After the collapse of the USSR, relations between the Central Government and Chechnya became especially tense. At the end of 1991, General Dzhokhar Dudayev came to power in Chechnya. Expressing the will of the National Congress Chechen people(OKCHN), Dudayev dissolved the Supreme Council of Checheno-Ingushetia and announced the creation of the independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.
In connection with the reorganization of the former Soviet army Dudayev managed to take control of a significant part of the property and weapons Soviet troops in Chechnya, right down to aviation. Russia declared the “Dudaev regime” illegal.
Soon, a struggle for spheres of influence began among the Chechens themselves, which, with the intervention of federal authorities and security forces, resulted in a kind of civil war in 1994. On December 11, 1994, the operation of federal troops to capture Grozny began. The assault on Grozny on New Year's Eve, which left hundreds of Russian troops dead, was a disaster.
The development and material support of the operation were extremely unsatisfactory. 20% of the military equipment of the federal troops in Chechnya was completely faulty, 40% was partially faulty. What came as a surprise to Russian politicians and military officers was that Dudayev had a well-trained army. But most importantly, Dudayev skillfully played on national feelings and portrayed Russia as the enemy of the Chechen people. He managed to win over the population of Chechnya to his side. Dudayev turned into a national hero. Most Chechens perceived the entry of federal troops as an invasion by an enemy army seeking to take away their freedom and independence.
As a result, the operation to restore the rule of law, preserve the integrity of Russia, and disarm the bandits turned into a protracted, bloody war for Russian society. In the Chechen issue, the Russian government did not show statesmanship, patience, diplomatic skill, or understanding of the historical, cultural and everyday traditions of the mountain peoples.
1. The Russian government sought to eliminate the “independence” of General Dudayev and wanted to preserve the territorial integrity of Russia.
2. With the loss of Chechnya, Chechen oil was lost and the supply of oil from Baku to Novorossiysk was disrupted. Oil exports decreased.
3. The outbreak of the war was facilitated by criminal financial structures interested in this war for “money laundering”.
Thus, oil and money steel the real reason war.
First Chechen War (December 1994 - June 1996) was not supported by Russian society, which considered it unnecessary, and its main culprit was the Kremlin government. Negative attitudes soared after major defeat Russian troops on New Year's Eve from 1994 to 1995. In January 1995, only 23% of respondents supported the use of the army in Chechnya, with 55% against. Most considered this action unworthy of a great power. 43% were in favor of an immediate cessation of hostilities.
A year later, the protest against the war reached an extremely large level: at the beginning of 1996, 80-90% of Russians surveyed had a purely negative attitude towards it. For the first time in the history of Russia, a significant part of the media systematically took an anti-war position, showed the monstrous destruction, disasters and grief of the population of Chechnya, and criticized the authorities and law enforcement agencies. Many socio-political movements and parties openly opposed the war. The mood of society played a role in ending the war.
Realizing the futility of a military solution to the Chechen problem, the Russian government began to look for options political settlement contradictions. In March 1996, B. Yeltsin decided to create working group upon the end of hostilities and the settlement of the situation in Chechnya. In April 1996, the withdrawal of federal troops to the administrative borders of Chechnya began. It is believed that Dudayev died in April 1996.
Negotiations began between the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Chechen Republic A. Lebed(he was the secretary of the Security Council) and the head of the headquarters of the armed formations A. Maskhadov. On August 31, in Khasavyurt (Dagestan), Lebed and Maskhadov signed a joint statement “On the cessation of hostilities in Chechnya” and “Principles for determining the foundations of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic.” An agreement was reached to hold presidential elections in Chechnya. The final decision on the issue of the political status of Chechnya was postponed for five years (until December 2001). In August, federal troops began to withdraw from Grozny, which was immediately captured by militants.
In January 1997, Colonel Aslan Maskhadov was elected President of the Chechen Republic- former chief of staff of the Chechen armed forces. He proclaimed a course for the national independence of Chechnya.
Russia lost the first Chechen war, suffering significant human losses and enormous material damage. The national economy of Chechnya was completely destroyed. The problem of refugees has arisen. Among those leaving were a lot of educated, qualified workers, including teachers.
After the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and A. Maskhadov coming to power, a real catastrophe began in Chechnya. For the second time in a short time Chechen Republic handed over to criminal elements and extremists. The Constitution of the Russian Federation on the territory of Chechnya ceased to be in force, legal proceedings were eliminated and replaced by Sharia rule. The Russian population of Chechnya was subjected to discrimination and persecution. In the fall of 1996, the majority of the population of Chechnya lost hope for a better future and hundreds of thousands of Chechens left the republic along with the Russians.
After the end of the war in Chechnya, Russia was faced with the problem of terrorism in the North Caucasus. From the end of 1996 to 1999, criminal terror was accompanied by political terror in Chechnya. The Ichkerian parliament hastily adopted the so-called law, on the basis of which not only those who actually collaborated with federal authorities were persecuted, but also those who were suspected of sympathizing with Russia. All educational institutions found themselves under the strict control of self-appointed Sharia courts and all kinds of Islamic movements, which dictated not only the content of educational programs, but also determined personnel policies.
Under the banner of Islamization, the teaching of a number of disciplines was stopped both in schools and universities, but the basics of Islam, the basics of Sharia, etc. were introduced. Separate education for boys and girls was introduced in schools, and in high schools they were required to wear a burqa. Study was introduced Arabic, and this was not provided with personnel, methodological manuals and developed programs. The militants considered secular education to be harmful. There has been a noticeable degradation of an entire generation. Most Chechen children did not study during the war years. Uneducated youth can only join criminal groups. Illiterate people are always easy to manipulate by playing on their national and religious feelings.
Chechen gangs pursued a policy of intimidation of the Russian authorities: taking hostages, bombing houses in Moscow, Volgodonsk, Buinaksk, and attacks on Dagestan. As a response, the Russian government led by V.V. Putin decided to use force in the fight against terrorists.
The Second Chechen War began in September 1999.
She appeared completely different in all major indicators:
By nature and method of conduct;
In relation to it, the population, citizens of the Russian Federation, including the civilian population of Chechnya itself;
In relation to citizens towards the army;
By the number of victims on both sides, including the civilian population;
Media behavior, etc.
The war was caused by the need to ensure security and tranquility in the Caucasus.
60% of the Russian population was for the war. It was a war in the name of protecting the integrity of the country. The Second Chechen War caused a mixed reaction in the world. Public opinion Western countries regarding the second Chechen war was at odds with all-Russian opinion. It is typical for Westerners to perceive the events in Chechnya as Russia’s suppression of an uprising of a small people, and not as the destruction of terrorists. It was widely believed that Russia was guilty of human rights violations and that there was “ethnic cleansing” in Chechnya.
At the same time, the Western media hid the criminal actions of Chechen extremists, kidnapping and trafficking in people, the cultivation of slavery, medieval morals and laws. The Russian government made it clear to world public opinion that the actions of the federal troops are aimed, first of all, at carrying out a counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus. When entering the second Chechen war, Russia also took into account the fact that Turkey, the United States and NATO are pursuing their own interests in this region.
The group of federal forces in Chechnya numbered 90 thousand people, of which about 70 thousand were in military service, the rest served under contract. According to press reports, the number of militants was 20-25 thousand, the basis of which was 10-15 thousand professional mercenaries. A. Maskhadov was on their side.
By March 2000, the active phase of the Chechen war was over. But now the militants were actively carrying out terrorist attacks and sabotage on the territory of Chechnya, and launched partisan actions. Federal forces Special attention began to focus on intelligence. Cooperation between the army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs was established.
By mid-2000, federal troops defeated most of the organized combat forces of the separatists and took control of almost all the cities and villages of Chechnya. Then the bulk of the military units were withdrawn from the territory of the republic, and power there passed from the military commandant’s offices to the Chechen Administration created by decree of the President of the Russian Federation and its local bodies. They were led by Chechens. A huge work has begun to revive the economy and culture of the republic from the ruins and ashes.
However, this creative work began to be hampered by the remnants of militant gangs who had taken refuge in the inaccessible mountainous areas of Chechnya. They adopted the tactics of sabotage and terrorism, systematically organizing explosions on roads from around the corner, killing employees of the Chechen Administration and Russian military personnel. Only in the first half of 2001. More than 230 terrorist attacks were carried out, resulting in the death of hundreds of people.
At the beginning of the 21st century, the Russian leadership continued its policy of establishing peaceful life on Chechen soil. The task was set to shortest terms solve the problem of restoring socio-economic life and constitutional authorities in Chechnya. And in general, this task is being successfully accomplished.
Fights around the building of the former Republican Committee of the CPSU ("Presidential Palace") in Grozny, January 1995
The First Chechen War (officially called “Restoration of Constitutional Order in the Chechen Republic”, other names - “Chechen Conflict”, “First Chechen Campaign”) - the common name for military operations in Chechnya and border regions North Caucasus between Russian troops (Armed Forces and Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria with the aim of taking control of the territory of Chechnya, on which the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was proclaimed in 1991.
Officially, the conflict was defined as “measures to maintain constitutional order”; military actions were called the “first Chechen war”, less often the “Russian-Chechen” or “Russian-Caucasian war”. The conflict and the events preceding it were characterized by a large number of casualties among the population, military and law enforcement agencies, and facts of ethnic cleansing of the non-Chechen population in Chechnya were noted.
Background to the conflict
With the beginning of perestroika, various nationalist movements intensified in various republics of the Soviet Union, including Checheno-Ingushetia. One of such organizations was the National Congress of the Chechen People (NCCHN), created in 1990, which set as its goal the secession of Chechnya from the USSR and the creation of an independent Chechen state. It was headed by a former Soviet general Air Force Dzhokhar Dudayev.
"Chechen Revolution" 1991
On June 8, 1991, at the II session of the OKCHN, Dudayev proclaimed the independence of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-cho, thus creating dual power in the republic.
During the events of August 19-21, 1991 in Moscow, the leadership of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic supported the State Emergency Committee. Having assessed the situation, on September 6, 1991, Dudayev announced the dissolution of republican government structures, accusing Russia of “colonial” policies. On the same day, Dudayev’s supporters stormed the building Supreme Council, television center and Radio House. More than 40 deputies were beaten, and the chairman of the Grozny City Council, Vitaly Kutsenko, was killed by being thrown out of a window. On this issue, the head of the Chechen Republic Zavgaev D.G. spoke in 1996 at a meeting of the State Duma:
“...The war began when Vitaly Kutsenko, chairman of the Grozny City Council, was killed in broad daylight...”
The Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, Ruslan Khasbulatov, then sent them a telegram: “Dear fellow countrymen! I was pleased to learn about the resignation of the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic. A favorable political situation has finally emerged, when the democratic processes taking place in the republic are freed from obvious and secret fetters...”
After the collapse of the USSR, Dzhokhar Dudayev announced the final secession of Chechnya from the Russian Federation.
On October 27, 1991, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in the republic under the control of separatists, and Dzhokhar Dudayev became the President of the republic. On November 2, 1991, the Fifth Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR declared these elections illegal. Later the chairman expressed the same opinion constitutional court V. D. Zorkin.
On November 7, 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the Decree “On the introduction of a state of emergency in the Chechen-Ingush Republic (1991).”
Separatist supporters surrounded the buildings of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB, military camps, and blocked railway and air hubs. In the end, the introduction of a state of emergency was thwarted; the Decree “On the introduction of a state of emergency in the Chechen-Ingush Republic (1991)” was canceled on November 11, three days after its signing, after a heated discussion at a meeting of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR and from the republic The withdrawal of Russian military units and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs began, which was finally completed by the summer of 1992. The separatists began seizing and looting military warehouses.
In June 1992, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev ordered the transfer of half of all weapons and ammunition available in the republic to the Dudayevites. According to him, this was a forced step, since a significant part of the “transferred” weapons had already been captured, and there was no way to remove the rest due to the lack of soldiers and trains. First Deputy Prime Minister of the Government Oleg Lobov at a plenary meeting of the State Duma explained the situation with the appearance of a large number of weapons among the population of Chechnya:
“...in 1991, a huge amount of weapons was partially transferred, and partially (and mostly) seized by force during the withdrawal of troops from the Chechen Republic. It was a period of reorganization. The number of these weapons amounts to tens of thousands of units, and they are dispersed throughout the Chechen Republic...”
