According to Russian chronicles, these nomads were called “Tatarov” in Rus' after the name of the most active and active tribe of Otuz-Tatars. It became known since the conquest of Beijing in 1217, and the Chinese began to call all the occupying tribes that came from the Mongolian steppes by this name. Under the name “Tatars,” the invaders entered Russian chronicles as a general concept for all eastern nomads who devastated Russian lands.

The yoke began during the years of conquest of Russian territories (the battle of Kalka in 1223, the conquest of northeastern Rus' in 1237–1238, the invasion of southern Russia in 1240 and southwestern Rus' in 1242). It was accompanied by the destruction of 49 Russian cities out of 74, which was a heavy blow to the foundations of urban Russian culture - handicraft production. The yoke led to the liquidation of numerous monuments of material and spiritual culture, the destruction of stone buildings, and the burning of monastery and church libraries.

The date of the formal establishment of the yoke is considered to be 1243, when the father of Alexander Nevsky was the last son of Vsevolod the Big Nest, Prince. Yaroslav Vsevolodovich accepted from the conquerors a label (certifying document) for the great reign in the Vladimir land, in which he was called “senior to all other princes in the Russian land.” At the same time, the Russian principalities, defeated by Mongol-Tatar troops several years earlier, were not considered directly included in the empire of the conquerors, which in the 1260s received the name Golden Horde. They remained politically autonomous and retained a local princely administration, the activities of which were controlled by permanent or regularly visiting representatives of the Horde (Baskaks). Russian princes were considered tributaries of the Horde khans, but if they received labels from the khans, they remained officially recognized rulers of their lands. Both systems - tributary (collection of tribute by the Horde - “exit” or, later, “yasak”) and issuance of labels - consolidated the political fragmentation of Russian lands, increased rivalry between the princes, contributed to the weakening of ties between the northeastern and northwestern principalities and lands from the south and southwestern Russia, which became part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Poland.

The Horde did not maintain a permanent army on the Russian territory they conquered. The yoke was supported by the dispatch of punitive detachments and troops, as well as repressions against disobedient rulers who resisted the implementation of administrative measures conceived at the khan's headquarters. Thus, in Rus' in the 1250s, particular dissatisfaction was caused by the conduct of a general census of the population of Russian lands by the Baskaks, the “numbered”, and later by the establishment of underwater and military conscription. One of the ways to influence the Russian princes was the system of taking hostages, leaving one of the princes’ relatives at the khan’s headquarters, in the city of Sarai on the Volga. At the same time, the relatives of obedient rulers were encouraged and released, while the obstinate ones were killed.

The Horde encouraged the loyalty of those princes who compromised with the conquerors. Thus, for Alexander Nevsky’s willingness to pay a “exit” (tribute) to the Tatars, he not only received the support of the Tatar cavalry in the battle with the German knights on Lake Peipus in 1242, but also ensured that his father, Yaroslav, received the first label for the great reign. In 1259, during a rebellion against the “numerals” in Novgorod, Alexander Nevsky ensured that the census was carried out and even provided guards (“watchmen”) for the Baskaks so that they would not be torn to pieces by the rebellious townspeople. For the support provided to him, Khan Berke refused the forced Islamization of the conquered Russian territories. Moreover, the Russian Church was exempt from paying tribute (“exit”).

When the first, most difficult time of the introduction of the khan's power into Russian life had passed, and the top of Russian society (princes, boyars, merchants, church) found a common language with the new government, the entire burden of paying tribute to the united forces of the conquerors and old masters fell on the people. The waves of popular uprisings described by the chronicler constantly arose for almost half a century, starting from 1257–1259, the first attempt at an all-Russian census. Its implementation was entrusted to Kitata, a relative of the Great Khan. Uprisings against the Baskaks repeatedly occurred everywhere: in the 1260s in Rostov, in 1275 in the southern Russian lands, in the 1280s in Yaroslavl, Suzdal, Vladimir, Murom, in 1293 and again, in 1327, in Tver. Elimination of the Baska system after the participation of the troops of the Moscow prince. Ivan Danilovich Kalita in the suppression of the Tver uprising of 1327 (from that time on, the collection of tribute from the population was entrusted, in order to avoid new conflicts, to the Russian princes and their subordinate tax farmers) did not stop paying tribute as such. Temporary relief from them was obtained only after the Battle of Kulikovo in 1380, but already in 1382 the payment of tribute was restored.

The first prince who received the great reign without the ill-fated “label”, on the rights of his “fatherland”, was the son of the winner of the Horde in the Battle of Kulikovo. Vasily I Dmitrievich. Under him, the “exit” to the Horde began to be paid irregularly, and Khan Edigei’s attempt to restore the previous order of things by capturing Moscow (1408) failed. Although during the feudal war of the mid-15th century. The Horde made a series of new devastating invasions of Rus' (1439, 1445, 1448, 1450, 1451, 1455, 1459), but they were no longer able to restore their dominion over. The political unification of the Russian lands around Moscow under Ivan III Vasilyevich created the conditions for the complete elimination of the yoke; in 1476 he refused to pay tribute at all. In 1480, after the unsuccessful campaign of the Khan of the Great Horde Akhmat (“Standing on the Ugra” 1480), the yoke was finally overthrown.

Modern researchers differ significantly in their assessments of the Horde's more than 240-year rule over Russian lands. The very designation of this period as “yoke” in relation to Russian and Slavic history in general was introduced by the Polish chronicler Dlugosz in 1479 and since then has been firmly entrenched in Western European historiography. In Russian science, this term was first used by N.M. Karamzin (1766–1826), who believed that it was the yoke that held back the development of Rus' in comparison with Western Europe: “The shadow of the barbarians, darkening the horizon of Russia, hid Europe from us at the very time when beneficial information and skills multiplied more and more in her.” The same opinion about the yoke as a restraining factor in the development and formation of all-Russian statehood, the strengthening of eastern despotic tendencies in it, was also shared by S.M. Soloviev and V.O. Klyuchevsky, who noted that the consequences of the yoke were the ruin of the country, a long lag behind Western Europe, irreversible changes in cultural and socio-psychological processes. This approach to assessing the Horde yoke also dominated in Soviet historiography (A.N. Nasonov, V.V. Kargalov).

Scattered and rare attempts to revise the established point of view met with resistance. The works of historians working in the West were critically received (primarily G.V. Vernadsky, who saw in the relationship between the Russian lands and the Horde a complex symbiosis, from which each people gained something). The concept of the famous Russian Turkologist L.N. Gumilyov, who tried to destroy the myth that nomadic peoples brought nothing but suffering to Rus' and were only robbers and destroyers of material and spiritual values, was also suppressed. He believed that the tribes of nomads from the East who invaded Rus' were able to establish a special administrative order that ensured the political autonomy of the Russian principalities, saved their religious identity (Orthodoxy), and thereby laid the foundations for religious tolerance and the Eurasian essence of Russia. Gumilyov argued that the result of the conquests of Rus' at the beginning of the 13th century. it was not a yoke, but a kind of alliance with the Horde, recognition by the Russian princes of the supreme power of the khan. At the same time, the rulers of neighboring principalities (Minsk, Polotsk, Kyiv, Galich, Volyn) who did not want to recognize this power found themselves conquered by the Lithuanians or Poles, became part of their states and were subjected to centuries-long Catholicization. It was Gumilyov who first pointed out that the ancient Russian name for nomads from the East (among whom the Mongols predominated) - “Tatarov” - cannot offend the national feelings of modern Volga (Kazan) Tatars living on the territory of Tatarstan. Their ethnic group, he believed, did not bear historical responsibility for the actions of nomadic tribes from the steppes of Southeast Asia, since the ancestors of the Kazan Tatars were the Kama Bulgars, Kipchaks and partly the ancient Slavs. Gumilev connected the history of the emergence of the “myth of the yoke” with the activities of the creators of the Norman theory - German historians who served in the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences in the 18th century and distorted the real facts.

