An avenue in Brussels, a metro station, a square in Paris, a highway in England, streets in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and even India.
Stalingrad. This city is immortalized in the memory of Europeans with names and, every day, pronouncing them, the inhabitants of Europe involuntarily pay a small tribute to the memory of those who died under it.
Stalingrad is the city where the turning point in the Great Patriotic War took place. In the fall of 1942, at the cost of huge losses, Soviet troops stopped the offensive on the Volga. It was impossible for the Soviet command to lose the city that bore the name of Stalin. In addition, Stalingrad was of enormous strategic importance - having captured it, the Nazis would have hampered supplies critical resources to the Soviet army - fuel, ammunition, food.
Preparing for surgery
The front of the German army in the fall of 1942 was stretched over a distance of over 2 thousand kilometers. The Nazis' plans included holding the current strategic positions until the spring of 1943, and then continuing the offensive. The attack flanks were poorly strengthened - the Wehrmacht command believed that the Red Army was exhausted by previous bloody battles, and therefore would not dare to launch a counteroffensive.
This confidence played into the hands of the Soviet command, which already in September 1942 began preparing Operation Uranus. Its goal was to carry out two strategic strikes - the Southwestern Army under the leadership of N.F. Vatutina was supposed to advance 120 km in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Serafimovich, the Stalingrad Front - to launch an offensive towards the Sarpinsky lakes.
The Headquarters planned to close the shock groups of the two armies in the Kalach-Sovetsky area and thus encircle the German units. The Don Front was tasked with assisting the offensive by attacking enemy positions in the area of the villages of Kachalinskaya and Kletskaya.
The Soviet army had an advantage in the number of troops: 1,103,000 soldiers versus 1,011,000, as well as in guns, mortars, tanks and aircraft. For example, the Nazis had 1,240 aircraft in the fall of 1943, and the Red Army had 1,350.
On November 13, 1943, Stalin approved the operation plan, and on November 19, a powerful artillery barrage fell on the Germans near Stalingrad. Initially, it was planned to strike enemy positions with Soviet aircraft, but weather conditions prevented this.
The 3rd Romanian Army, which found itself under heavy fire and a fierce attack from the 5th Tank Army of the Don Front, quickly retreated, but in the rear of the Romanians stood the Germans, who began to put up serious resistance. The 1st Tank Corps under the leadership of V.V. came to the aid of the 5th Panzer. Butkov and the 2nd Tank Corps under the command of A.G. Homeland. Having crushed the Germans, they began to move towards the goal set by Headquarters - Kalach.
Divisions of the Stalingrad Front launched a counteroffensive
On November 20, divisions of the Stalingrad Front launched a counteroffensive. The blow was so strong that it not only broke through the defenses, but also advanced the troops 9 kilometers. As a result of this attack, 3 German divisions were destroyed. The Nazis, having recovered from the first shock, decided to save the situation by strengthening their positions. Two tank divisions were transferred from the North Caucasus.
The commander of the 6th Army, Field Marshal Paulus, was so confident in his ability to repel the offensive of the Soviet army that, right up to falling into the “cauldron,” he sent Hitler full of optimistic reports, in which he convinced Headquarters of the unshakability of his positions on the banks of the Volga.
Meanwhile, the Soviet units were moving towards the village of Manoilin, and having reached it, on November 21 they turned east towards the Don. Trying to stop their movement, the German 24th Panzer Division entered the battle, which was defeated as a result of the fighting.
The first stage of Operation Uranus ended on November 23, 1942 with the capture of Soviet army village of Kalach. Circle around 330 thousand German soldiers, remaining in the areas of Stalingrad, closed.
The plans of the commander of the encircled 6th Panzer Army, Paulus, included a breakthrough to the southeast, but Hitler forbade him to leave the city.
We found ourselves outside the “cauldron”
From those units that found themselves outside the “cauldron”, Army Group “Don” was hastily formed. She was given the task of breaking through the encirclement with the help of parts of Paulus’s army and holding Stalingrad.