Collapse of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (1991-1993)
The victory of the separatists in Grozny led to the collapse of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Malgobek, Nazranovsky and most of the Sunzhensky district of the former Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic formed the Republic of Ingushetia within the Russian Federation. Legally, the Chechen-Ingush Republic ceased to exist on January 9, 1993.
The exact border between Chechnya and Ingushetia has not been demarcated and has not yet been determined (2017). During the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in November 1992, Russian troops were introduced into the Prigorodny region of North Ossetia. Relations between Russia and Chechnya have deteriorated sharply. The Russian high command proposed at the same time solving the “Chechen problem” by force, but then the deployment of troops into the territory of Chechnya was prevented by the efforts of Yegor Gaidar.
Period of de facto independence (1991-1994)
As a result, Chechnya became a virtually independent state, but not legally recognized by any country, including Russia. The Republic had state symbols- flag, coat of arms and anthem, authorities - president, parliament, government, secular courts. It was planned to create the Armed Forces, as well as the introduction of its own state currency - nahar. In the constitution adopted on March 12, 1992, the CRI was characterized as an “independent secular state”; its government refused to sign a federal agreement with the Russian Federation.
In fact, government system CRI turned out to be extremely ineffective and rapidly became criminalized in the period 1991-1994.
In 1992-1993, over 600 intentional murders were committed on the territory of Chechnya. During the period of 1993, at the Grozny branch of the North Caucasus Railway, 559 trains were subjected to an armed attack with the complete or partial looting of about 4 thousand cars and containers worth 11.5 billion rubles. Over 8 months of 1994, 120 armed attacks were carried out, as a result of which 1,156 wagons and 527 containers were looted. Losses amounted to more than 11 billion rubles. In 1992-1994, 26 railway workers were killed as a result of armed attacks. The current situation forced the Russian government to decide to stop traffic through the territory of Chechnya from October 1994.
A special trade was the production of false advice notes, from which more than 4 trillion rubles were received. Hostage-taking and slave trade flourished in the republic - according to Rosinformtsentr, a total of 1,790 people have been kidnapped and illegally held in Chechnya since 1992.
Even after this, when Dudayev stopped paying taxes to the general budget and banned employees of the Russian special services from entering the republic, the federal center continued to transfer funds from the budget to Chechnya. In 1993, 11.5 billion rubles were allocated for Chechnya. Russian oil continued to flow into Chechnya until 1994, but it was not paid for and was resold abroad.
1993 political crisis
In the spring of 1993, the contradictions between President Dudayev and the parliament sharply worsened in the CRI. On April 17, 1993, Dudayev announced the dissolution of parliament, the constitutional court and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On June 4, armed Dudayevites under the command of Shamil Basayev seized the building of the Grozny City Council, where meetings of the parliament and the constitutional court were held; Thus, a coup d'état took place in the CRI. The constitution adopted last year was amended and a regime of Dudayev's personal power was established in the republic, which lasted until August 1994, when legislative powers were returned to parliament.
Formation of the anti-Dudaev opposition (1993-1994)
After the coup d'etat on June 4, 1993, in the northern regions of Chechnya, not controlled by the separatist government in Grozny, an armed anti-Dudaev opposition was formed, which began an armed struggle against the Dudayev regime. The first opposition organization was the Committee of National Salvation (KNS), which carried out several armed actions, but was soon defeated and disintegrated. It was replaced by the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic (VCCR), headed by Umar Avturkhanov, which declared itself the only legitimate authority on the territory of Chechnya. The VSChR was recognized as such by the Russian authorities, who provided it with all kinds of support (including weapons and volunteers).
Beginning of the Civil War (1994)
Since the summer of 1994, Chechnya has developed fighting between troops loyal to Dudayev and forces of the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic opposed to Dudayev, unofficially supported by Russia. Troops loyal to Dudayev carried out offensive operations in the Nadterechny and Urus-Martan regions controlled by opposition troops. They were accompanied by significant losses on both sides; tanks, artillery and mortars were used.
The forces of the parties were approximately equal, and neither of them was able to gain the upper hand in the fight.
On November 26, the opposition unsuccessfully stormed Grozny for the third time. At the same time, a number of Russian military personnel who “fought on the side of the opposition” under a contract with the Federal Counterintelligence Service were captured by Dudayev’s supporters.
Progress of the war
Deployment of troops (December 1994)
At that time, the use of the expression “the entry of Russian troops into Chechnya,” according to journalist Alexander Nevzorov, was, to a greater extent, caused by journalistic terminological confusion - Chechnya was part of Russia. At a meeting of the Security Council on November 29, Minister of Nationalities Nikolai Egorov said that 70% of Chechens would support the entry of troops and would sprinkle flour on the road for Russian soldiers, while the remaining 30% would be neutral.
Even before any decision was announced by the Russian authorities, on December 1, Russian aviation attacked the Kalinovskaya and Khankala airfields and disabled all aircraft at the disposal of the separatists. On December 11, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 “On measures to ensure legality, law and order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic.” Later, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation recognized most of the decrees and resolutions of the government that justified the actions of the federal government in Chechnya as consistent with the Constitution.
The president's decision caused a split in the de facto coalition between the government and the largest parliamentary force at that time - the Democratic Choice of Russia party, led by Yegor Gaidar. The majority of members of the Far Eastern Republic supported Gaidar’s decision to join the opposition and protest against the outbreak of hostilities. Several protests against the start of the war took place in December.
On the day of signing Decree No. 2169, December 11, 1994, units of the United Group of Forces (OGV), consisting of units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops were divided into three groups and entered with three different sides - from the west from North Ossetia through Ingushetia, from the northwest from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia, directly bordering Chechnya, and from the east from the territory of Dagestan. Command of the operation in Chechnya was offered to First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces Eduard Vorobyov, but he refused to lead the operation “due to its complete unpreparedness” and submitted his resignation from the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
The eastern group was blocked in the Khasavyurt region of Dagestan local residents- Akkin Chechens. The western group was also blocked by local residents and came under fire near the village of Barsuki, but using force, they nevertheless broke through into Chechnya. The Mozdok group advanced most successfully, already on December 12 approaching the village of Dolinsky, located 10 km from Grozny.
Near Dolinskoye, Russian troops came under Chechen missile fire artillery installation"Grad" and then entered into battle for this settlement.
A new offensive by OGV units began on December 19. The Vladikavkaz (western) group blocked Grozny from western direction, going around the Sunzhensky ridge. On December 20, the Mozdok (northwestern) group occupied Dolinsky and blocked Grozny from the northwest. The Kizlyar (eastern) group blocked Grozny from the east, and paratroopers of the 104th Airborne Regiment blocked the city from the Argun Gorge. Wherein South part Grozny was not blocked.
Thus, on initial stage combat operations, in the first weeks of the war, Russian troops were able to occupy almost without resistance northern regions Chechnya.
On December 20, the first deputy chief of the Main Command became commander of the United Group of Russian Forces in Chechnya operational management General Staff Armed Forces Russian Federation Anatoly Kvashnin. Pavel Grachev later recalled:
...It so happened that some generals - my assistants, deputies - for various reasons refused or were unable to lead the group and conduct combat operations. I don’t want to give their names... Therefore, I am grateful to the same Army General Kvashnin, who then came up to me and said: “Comrade Minister, if you allow, I am ready to take command...”
In mid-December, federal troops began shelling the suburbs of Grozny, and on December 19 the first bomb attack was carried out on the city center.
Despite the fact that Grozny still remained unblocked from south side, On December 31, 1994, the assault on the city began. About 250 armored vehicles entered the city, extremely vulnerable in street battles. Russian troops were poorly prepared, there was no interaction and coordination between various units, and many soldiers had no combat experience. The troops had aerial photographs of the city, outdated plans of the city in limited quantities. The communications facilities were not equipped with closed-circuit communications equipment, which allowed the enemy to intercept communications. The troops were given an order to occupy only industrial buildings and areas and not to invade the homes of the civilian population.
The western group of troops was stopped, the eastern also retreated and did not take any action until January 2, 1995. In the northern direction, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 131st separate Maykop motorized rifle brigade (more than 300 people), a motorized rifle battalion and a tank company of the 81st Petrakuvsky motorized rifle regiment (10 tanks), under the command of General Pulikovsky, reached the railway station and the Presidential Palace. Federal forces were surrounded - the losses of the battalions of the Maykop brigade, according to official data, amounted to 85 people killed and 72 missing, 20 tanks were destroyed, the brigade commander Colonel Savin was killed, more than 100 military personnel were captured. The reinforced battalion of the Petrakuvsky Motorized Rifle Regiment also suffered heavy losses - by the end of January 1, 30% of its payroll remained.
The eastern group under the command of General Rokhlin was also surrounded and bogged down in battles with separatist units, but nevertheless, Rokhlin did not give the order to retreat.
On January 7, 1995, the Northeast and North groupings were united under the command of General Rokhlin, and Ivan Babichev became commander of the West grouping.
Russian troops changed tactics - now, instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, they used maneuverable air assault groups supported by artillery and aviation. Fierce street fighting broke out in Grozny.
Two groups moved to the Presidential Palace and by January 9 occupied the building of the Oil Institute and the Grozny airport. By January 19, these groups met in the center of Grozny and captured the Presidential Palace, but detachments of Chechen separatists retreated across the Sunzha River and took up defensive positions on Minutka Square. Despite the successful offensive, Russian troops controlled only about a third of the city at that time.
By the beginning of February, the strength of the OGV was increased to 70,000 people. General Anatoly Kulikov became the new commander of the OGV.
Only on February 3, 1995, the “South” group was formed and the implementation of the plan to blockade Grozny from the south began. By February 9, Russian units reached the line of the Rostov-Baku federal highway.
On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between the commander of the OGV Anatoly Kulikov and the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI Aslan Maskhadov on concluding a temporary truce - the parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, and both sides were given the opportunity to remove the dead and wounded from the streets of the city. The truce, however, was violated by both sides.
In the 20th of February, street fighting continued in the city (especially in its southern part), but the Chechen troops, deprived of support, gradually retreated from the city.
Finally, on March 6, 1995, a detachment of militants of the Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev retreated from Chernorechye, the last area of Grozny controlled by the separatists, and the city finally came under the control of Russian troops.
A pro-Russian administration of Chechnya was formed in Grozny, headed by Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov.
As a result of the assault on Grozny, the city was virtually destroyed and turned into ruins.
Destroyed Russian infantry fighting vehicle in Grozny, January 1995
Establishing control over the lowland regions of Chechnya (March - April 1995)
After the assault on Grozny, the main task of the Russian troops was to establish control over the lowland areas of the rebellious republic.
The Russian side began to conduct active negotiations with the population, convincing local residents to expel the militants from their settlements. At the same time, Russian units occupied commanding heights above villages and cities. Thanks to this, Argun was taken on March 15-23, and the cities of Shali and Gudermes were taken without a fight on March 30 and 31, respectively. However, the militant groups were not destroyed and freely left populated areas.
Despite this, local battles took place in the western regions of Chechnya. On March 10, fighting began for the village of Bamut. On April 7-8, a combined detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, consisting of the Sofrinsky brigade of internal troops and supported by SOBR and OMON detachments, entered the village of Samashki (Achkhoy-Martan district of Chechnya). It was alleged that the village was defended by more than 300 people (the so-called “Abkhaz battalion” of Shamil Basayev). After Russian soldiers entered the village, some residents who had weapons began to resist, and shootouts broke out on the streets of the village.
According to a number international organizations(in particular, the UN Commission on Human Rights - UNCHR) many civilians died during the battle for Samashki. This information, disseminated by the separatist agency Chechen Press, however, turned out to be quite contradictory - thus, according to representatives of the Memorial human rights center, this data “does not inspire confidence.” According to Memorial, the minimum number of civilians killed during the clearing of the village was 112-114 people.
One way or another, this operation caused a great resonance in Russian society and strengthened anti-Russian sentiments in Chechnya.
On April 15-16, the decisive assault on Bamut began - Russian troops managed to enter the village and gain a foothold on the outskirts. Then, however, Russian troops were forced to leave the village, as the militants now occupied commanding heights above the village, using old missile silos of the Strategic Missile Forces, designed for waging a nuclear war and invulnerable to Russian aircraft. A series of battles for this village continued until June 1995, then the battles were suspended after the terrorist attack in Budennovsk and resumed in February 1996.