In post-Soviet historiography, the question of the existence of the yoke still remains controversial. A consequence of the growing number of supporters of Gumilyov’s concept was the appeal to the President of the Russian Federation in 2000 to cancel the celebration of the anniversary of the Battle of Kulikovo, since, according to the authors of the appeals, “there was no yoke in Rus'.” According to these researchers, supported by the authorities of Tatarstan and Kazakhstan, in the Battle of Kulikovo, united Russian-Tatar troops fought with the usurper of power in the Horde, Temnik Mamai, who proclaimed himself khan and gathered under his banner the mercenary Genoese, Alans (Ossetians), Kasogs (Circassians) and Polovtsians

Despite the debatability of all these statements, the fact of significant mutual influence of the cultures of peoples who have lived in close political, social and demographic contacts for almost three centuries is undeniable.

Lev Pushkarev, Natalya Pushkareva

So was there a Tatar-Mongol yoke in Rus'?

A passing Tatar. Hell will truly consume these.

(Pass.)

From Ivan Maslov’s parody theatrical play “Elder Paphnutius”, 1867.

The traditional version of the Tatar-Mongol invasion of Rus', “Tatar- Mongol yoke”, and liberation from it is known to the reader from school. As presented by most historians, the events looked something like this. At the beginning of the 13th century in the steppes Far East The energetic and brave tribal leader Genghis Khan gathered a huge army of nomads, welded together by iron discipline, and rushed to conquer the world - “to the last sea.” Having conquered their closest neighbors, and then China, the mighty Tatar-Mongol horde rolled west. Having traveled about 5 thousand kilometers, the Mongols defeated Khorezm, then Georgia, and in 1223 they reached the southern outskirts of Rus', where they defeated the army of Russian princes in the battle on the Kalka River. In the winter of 1237, the Tatar-Mongols invaded Rus' with all their countless troops, burned and destroyed many Russian cities, and in 1241 they tried to conquer Western Europe, invading Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, reached the shores of the Adriatic Sea, but turned back because that they were afraid to leave Rus' in their rear, devastated, but still dangerous for them. The Tatar-Mongol yoke began.

The great poet A.S. Pushkin left heartfelt lines: “Russia was destined for a high destiny... its vast plains absorbed the power of the Mongols and stopped their invasion at the very edge of Europe; The barbarians did not dare to leave enslaved Russia in their rear and returned to the steppes of their East. The resulting enlightenment was saved by a torn and dying Russia...”

The huge Mongol power, stretching from China to the Volga, hung like an ominous shadow over Russia. The Mongol khans gave the Russian princes labels to reign, attacked Rus' many times to plunder and plunder, and repeatedly killed Russian princes in their Golden Horde.

Having strengthened over time, Rus' began to resist. In 1380, the Grand Duke of Moscow Dmitry Donskoy defeated the Horde Khan Mamai, and a century later in the so-called “stand on the Ugra” the troops of the Grand Duke Ivan III and the Horde Khan Akhmat met. The opponents camped for a long time on opposite sides of the Ugra River, after which Khan Akhmat, finally realizing that the Russians had become strong and he had little chance of winning the battle, gave the order to retreat and led his horde to the Volga. These events are considered the “end of the Tatar-Mongol yoke.”

But in recent decades this classic version has been called into question. Geographer, ethnographer and historian Lev Gumilev convincingly showed that relations between Russia and the Mongols were much more complex than the usual confrontation between cruel conquerors and their unfortunate victims. Deep knowledge in the field of history and ethnography allowed the scientist to conclude that there was a certain “complementarity” between the Mongols and Russians, that is, compatibility, the ability for symbiosis and mutual support at the cultural and ethnic level. The writer and publicist Alexander Bushkov went even further, “twisting” Gumilyov’s theory to its logical conclusion and expressing a completely original version: what is commonly called the Tatar-Mongol invasion was in fact a struggle of the descendants of Prince Vsevolod the Big Nest (son of Yaroslav and grandson of Alexander Nevsky ) with their rival princes for sole power over Russia. Khans Mamai and Akhmat were not alien raiders, but noble nobles who, according to the dynastic ties of the Russian-Tatar families, had legally valid rights to the great reign. Thus, the Battle of Kulikovo and the “stand on the Ugra” are not episodes of the struggle against foreign aggressors, but pages of the civil war in Rus'. Moreover, this author promulgated a completely “revolutionary” idea: under the names “Genghis Khan” and “Batu” the Russian princes Yaroslav and Alexander Nevsky appear in history, and Dmitry Donskoy is Khan Mamai himself (!).

Of course, the publicist’s conclusions are full of irony and border on postmodern “banter,” but it should be noted that many facts of the history of the Tatar-Mongol invasion and “yoke” really look too mysterious and need closer attention and unbiased research. Let's try to look at some of these mysteries.

Let's start with a general note. Western Europe in the 13th century presented a disappointing picture. The Christian world was experiencing a certain depression. The activity of Europeans shifted to the borders of their range. German feudal lords began to seize the border Slavic lands and turn their population into powerless serfs. The Western Slavs who lived along the Elbe resisted German pressure with all their might, but the forces were unequal.

Who were the Mongols who approached the borders of the Christian world from the east? How did the powerful Mongol state appear? Let's take an excursion into its history.

At the beginning of the 13th century, in 1202–1203, the Mongols defeated first the Merkits and then the Keraits. The fact is that the Keraits were divided into supporters of Genghis Khan and his opponents. The opponents of Genghis Khan were led by the son of Van Khan, the legal heir to the throne - Nilha. He had reasons to hate Genghis Khan: even at the time when Van Khan was an ally of Genghis, he (the leader of the Keraits), seeing the undeniable talents of the latter, wanted to transfer the Kerait throne to him, bypassing his own son. Thus, the clash between some of the Keraits and the Mongols occurred during Wang Khan’s lifetime. And although the Keraits had a numerical superiority, the Mongols defeated them, as they showed exceptional mobility and took the enemy by surprise.

In the clash with the Keraits, the character of Genghis Khan was fully revealed. When Wang Khan and his son Nilha fled from the battlefield, one of their noyons (military leaders) with a small detachment detained the Mongols, saving their leaders from captivity. This noyon was seized, brought before the eyes of Genghis, and he asked: “Why, noyon, seeing the position of your troops, did not you leave? You had both time and opportunity.” He replied: “I served my khan and gave him the opportunity to escape, and my head is for you, O conqueror.” Genghis Khan said: “Everyone must imitate this man.

Look how brave, faithful, valiant he is. I can’t kill you, noyon, I’m offering you a place in my army.” Noyon became a thousand-man and, of course, served Genghis Khan faithfully, because the Kerait horde disintegrated. Van Khan himself died while trying to escape to the Naiman. Their guards at the border, seeing Kerait, killed him, and presented the old man’s severed head to their khan.

In 1204, there was a clash between the Mongols of Genghis Khan and the powerful Naiman Khanate. And again the Mongols won. The vanquished were included in the horde of Genghis. In the eastern steppe there were no longer any tribes capable of actively resisting the new order, and in 1206, at the great kurultai, Chinggis was again elected khan, but of all Mongolia. This is how the pan-Mongolian state was born. The only tribe hostile to him remained the ancient enemies of the Borjigins - the Merkits, but by 1208 they were forced out into the valley of the Irgiz River.