Operation Winter Storm was developed at Hitler's Headquarters. Its implementation was entrusted to Field Marshal Erich von Manstein. The main crushing force in the defeat of the Soviet units was to be Hermann Hoth's 4th Tank Army.
Manstein’s “iron fist” struck the area of the village of Kotelnikov on December 12, 1942. The Red Army foresaw the Nazis' plans to break through Paulus's encirclement from the outside, but the area that Hoth attacked turned out to be poorly prepared. The Germans defeated the 302nd Infantry Division, thereby breaking through the defenses of the 51st Army. December 19 could have been fatal for Soviet troops near Stalingrad - the Nazis brought up fresh reserves. The five-day heroic resistance of the Soviet units saved the situation - by this time the Red Army command had strengthened their positions with the forces of the 2nd Guards Army.
At one of the most critical moments - December 20, 1942 - the forces of the armies and Paulus were close to reunification. They were separated by only 40 kilometers. But in desperate battles the advancing fascists lost half personnel. Paulus, who was eager to help Manstein, received a strict order from Hitler from Headquarters - not to leave the city. After which the Germans had no chance to escape the encirclement.
Meanwhile, the Italian and Romanian units defending the left flank of the German army, unable to withstand the intense fighting, began to quickly leave their positions. The flight became widespread, and this allowed the Soviet units to move towards Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, simultaneously occupying airfields that were strategically important for the Germans.
Don Front
Seeing the catastrophic nature of the situation, Manstein decided to retreat, fearing the loss of important communication facilities by the army. The German front turned out to be stretched and weakened, and the front commander R. Malinovsky was able to take advantage of this factor. On December 24, the Red Army again occupied the village of Verkhne-Kumsky, and then units of the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive in the Kotelnikovo area.
On January 8, 1943, the Soviet command put forward a proposal to surrender to Field Marshal Paulus. And it received a decisive refusal. Paulus understood that Hitler would regard his agreement to surrender as treason. But the position of the surrounded Germans was already hopeless. In addition, the Soviet command decided to maximally intensify the offensive against the encircled group.
The Don Front began to liquidate it. The approximate number of Germans caught in the “cauldron” was 250 thousand. Soviet troops divided those surrounded into two parts, thereby weakening their resistance and demoralizing the Nazis. On January 31, the field marshal and his inner circle surrendered. And over the next two days, all the troops that were surrounded surrendered. And February 2, 1943 went down in history as the day of victory of Soviet troops in the Battle of Stalingrad.
Today is a special day in the history of our country.
Smooth 70 years ago, on a gloomy and cloudy morning, Operation Uranus began.
- which in its development ultimately led to the beginning of a radical turning point in the war. The Third Reich began to roll back in a strategic sense.
But on this day, its future success was still unknown to anyone and hidden in the fog of war: the Kharkov disaster under the leadership of Timoshenko - Khrushchev, for which large forces were also preparing, happened only six months ago. The wound of the lesions was bleeding. Therefore, now the measures to covertly concentrate, camouflage troops and encrypt negotiations at all levels were unprecedented - otherwise everything could have gone as it did in the summer, that is, catastrophically. Some Soviet commanders went into this operation with doubt and uncertainty - such as, say, tank general V.T. Volsky, who wrote a panicked letter to Stalin. However, despite possible risks, on November 13, at a meeting of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, the operation was finally approved by Stalin and the flywheel of troop movement to starting positions.
The counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Stalingrad began after a powerful artillery barrage on the morning of November 19 - troops of the Southwestern and Don Fronts in a number of sectors broke through the defenses of the 3rd Romanian Army (Hitler's satellite) and mobile tank units entered the resulting breakthrough. The next day, the 20th, on the other side, the strike force of the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive, breaking through the front of the 4th Panzer Army of Hoth. Both Soviet groups will unite four days later in the Kalach-on-Don area, closing the VI Army of Colonel General Paulus into a cauldron that will later become world famous.