By April 1995, Russian troops occupied almost the entire flat territory of Chechnya and the separatists focused on sabotage and guerrilla operations.
Establishing control over the mountainous regions of Chechnya (May - June 1995)
From April 28 to May 11, 1995, the Russian side announced a suspension of hostilities on its part.
The offensive resumed only on May 12. The attacks of Russian troops fell on the villages of Chiri-Yurt, which covered the entrance to the Argun Gorge, and Serzhen-Yurt, located at the entrance to the Vedenskoye Gorge. Despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, Russian troops were bogged down in enemy defenses - it took General Shamanov a week of shelling and bombing to take Chiri-Yurt.
Under these conditions, the Russian command decided to change the direction of the attack - instead of Shatoy to Vedeno. The militant units were pinned down in the Argun Gorge and on June 3 Vedeno was taken by Russian troops, and on June 12 the regional centers of Shatoy and Nozhai-Yurt were taken.
Just as in the lowland areas, the separatist forces were not defeated and they were able to leave the abandoned settlements. Therefore, even during the “truce”, the militants were able to transfer a significant part of their forces to the northern regions - on May 14, the city of Grozny was shelled by them more than 14 times.
On June 14, 1995, a group of Chechen militants, numbering 195 people, led by field commander Shamil Basayev, entered the territory of the Stavropol Territory in trucks and stopped in the city of Budyonnovsk.
The first target of the attack was the building of the city police department, then the terrorists occupied the city hospital and herded captured civilians into it. In total, there were about 2,000 hostages in the hands of terrorists. Basayev put forward demands to the Russian authorities - a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, negotiations with Dudayev through the mediation of UN representatives in exchange for the release of hostages.
Under these conditions, the authorities decided to storm the hospital building. Due to an information leak, the terrorists managed to prepare to repel the assault, which lasted four hours; As a result, the special forces recaptured all buildings (except the main one), freeing 95 hostages. Special forces losses amounted to three people killed. On the same day, an unsuccessful second assault attempt was made.
After the failure of forceful actions to free the hostages, negotiations began between the then head of the Russian government, Viktor Chernomyrdin, and field commander Shamil Basayev. The terrorists were provided with buses, on which they, along with 120 hostages, arrived in the Chechen village of Zandak, where the hostages were released.
The total losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 143 people (of which 46 were law enforcement officers) and 415 wounded, terrorist losses - 19 killed and 20 wounded.
The situation in the republic in June-December 1995
After the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk, from June 19 to 22, the first round of negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides took place in Grozny, at which it was possible to achieve the introduction of a moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period.
From June 27 to 30, the second stage of negotiations took place there, at which an agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners “all for all,” the disarmament of the CRI detachments, the withdrawal of Russian troops and the holding of free elections.
Despite all the agreements concluded, the ceasefire regime was violated by both sides. Chechen detachments returned to their villages, but no longer as members of illegal armed groups, but as “self-defense units.” Local battles took place throughout Chechnya. For some time, the tensions that arose could be resolved through negotiations. Thus, on August 18-19, Russian troops blocked Achkhoy-Martan; the situation was resolved at negotiations in Grozny.
On August 21, a detachment of militants of the field commander Alaudi Khamzatov captured Argun, but after heavy shelling by Russian troops, they left the city, into which Russian armored vehicles were then introduced.
In September, Achkhoy-Martan and Sernovodsk were blocked by Russian troops, since militant detachments were located in these settlements. The Chechen side refused to leave their occupied positions, since, according to them, these were “self-defense units” that had the right to remain in accordance with previously reached agreements.
On October 6, 1995, an assassination attempt was made on the commander of the United Group of Forces (OGV), General Romanov, as a result of which he ended up in a coma. In turn, “retaliation strikes” were carried out against Chechen villages.
On October 8, an unsuccessful attempt was made to eliminate Dudayev - an air strike was carried out on the village of Roshni-Chu. More than 40 houses were destroyed in the village, 6 were killed and 15 local residents were injured.
The Russian leadership decided before the elections to replace the leaders of the pro-Russian administration of the republic, Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov, with the last chairman of the Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Doku Zavgaev.
On December 10-12, the city of Gudermes, occupied by Russian troops without resistance, was captured by the detachments of Salman Raduev, Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov and Sultan Gelikhanov. On December 14-20, there were battles for this city; it took Russian troops about another week of “cleansing operations” to finally take control of Gudermes.
On December 14-17, elections were held in Chechnya, which were held with a large number of violations, but were nevertheless recognized as valid. Separatist supporters announced in advance their boycott and non-recognition of the elections. Doku Zavgaev won the elections, receiving over 90% of the votes; At the same time, all UGA military personnel participated in the elections.
On January 9, 1996, a detachment of militants numbering 256 people under the command of field commanders Salman Raduev, Turpal-Ali Atgeriyev and Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov carried out a raid on the city of Kizlyar. The militants' initial target was a Russian helicopter base and weapons depot. The terrorists destroyed two Mi-8 transport helicopters and took several hostages from among the military personnel guarding the base. Russian military and law enforcement agencies began to approach the city, so the terrorists seized the hospital and maternity hospital, driving about 3,000 more civilians there. This time Russian authorities they did not give the order to storm the hospital, so as not to strengthen anti-Russian sentiments in Dagestan. During the negotiations, it was possible to agree on providing the militants with buses to the border with Chechnya in exchange for the release of the hostages, who were supposed to be dropped off at the very border. On January 10, a convoy with militants and hostages moved towards the border. When it became clear that the terrorists would go to Chechnya, the bus convoy was stopped with warning shots. Taking advantage of the confusion of the Russian leadership, the militants captured the village of Pervomaiskoye, disarming the police checkpoint located there. Negotiations took place from January 11 to 14, and an unsuccessful assault on the village took place on January 15-18. In parallel with the assault on Pervomaisky, on January 16, in the Turkish port of Trabzon, a group of terrorists seized the passenger ship "Avrasia" with threats to shoot Russian hostages if the assault was not stopped. After two days of negotiations, the terrorists surrendered to the Turkish authorities.
The losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 78 people killed and several hundred wounded.
On March 6, 1996, several groups of militants attacked Grozny, controlled by Russian troops, from various directions. The militants captured the Staropromyslovsky district of the city, blocked and fired at Russian checkpoints and checkpoints. Despite the fact that Grozny remained under the control of the Russian armed forces, the separatists took with them supplies of food, medicine and ammunition when they retreated. The losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 70 people killed and 259 wounded.
On April 16, 1996, a column of the 245th motorized rifle regiment of the Russian Armed Forces, moving to Shatoi, was ambushed in the Argun Gorge near the village of Yaryshmardy. The operation was led by field commander Khattab. The militants knocked out the leading and trailing column of the vehicle, so the column was blocked and suffered significant losses - all armored vehicles and half of the personnel were lost.
From the very beginning of the Chechen campaign, Russian special services have repeatedly tried to eliminate the President of the Chechen Republic, Dzhokhar Dudayev. Attempts to send assassins ended in failure. It was possible to find out that Dudayev often talks on a satellite phone of the Inmarsat system.
On April 21, 1996, a Russian A-50 AWACS aircraft, which was equipped with equipment for bearing a satellite phone signal, received an order to take off. At the same time, Dudayev’s motorcade left for the area of the village of Gekhi-Chu. Unfolding his phone, Dudayev contacted Konstantin Borov. At that moment, the signal from the phone was intercepted, and two Su-25 attack aircraft took off. When the planes reached the target, two missiles were fired at the motorcade, one of which hit the target directly.
By a closed decree of Boris Yeltsin, several military pilots were awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation.
Negotiations with the separatists (May-July 1996)
Despite some successes of the Russian Armed Forces (the successful liquidation of Dudayev, the final capture of the settlements of Goiskoye, Stary Achkhoy, Bamut, Shali), the war began to take a protracted character. In the context of the upcoming presidential elections, the Russian leadership decided to once again negotiate with the separatists.
On May 27-28, a meeting of the Russian and Ichkerian (headed by Zelimkhan Yandarbiev) delegations was held in Moscow, at which it was possible to agree on a truce from June 1, 1996 and an exchange of prisoners. Immediately after the end of the negotiations in Moscow, Boris Yeltsin flew to Grozny, where he congratulated the Russian military on their victory over the “rebellious Dudayev regime” and announced the abolition of conscription.
On June 10, in Nazran (Republic of Ingushetia), during the next round of negotiations, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya (with the exception of two brigades), the disarmament of separatist detachments, and the holding of free democratic elections. The question of the status of the republic was temporarily postponed.
The agreements concluded in Moscow and Nazran were violated by both sides, in particular, the Russian side was in no hurry to withdraw its troops, and the Chechen field commander Ruslan Khaikhoroev took responsibility for the explosion of a regular bus in Nalchik.
On July 3, 1996, the current President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, was re-elected to the presidency. The new Secretary of the Security Council, Alexander Lebed, announced the resumption of hostilities against militants.
On July 9, after the Russian ultimatum, hostilities resumed - aircraft attacked militant bases in the mountainous Shatoi, Vedeno and Nozhai-Yurt regions.
On August 6, 1996, detachments of Chechen separatists numbering from 850 to 2000 people again attacked Grozny. The separatists did not aim to capture the city; they were blocked administrative buildings in the city center, and checkpoints and checkpoints were also fired upon. The Russian garrison under the command of General Pulikovsky, despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, was unable to hold the city, suffering significant losses (over 2,000 military personnel killed, missing and wounded).
Simultaneously with the assault on Grozny, the separatists also captured the cities of Gudermes (they took it without a fight) and Argun (Russian troops only held the commandant’s office building).
According to Oleg Lukin, it was the defeat of Russian troops in Grozny that led to the signing of the Khasavyurt ceasefire agreements.
On August 31, 1996, representatives of Russia (Chairman of the Security Council Alexander Lebed) and Ichkeria (Aslan Maskhadov) signed a truce agreement in the city of Khasavyurt (Dagestan). Russian troops were completely withdrawn from Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed until December 31, 2001.
Peacekeeping initiatives and activities of humanitarian organizations
On December 15, 1994, the “Mission of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the North Caucasus” began to operate in the conflict zone, which included deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation and a representative of Memorial (later called the “Mission public organizations under the leadership of S. A. Kovalev”). “Kovalyov’s Mission” did not have official powers, but acted with the support of several human rights public organizations, coordinated the work of the Mission human rights center"Memorial".
Since December 1994, the Democratic Choice of Russia party and its leader Yegor Gaidar have taken an active anti-war position. A number of anti-war rallies are being held in Moscow with calls to curtail the military operation, and various military appeals are being signed. Including E. Gaidar (who, in the days before the start of the war, according to his own statement, for the first time could not get through to B. Yeltsin), wrote a letter to the president on December 17, 1994, where he states that “the assault and bombing of Grozny will lead to huge casualties” and calls on the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to “prevent an escalation of hostilities in Chechnya.” On December 20, Yegor Gaidar also initiated the collection of letters from all those opposed to the war in Chechnya in the hope that a large volume of statements from citizens could influence the president’s decision. The newspaper published a text with a “template” letter to the president.
On December 31, 1994, on the eve of the storming of Grozny by Russian troops, Sergei Kovalev, as part of a group of State Duma deputies and journalists, negotiated with Chechen militants and parliamentarians in the presidential palace in Grozny. When the assault began and Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers began to burn in the square in front of the palace, civilians took refuge in the basement of the presidential palace, and soon wounded and captured Russian soldiers began to appear there. Correspondent Danila Galperovich recalled that Kovalev, being among the militants at Dzhokhar Dudayev’s headquarters, “almost all the time was in a basement room equipped with army radio stations,” offering Russian tank crews “an exit from the city without shooting if they indicate the route.” According to journalist Galina Kovalskaya, who was also there, after they were shown burning Russian tanks in the city center,
Sergei Kovalev took a walkie-talkie from Dudayev’s guards and used it to call on Russian military personnel to surrender. For this, Kovalev will later be declared a “traitor”, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev will persuade him and General Troshev will remember him with an unkind word in his book. However, at that moment all of us, including Kovalev, saw one thing: our guys were burning in tanks in vain. Captivity is the only way for them to survive.
Kovalev himself denies the veracity of Kovalskaya’s testimony: “I technically could not do this, because in order to tell these tanks by radio, you need to have a radio tuned to the wavelength of these tanks.”