The growing power of Genghis Khan allowed his horde to assimilate different tribes and peoples quite easily. Because, in accordance with Mongolian stereotypes of behavior, the khan could and should have demanded obedience, obedience to orders, and fulfillment of duties, but forcing a person to renounce his faith or customs was considered immoral - the individual retained the right to own choice. This state of affairs was attractive to many. In 1209, the Uighur state sent envoys to Genghis Khan with a request to accept them into his ulus. The request was naturally granted, and Genghis Khan gave the Uyghurs enormous trading privileges. A caravan route went through Uyghuria, and the Uyghurs, being part of Mongolian state, got rich by selling water, fruits, meat and “pleasures” to hungry caravanners at high prices. The voluntary union of Uighuria with Mongolia turned out to be useful for the Mongols. With the annexation of Uyghuria, the Mongols went beyond the boundaries of their ethnic area and came into contact with other peoples of the ecumene.

In 1216, on the Irgiz River, the Mongols were attacked by the Khorezmians. Khorezm by that time was the most powerful of the states that arose after the weakening of the power of the Seljuk Turks. The rulers of Khorezm turned from governors of the ruler of Urgench into independent sovereigns and adopted the title of “Khorezmshahs”. They turned out to be energetic, enterprising and militant. This allowed them to conquer most of Central Asia and southern Afghanistan. The Khorezmshahs created a huge state in which the main military force were Turks from the adjacent steppes.

But the state turned out to be fragile, despite the wealth, brave warriors and experienced diplomats. The regime of the military dictatorship relied on tribes alien to the local population, who had a different language, different morals and customs. The cruelty of the mercenaries caused discontent among the residents of Samarkand, Bukhara, Merv and other Central Asian cities. The uprising in Samarkand led to the destruction of the Turkic garrison. Naturally, this was followed by a punitive operation of the Khorezmians, who brutally dealt with the population of Samarkand. Other large and wealthy cities in Central Asia were also affected.

In this situation, Khorezmshah Muhammad decided to confirm his title of “ghazi” - “victor of the infidels” - and become famous for another victory over them. The opportunity presented itself to him in the same year 1216, when the Mongols, fighting with the Merkits, reached Irgiz. Having learned about the arrival of the Mongols, Muhammad sent an army against them on the grounds that the steppe inhabitants needed to be converted to Islam.

The Khorezmian army attacked the Mongols, but in a rearguard battle they themselves went on the offensive and severely battered the Khorezmians. Only the attack of the left wing, commanded by the son of the Khorezmshah, the talented commander Jalal ad-Din, straightened the situation. After this, the Khorezmians retreated, and the Mongols returned home: they did not intend to fight with Khorezm; on the contrary, Genghis Khan wanted to establish ties with the Khorezmshah. After all, the Great Caravan Route went through Central Asia and all the owners of the lands along which it ran grew rich due to the duties paid by merchants. Merchants willingly paid duties because they passed on their costs to consumers without losing anything. Wanting to preserve all the advantages associated with the existence of caravan routes, the Mongols strove for peace and quiet on their borders. The difference of faith, in their opinion, did not give a reason for war and could not justify bloodshed. Probably, the Khorezmshah himself understood the episodic nature of the clash on Irshza. In 1218, Muhammad sent a trade caravan to Mongolia. Peace was restored, especially since the Mongols had no time for Khorezm: shortly before this, the Naiman prince Kuchluk began a new war with the Mongols.

Once again, Mongol-Khorezm relations were disrupted by the Khorezm Shah himself and his officials. In 1219, a rich caravan from the lands of Genghis Khan approached the Khorezm city of Otrar. The merchants went to the city to replenish food supplies and wash themselves in the bathhouse. There the merchants met two acquaintances, one of whom reported to the ruler of the city that these merchants were spies. He immediately realized that there was an excellent reason to rob travelers. The merchants were killed and their property was confiscated. The ruler of Otrar sent half of the loot to Khorezm, and Muhammad accepted the loot, which means he shared responsibility for what he had done.

Genghis Khan sent envoys to find out what caused the incident. Muhammad became angry when he saw the infidels, and ordered some of the ambassadors to be killed, and some, stripped naked, to be driven out to certain death in the steppe. Two or three Mongols finally made it home and told about what had happened. Genghis Khan's anger knew no bounds. From the Mongolian point of view, two of the most terrible crimes occurred: the deception of those who trusted and the murder of guests. According to custom, Genghis Khan could not leave unavenged either the merchants who were killed in Otrar, or the ambassadors whom the Khorezmshah insulted and killed. Khan had to fight, otherwise his fellow tribesmen would simply refuse to trust him.

In Central Asia, the Khorezmshah had at his disposal a regular army of four hundred thousand. And the Mongols, as the famous Russian orientalist V.V. Bartold believed, had no more than 200 thousand. Genghis Khan demanded military assistance from all allies. Warriors came from the Turks and Kara-Kitai, the Uyghurs sent a detachment of 5 thousand people, only the Tangut ambassador boldly replied: “If you don’t have enough troops, don’t fight.” Genghis Khan considered the answer an insult and said: “Only the dead could I bear such an insult.”

Genghis Khan sent assembled Mongolian, Uighur, Turkic and Kara-Chinese troops to Khorezm. Khorezmshah, having quarreled with his mother Turkan Khatun, did not trust the military leaders related to her. He was afraid to gather them into a fist in order to repel the onslaught of the Mongols, and scattered the army into garrisons. The best commanders of the Shah were his own unloved son Jalal ad-Din and the commandant of the Khojent fortress Timur-Melik. The Mongols took the fortresses one after another, but in Khojent, even after taking the fortress, they were unable to capture the garrison. Timur-Melik put his soldiers on rafts and escaped pursuit along the wide Syr Darya. The scattered garrisons could not hold back the advance of Genghis Khan's troops. Soon everything big cities sultanate - Samarkand, Bukhara, Merv, Herat - were captured by the Mongols.

Regarding the capture of Central Asian cities by the Mongols, there is an established version: “Wild nomads destroyed the cultural oases of agricultural peoples.” Is it so? This version, as L.N. Gumilev showed, is based on the legends of court Muslim historians. For example, the fall of Herat was reported by Islamic historians as a disaster in which the entire population of the city was exterminated, except for a few men who managed to escape in the mosque. They hid there, afraid to go out into the streets littered with corpses. Only wild animals roamed the city and tormented the dead. After sitting for some time and coming to their senses, these “heroes” went to distant lands to rob caravans in order to regain their lost wealth.

But is this possible? If the entire population of a large city was exterminated and lay on the streets, then inside the city, in particular in the mosque, the air would be full of corpse miasma, and those hiding there would simply die. No predators, except jackals, live near the city, and they very rarely penetrate into the city. It was simply impossible for exhausted people to move to rob caravans several hundred kilometers from Herat, because they would have to walk, carrying heavy loads - water and provisions. Such a “robber”, having met a caravan, would no longer be able to rob it...

Even more surprising is the information reported by historians about Merv. The Mongols took it in 1219 and also allegedly exterminated all the inhabitants there. But already in 1229 Merv rebelled, and the Mongols had to take the city again. And finally, two years later, Merv sent a detachment of 10 thousand people to fight the Mongols.

We see that the fruits of fantasy and religious hatred gave rise to legends of Mongol atrocities. If you take into account the degree of reliability of sources and ask simple but inevitable questions, it is easy to separate historical truth from literary fiction.