The offensive really turned out to be completely unexpected for the Wehrmacht: the highest secrecy in preparing the operation fully justified itself. But the cauldron also turned out to be unexpected for the Red Army - a preliminary assessment of the troops in that area assumed their number was about 90-120 thousand, but in reality it turned out that there were three times more in the “bag” - 330 thousand people. But the Soviet commanders don’t know about this yet either. Just as the Germans do not know on this day that this is not a tactical offensive, but a large-scale one, pursuing strategic goals. The true force of the blow will be determined for them only after 2-3 days - precious days when it was necessary to act immediately and the clock was ticking.
Let's open the "Red Star" for this day. It is completely ordinary, and nothing betrays what began to happen on the fronts 3-4 hours after the issue was signed for printing. Is it possible that on the header there is a meaningful statement by Stalin with the idea that " every dog has his day". And that's it.
3. Those who are interested can study the message of the Sovinformburo for the previous day - I am posting it in full.
4. The next day, November 20, “Zvezdochka” actually posted a message about the strike. But not about this and not in this place of the front: about the Stalingrad breakthrough of the newspaper Soviet Union They will remain silent for another three whole days, and only when Headquarters receives a message about the connection of fronts in Kalach, will the command be given to print an emergency message about the counteroffensive.
So far, everything is going on in “silence” - the world does not know that epoch-making changes are already taking place on both sides of Stalingrad.
5. So, let's remember the feat of our ancestors on this significant day. They deserve it.
6. And here is a schematic map of "Stalingrad Cannes". This is how the boiler was formed.
But on November 19, the events lie in the fog of war - everything is still ahead.
* * *
My grandfather Vasily, unfortunately, did not live to see this day; he died on September 15, 1942. But his wife, Agrafena Stepanovna, my grandmother, at the very end of July 1942 crossed the Volga at the Stalingrad railway crossing, coming from the city of Shakhty, already occupied by the Germans, and having in her arms an 11-year-old daughter and a one-year-old baby (my father). Then she was evacuated further east, to Prokopyevsk. So that's why I have the opportunity to talk to you today. If I hadn’t had time, I wouldn’t have existed either.
But at the same time, the younger brother of my other grandfather, Anatoly, was on the Right Bank. He fought on the “hot” front in Stalingrad for only a month, being seriously wounded at the end of November, then he was discharged and, after hospitalization, in the spring of 1943 he left for his small homeland in Transbaikalia. And he was called up in the spring of 1942, and spent almost six months in the Volga field camps of the Red Army during formation.
Therefore, all the important Stalingrad dates (November 19, 23 and February 2) are dear to me and I remember and celebrate them.
7. After the war, November 19 deservedly became the Day of Artillery and Missile Forces, on which I congratulate the artillerymen and missilemen.
8. And in conclusion - the legendary march of Stalin’s artillerymen.
It is especially appropriate today. Listen and get inspired.
Once again, happy holiday to all those for whom this day is a holiday!
Code name of the plan for the offensive operation of the Southwestern, Stalingrad and Don fronts during the Great Patriotic War, during which the Stalingrad group of the Wehrmacht was surrounded.
Situation at the beginning of the operation
By the time the operation began, it had already been going on for four months. Repeated attempts by the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht (commander - Colonel General) to take Stalingrad by storm were unsuccessful. The 62nd and 64th armies held strong defenses on the outskirts of the city. The stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops, the stretched rear and the approach of winter led to the fact that the German army found itself in a difficult situation. The Wehrmacht command intended to hold the occupied positions until the onset of spring, and then carry out a decisive offensive.
Operation plan and preparation for it
The first discussions of the plan for the offensive operation near Stalingrad took place at the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief in early September 1942. During them, it was decided that the offensive should solve two main tasks - to encircle and isolate the German group operating in the city area from the main forces of the Wehrmacht, and then defeat it.