According to the Institute of Human Rights, headed by Kovalev, this episode, as well as Kovalev’s entire human rights and anti-war position, became the reason for a negative reaction from the military leadership, representatives state power, as well as numerous supporters of the “state” approach to human rights. In January 1995, the State Duma adopted a draft resolution in which his work in Chechnya was recognized as unsatisfactory: as Kommersant wrote, “due to his “unilateral position” aimed at justifying illegal armed groups.”
In March 1995, the State Duma removed Kovalev from the post of Commissioner for Human Rights in Russia, according to Kommersant, “for his statements against the war in Chechnya.”
As part of the “Kovalyov mission”, representatives of various non-governmental organizations, deputies, and journalists traveled to the conflict zone. The mission was collecting information about what was happening in the Chechen war and searching for missing persons and prisoners; contributed to the release of Russian military personnel captured by Chechen militants. For example, the Kommersant newspaper reported that during the siege of the village of Bamut by Russian troops, the commander of militant detachments, Khaikharoev, promised to execute five prisoners after each shelling of the village by Russian troops, but under the influence of Sergei Kovalev, who participated in negotiations with field commanders, Khaikharoev abandoned these intentions.
Since the beginning of the conflict, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has launched an extensive relief program, providing more than 250,000 internally displaced people with food parcels, blankets, soap, warm clothing and plastic coverings in the first months. In February 1995, of the 120,000 residents remaining in Grozny, 70,000 were completely dependent on ICRC assistance.
In Grozny, the water supply and sewer systems were completely destroyed, and the ICRC hastily began organizing supplies for the city drinking water. In the summer of 1995, approximately 750,000 liters of chlorinated water were delivered daily by tanker truck to meet the needs of more than 100,000 residents at 50 distribution points throughout Grozny. The following year, 1996, more than 230 million liters were produced drinking water for residents of the North Caucasus.
In Grozny and other cities of Chechnya, free canteens were opened for the most vulnerable segments of the population, in which 7,000 people were provided with hot food every day. More than 70,000 schoolchildren in Chechnya received books and school supplies from the ICRC.
During 1995-1996, the ICRC implemented a number of assistance programs for victims of the armed conflict. Its delegates visited about 700 people detained by federal forces and Chechen fighters in 25 places of detention in Chechnya itself and neighboring regions, delivered more than 50,000 letters to the recipients on Red Cross message forms, which became the only opportunity for separated families to establish contacts with each other, so how all forms of communication were interrupted. The ICRC provided medicines and medical supplies to 75 hospitals and medical institutions in Chechnya, North Ossetia, Ingushetia and Dagestan, participated in the reconstruction and provision of medicines to hospitals in Grozny, Argun, Gudermes, Shali, Urus-Martan and Shatoy, and provided regular assistance to homes for the disabled and orphanages shelters.
In the fall of 1996, in the village of Novye Atagi, the ICRC equipped and opened a hospital for war victims. During the three months of operation, the hospital received more than 320 people, 1,700 people received outpatient care, and almost six hundred surgical operations. On December 17, 1996, an armed attack was carried out on a hospital in Novye Atagi, as a result of which six of its foreign employees were killed. After this, the ICRC was forced to withdraw foreign staff from Chechnya.
In April 1995, American humanitarian specialist Frederick Cuney, together with two Russian doctors from the Russian Red Cross Society and a translator, was organizing humanitarian aid in Chechnya. Cuney was trying to negotiate a truce when he went missing. There is reason to believe that Cuney and his Russian associates were captured by Chechen militants and executed on the orders of Rezvan Elbiev, one of the heads of counterintelligence of Dzhokhar Dudayev, because they were mistaken for Russian agents. There is a version that this was the result of a provocation by the Russian special services, who thus dealt with Cuney at the hands of the Chechens.
Various women's movements ("Soldiers' Mothers", "White Shawl", "Women of the Don" and others) worked with military personnel - participants in combat operations, released prisoners of war, wounded, and other categories of victims during military operations.
Journalist and human rights activist Viktor Popkov contributed to the release of captured Russian soldiers by the Chechens; in March 1995 he took part in organizing a “peace march”, when several dozen people, mostly mothers dead soldiers, drove and marched under anti-war slogans from Moscow to Chechnya. In May 1995, he was arrested by Chechen special services on suspicion of espionage for federal forces and spent about a month in prison. In the summer of the same year, he was a mediator and observer in the negotiation process that had begun.
Yuri Shevchuk and his rock band DDT gave three big concerts in Chechnya: in Khankala, Grozny and Severny airport for Russian military personnel and Chechens, trying to achieve reconciliation.
Foreign military assistance to Chechen separatists
Chechen anti-government formations began receiving military assistance even before the start of hostilities in Chechnya.
In 1991, the first batch of Soviet-style small arms was delivered from Turkey under the guise of “humanitarian aid” to Chechnya (mainly weapons produced by the GDR, which Turkey had previously received from Germany under the NATO assistance program).
Results
The result of the war was the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and the withdrawal of Russian troops. Chechnya again became a de facto independent state, but de jure not recognized by any country in the world (including Russia).
Destroyed houses and villages were not restored, the economy was exclusively criminal, however, it was criminal not only in Chechnya, so, according to former deputy Konstantin Borovoy, bribes in the construction business under contracts of the Ministry of Defense, during the First Chechen War, reached 80% from the contract amount. Due to ethnic cleansing and fighting, almost the entire non-Chechen population left Chechnya (or was killed). The interwar crisis and the rise of Wahhabism began in the republic, which later led to the invasion of Dagestan, and then to the beginning of the Second Chechen War.
Losses
According to data released by the OGV headquarters after the end of hostilities, the losses of Russian troops amounted to 4,103 killed, 1,231 missing/deserted/prisoned, and 19,794 wounded. According to updated data collected by a group of researchers led by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev, the losses of the federal forces amounted to 5,042 killed, 510 missing, and 16,098 wounded. According to the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, the losses amounted to at least 14,000 people killed (documented deaths according to the mothers of deceased servicemen). However, it should be borne in mind that the data from the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers includes only the losses of conscript soldiers, without taking into account the losses of contract soldiers, special forces soldiers, etc.
The losses of the militants, according to the Russian side, amounted to 17,391 people. According to the chief of staff of the Chechen units (later President of the ChRI) A. Maskhadov, the losses of the Chechen side amounted to about 3,000 people killed. According to the human rights organization Memorial, the losses of the militants did not exceed 2,700 people killed, and the number of civilian casualties was up to 50 thousand people killed. Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation A.I. Lebed estimated the losses of the civilian population of Chechnya at 80,000 dead.
The article briefly talks about the first Chechen war (1994-1996), which was waged by Russia on the territory of Chechnya. The conflict led to heavy losses among Russian military personnel, as well as among the Chechen civilian population.
- The course of the first Chechen war
- Results of the first Chechen war
Causes of the first Chechen war
- As a result of the events of 1991 and the secession of republics from the USSR, similar processes began in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The nationalist movement in the republic was led by former Soviet general D. Dudayev. In 1991, he proclaimed the creation of the independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CRI). A coup d'etat took place, as a result of which representatives of the previous government were overthrown. The nationalists took over the main government institutions. Boris Yeltsin's introduction of a state of emergency in the republic could no longer change anything. The withdrawal of Russian troops begins.
CRI was an unrecognized republic not only in Russia, but throughout the world. Power relied on military force and criminal structures. The sources of income for the new government were the slave trade, robberies, and trade in drugs and oil from the Russian pipeline passing through the territory of Chechnya. - In 1993, D. Dudayev carried out another coup d'etat, dispersing parliament and the constitutional court. The constitution adopted after this established the regime of personal power of D. Dudayev.
On the territory of the CRI, opposition to the government arises in the form of the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic. Council enjoys support Russian government, it turns out to him material aid, Russian special forces are dispatched to provide support. Military clashes between Dudayev’s detachments and representatives of the opposition take place.
The course of the first Chechen war
- Even before the official declaration of hostilities in early December 1991, Russian aviation launched a massive attack on Chechen airfields, destroying all enemy aircraft. B. Yeltsin signs a decree on the start of hostilities. The Russian army begins an invasion of Chechnya. During the first weeks, all northern Chechen regions came under Russian control, and Grozny was practically surrounded.
- From the end of December 1994 to March 1995. Grozny was stormed. Despite the significant superiority in numbers and weapons Russian army suffered heavy losses, and the assault took for a long time. In the conditions of street fighting, the heavy equipment of the Russian army did not pose a serious threat; the militants easily destroyed tanks with grenade launchers. The soldiers for the most part were untrained, there were no maps of the city, and there was no established communication between the units. Already during the assault, the Russian command changes tactics. With the support of artillery and aviation, the offensive is carried out by small air assault groups. The widespread use of artillery and bombing turns Grozny into ruins. In March, the last groups of militants leave it. Pro-Russian authorities are being created in the city.
- After a series of battles, the Russian army captures key regions and cities of Chechnya. However, retreating in time, the militants do not suffer serious losses. The war takes on a partisan character. Militants carry out terrorist attacks and surprise attacks on Russian army positions throughout Chechnya. In response, airstrikes are carried out, during which civilians often die. This causes hatred towards Russian forces, the population provides assistance to the militants. The situation was complicated by terrorist attacks in Budennovsk (1995) and Kizlyar (1996), during which many civilians and soldiers died, and the militants suffered virtually no losses.
- In April 1996, D. Dudayev was killed as a result of an airstrike, but this no longer affected the course of the war.
- On the eve of the presidential elections, Boris Yeltsin, for political purposes, decided to agree to a truce in a war that was unpopular among the people. In June 1996, an agreement was signed on a truce, the disarmament of the separatists and the withdrawal of Russian troops, but neither side fulfilled the terms of the agreement.
- Immediately after winning the elections, Boris Yeltsin announced the resumption of hostilities. In August, militants storm Grozny. Despite superior forces, Russian troops were unable to hold the city. A number of other settlements were captured by the separatists.
- The fall of Grozny led to the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements. The Russian army was withdrawing from Chechnya, the question of the status of the republic was postponed for five years.
Results of the first Chechen war
- The Chechen war was supposed to put an end to illegal power on the territory of the republic. In general, successful military operations at the first stage of the war, the capture of Grozny did not lead to victory. Moreover, significant losses among Russian troops made the war extremely unpopular in Russia. The widespread use of aviation and artillery was accompanied by casualties among civilians, as a result of which the war acquired a protracted, partisan character. Russian troops held only large centers and were constantly attacked.
- The goal of the war was not achieved. After the withdrawal of Russian troops, power was again in the hands of criminal and nationalist groups.
First Chechen War |
|
Chechnya, also partially Ingushetia, Dagestan, Stavropol Territory |
|
Khasavyurt agreements, withdrawal of federal troops from Chechnya. |
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Territorial changes: |
De facto independence of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. |
Opponents |
|
Russian Armed Forces |
Chechen separatists |
Internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia |
|
Commanders |
|
Boris Yeltsin |
Dzhokhar Dudayev † |
Strengths of the parties |
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95,000 troops (February 1995) |
3,000 (Republican Guard), 27,000 (regulars and militia) |
Military losses |
|
About 5,500 dead and missing (according to official figures) |
17,391 dead and prisoners (Russian data) |
First Chechen War (Chechen conflict 1994-1996, First Chechen campaign, Restoration of constitutional order in the Chechen Republic) - fighting between Russian government forces (Armed Forces and Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in Chechnya and some settlements in neighboring regions of the Russian North Caucasus with the aim of taking control of the territory of Chechnya, on which the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was proclaimed in 1991. Often called the “first Chechen war,” although the conflict was officially called “measures to maintain constitutional order.” The conflict and the events preceding it were characterized by a large number of casualties among the population, military and law enforcement agencies, and facts of genocide of the non-Chechen population in Chechnya were noted.
Despite certain military successes of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, the results of this conflict were the defeat and withdrawal of federal troops, mass destruction and casualties, de facto independence of Chechnya until the second Chechen conflict and a wave of terror that swept across Russia.
Background to the conflict
With the beginning of “perestroika” in various republics of the Soviet Union, including Checheno-Ingushetia, various nationalist movements intensified. One of such organizations was the National Congress of the Chechen People, created in 1990, which set as its goal the secession of Chechnya from the USSR and the creation of an independent Chechen state. It was headed former general Soviet Air Force Dzhokhar Dudayev.