The Mongols occupied Persia almost without fighting, pushing the Khorezmshah's son Jalal ad-Din into northern India. Muhammad II Ghazi himself, broken by the struggle and constant defeats, died in a leper colony on an island in the Caspian Sea (1221). The Mongols made peace with the Shiite population of Iran, which was constantly offended by the Sunnis in power, in particular the Baghdad Caliph and Jalal ad-Din himself. As a result, the Shia population of Persia suffered significantly less than the Sunnis of Central Asia. Be that as it may, in 1221 the state of the Khorezmshahs was ended. Under one ruler - Muhammad II Ghazi - this state achieved both its greatest power and its destruction. As a result, Khorezm, Northern Iran, and Khorasan were annexed to the Mongol Empire.

In 1226, the hour struck for the Tangut state, which, at the decisive moment of the war with Khorezm, refused to help Genghis Khan. The Mongols rightly viewed this move as a betrayal that, according to Yasa, required vengeance. The capital of Tangut was the city of Zhongxing. It was besieged by Genghis Khan in 1227, having defeated the Tangut troops in previous battles.

During the siege of Zhongxing, Genghis Khan died, but the Mongol noyons, by order of their leader, hid his death. The fortress was taken, and the population of the “evil” city, which suffered the collective guilt of betrayal, was executed. The Tangut state disappeared, leaving behind only written evidence of its former culture, but the city survived and lived until 1405, when it was destroyed by the Chinese of the Ming Dynasty.

From the capital of the Tanguts, the Mongols took the body of their great ruler to their native steppes. The funeral ritual was as follows: the remains of Genghis Khan were lowered into a dug grave, along with many valuable things, and all the slaves who performed funeral work were killed. According to custom, exactly one year later it was necessary to celebrate the wake. In order to later find the burial place, the Mongols did the following. At the grave they sacrificed a little camel that had just been taken from its mother. And a year later, the camel herself found in the vast steppe the place where her cub was killed. Having slaughtered this camel, the Mongols performed the required funeral ritual and then left the grave forever. Since then, no one knows where Genghis Khan is buried.

IN last years In his life he was extremely concerned about the fate of his state. The khan had four sons from his beloved wife Borte and many children from other wives, who, although they were considered legitimate children, had no rights to their father’s throne. The sons from Borte differed in inclinations and character. The eldest son, Jochi, was born shortly after the Merkit captivity of Borte, and therefore not only evil tongues, but also his younger brother Chagatai called him a “Merkit degenerate.” Although Borte invariably defended Jochi, and Genghis Khan himself always recognized him as his son, the shadow of his mother’s Merkit captivity fell on Jochi with the burden of suspicion of illegitimacy. Once, in the presence of his father, Chagatai openly called Jochi illegitimate, and the matter almost ended in a fight between the brothers.

It is curious, but according to the testimony of contemporaries, Jochi’s behavior contained some stable stereotypes that greatly distinguished him from Chinggis. If for Genghis Khan there was no concept of “mercy” in relation to enemies (he left life only for small children adopted by his mother Hoelun, and valiant warriors who went into Mongol service), then Jochi was distinguished by his humanity and kindness. So, during the siege of Gurganj, the Khorezmians, completely exhausted by the war, asked to accept surrender, that is, in other words, to spare them. Jochi spoke out in favor of showing mercy, but Genghis Khan categorically rejected the request for mercy, and as a result, the garrison of Gurganj was partially slaughtered, and the city itself was flooded by the waters of the Amu Darya. The misunderstanding between the father and the eldest son, constantly fueled by the intrigues and slander of relatives, deepened over time and turned into the sovereign's mistrust of his heir. Genghis Khan suspected that Jochi wanted to gain popularity among the conquered peoples and secede from Mongolia. It is unlikely that this was the case, but the fact remains: at the beginning of 1227, Jochi, who was hunting in the steppe, was found dead - his spine was broken. The details of what happened were kept secret, but, without a doubt, Genghis Khan was a person interested in the death of Jochi and was quite capable of ending his son’s life.

In contrast to Jochi, Genghis Khan's second son, Chaga-tai, was a strict, efficient and even cruel man. Therefore, he received the position of "guardian of the Yasa" (something like an attorney general or chief judge). Chagatai strictly observed the law and treated its violators without any mercy.

The third son of the Great Khan, Ogedei, like Jochi, was distinguished by his kindness and tolerance towards people. The character of Ogedei is best illustrated by this incident: one day, on a joint trip, the brothers saw a Muslim washing himself by the water. According to Muslim custom, every believer is obliged to perform prayer and ritual ablution several times a day. Mongolian tradition, on the contrary, forbade a person to wash throughout the summer. The Mongols believed that washing in a river or lake causes a thunderstorm, and a thunderstorm in the steppe is very dangerous for travelers, and therefore “calling a thunderstorm” was considered an attempt on people’s lives. Nuker vigilantes of the ruthless zealot of the law Chagatai captured the Muslim. Anticipating a bloody outcome - the unfortunate man was in danger of having his head cut off - Ogedei sent his man to tell the Muslim to answer that he had dropped a gold piece into the water and was just looking for it there. The Muslim said so to Chagatay. He ordered to look for the coin, and during this time Ogedei’s warrior threw the gold into the water. The found coin was returned to the “rightful owner.” In parting, Ogedei, taking a handful of coins from his pocket, handed them to the rescued person and said: “The next time you drop gold into the water, don’t go after it, don’t break the law.”

The youngest of Genghis' sons, Tului, was born in 1193. Since Genghis Khan was in captivity at that time, this time Borte’s infidelity was quite obvious, but Genghis Khan recognized Tuluya as his legitimate son, although he did not outwardly resemble his father.

Of Genghis Khan's four sons, the youngest had the greatest talents and showed the greatest moral dignity. A good commander and an outstanding administrator, Tuluy was also a loving husband and distinguished by his nobility. He married the daughter of the deceased head of the Keraits, Van Khan, who was a devout Christian. Tuluy himself did not have the right to accept Christian faith: Like Genghisid, he had to profess the Bon religion (paganism). But the khan’s son allowed his wife not only to perform all Christian rituals in a luxurious “church” yurt, but also to have priests with her and receive monks. The death of Tuluy can be called heroic without any exaggeration. When Ogedei fell ill, Tuluy voluntarily took a powerful shamanic potion in an effort to “attract” the disease to himself, and died saving his brother.

All four sons had the right to succeed Genghis Khan. After Jochi was eliminated, there were three heirs left, and when Genghis died and a new khan had not yet been elected, Tului ruled the ulus. But at the kurultai of 1229, the gentle and tolerant Ogedei was chosen as the Great Khan, in accordance with the will of Genghis. Ogedei, as we have already mentioned, had a kind soul, but the kindness of a sovereign is often not to the benefit of the state and his subjects. The management of the ulus under him was carried out mainly thanks to the severity of Chagatai and the diplomatic and administrative skills of Tuluy. The Great Khan himself preferred wanderings with hunts and feasts in Western Mongolia to state concerns.

The grandchildren of Genghis Khan were allocated various areas of the ulus or high positions. Jochi's eldest son, Orda-Ichen, received the White Horde, located between the Irtysh and the Tarbagatai ridge (the area of ​​​​present-day Semipalatinsk). The second son, Batu, began to own the Golden (Great) Horde on the Volga. The third son, Sheibani, received the Blue Horde, which roamed from Tyumen to the Aral Sea. At the same time, the three brothers - the rulers of the uluses - were allocated only one or two thousand Mongol soldiers, while the total number of the Mongol army reached 130 thousand people.