The plan of the operation, codenamed “Uranus,” was distinguished by its breadth and boldness of concept. Troops of three fronts were involved in it - Stalingrad (commander - Colonel General), Southwestern (commander - Lieutenant General, from December 1942 Colonel General) and (commander - Lieutenant General, from January 1943 Colonel General ). total area offensive was 400 square meters. The northern group of forces had to overcome German defense and fight 120-140 kilometers, and the southern one - 100 kilometers, after which both groups were supposed to meet, completing the encirclement of Paulus’s army. When developing the operation, it was taken into account that German troops, in attempts to take Stalingrad, had used up all their reserves - by mid-November it had only six reserve divisions scattered across large plot front. The German command tried to strengthen them, but was too late.
To prepare for the offensive, the fronts were strengthened. The Southwestern Front included two tank divisions, a cavalry corps, and a number of artillery and tank units and formations; Stalingrad includes mechanized and cavalry corps, three mechanized and three tank brigades; Donskoy includes three rifle divisions. All these forces were transferred as quickly as possible - from October 1 to November 18, 1942. In total, at the beginning of the operation, the Soviet troops involved in it numbered about 1 million 135 thousand soldiers and commanders, about 15 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 1.9 thousand aircraft. In this way, a decisive superiority was created over the enemy in this sector of the front: in personnel by 2-2.5 times, and in artillery and tanks by 4-5 times.
General management of the operation from Headquarters was carried out by the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General (since January 1943 - Army General). Preparations for it were carried out with the participation of Army General and Colonel General of Artillery N. N. Voronov.
The Soviet command widely used methods of misinforming the enemy regarding the location and time of the attack. Thanks to the high-quality camouflage of troop movements, the enemy did not know until the very last moment what forces the Soviet troops had on the Stalingrad sector of the front. The construction of false objects was widely used - 17 bridges were built across the Don alone, 12 of which were false. All these measures led to the fact that the Wehrmacht command did not expect a counteroffensive at Stalingrad, thinking that the offensive operation would be undertaken in the Rzhev salient or in the Caucasus.
Progress of hostilities
The operation began on November 19, 1942. On this day, the Southwestern and right wing of the Don Front went on the offensive. Due to poor weather conditions, the command had to abandon air support and rely only on artillery. At 7:30, simultaneously in several areas, 3,500 guns and mortars began shelling enemy positions. The German troops, who did not expect the attack, suffered heavy losses. The first to attack were the 14th (commander - Guards Major General A. S. Gryaznov) and 47th (commander - Guard Colonel, from December 1942 Guards Major General F. A. Ostashenko) Guards, 119th ( commander - colonel, since January 1943, Major General M. M. Danilov) and 124th (commander - Major General A. I. Belov) rifle divisions. The enemy offered stubborn resistance - in the first four hours of the offensive, Soviet units advanced only 2-3 kilometers. The 1st (commander - Major General of Tank Forces M.E. Katukov) and 26th (commander - Major General of Tank Forces A.G. Rodin) tank corps were introduced into the breakthrough, which completed the task of breaking through the defense - enemy troops , most of which in this area were Romanian units, were partly pushed back, partly surrendered. By mid-day, the defense was finally broken through and further actions were being developed behind enemy lines. In an effort to push back the Soviet troops and restore the situation, the German command brought into action operational reserves - four divisions. However, they only managed to delay the advance of the Red Army units. The 63rd (commander - Colonel N.D. Kozin), 76th (commander - Colonel N.T. Tavartkiladze), 96th (commander - Major General I.M. Shepetov), 293 successfully operated in their sectors 1st (commander - Major General F.D. Lagutin) rifle divisions, 4th tank (commander - Major General of Tank Forces A.G. Kravchenko) and 3rd Guards Cavalry (commander - Major General I.A. . Pliev) housing. The mobile formations of the Southwestern Front rapidly moved south into the operational depth, destroying the enemy's reserves, headquarters and retreating formations. The Romanian troops suffered especially heavy losses here - two of their corps were completely destroyed, another one was surrounded.