"Chechen Revolution" 1991
On June 8, 1991, at the II session of the OKCHN, Dudayev proclaimed the independence of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-cho; Thus, a dual power arose in the republic.
During the “August putsch” in Moscow, the leadership of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic supported the State Emergency Committee. In response to this, on September 6, 1991, Dudayev announced the dissolution of republican government structures, accusing Russia of “colonial” policies. On the same day, Dudayev's guards stormed the building of the Supreme Council, the television center and the Radio House.
More than 40 deputies were beaten, and the chairman of the Grozny City Council, Vitaly Kutsenko, was thrown out of a window, as a result of which he died. The Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, Ruslan Khasbulatov, then sent them a telegram: “I was pleased to learn about the resignation of the Armed Forces of the Republic.” After the collapse of the USSR, Dzhokhar Dudayev announced the final secession of Chechnya from the Russian Federation.
On October 27, 1991, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in the republic under the control of separatists. Dzhokhar Dudayev became the president of the republic. These elections were declared illegal by the Russian Federation.
On November 7, 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree introducing a state of emergency in Checheno-Ingushetia. After these actions by the Russian leadership, the situation in the republic sharply worsened - separatist supporters surrounded the buildings of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB, military camps, and blocked railway and air hubs. In the end, the introduction of a state of emergency was thwarted and the withdrawal of Russian military units and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs from the republic began, which was finally completed by the summer of 1992. The separatists began seizing and looting military warehouses. Dudayev's forces got a lot of weapons: 2 launchers rocket launchers ground forces, 4 tanks, 3 infantry fighting vehicles, 1 armored personnel carrier, 14 lightly armored tractors, 6 aircraft, 60 thousand small automatic weapons and a lot of ammunition. In June 1992, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev ordered the transfer of half of all weapons and ammunition available in the republic to the Dudayevites. According to him, this was a forced step, since a significant part of the “transferred” weapons had already been captured, and there was no way to remove the rest due to the lack of soldiers and trains.
Collapse of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (1991-1992)
The victory of the separatists in Grozny led to the collapse of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Malgobek, Nazranovsky and most of the Sunzhensky district of the former Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic formed the Republic of Ingushetia within the Russian Federation. Legally, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic ceased to exist on December 10, 1992.
The exact border between Chechnya and Ingushetia was not demarcated and has not been determined to this day (2010). During the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in November 1992, Russian troops were introduced into the Prigorodny region of North Ossetia. Relations between Russia and Chechnya have deteriorated sharply. The Russian high command proposed at the same time solving the “Chechen problem” by force, but then the deployment of troops into the territory of Chechnya was prevented by the efforts of Yegor Gaidar.
Period of de facto independence (1991-1994)
As a result, Chechnya became a virtually independent state, but not legally recognized by any country, including Russia. The republic had state symbols - the flag, coat of arms and anthem, authorities - the president, parliament, government, secular courts. It was planned to create a small Armed Forces, as well as the introduction of its own state currency - nahar. In the constitution adopted on March 12, 1992, the CRI was characterized as an “independent secular state”; its government refused to sign a federal agreement with the Russian Federation.
In reality, the state system of the ChRI turned out to be extremely ineffective and rapidly became criminalized in the period 1991-1994.
In 1992-1993, over 600 intentional murders were committed on the territory of Chechnya. During the period of 1993, at the Grozny branch of the North Caucasus Railway, 559 trains were subjected to an armed attack with the complete or partial looting of about 4 thousand cars and containers worth 11.5 billion rubles. During 8 months of 1994, 120 armed attacks were carried out, as a result of which 1,156 wagons and 527 containers were looted. Losses amounted to more than 11 billion rubles. In 1992-1994, 26 railway workers were killed as a result of armed attacks. The current situation forced the Russian government to decide to stop traffic through the territory of Chechnya from October 1994.
A special trade was the production of false advice notes, from which more than 4 trillion rubles were received. Hostage-taking and slave trade flourished in the republic - according to Rosinformtsentr, a total of 1,790 people have been kidnapped and illegally held in Chechnya since 1992.
Even after this, when Dudayev stopped paying taxes to the general budget and banned employees of the Russian special services from entering the republic, the federal center continued to transfer money to Chechnya cash from the budget. In 1993, 11.5 billion rubles were allocated for Chechnya. Russian oil continued to flow into Chechnya until 1994, but it was not paid for and was resold abroad.
The period of Dudayev's rule is characterized by ethnic cleansing against the entire non-Chechen population. In 1991-1994, the non-Chechen (primarily Russian) population of Chechnya was subjected to murders, attacks and threats from Chechens. Many were forced to leave Chechnya, being driven out of their homes, abandoning them or selling their apartments to Chechens at low prices. In 1992 alone, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 250 Russians were killed in Grozny, and 300 went missing. The morgues were filled with unidentified corpses. Widespread anti-Russian propaganda was fueled by relevant literature, direct insults and calls from government platforms, and desecration of Russian cemeteries.
1993 political crisis
In the spring of 1993, the contradictions between President Dudayev and the parliament sharply worsened in the CRI. On April 17, 1993, Dudayev announced the dissolution of parliament, the constitutional court and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On June 4, armed Dudayevites under the command of Shamil Basayev seized the building of the Grozny City Council, where meetings of the parliament and the constitutional court were held; Thus, a coup d'état took place in the CRI. The constitution adopted last year was amended and a regime of Dudayev's personal power was established in the republic, which lasted until August 1994, when legislative powers were returned to parliament.
Formation of the anti-Dudaev opposition (1993-1994)
After the coup d'etat on June 4, 1993, in the northern regions of Chechnya, not controlled by the separatist government in Grozny, an armed anti-Dudaev opposition was formed, which began an armed struggle against the Dudayev regime. The first opposition organization was the Committee of National Salvation (KNS), which carried out several armed actions, but was soon defeated and disintegrated. It was replaced by the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic (VCCR), which declared itself the only legitimate authority on the territory of Chechnya. The VSChR was recognized as such by the Russian authorities, who provided it with all kinds of support (including weapons and volunteers).
Beginning of the Civil War (1994)
Since the summer of 1994, fighting has unfolded in Chechnya between government troops loyal to Dudayev and the forces of the opposition Provisional Council. Troops loyal to Dudayev carried out offensive operations in the Nadterechny and Urus-Martan regions controlled by opposition troops. They were accompanied by significant losses on both sides; tanks, artillery and mortars were used.
The forces of the parties were approximately equal, and neither of them was able to gain the upper hand in the fight.
In Urus-Martan alone in October 1994, Dudayev’s supporters lost 27 people killed, according to the opposition. The operation was planned by the Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI A. Maskhadov. The commander of the opposition detachment in Urus-Martan, B. Gantamirov, lost from 5 to 34 people killed, according to various sources. In Argun in September 1994, the detachment of the opposition field commander R. Labazanov lost 27 people killed. The opposition, in turn, carried out offensive actions in Grozny on September 12 and October 15, 1994, but retreated each time without achieving decisive success, although it did not suffer large losses.
On November 26, the opposition unsuccessfully stormed Grozny for the third time. At the same time, a number of Russian military personnel who “fought on the side of the opposition” under a contract with the Federal Counterintelligence Service were captured by Dudayev’s supporters.
Progress of the war
Deployment of troops (December 1994)
Even before any decision was announced by the Russian authorities, on December 1, Russian aviation attacked the Kalinovskaya and Khankala airfields and disabled all aircraft at the disposal of the separatists. On December 11, 1994, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 “On measures to ensure law, order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic.”
On the same day, units of the United Group of Forces (OGV), consisting of units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops were divided into three groups and entered from three different sides - from the west (from North Ossetia through Ingushetia), northwest (from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia, directly bordering Chechnya) and east (from the territory of Dagestan).
The eastern group was blocked in the Khasavyurt region of Dagestan by local residents - Akkin Chechens. The western group was also blocked by local residents and came under fire near the village of Barsuki, but using force, they nevertheless broke through into Chechnya. The Mozdok group advanced most successfully, already on December 12 approaching the village of Dolinsky, located 10 km from Grozny.
Near Dolinskoye, Russian troops came under fire from a Chechen Grad rocket artillery system and then entered into battle for this populated area.
A new offensive by OGV units began on December 19. The Vladikavkaz (western) group blocked Grozny from the western direction, bypassing the Sunzhensky ridge. On December 20, the Mozdok (northwestern) group occupied Dolinsky and blocked Grozny from the northwest. The Kizlyar (eastern) group blocked Grozny from the east, and paratroopers of the 104th Airborne Division blocked the city from the Argun Gorge. At the same time, the southern part of Grozny was not blocked.
Thus, at the initial stage of hostilities, in the first weeks of the war, Russian troops were able to occupy the northern regions of Chechnya practically without resistance.
Assault on Grozny (December 1994 - March 1995)
Despite the fact that Grozny still remained unblocked on the southern side, on December 31, 1994, the assault on the city began. About 250 armored vehicles entered the city, extremely vulnerable in street battles. Russian troops were poorly prepared, there was no interaction and coordination between various units, and many soldiers had no combat experience. The troops did not even have maps of the city or normal communications.
The western group of troops was stopped, the eastern also retreated and did not take any action until January 2, 1995. In the northern direction, the 131st separate Maykop motorized rifle brigade and the 81st Petrakuv motorized rifle regiment, under the command of General Pulikovsky, reached the railway station and the Presidential Palace. There they were surrounded and defeated - the losses of the Maykop brigade amounted to 85 people killed and 72 missing, 20 tanks were destroyed, the brigade commander Colonel Savin was killed, more than 100 military personnel were captured.
The eastern group under the command of General Rokhlin was also surrounded and bogged down in battles with separatist units, but nevertheless, Rokhlin did not give the order to retreat.
On January 7, 1995, the Northeast and North groupings were united under the command of General Rokhlin, and Ivan Babichev became commander of the West grouping.
Russian troops changed tactics - now, instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, they used maneuverable air assault groups supported by artillery and aviation. Fierce street fighting broke out in Grozny.
Two groups moved to the Presidential Palace and by January 9 occupied the building of the Oil Institute and the Grozny airport. By January 19, these groups met in the center of Grozny and captured the Presidential Palace, but detachments of Chechen separatists retreated across the Sunzha River and took up defensive positions on Minutka Square. Despite the successful offensive, Russian troops controlled only about a third of the city at that time.
By the beginning of February, the strength of the OGV was increased to 70,000 people. General Anatoly Kulikov became the new commander of the OGV.
Only on February 3, 1995, the “South” group was formed and the implementation of the plan to blockade Grozny from the south began. By February 9, Russian units reached the border of the Rostov-Baku federal highway.
On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between the commander of the OGV Anatoly Kulikov and the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI Aslan Maskhadov on concluding a temporary truce - the parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, and both sides were given the opportunity to remove the dead and wounded from the streets of the city. The truce, however, was violated by both sides.
In the 20th of February, street fighting continued in the city (especially in its southern part), but the Chechen troops, deprived of support, gradually retreated from the city.
Finally, on March 6, 1995, a detachment of militants of the Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev retreated from Chernorechye, the last area of Grozny controlled by the separatists, and the city finally came under the control of Russian troops.
A pro-Russian administration of Chechnya was formed in Grozny, headed by Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov.
As a result of the assault on Grozny, the city was virtually destroyed and turned into ruins.
Establishing control over the lowland regions of Chechnya (March - April 1995)
After the assault on Grozny, the main task of the Russian troops was to establish control over the lowland areas of the rebellious republic.
The Russian side began to conduct active negotiations with the population, convincing local residents to expel the militants from their settlements. At the same time, Russian units occupied commanding heights above villages and cities. Thanks to this, Argun was taken on March 15-23, and the cities of Shali and Gudermes were taken without a fight on March 30 and 31, respectively. However, the militant groups were not destroyed and freely left populated areas.
Despite this, local battles took place in the western regions of Chechnya. On March 10, fighting began for the village of Bamut. On April 7-8, a combined detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, consisting of the Sofrinsky brigade of internal troops and supported by SOBR and OMON detachments, entered the village of Samashki (Achkhoy-Martan district of Chechnya) and entered into battle with the militant forces. It was alleged that the village was defended by more than 300 people (the so-called “Abkhaz battalion” of Shamil Basayev). The losses of the militants amounted to more than 100 people, the Russians - 13-16 people killed, 50-52 wounded. During the battle for Samashki, many civilians died and this operation caused a great resonance in Russian society and strengthened anti-Russian sentiments in Chechnya.