The children of Chagatai also received a thousand soldiers, and the descendants of Tului, being at court, owned the entire grandfather’s and father’s ulus. So the Mongols established a system of inheritance called minorat, in which the youngest son received all the rights of his father as an inheritance, and older brothers received only a share in the common inheritance.

The Great Khan Ogedei also had a son, Guyuk, who claimed the inheritance. The expansion of the clan during the lifetime of Chingis’s children caused the division of the inheritance and enormous difficulties in managing the ulus, which stretched across the territory from the Black to the Yellow Sea. In these difficulties and family scores were hidden the seeds of future strife that destroyed the state created by Genghis Khan and his comrades.

How many Tatar-Mongols came to Rus'? Let's try to sort this issue out.

Russian pre-revolutionary historians mention a “half-million-strong Mongol army.” V. Yang, author of the famous trilogy “Genghis Khan”, “Batu” and “To the Last Sea”, names the number four hundred thousand. However, it is known that a warrior of a nomadic tribe goes on a campaign with three horses (minimum two). One carries luggage (packed rations, horseshoes, spare harness, arrows, armor), and the third needs to be changed from time to time so that one horse can rest if it suddenly has to go into battle.

Simple calculations show that for an army of half a million or four hundred thousand soldiers, at least one and a half million horses are needed. Such a herd is unlikely to be able to effectively move a long distance, since the leading horses will instantly destroy the grass over a vast area, and the rear ones will die from lack of food.

All the main invasions of the Tatar-Mongols into Rus' took place in winter, when the remaining grass was hidden under the snow, and you couldn’t take much fodder with you... The Mongolian horse really knows how to get food from under the snow, but ancient sources do not mention the horses of the Mongolian breed that existed “in service” with the horde. Horse breeding experts prove that the Tatar-Mongol horde rode Turkmens, and this is a completely different breed, looks different, and is not capable of feeding itself in the winter without human help...

In addition, the difference between a horse allowed to wander in winter without any work and a horse forced to make long journeys under a rider and also participate in battles is not taken into account. But in addition to the horsemen, they also had to carry heavy booty! The convoys followed the troops. The cattle that pull the carts also need to be fed... The picture of a huge mass of people moving in the rearguard of an army of half a million with convoys, wives and children seems quite fantastic.

The temptation for a historian to explain the Mongol campaigns of the 13th century by “migrations” is great. But modern researchers show that the Mongol campaigns were not directly related to the movements of huge masses of the population. Victories were won not by hordes of nomads, but by small, well-organized mobile detachments returning to their native steppes after campaigns. And the khans of the Jochi branch - Batu, Horde and Sheybani - received, according to the will of Genghis, only 4 thousand horsemen, i.e. about 12 thousand people settled in the territory from the Carpathians to Altai.

In the end, historians settled on thirty thousand warriors. But here, too, unanswered questions arise. And the first among them will be this: isn’t it enough? Despite the disunity of the Russian principalities, thirty thousand cavalry is too small a figure to cause “fire and ruin” throughout Rus'! After all, they (even supporters of the “classical” version admit this) did not move in a compact mass. Several detachments scattered in different directions, and this reduces the number of “innumerable Tatar hordes” to the limit beyond which elementary mistrust begins: could such a number of aggressors conquer Rus'?

It turns out to be a vicious circle: a huge Tatar-Mongol army, for purely physical reasons, would hardly be able to maintain combat capability in order to move quickly and deliver the notorious “indestructible blows.” A small army would hardly have been able to establish control over most of the territory of Rus'. To get out of this vicious circle, we have to admit: the Tatar-Mongol invasion was in fact only an episode of the bloody civil war that was going on in Rus'. The enemy forces were relatively small; they relied on their own forage reserves accumulated in the cities. And the Tatar-Mongols became an additional external factor, used in the internal struggle in the same way as the troops of the Pechenegs and Polovtsians had previously been used.

The chronicle information that has reached us about the military campaigns of 1237–1238 depicts the classically Russian style of these battles - the battles take place in winter, and the Mongols - the steppe inhabitants - act with amazing skill in the forests (for example, the encirclement and subsequent complete destruction on the City River of a Russian detachment under the command of the great Prince of Vladimir Yuri Vsevolodovich).

Having taken a general look at the history of the creation of the huge Mongol power, we must return to Rus'. Let us take a closer look at the situation with the Battle of the Kalka River, which is not fully understood by historians.

It was not the steppe people who represented the main danger to Kievan Rus at the turn of the 11th–12th centuries. Our ancestors were friends with the Polovtsian khans, married “red Polovtsian girls”, accepted baptized Polovtsians into their midst, and the descendants of the latter became Zaporozhye and Sloboda Cossacks, it is not for nothing that in their nicknames the traditional Slavic suffix of affiliation “ov” (Ivanov) was replaced by the Turkic one - “ enko" (Ivanenko).

At this time, a more formidable phenomenon emerged - a decline in morals, a rejection of traditional Russian ethics and morality. In 1097, a princely congress took place in Lyubech, marking the beginning of a new political form of existence of the country. There it was decided that “let everyone keep his fatherland.” Rus' began to turn into a confederation of independent states. The princes swore to inviolably observe what was proclaimed and kissed the cross in this. But after the death of Mstislav, the Kiev state began to quickly disintegrate. Polotsk was the first to settle down. Then the Novgorod “republic” stopped sending money to Kyiv.

A striking example of the loss of moral values ​​and patriotic feelings was the act of Prince Andrei Bogolyubsky. In 1169, having captured Kyiv, Andrei gave the city to his warriors for three days of plunder. Until that moment, in Rus' it was customary to do this only with foreign cities. During any civil strife, such a practice was never extended to Russian cities.

Igor Svyatoslavich, a descendant of Prince Oleg, the hero of “The Tale of Igor’s Campaign,” who became the Prince of Chernigov in 1198, set himself the goal of dealing with Kiev, a city where the rivals of his dynasty were constantly strengthening. He agreed with the Smolensk prince Rurik Rostislavich and called on the Polovtsians for help. Prince Roman Volynsky spoke in defense of Kyiv, the “mother of Russian cities,” relying on the Torcan troops allied to him.

The plan of the Chernigov prince was implemented after his death (1202). Rurik, Prince of Smolensk, and the Olgovichi with the Polovtsy in January 1203, in a battle that was fought mainly between the Polovtsy and the Torks of Roman Volynsky, gained the upper hand. Having captured Kyiv, Rurik Rostislavich subjected the city to a terrible defeat. The Tithe Church and the Kiev Pechersk Lavra were destroyed, and the city itself was burned. “They have created a great evil that has not existed since baptism in the Russian land,” the chronicler left a message.

After the fateful year of 1203, Kyiv never recovered.

According to L.N. Gumilyov, by this time the ancient Russians had lost their passionarity, that is, their cultural and energetic “charge”. In such conditions, a clash with a strong enemy could not but become tragic for the country.

Meanwhile, the Mongol regiments were approaching the Russian borders. At that time, the main enemy of the Mongols in the west was the Cumans. Their enmity began in 1216, when the Cumans accepted the blood enemies of Genghis - the Merkits. The Polovtsians actively pursued their anti-Mongol policy, constantly supporting the Finno-Ugric tribes hostile to the Mongols. At the same time, the Cumans of the steppe were as mobile as the Mongols themselves. Seeing the futility of cavalry clashes with the Cumans, the Mongols sent an expeditionary force behind enemy lines.

Talented commanders Subetei and Jebe led a corps of three tumens across the Caucasus. The Georgian king George Lasha tried to attack them, but was destroyed along with his army. The Mongols managed to capture the guides who showed the way through the Daryal Gorge. So they went to the upper reaches of the Kuban, to the rear of the Polovtsians. They, having discovered the enemy in their rear, retreated to the Russian border and asked for help from the Russian princes.

It should be noted that the relations between Rus' and the Polovtsians do not fit into the scheme of irreconcilable confrontation “sedentary - nomadic”. In 1223, the Russian princes became allies of the Polovtsians. The three strongest princes of Rus' - Mstislav the Udaloy from Galich, Mstislav of Kiev and Mstislav of Chernigov - gathered troops and tried to protect them.

The clash on Kalka in 1223 is described in some detail in the chronicles; In addition, there is another source - “The Tale of the Battle of Kalka, and of the Russian Princes, and of the Seventy Heroes.” However, the abundance of information does not always bring clarity...

Historical science has long not denied the fact that the events on Kalka were not the aggression of evil aliens, but an attack by the Russians. The Mongols themselves did not seek war with Russia. The ambassadors who arrived to the Russian princes quite friendly asked the Russians not to interfere in their relations with the Polovtsians. But, true to their allied obligations, the Russian princes rejected peace proposals. In doing so, they made a fatal mistake that had bitter consequences. All the ambassadors were killed (according to some sources, they were not just killed, but “tortured”). At all times, the murder of an ambassador or envoy was considered a serious crime; According to Mongolian law, deceiving someone who trusted was an unforgivable crime.

Following this Russian army goes on a long journey. Having left the borders of Rus', it first attacks the Tatar camp, takes booty, steals cattle, after which it moves outside its territory for another eight days. A decisive battle takes place on the Kalka River: the eighty-thousandth Russian-Polovtsian army attacked the twenty-thousandth (!) detachment of the Mongols. This battle was lost by the Allies due to their inability to coordinate their actions. The Polovtsy left the battlefield in panic. Mstislav Udaloy and his “younger” prince Daniil fled across the Dnieper; They were the first to reach the shore and managed to jump into the boats. At the same time, the prince chopped up the rest of the boats, fearing that the Tatars would be able to cross after him, “and, filled with fear, I reached Galich on foot.” Thus, he doomed his comrades, whose horses were worse than princely ones, to death. The enemies killed everyone they overtook.

The other princes are left alone with the enemy, fight off his attacks for three days, after which, believing the assurances of the Tatars, they surrender. Here lies another mystery. It turns out that the princes surrendered after a certain Russian named Ploskinya, who was in the enemy’s battle formations, solemnly kissed the pectoral cross that the Russians would be spared and their blood would not be shed. The Mongols, according to their custom, kept their word: having tied up the captives, they laid them on the ground, covered them with planks and sat down to feast on the bodies. Not a drop of blood was actually shed! And the latter, according to Mongolian views, was considered extremely important. (By the way, only the “Tale of the Battle of Kalka” reports that the captured princes were put under planks. Other sources write that the princes were simply killed without mockery, and still others that they were “captured.” So the story with a feast on the bodies is just one version.)

Different peoples perceive the rule of law and the concept of honesty differently. The Russians believed that the Mongols, by killing the captives, broke their oath. But from the point of view of the Mongols, they kept their oath, and the execution was the highest justice, because the princes committed the terrible sin of killing someone who trusted them. Therefore, the point is not in deceit (history provides a lot of evidence of how the Russian princes themselves violated the “kiss of the cross”), but in the personality of Ploskini himself - a Russian, a Christian, who somehow mysteriously found himself among the warriors of the “unknown people”.

Why did the Russian princes surrender after listening to Ploskini’s entreaties? “The Tale of the Battle of Kalka” writes: “There were also wanderers along with the Tatars, and their commander was Ploskinya.” Brodniks are Russian free warriors who lived in those places, the predecessors of the Cossacks. However, establishing Ploschini's social status only confuses the matter. It turns out that the wanderers in a short time managed to come to an agreement with the “unknown peoples” and became so close to them that they jointly struck at their brothers in blood and faith? One thing can be stated with certainty: part of the army with which the Russian princes fought on Kalka was Slavic, Christian.

The Russian princes do not look their best in this whole story. But let's return to our riddles. For some reason, the “Tale of the Battle of Kalka” that we mentioned is not able to definitely name the enemy of the Russians! Here is the quote: “...Because of our sins, unknown peoples came, the godless Moabites [symbolic name from the Bible], about whom no one knows exactly who they are and where they came from, and what their language is, and what tribe they are, and what faith. And they call them Tatars, while others say Taurmen, and others say Pechenegs.”

Amazing lines! They were written much later than the events described, when it was supposed to be known exactly who the Russian princes fought on Kalka. After all, part of the army (albeit small) nevertheless returned from Kalka. Moreover, the victors, pursuing the defeated Russian regiments, chased them to Novgorod-Svyatopolch (on the Dnieper), where they attacked the civilian population, so that among the townspeople there should have been witnesses who saw the enemy with their own eyes. And yet he remains “unknown”! This statement further confuses the matter. After all, by the time described, the Polovtsians were well known in Rus' - they lived nearby for many years, then fought, then became related... The Taurmen - a nomadic Turkic tribe that lived in the Northern Black Sea region - were again well known to the Russians. It is curious that in the “Tale of Igor’s Campaign” certain “Tatars” are mentioned among the nomadic Turks who served the Chernigov prince.

One gets the impression that the chronicler is hiding something. For some reason unknown to us, he does not want to directly name the Russian enemy in that battle. Maybe the battle on Kalka is not a clash with unknown peoples at all, but one of the episodes of the internecine war waged among themselves by Russian Christians, Polovtsian Christians and the Tatars who got involved in the matter?

After the Battle of Kalka, some of the Mongols turned their horses to the east, trying to report on the completion of the assigned task - the victory over the Cumans. But on the banks of the Volga, the army was ambushed by the Volga Bulgars. The Muslims, who hated the Mongols as pagans, unexpectedly attacked them during the crossing. Here the victors at Kalka were defeated and lost many people. Those who managed to cross the Volga left the steppes to the east and united with the main forces of Genghis Khan. Thus ended the first meeting of the Mongols and Russians.

L.N. Gumilyov collected a huge amount of material, clearly demonstrating that the relationship between Russia and the Horde CAN be described by the word “symbiosis”. After Gumilev, they write especially a lot and often about how Russian princes and “Mongol khans” became brothers-in-law, relatives, sons-in-law and fathers-in-law, how they went on joint military campaigns, how (let’s call a spade a spade) they were friends. Relations of this kind are unique in their own way - the Tatars did not behave this way in any country they conquered. This symbiosis, brotherhood in arms leads to such an interweaving of names and events that sometimes it is even difficult to understand where the Russians end and the Tatars begin...

author

2. The Tatar-Mongol invasion as the unification of Rus' under the rule of the Novgorod = Yaroslavl dynasty of George = Genghis Khan and then his brother Yaroslav = Batu = Ivan Kalita Above, we have already begun to talk about the “Tatar-Mongol invasion” as the unification of the Russian

From the book Rus' and the Horde. Great Empire of the Middle Ages author Nosovsky Gleb Vladimirovich

3. “Tatar-Mongol yoke” in Rus' - the era of military control in the Russian Empire and its heyday 3.1. What is the difference between our version and the Miller-Romanov version? The Miller-Romanov story paints the era of the 13th–15th centuries in the dark colors of a fierce foreign yoke in Rus'. With one