On April 15-16, the decisive assault on Bamut began - Russian troops managed to enter the village and gain a foothold on the outskirts. Then, however, Russian troops were forced to leave the village, as the militants now occupied commanding heights above the village, using old missile silos of the Strategic Missile Forces, designed for waging a nuclear war and invulnerable to Russian aircraft. A series of battles for this village continued until June 1995, then the battles were suspended after the terrorist attack in Budennovsk and resumed in February 1996.
By April 1995, Russian troops occupied almost the entire flat territory of Chechnya and the separatists focused on sabotage and guerrilla operations.
Establishing control over the mountainous regions of Chechnya (May - June 1995)
From April 28 to May 11, 1995, the Russian side announced a suspension of hostilities on its part.
The offensive resumed only on May 12. The attacks of Russian troops fell on the villages of Chiri-Yurt, which covered the entrance to the Argun Gorge, and Serzhen-Yurt, located at the entrance to the Vedenskoye Gorge. Despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, Russian troops were bogged down in enemy defenses - it took General Shamanov a week of shelling and bombing to take Chiri-Yurt.
Under these conditions, the Russian command decided to change the direction of the attack - instead of Shatoy to Vedeno. The militant units were pinned down in the Argun Gorge and on June 3 Vedeno was taken by Russian troops, and on June 12 the regional centers of Shatoy and Nozhai-Yurt were taken.
Just as in the lowland areas, the separatist forces were not defeated and they were able to leave the abandoned settlements. Therefore, even during the “truce”, the militants were able to transfer a significant part of their forces to the northern regions - on May 14, the city of Grozny was shelled by them more than 14 times.
Terrorist attack in Budennovsk (June 14 - 19, 1995)
On June 14, 1995, a group of Chechen militants numbering 195 people, led by field commander Shamil Basayev, entered the territory of the Stavropol Territory (Russian Federation) in trucks and stopped in the city of Budyonnovsk.
The first target of the attack was the building of the city police department, then the terrorists occupied the city hospital and herded captured civilians into it. In total, there were about 2,000 hostages in the hands of terrorists. Basayev put forward demands to the Russian authorities - a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, negotiations with Dudayev through the mediation of UN representatives in exchange for the release of hostages.
Under these conditions, the authorities decided to storm the hospital building. Due to an information leak, the terrorists managed to prepare to repel the assault, which lasted four hours; As a result, the special forces recaptured all buildings (except the main one), freeing 95 hostages. Special forces losses amounted to three people killed. On the same day, an unsuccessful second assault attempt was made.
After the failure of military action to free the hostages, negotiations began between the then Chairman of the Russian Government Viktor Chernomyrdin and field commander Shamil Basayev. The terrorists were provided with buses, on which they, along with 120 hostages, arrived in the Chechen village of Zandak, where the hostages were released.
The total losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 143 people (of which 46 were law enforcement officers) and 415 wounded, terrorist losses - 19 killed and 20 wounded.
The situation in the republic in June - December 1995
After the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk, from June 19 to 22, the first round of negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides took place in Grozny, at which it was possible to achieve the introduction of a moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period.
From June 27 to 30, the second stage of negotiations took place there, at which an agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners “all for all,” the disarmament of the CRI detachments, the withdrawal of Russian troops and the holding of free elections.
Despite all the agreements concluded, the ceasefire regime was violated by both sides. Chechen detachments returned to their villages, but no longer as members of illegal armed groups, but as “self-defense units.” Local battles took place throughout Chechnya. For some time, the tensions that arose could be resolved through negotiations. Thus, on August 18-19, Russian troops blocked Achkhoy-Martan; the situation was resolved at negotiations in Grozny.
On August 21, a detachment of militants of the field commander Alaudi Khamzatov captured Argun, but after heavy shelling by Russian troops, they left the city, into which Russian armored vehicles were then introduced.
In September, Achkhoy-Martan and Sernovodsk were blocked by Russian troops, since militant detachments were located in these settlements. The Chechen side refused to leave their occupied positions, since, according to them, these were “self-defense units” that had the right to be in accordance with previously reached agreements.
On October 6, 1995, an assassination attempt was made against the commander of the United Group of Forces (OGV), General Romanov, as a result of which he ended up in a coma. In turn, “retaliation strikes” were carried out against Chechen villages.
On October 8, an unsuccessful attempt was made to eliminate Dudayev - an air strike was carried out on the village of Roshni-Chu.
The Russian leadership decided before the elections to replace the leaders of the pro-Russian administration of the republic, Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov, with the former head of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Dokka Zavgaev.
On December 10-12, the city of Gudermes, occupied by Russian troops without resistance, was captured by the detachments of Salman Raduev, Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov and Sultan Gelikhanov. On December 14-20, there were battles for this city; it took Russian troops about another week of “cleansing operations” to finally take control of Gudermes.
On December 14-17, elections were held in Chechnya, which were held with a large number of violations, but were nevertheless recognized as valid. Separatist supporters announced in advance their boycott and non-recognition of the elections. Dokku Zavgaev won the elections, receiving over 90% of the votes; At the same time, all UGA military personnel participated in the elections.
Terrorist attack in Kizlyar (January 9-18, 1996)
On January 9, 1996, a detachment of militants numbering 256 people under the command of field commanders Salman Raduev, Turpal-Ali Atgeriyev and Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov carried out a raid on the city of Kizlyar (Republic of Dagestan, Russian Federation). The militants' initial target was a Russian helicopter base and weapons depot. The terrorists destroyed two Mi-8 transport helicopters and took several hostages from among the military personnel guarding the base. Russian military and law enforcement agencies began to approach the city, so the terrorists seized the hospital and maternity hospital, driving about 3,000 more civilians there. This time, the Russian authorities did not give the order to storm the hospital, so as not to strengthen anti-Russian sentiments in Dagestan. During the negotiations, it was possible to agree on providing the militants with buses to the border with Chechnya in exchange for the release of the hostages, who were supposed to be dropped off at the very border. On January 10, a convoy with militants and hostages moved towards the border. When it became clear that the terrorists would go to Chechnya, the bus convoy was stopped with warning shots. Taking advantage of the confusion of the Russian leadership, the militants captured the village of Pervomaiskoye, disarming the police checkpoint located there. Negotiations took place from January 11 to 14, and an unsuccessful assault on the village took place on January 15-18. In parallel with the assault on Pervomaisky, on January 16, in the Turkish port of Trabzon, a group of terrorists seized the passenger ship "Avrasia" with threats to shoot Russian hostages if the assault was not stopped. After two days of negotiations, the terrorists surrendered to the Turkish authorities.
The losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 78 people killed and several hundred wounded.
Militant attack on Grozny (March 6-8, 1996)
On March 6, 1996, several groups of militants attacked Grozny, controlled by Russian troops, from various directions. The militants captured the Staropromyslovsky district of the city, blocked and fired at Russian checkpoints and checkpoints. Despite the fact that Grozny remained under the control of the Russian armed forces, the separatists took with them supplies of food, medicine and ammunition when they retreated. The losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 70 people killed and 259 wounded.
Battle near the village of Yaryshmardy (April 16, 1996)
On April 16, 1996, a column of the 245th motorized rifle regiment of the Russian Armed Forces, moving to Shatoi, was ambushed in the Argun Gorge near the village of Yaryshmardy. The operation was led by field commander Khattab. The militants knocked out the leading and trailing column of the vehicle, so the column was blocked and suffered significant losses.
Liquidation of Dzhokhar Dudayev (April 21, 1996)
From the very beginning of the Chechen campaign, Russian special services have repeatedly tried to eliminate the President of the Chechen Republic, Dzhokhar Dudayev. Attempts to send assassins ended in failure. It was possible to find out that Dudayev often talks on a satellite phone of the Inmarsat system.
On April 21, 1996, a Russian A-50 AWACS aircraft, which was equipped with equipment for bearing a satellite phone signal, received an order to take off. At the same time, Dudayev’s motorcade left for the area of the village of Gekhi-Chu. Unfolding his phone, Dudayev contacted Konstantin Borov. At that moment, the signal from the phone was intercepted and two Su-25 attack aircraft took off. When the planes reached the target, two missiles were fired at the motorcade, one of which hit the target directly.
By a closed decree of Boris Yeltsin, several military pilots were awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation.
Negotiations with the separatists (May-July 1996)
Despite some successes of the Russian Armed Forces (the successful liquidation of Dudayev, the final capture of the settlements of Goiskoye, Stary Achkhoy, Bamut, Shali), the war began to take a protracted character. In the context of the upcoming presidential elections, the Russian leadership decided to once again negotiate with the separatists.
On May 27-28, a meeting of the Russian and Ichkerian (headed by Zelimkhan Yandarbiev) delegations was held in Moscow, at which it was possible to agree on a truce from June 1, 1996 and an exchange of prisoners. Immediately after the end of the negotiations in Moscow, Boris Yeltsin flew to Grozny, where he congratulated the Russian military on their victory over the “rebellious Dudayev regime” and announced the abolition of conscription.
On June 10, in Nazran (Republic of Ingushetia), during the next round of negotiations, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya (with the exception of two brigades), the disarmament of separatist groups, and the holding of free democratic elections. The question of the status of the republic was temporarily postponed.
The agreements concluded in Moscow and Nazran were violated by both sides, in particular, the Russian side was in no hurry to withdraw its troops, and the Chechen field commander Ruslan Khaikhoroev took responsibility for the explosion of a regular bus in Nalchik.
On July 3, 1996, the current President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, was re-elected to the presidency. The new Secretary of the Security Council, Alexander Lebed, announced the resumption of hostilities against militants.
On July 9, after the Russian ultimatum, hostilities resumed - aircraft attacked militant bases in the mountainous Shatoi, Vedeno and Nozhai-Yurt regions.
Operation Jihad (6-22 August 1996)
On August 6, 1996, detachments of Chechen separatists numbering from 850 to 2000 people again attacked Grozny. The separatists did not aim to capture the city; They blocked administrative buildings in the city center, and also fired at checkpoints and checkpoints. The Russian garrison under the command of General Pulikovsky, despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, was unable to hold the city.
Simultaneously with the assault on Grozny, the separatists also captured the cities of Gudermes (they took it without a fight) and Argun (Russian troops only held the commandant’s office building).
According to Oleg Lukin, it was the defeat of Russian troops in Grozny that led to the signing of the Khasavyurt ceasefire agreements.
Khasavyurt Agreements (August 31, 1996)
On August 31, 1996, representatives of Russia (Chairman of the Security Council Alexander Lebed) and Ichkeria (Aslan Maskhadov) signed a truce agreement in the city of Khasavyurt (Republic of Dagestan). Russian troops were completely withdrawn from Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed until December 31, 2001.
Peacekeeping initiatives and activities of humanitarian organizations
On December 15, 1994, the “Mission of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the North Caucasus” began to operate in the conflict zone, which included deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation and a representative of Memorial (later called the “Mission of Public Organizations under the leadership of S. A. Kovalev”). . “Kovalyov’s Mission” did not have official powers, but acted with the support of several human rights public organizations; the work of the Mission was coordinated by the Memorial human rights center.
On December 31, 1994, on the eve of the storming of Grozny by Russian troops, Sergei Kovalev, as part of a group of State Duma deputies and journalists, negotiated with Chechen militants and parliamentarians in the presidential palace in Grozny. When the assault began and Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers began to burn in the square in front of the palace, civilians took refuge in the basement of the presidential palace, and soon wounded and captured Russian soldiers began to appear there. Correspondent Danila Galperovich recalled that Kovalev, being among the militants at Dzhokhar Dudayev’s headquarters, “almost all the time was in a basement room equipped with army radio stations,” offering Russian tank crews “an exit from the city without shooting if they indicate the route.” According to journalist Galina Kovalskaya, who was also there, after they were shown burning Russian tanks in the city center,
According to the Institute of Human Rights, headed by Kovalev, this episode, as well as Kovalev’s entire human rights and anti-war position, became the reason for a negative reaction from the military leadership, government officials, as well as numerous supporters of the “state” approach to human rights. In January 1995, the State Duma adopted a draft resolution in which his work in Chechnya was recognized as unsatisfactory: as Kommersant wrote, “due to his “unilateral position” aimed at justifying illegal armed groups.”