From the book Reconstruction of True History author Nosovsky Gleb Vladimirovich

12. There was no foreign “Tatar-Mongol conquest” of Rus'. Medieval Mongolia and Rus' are simply one and the same. No foreigners conquered Rus'. Rus' was originally inhabited by peoples originally living on their land - Russians, Tatars, etc. The so-called

author Nosovsky Gleb Vladimirovich

7.4. Fourth period: the Tatar-Mongol yoke from the battle of the City in 1238 to the “standing on the Ugra” in 1481, considered today the “official end of the Tatar-Mongol yoke” BATY KHAN from 1238. YAROSLAV VSEVOLODOVICH 1238–1248, ruled for 10 years, capital - Vladimir. Came from Novgorod

From the book Book 1. New chronology of Rus' [Russian Chronicles. "Mongol-Tatar" conquest. Battle of Kulikovo. Ivan groznyj. Razin. Pugachev. The defeat of Tobolsk and author Nosovsky Gleb Vladimirovich

2. The Tatar-Mongol invasion as the unification of Rus' under the rule of the Novgorod = Yaroslavl dynasty of George = Genghis Khan and then his brother Yaroslav = Batu = Ivan Kalita Above, we have already begun to talk about the “Tatar-Mongol invasion” as a process of unification of the Russian

From the book Book 1. New chronology of Rus' [Russian Chronicles. "Mongol-Tatar" conquest. Battle of Kulikovo. Ivan groznyj. Razin. Pugachev. The defeat of Tobolsk and author Nosovsky Gleb Vladimirovich

3. The Tatar-Mongol yoke in Rus' is a period of military control in the United Russian Empire 3.1. What is the difference between our version and the Miller-Romanov version? The Miller-Romanov story paints the era of the 13th–15th centuries in the dark colors of a fierce foreign yoke in Rus'. WITH

author Nosovsky Gleb Vladimirovich

4th period: Tatar-Mongol yoke from the battle of the City in 1237 to the “standing on the Ugra” in 1481, considered today the “official end of the Tatar-Mongol yoke” Batu Khan from 1238 Yaroslav Vsevolodovich 1238–1248 (10), capital - Vladimir, came from Novgorod (p. 70). By: 1238–1247 (8). By

From the book New Chronology and the Concept of the Ancient History of Rus', England and Rome author Nosovsky Gleb Vladimirovich

The Tatar-Mongol invasion as the unification of Rus' under the rule of the Novgorod = Yaroslavl dynasty of George = Genghis Khan and then his brother Yaroslav = Batu = Ivan Kalita Above, we have already begun to talk about the “Tatar-Mongol invasion” as a process of unification of the Russian

From the book New Chronology and the Concept of the Ancient History of Rus', England and Rome author Nosovsky Gleb Vladimirovich

The Tatar-Mongol yoke in Rus' = the period of military rule in the united Russian empire. What is the difference between our version and the traditional one? Traditional history paints the era of the 13th–15th centuries in the dark colors of foreign yoke in Rus'. On the one hand, we are called to believe that

From the book Gumilyov, son of Gumilyov author Belyakov Sergey Stanislavovich

THE TATAR-MONGOL YOKE But perhaps the victims were justified, and the “alliance with the Horde” saved the Russian land from the worst misfortune, from the insidious papal prelates, from the merciless dog-knights, from enslavement not only physical, but also spiritual? Maybe Gumilev is right, and Tatar help

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12. There was no foreign “Tatar-Mongol conquest” of Rus'. Medieval Mongolia and Rus' are simply one and the same. No foreigners conquered Rus'. Rus' was originally inhabited by peoples who had originally lived on their land - Russians, Tatars, etc. The so-called

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Chapter X “Tatar-Mongol yoke” - how it was There was no so-called Tatar yoke. The Tatars never occupied Russian lands and did not keep their garrisons there... It is difficult to find parallels in history for such generosity of the victors. B. Ishboldin, honorary professor

The Russian principalities before the Tatar-Mongol yoke and the Moscow state after gaining legal independence are, as they say, two big differences. It will not be an exaggeration that the united Russian state, the direct heir of which is modern Russia, formed during the period of the yoke and under its influence. The overthrow of the Tatar-Mongol yoke was not only the cherished goal of Russian identity during the second half of the 13th-15th centuries. It also turned out to be a means of creating a state, national mentality and cultural identity.

Approaching the Battle of Kulikovo...

Most people’s idea of ​​the process of overthrowing the Tatar-Mongol yoke comes down to a very simplified scheme, according to which, before the Battle of Kulikovo, Rus' was enslaved by the Horde and did not even think about resistance, and after the Battle of Kulikovo, the yoke lasted another hundred years simply due to a misunderstanding. In reality, everything was more complicated.

The fact that the Russian principalities, although they generally recognized their vassal position in relation to the Golden Horde, did not stop trying to resist, is evidenced by a simple historical fact. Since the establishment of the yoke and throughout its entire length, about 60 major punitive campaigns, invasions and large-scale raids of Horde troops on Rus' are known from Russian chronicles. Obviously, in the case of completely conquered lands, such efforts are not required - this means that Rus' resisted, resisted actively, for centuries.

The Horde troops suffered their first significant military defeat on the territory controlled by Rus' about a hundred years before the Battle of Kulikovo. True, this battle took place during the internecine war for the grand-ducal throne of the Vladimir principality, which flared up between the sons of Alexander Nevsky . In 1285, Andrei Alexandrovich attracted the Horde prince Eltorai to his side and with his army went against his brother Dmitry Alexandrovich, who reigned in Vladimir. As a result, Dmitry Alexandrovich won a convincing victory over the Tatar-Mongol punitive corps.

Further, individual victories in military clashes with the Horde occurred, although not too often, but with stable consistency. Distinguished by his peacefulness and penchant for political solutions to all issues, the Moscow prince Daniil Alexandrovich, the youngest son of Nevsky, defeated the Mongol detachment near Pereyaslavl-Ryazan in 1301. In 1317, Mikhail Tverskoy defeated the army of Kavgady, which was attracted to his side by Yuri of Moscow.

The closer to the Battle of Kulikovo, the more confident the Russian principalities became, and unrest and unrest were observed in the Golden Horde, which could not but affect the balance of military forces.

In 1365, the Ryazan forces defeated the Horde detachment near the Shishevsky forest; in 1367, the Suzdal army won a victory at Pyana. Finally, in 1378, Dmitry of Moscow, the future Donskoy, won his dress rehearsal in the confrontation with the Horde: on the Vozha River he defeated an army under the command of Murza Begich, a close associate of Mamai.

Overthrow of the Tatar-Mongol yoke: the great Battle of Kulikovo

It is unnecessary to talk once again about the significance of the Battle of Kulikovo in 1380, as well as to retell the details of its immediate course. From childhood, everyone knows the dramatic details of how Mamai’s army pressed on the center of the Russian army and how, at the most decisive moment, the Ambush Regiment hit the Horde and their allies in the rear, turning the fate of the battle. It is also well known that for Russian self-awareness it became an event of great importance when, for the first time after the establishment of the yoke, the Russian army was able to give a large-scale battle to the invader and win. But it is worth remembering that the victory in the Battle of Kulikovo, with all its enormous moral significance, did not lead to the overthrow of the yoke.

Dmitry Donskoy managed to take advantage of the difficult political situation in the Golden Horde and embody his leadership abilities and the fighting spirit of his own army. However, just two years later, Moscow was taken by the forces of the legitimate khan of the Horde, Tokhtamysh (Temnik Mamai was a temporary usurper) and almost completely destroyed.

The young Principality of Moscow was not yet ready to fight on equal terms with the weakened but still powerful Horde. Tokhtamysh imposed an increased tribute on the principality (the previous tribute was retained in the same amount, but the population actually decreased by half; in addition, an emergency tax was introduced). Dmitry Donskoy undertook to send his eldest son Vasily to the Horde as a hostage. But political power The Horde had already lost control of Moscow - Prince Dmitry Ivanovich managed to transfer power by inheritance independently, without any label from the khan. In addition, a few years later Tokhtamysh was defeated by another eastern conqueror, Timur, and for some period Rus' stopped paying tribute.

In the 15th century, tribute was generally paid with serious fluctuations, taking advantage of increasingly constant periods of internal instability in the Horde. In the 1430s - 1450s, the Horde rulers undertook several ruinous campaigns against Rus' - but in essence these were just predatory raids, and not attempts to restore political supremacy.

In fact, the yoke did not end in 1480...

In school exam papers on the history of Russia, the correct answer to the question “When and with what event did the period of the Tatar-Mongol yoke in Rus' end?” will be considered “In 1480, Standing on the Ugra River.” In fact, this is the correct answer - but from a formal point of view, it does not correspond to historical reality.

In fact, in 1476, the Grand Duke of Moscow Ivan III refused to pay tribute to the Khan of the Great Horde, Akhmat. Until 1480, Akhmat dealt with his other enemy, the Crimean Khanate, after which he decided to punish the rebellious Russian ruler. The two armies met at the Ugra River in September 1380. The Horde's attempt to cross the river was stopped by Russian troops. After this, the Standing itself began, lasting until the beginning of November. As a result, Ivan III was able to force Akhmat to retreat without unnecessary loss of life. Firstly, there were strong reinforcements on the way to the Russians. Secondly, Akhmat’s cavalry began to experience a shortage of fodder, and illnesses began in the army itself. Thirdly, the Russians sent a sabotage detachment to the rear of Akhmat, which was supposed to plunder the defenseless capital of the Horde.

As a result, the khan ordered a retreat - and this ended the Tatar-Mongol yoke of almost 250 years. However, from a formal diplomatic position, Ivan III and the Moscow state remained in vassal dependence on the Great Horde for another 38 years. In 1481, Khan Akhmat was killed, and another wave of struggle for power arose in the Horde. IN difficult conditions At the end of the 15th – beginning of the 16th centuries, Ivan III was not sure that the Horde would not be able to mobilize its forces again and organize a new large-scale campaign against Rus'. Therefore, being in fact a sovereign ruler and no longer paying tribute to the Horde, for diplomatic reasons in 1502, he officially recognized himself as a vassal of the Great Horde. But soon the Horde was finally defeated by its eastern enemies, so that in 1518 all vassal relations, even at the formal level, between the Moscow State and the Horde were terminated.

Alexander Babitsky


o (Mongol-Tatar, Tatar-Mongol, Horde) - the traditional name for the system of exploitation of Russian lands by nomadic conquerors who came from the East from 1237 to 1480.

This system was aimed at carrying out mass terror and robbing the Russian people by levying cruel exactions. She acted primarily in the interests of the Mongolian nomadic military-feudal nobility (noyons), in whose favor the lion's share of the collected tribute went.

Mongolian Tatar yoke was established as a result of the invasion of Batu Khan in the 13th century. Until the early 1260s, Rus' was under the rule of the great Mongol khans, and then the khans of the Golden Horde.

The Russian principalities were not directly part of the Mongol state and retained the local princely administration, the activities of which were controlled by the Baskaks - the khan's representatives in the conquered lands. The Russian princes were tributaries of the Mongol khans and received from them labels for ownership of their principalities. Formally, the Mongol-Tatar yoke was established in 1243, when Prince Yaroslav Vsevolodovich received from the Mongols a label for the Grand Duchy of Vladimir. Rus', according to the label, lost the right to fight and had to regularly pay tribute to the khans twice annually (in spring and autumn).

There was no permanent Mongol-Tatar army on the territory of Rus'. The yoke was supported by punitive campaigns and repressions against rebellious princes. The regular flow of tribute from Russian lands began after the census of 1257-1259, conducted by Mongol “numerals”. The units of taxation were: in cities - yard, in rural areas - “village”, “plow”, “plough”. Only the clergy were exempt from tribute. The main “Horde burdens” were: “exit”, or “tsar’s tribute” - a tax directly for the Mongol khan; trade fees (“myt”, “tamka”); carriage duties (“pits”, “carts”); maintenance of the khan's ambassadors (“food”); various “gifts” and “honors” to the khan, his relatives and associates. Every year, a huge amount of silver left the Russian lands as tribute. Large “requests” for military and other needs were periodically collected. In addition, the Russian princes were obliged, by order of the khan, to send soldiers to participate in campaigns and in round-up hunts (“lovitva”). In the late 1250s and early 1260s, tribute was collected from the Russian principalities by Muslim merchants (“besermen”), who bought this right from the great Mongol Khan. Most of the tribute went to the Great Khan in Mongolia. During the uprisings of 1262, the “besermans” were expelled from Russian cities, and the responsibility for collecting tribute passed to the local princes.

Rus''s struggle against the yoke became increasingly widespread. In 1285, Grand Duke Dmitry Alexandrovich (son of Alexander Nevsky) defeated and expelled the army of the “Horde prince”. At the end of the 13th - first quarter of the 14th century, performances in Russian cities led to the elimination of the Baskas. With the strengthening of the Moscow principality, the Tatar yoke gradually weakened. Moscow Prince Ivan Kalita (reigned in 1325-1340) achieved the right to collect “exit” from all Russian principalities. From the middle of the 14th century, the orders of the khans of the Golden Horde, not supported by a real military threat, were no longer carried out by the Russian princes. Dmitry Donskoy (1359-1389) did not recognize the khan's labels issued to his rivals, and seized the Grand Duchy of Vladimir by force. In 1378, he defeated the Tatar army on the Vozha River in the Ryazan land, and in 1380 he defeated the Golden Horde ruler Mamai in the Battle of Kulikovo.

However, after Tokhtamysh’s campaign and the capture of Moscow in 1382, Rus' was forced to again recognize the power of the Golden Horde and pay tribute, but already Vasily I Dmitrievich (1389-1425) received the great reign of Vladimir without the khan’s label, as “his patrimony.” Under him, the yoke was nominal. Tribute was paid irregularly, and the Russian princes pursued independent policies. The attempt of the Golden Horde ruler Edigei (1408) to restore full power over Russia ended in failure: he failed to take Moscow. The strife that began in the Golden Horde opened up the possibility for Russia to overthrow the Tatar yoke.

However, in the middle of the 15th century, Muscovite Rus' itself experienced a period of internecine war, which weakened its military potential. During these years, the Tatar rulers organized a series of devastating invasions, but they were no longer able to bring the Russians to complete submission. The unification of Russian lands around Moscow led to the concentration in the hands of the Moscow princes of such political power that the weakening Tatar khans could not cope with. The Grand Duke of Moscow Ivan III Vasilyevich (1462-1505) refused to pay tribute in 1476. In 1480, after the unsuccessful campaign of the Khan of the Great Horde Akhmat and “standing on the Ugra”, the yoke was finally overthrown.

The Mongol-Tatar yoke had negative, regressive consequences for the economic, political and cultural development of the Russian lands, and was a brake on the growth of the productive forces of Rus', which were at a higher socio-economic level compared to the productive forces of the Mongol state. It artificially preserved for a long time the purely feudal natural character of the economy. Politically, the consequences of the yoke were manifested in the disruption of the natural process of state development of Rus', in the artificial maintenance of its fragmentation. The Mongol-Tatar yoke, which lasted two and a half centuries, was one of the reasons for the economic, political and cultural lag of Rus' from Western European countries.

The material was prepared based on information from open sources.