In March 1995, the State Duma removed Kovalev from the post of Commissioner for Human Rights in Russia, according to Kommersant, “for his statements against the war in Chechnya.”
As part of the “Kovalyov mission”, representatives of various non-governmental organizations, deputies, and journalists traveled to the conflict zone. The mission collected information about what was happening in the Chechen war, searched for missing persons and prisoners, and contributed to the release of Russian military personnel captured by Chechen militants. For example, the Kommersant newspaper reported that during the siege of the village of Bamut by Russian troops, the commander of the militant detachments, Khaikharoev, promised to execute five prisoners after each shelling of the village by Russian troops, but under the influence of Sergei Kovalev, who participated in negotiations with the field commanders , Khaikharoev abandoned these intentions.
Since the beginning of the conflict, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has launched an extensive relief program, providing more than 250,000 displaced people with food parcels, blankets, soap, warm clothing and plastic coverings in the first months. In February 1995, of the 120,000 residents remaining in Grozny, 70,000 were completely dependent on ICRC assistance.
In Grozny, the water supply and sewer systems were completely destroyed, and the ICRC hastily began organizing the supply of drinking water to the city. In the summer of 1995, approximately 750,000 liters of chlorinated water were delivered daily by tanker truck to meet the needs of more than 100,000 residents at 50 distribution points throughout Grozny. Over the next year, 1996, more than 230 million liters of drinking water were produced for residents of the North Caucasus.
In Grozny and other cities of Chechnya, free canteens were opened for the most vulnerable segments of the population, in which 7,000 people were provided with hot food every day. More than 70,000 schoolchildren in Chechnya received books and school supplies from the ICRC.
During 1995-1996, the ICRC carried out a number of programs to assist those affected by the armed conflict. Its delegates visited about 700 people detained by federal forces and Chechen fighters in 25 places of detention in Chechnya itself and neighboring regions, delivered more than 50,000 letters to the recipients on Red Cross message forms, which became the only opportunity for separated families to establish contacts with each other, so how all forms of communication were interrupted. The ICRC provided medicines and medical supplies to 75 hospitals and medical institutions in Chechnya, North Ossetia, Ingushetia and Dagestan, participated in the reconstruction and provision of medicines to hospitals in Grozny, Argun, Gudermes, Shali, Urus-Martan and Shatoy, and provided regular assistance to homes for the disabled and orphanages shelters.
In the fall of 1996, in the village of Novye Atagi, the ICRC equipped and opened a hospital for war victims. During the three months of operation, the hospital received more than 320 people, 1,700 people received outpatient care, and almost six hundred surgical operations were performed. On December 17, 1996, an armed attack was carried out on a hospital in Novye Atagi, as a result of which six of its foreign employees were killed. After this, the ICRC was forced to withdraw foreign staff from Chechnya.
In April 1995, American humanitarian specialist Frederick Cuney, together with two Russian doctors from the Russian Red Cross Society and a translator, was organizing humanitarian aid in Chechnya. Cuney was trying to negotiate a truce when he went missing. There is reason to believe that Cuney and his Russian associates were captured by Chechen militants and executed on the orders of Rezvan Elbiev, one of the heads of counterintelligence of Dzhokhar Dudayev, because they were mistaken for Russian agents. There is a version that this was the result of a provocation by the Russian special services, who thus dealt with Cuney at the hands of the Chechens.
Various women's movements ("Soldiers' Mothers", "White Shawl", "Women of the Don" and others) worked with military personnel - participants in combat operations, released prisoners of war, wounded, and other categories of victims during military operations.
Results
The result of the war was the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and the withdrawal of Russian troops. Chechnya again became a de facto independent state, but de jure not recognized by any country in the world (including Russia).
Destroyed houses and villages were not restored, the economy was exclusively criminal, however, it was criminal not only in Chechnya, so, according to former deputy Konstantin Borovoy, kickbacks in the construction business under contracts of the Ministry of Defense, during the First Chechen War, reached 80% from the contract amount. Due to ethnic cleansing and fighting, almost the entire non-Chechen population left Chechnya (or was killed). The interwar crisis and the rise of Wahhabism began in the republic, which later led to the invasion of Dagestan, and then to the beginning of the Second Chechen War.
Losses
According to data released by the OGV headquarters, the losses of Russian troops amounted to 4,103 killed, 1,231 missing/deserted/prisoned, and 19,794 wounded. According to the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, the losses amounted to at least 14,000 people killed (documented deaths according to the mothers of deceased servicemen). However, it should be borne in mind that the data from the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers includes only the losses of conscript soldiers, without taking into account the losses of contract soldiers, special forces soldiers, etc. The losses of militants, according to the Russian side, amounted to 17,391 people. According to the chief of staff of the Chechen units (later President of the ChRI) A. Maskhadov, the losses of the Chechen side amounted to about 3,000 people killed. According to the Memorial Human Rights Center, the militants’ losses did not exceed 2,700 people killed. The number of civilian casualties is not known for certain - according to the human rights organization Memorial, they amount to up to 50 thousand people killed. Secretary of the Russian Security Council A. Lebed estimated the losses of the civilian population of Chechnya at 80,000 dead.
Commanders
Commanders of the United Group of Federal Forces in the Chechen Republic
- Mityukhin, Alexey Nikolaevich (December 1994)
- Kvashnin, Anatoly Vasilievich (December 1994 - February 1995)
- Kulikov, Anatoly Sergeevich (February - July 1995)
- Romanov, Anatoly Alexandrovich (July - October 1995)
- Shkirko, Anatoly Afanasyevich (October - December 1995)
- Tikhomirov, Vyacheslav Valentinovich (January - October 1996)
- Pulikovsky, Konstantin Borisovich (acting July - August 1996)
In art
Movies
- “Cursed and Forgotten” (1997) is a feature-journalistic film by Sergei Govorukhin.
- “60 Hours of the Maikop Brigade” (1995) - a documentary film by Mikhail Polunin about the “New Year’s” assault on Grozny.
- “Blockpost” (1998) is a feature film by Alexander Rogozhkin.
- “Purgatory” (1997) is a naturalistic feature film by Alexander Nevzorov.
- “Prisoner of the Caucasus” (1996) is a feature film by Sergei Bodrov.
- DDT in Chechnya (1996): part 1, part 2
Music
- "Dead city. Christmas" - a song about Yuri Shevchuk's "New Year's" assault on Grozny.
- Yuri Shevchuk’s song “The boys were dying” is dedicated to the first Chechen war.
- The songs “Lube” are dedicated to the first Chechen war: “Batyanya Battalion Commander” (1995), “Soon demobilization” (1996), “Step March” (1996), “Ment” (1997).
- Timur Mutsuraev - Almost all of his work is dedicated to the First Chechen War.
- Songs about the First Chechen War occupy a significant part of the work of the Chechen bard Imam Alimsultanov.
- The song of the group Dead Dolphins - Dead City is dedicated to the first Chechen war.
- Blue berets - " New Year", "Reflections of an officer at the hotline", "Two turntables on Mozdok."
Books
- “Prisoner of the Caucasus” (1994) - story (story) by Vladimir Makanin
- “Chechen Blues” (1998) - novel by Alexander Prokhanov.
- May Day (2000) - story by Albert Zaripov. The story of the storming of the village of Pervomayskoye in the Republic of Dagestan in January 1996.
- “Pathologies” (novel) (2004) - novel by Zakhar Prilepin.
- I was in this war (2001) - novel by Vyacheslav Mironov. The plot of the novel is built around the storming of Grozny by federal troops in the winter of 1994/95.
Since the end of the 18th century, when Russia began to establish itself in the North Caucasus, this region of the country could not be called calm. The nature of the area, as well as the peculiarities of the local mentality, led to disobedience and war against Russian troops, to banditry. The culmination of the confrontation between the mountaineers, who wanted to live according to Sharia, and the Russians, who sought to push the borders of their empire to the south, was the Caucasian War, which lasted 47 years - from 1817 to 1864. This war was won by the Russian army due to its numerical and technical superiority, as well as due to a number of local internal factors (for example, enmity between clans in the Caucasian Imamate).
However, even after completion Caucasian War This region did not become calm. Uprisings broke out here, but as the Russian borders moved south, their number began to decrease. By the beginning of the 20th century, a relative calm had established in the Caucasus, which was interrupted October Revolution and the one that followed her Civil War. However, then the North Caucasus region, which became part of the RSFSR, was quickly “put out” without unnecessary losses and clashes. But it is worth noting that rebel morals have always reigned among part of the population here.
During the collapse of the USSR, nationalist and separatist sentiments intensified in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Their growth especially intensified after Yeltsin announced a kind of “doctrine” for the subjects of the USSR “Take as much sovereignty as you can!” And as long as there was still power behind the Supreme Council of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, albeit not so strong, there could be no open speech. Only in October 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union became obvious, the Provisional Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic decided to divide the republic directly into Chechen and Ingush.
Unrecognized state
On October 17, 1991, presidential elections were held in the Chechen Republic, in which Dzhokhar Dudayev, Hero of the Soviet Union, aviation general, won. Immediately after these elections in unilaterally Independence of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-Cho was declared. However, the leadership of the RSFSR refused to recognize both the election results and the independence of the rebellious region.
The situation in Chechnya was heating up, and already late autumn In 1991, there was a real threat of conflict between the federals and the separatists. The new leadership of the country decided to send troops into the rebellious republic and nip attempts at secession in the bud. However, Russian troops, airlifted to Khankala on November 8 of the same year, were blocked by Chechen armed forces. Moreover, the threat of their encirclement and destruction became real, which the new government had absolutely no need for. As a result, after negotiations between the Kremlin and the leadership of the rebel republic, it was decided to withdraw Russian troops and transfer the remaining equipment to local armed forces. Thus, the Chechen army received tanks and armored personnel carriers...
Over the next three years, the situation in the region continued to deteriorate, and the gap between Moscow and Grozny widened. And although Chechnya has been essentially an independent republic since 1991, in reality it was not recognized by anyone. However, the unrecognized state had its own flag, coat of arms, anthem and even a constitution adopted in 1992. By the way, it was this constitution that approved the new name of the country - the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.
The formation of “independent Ichkeria” was closely connected with the criminalization of its economy and power, due to which it became clear that in fact Chechnya would live at the expense of Russia, while absolutely not wanting to be part of it. Robbery, robbery, murder and kidnappings flourished on the territory of the republic and in the Russian regions bordering it. And the more crimes were committed in the region, the clearer it became that this could not continue.
However, this was understood not only in Russia, but also in Chechnya itself. The years 1993-1994 were marked by the active formation of opposition to the Dudayev regime, especially noticeable in the northern, Nadterechny region of the country. It was here that the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic was formed in December 1993, relying on Russia and setting the goal of overthrowing Dzhokhar Dudayev.
The situation escalated to the limit in the fall of 1994, when supporters of the new, pro-Russian administration of Chechnya captured the north of the republic and began moving towards Grozny. There were also Russian military personnel in their ranks - mainly from the Kantemirov Guards Division. On November 26, troops entered the city. Initially, they did not encounter resistance, but the operation itself was planned simply horribly: the troops did not even have plans for Grozny and moved towards its center, often asking local residents for directions. However, the conflict soon moved into a “hot” stage, as a result of which the Chechen opposition was completely defeated, the Nadterechny region again came under the control of Dudayev’s supporters, and some of the Russian fighters were killed and some were captured.
As a result of this short-term conflict, Russian-Chechen relations deteriorated to the limit. In Moscow, it was decided to send troops into the rebellious republic, disarm illegal armed gangs and establish full control over the region. It was assumed that the majority of the population of Chechnya would support the operation, which was planned solely as a short-term operation.
Beginning of the war
On December 1, 1994, Russian aircraft bombed airfields under the control of Chechen separatists. As a result, the small number of Chechen aviation, represented mainly by An-2 transport aircraft and obsolete Czechoslovakian L-29 and L-39 fighters, was destroyed.
10 days later, on December 11, the President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin signed a decree on measures to restore constitutional order in the territory of the Chechen Republic. The start date for the operation was set for Wednesday, December 14th.
To send troops into Chechnya, a Joint Group of Forces (OGV) was created, which included both military units of the Ministry of Defense and troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The OGV was divided into three groups:
- Western group, whose goal was to enter the territory of the Chechen Republic from the west, from the territory of North Ossetia and Ingushetia;
- Northwestern group - its goal was to enter Chechnya from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia;
- The eastern group entered the territory of Chechnya from Dagestan.
The first (and main) goal of the combined group of troops was the city of Grozny, the capital of the rebellious republic. After capturing Grozny, it was planned to clear the southern, mountainous regions of Chechnya and complete the disarmament of the separatist detachments.
Already on the first day of the operation, December 11, the forces of the Western and Eastern groupings of Russian troops were blocked near the borders of Chechnya by local residents, who hoped to prevent the conflict in this way. Against the background of these groups, the North-Western group operated most successfully, whose troops, by the end of December 12, came close to the settlement of Dolinsky, located only ten kilometers from Grozny.
Only on December 12-13, having come under fire and using force, the Western group, as well as the Eastern, finally broke through into Chechnya. At this time, the troops of the North-Western (or Modzdok) group were fired upon by Grad multiple launch rocket launchers in the Dolinskoye area and were drawn into fierce battles for this populated area. It was possible to capture Dolinskoye only by December 20.
The movement of all three groups of Russian troops towards Grozny took place gradually, although in the absence of constant fire contact with the separatists. As a result of this advance, by the end of the 20th of December, the Russian army almost came close to the city of Grozny from three sides: north, west and east. However, here the Russian command made a serious mistake - although it was initially assumed that before the decisive assault the city should be completely blocked, in reality this was not done. In this regard, the Chechens could easily send reinforcements to the city from the southern regions of the country they controlled, as well as evacuate the wounded there.
Storm of Grozny
It is still unclear what actually prompted the Russian leadership to launch an assault on Grozny on December 31, when there were almost no conditions for it. Some researchers cite the reason as the desire of the military-political elite of the country to take Grozny “on the fly” for their own benefit, without taking into account and even ignoring the rebel gangs as a military force. Other researchers indicate that in this way the commanders of the troops in the Caucasus wanted to make a “gift” for the birthday of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Pavel Grachev. The latter’s words are widely circulated that “Grozny can be taken in two hours by one airborne regiment.” However, we must remember that in this statement the minister said that the capture of the city is possible only if full support and ensuring army actions (artillery support and complete encirclement of the city). In reality, unfortunately, there were no favorable conditions.
On December 31, Russian troops advanced to storm Grozny. It was here that the commanders made the second glaring mistake - tanks were introduced into the narrow streets of the city without proper reconnaissance and infantry support. The result of this “offensive” was very predictable and sad: a large number of armored vehicles were burned or captured, some units (for example, the 131st separate Maykop motorized rifle brigade) were surrounded and suffered significant losses. At the same time, a similar situation unfolded in all directions.
The only exception can be called the actions of the 8th Guards Army Corps under the command of General L. Ya. Rokhlin. When the corps troops were drawn into the capital of Chechnya, posts were set up at key points, located in close proximity to each other. Thus, the danger of cutting off the corps group was somewhat reduced. However, soon the corps troops were also surrounded in Grozny.
Already on January 1, 1995, it became clear: the attempt by Russian troops to take Grozny by storm had failed. The troops of the Western and Northwestern groups were forced to retreat from the city, preparing for new battles. The time has come for protracted battles for every building, for every block. At the same time, the Russian command made quite the right conclusions, and the troops changed tactics: now the actions were carried out by small (no more than a platoon), but very mobile air assault groups.
To carry out the blockade of Grozny from the south, the Southern Group was formed in early February, which soon managed to cut the Rostov-Baku highway and interrupt the supply of supplies and reinforcements to the militants in Grozny from the southern mountainous regions of Chechnya. In the capital itself, Chechen gangs gradually retreated under the attacks of Russian troops, bearing noticeable losses. Grozny finally came under the control of Russian troops on March 6, 1995, when the remnants of the separatist troops retreated from its last area, Chernorechye.
Fighting in 1995
After the capture of Grozny, the United Group of Forces was faced with the task of occupying the lowland regions of Chechnya and depriving the militants of the bases located here. At the same time, Russian troops sought to have a good relationship with the civilian population, persuading them not to provide assistance to the militants. This tactic very soon brought results: by March 23, the city of Argun was taken, and by the end of the month, Shali and Gudermes. The most fierce and bloody battles were for the village of Bamut, which was never captured until the end of the year. However, the results of the March battles were very successful: almost the entire flat territory of Chechnya was cleared of the enemy, and the morale of the troops was high.
After taking control of the lowland territories of Chechnya, the OGV command announced a temporary moratorium on combat operations. This was due to the need to regroup troops, put them in order, and also possible start peace negotiations. However, it was not possible to reach any agreement, so new battles began on May 11, 1995. Now Russian troops rushed to the Argun and Vedeno gorges. However, here they encountered stubborn enemy defense, which is why they were forced to begin maneuvering. Initially, the direction of the main attack was the settlement of Shatoy; soon the direction was changed to Vedeno. As a result, Russian troops managed to defeat the separatist forces and take control of the main part of the territory of the Chechen Republic.
However, it became clear that the war would not end with the transfer of the main settlements of Chechnya to Russian control. This became especially clear on June 14, 1995, when a group of Chechen militants under the command of Shamil Basayev managed to seize a city hospital in the city of Budennovsk, Stavropol Territory (which is located about 150 kilometers from Chechnya), taking about one and a half thousand people hostage. It is noteworthy that this terrorist act was carried out precisely when the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin declared that the war in Chechnya was practically over. Initially, the terrorists put forward conditions such as the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, but then, over time, they demanded money and a bus to Chechnya.
The effect of the seizure of the hospital in Budyonnovsk was like a bomb exploding: the public was shocked by such a daring and, most importantly, successful terrorist attack. This was a serious blow to the prestige of Russia and the Russian army. In the following days, the hospital complex was stormed, leading to heavy losses among both hostages and security forces. Ultimately, the Russian leadership decided to comply with the terrorists' demands and allowed them to travel by bus to Chechnya.
After the hostage taking in Budennovsk, negotiations began between the Russian leadership and the Chechen separatists, at which on June 22 they managed to achieve the introduction of a moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period. However, this moratorium was systematically violated by both sides.
Thus, it was assumed that local self-defense units would take control of the situation in Chechen settlements. However, under the guise of such detachments, militants with weapons often returned to the villages. As a result of such violations, local battles took place throughout the republic.
The peace process continued, but it came to an end on October 6, 1995. On this day, an attempt was made on the life of the commander of the Joint Group of Forces, Lieutenant General Anatoly Romanov. Immediately after this, “retaliation strikes” were carried out against some Chechen settlements, and there was also some intensification of hostilities on the territory of the republic.
A new round of escalation of the Chechen conflict occurred in December 1995. On the 10th, Chechen troops under the command of Salman Raduev suddenly occupied the city of Gudermes, which was held by Russian troops. However, the Russian command promptly assessed the situation, and already during the battles of December 17-20, they again returned the city to their hands.
In mid-December 1995, presidential elections were held in Chechnya, in which the main pro-Russian candidate Doku Zavgaev won with a huge advantage (about 90 percent). The separatists did not recognize the election results.
Fighting in 1996
On January 9, 1996, a group of Chechen militants raided the city of Kizlyar and a helicopter base. They managed to destroy two Mi-8 helicopters, and also seize a hospital and 3,000 civilians as hostages. The requirements were similar to those in Budyonnovsk: provision of transport and a corridor for the unhindered escape of terrorists to Chechnya. The Russian leadership, taught by the bitter experience of Budyonnovsk, decided to fulfill the conditions of the militants. However, already on the way, it was decided to stop the terrorists, as a result of which they changed the plan and carried out a raid on the village of Pervomaiskoye, which they captured. This time it was decided to take the village by storm and destroy the separatist forces, but the assault ended in complete failure and losses among the Russian troops. The stalemate around Pervomaisky continued for several more days, but on the night of January 18, 1996, the militants broke through the encirclement and fled to Chechnya.
The next high-profile episode of the war was the March militant raid on Grozny, which came as a complete surprise to the Russian command. As a result, the Chechen separatists managed to temporarily take control of the Staropromyslovsky district of the city, as well as seize considerable supplies of food, medicine and weapons. After this, fighting on the territory of Chechnya flared up with renewed vigor.
On April 16, 1996, near the village of Yaryshmardy, a Russian military convoy was ambushed by militants. As a result of the battle, the Russian side suffered huge losses, and the convoy lost almost all its armored vehicles.
As a result of the battles of early 1996, it became clear that the Russian army, which managed to inflict significant defeats on the Chechens in open battles, turned out to be fatally unprepared for guerrilla warfare. similar to that one, which took place some 8-10 years ago in Afghanistan. Alas, the experience of the Afghan war, priceless and gained in blood, was quickly forgotten.
On April 21, near the village of Gekhi-Chu, Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev was killed by an air-to-surface missile fired by a Su-25 attack aircraft. As a result, it was expected that the decapitated Chechen side would become more accommodating and the war would soon be ended. The reality, as usual, turned out to be more complicated.
By the beginning of May, a situation had matured in Chechnya when it was possible to begin negotiations on a peaceful settlement. There were several reasons for this. The first and main reason was general fatigue from the war. The Russian army, although it had a fairly high morale and enough experience to conduct combat operations, still could not ensure complete control over the entire territory of the Chechen Republic. The militants also suffered losses, and after the liquidation of Dudayev they were determined to begin peace negotiations. The local population suffered the most from the war and naturally did not want the bloodshed to continue on their land. Another important reason was the upcoming presidential elections in Russia, in order to win which Boris Yeltsin simply needed to stop the conflict.
As a result of peaceful negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides, an agreement was reached on a ceasefire from June 1, 1996. After 10 days, an agreement was also reached on the withdrawal of Russian units from Chechnya except for two brigades, whose task was to maintain order in the region. However, after Yeltsin won the elections in July 1996, fighting resumed.
The situation in Chechnya continued to deteriorate. On August 6, militants launched Operation Jihad, the purpose of which was to show not only Russia, but the whole world that the war in the region is far from over. This operation began with a massive separatist attack on the city of Grozny, which again turned out to be a complete surprise for the Russian command. Within a few days, most of the city fell under the control of the militants, and Russian troops, having a serious numerical advantage, were unable to hold a number of points in Grozny. Part of the Russian garrison was blocked, part was driven out of the city.
Simultaneously with the events in Grozny, the militants managed to capture the city of Gudermes almost without a fight. In Argun, Chechen separatists entered the city, occupied it almost completely, but ran into stubborn and desperate resistance from Russian military personnel in the area of the commandant's office. Nevertheless, the situation was truly threatening - Chechnya could easily go up in flames.
Results of the First Chechen War
On August 31, 1996, an agreement was signed between representatives of the Russian and Chechen sides on a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya and the actual end of the war. However, the final decision on legal status Chechnya was postponed until December 31, 2001.
The opinions of different historians regarding the correctness of such a step as the signing of a peace treaty in August 1996 are sometimes diametrically opposed. There is an opinion that the war was over precisely at the moment when the militants could be completely defeated. The situation in Grozny, where separatist troops were surrounded and methodically destroyed by the Russian army, indirectly proves this. However, on the other hand, the Russian army is morally tired of the war, which is precisely confirmed by the rapid capture by militants of such large cities as Gudermes and Argun. As a result, the peace treaty signed in Khasavyurt on August 31 (better known as the Khasavyurt Agreements) was the lesser of evils for Russia, because the army needed a break and reorganization, the state of affairs in the republic was close to critical and threatened with major losses for the army. However, this is the subjective opinion of the author.
The result of the First Chechen War can be called a classic draw, when none of the warring parties can firmly be called a winner or a loser. Russia continued to assert its rights to the Chechen Republic, and Chechnya, as a result, managed to defend its “independence,” albeit with numerous nuances. In general, the situation has not changed dramatically, except that in the next few years the region has undergone even more significant criminalization.
As a result of this war, Russian troops lost approximately 4,100 people killed, 1,200 missing, and about 20 thousand wounded. It is not possible to establish the exact number of militants killed, as well as the number of civilians killed. It is only known that the command of the Russian troops cites the figure of 17,400 killed separatists; The militants' chief of staff, A. Maskhadov, announced losses of 2,700 people.
After the First Chechen War, presidential elections were held in the rebellious republic, in which Aslan Maskhadov quite naturally won. However, the elections and the end of the war did not bring peace to the Chechen land.
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