On the Don Front, the main blow was delivered by the 65th Army (commander - Lieutenant General). By the end of the first day of the operation, it had advanced 4-5 kilometers, without being able to break through the defenses. However, the stubborn resistance of the enemy in this area could not save the situation - the gap created as a result of the breakthrough on the left flank of Paulus's army was rapidly growing. On November 20, 1942, units of the 26th Tank Corps stormed a strategically important junction highways Perelazovskoe. On the same day, the troops of the Stalingrad Front were brought into action. The 57th (commander - major general) and 64th (commander - lieutenant general) armies simultaneously, after artillery preparation, struck enemy positions from two flanks. The enemy defenses were broken through in several sectors: the 57th Army by the forces of the 169th (commander - Colonel I.I. Melnikov) and 422nd (commander - Colonel I.K. Morozov) rifle divisions, and the 64th - by the forces of 36 1st Guards (commander - Major General M.I. Denisenko), 38th (commander - Colonel A.D. Korotkov) and 204th (commander - Colonel, since December 1942, Major General A.V. Skvortsov ) rifle divisions. The 13th Tank (commander - Colonel T.I. Tanaschishin), 4th Mechanized (commander - Major General V.T. Volsky) and 4th Cavalry (commander - Lieutenant General T.T.) were introduced into the resulting breakthroughs Shapkin) corps, which launched an offensive to the northwest and southwest. Unlike the attack in the north, the southern one was unexpected for the German command. Already on the second day of the operation, the enemy was forced to commit all of its remaining reserves. These measures could only delay the advance of the Red Army.
The command of the 6th Army and the Wehrmacht did not appreciate the scale of the threat to their Stalingrad group in time. It was only on the evening of November 20, 1942 that it became obvious to Paulus that the Soviet units were carrying out a major operation. Realizing that the threat of complete encirclement loomed over him, he transferred part of his reserves, but many of them failed to break through. Seeing this, Paulus suggested that the command break through to the southwest, leaving the Stalingrad lines, but Hitler did not agree to this. The offensive of the Soviet troops led to the fact that the command post of the 6th Army was under threat of attack, and Paulus transferred it deeper to the rear, to the village of Nizhne-Chirskaya. Panic began to grow in the ranks of the German units, and especially among their allies - Romanians, Hungarians, Italians.
On November 23, 1942, the 26th Tank Corps liberated the city of Kalach. On the same day, near the Sovetsky farm, its units met with the 4th Mechanized Corps, which marked the unification of the troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts and the closure of the encirclement. It included about 330 thousand enemy soldiers and officers (22 divisions, 160 separate and auxiliary units). The next day, the defeat of the Romanian units in the area of the village of Raspopinskaya was completed - about 30 thousand soldiers and officers surrendered. In the shortest possible time, an encirclement front was created, protected both from attack from within and from attack from without - it was obvious that the enemy would soon try to break through it. On November 24, 1942, Paulus suggested that Hitler leave Stalingrad and break through to the southwest to join the main forces, but he again responded with a categorical refusal.
Over the next week, the Stalingrad and Don Front completed the encirclement, throwing back parts of the 6th Army and thereby reducing the front to 80 kilometers from west to east and to 40 from north to south. Having consolidated his battle formations, Paulus was able to organize an effective defense, including using those fortified lines on which Soviet troops held the defense throughout the summer-autumn of 1942. This significantly delayed the Soviet troops and delayed the defeat of the Stalingrad group.
The German command tried to organize a breakthrough with the forces of the shock army group "Goth" (commander - G. Goth), which was part of Army Group "Don" (commander -) and consisted of 9 infantry and 4 tank divisions. Manstein intended to carry it out in the area of the city of Kotelnikovo. On December 12, 1942, the troops involved went on the offensive and pushed back the Soviet troops. However, on December 15, 1942, beyond the Aksai River, as a result of stubborn resistance by Soviet troops, this offensive was stopped. The enemy had 40 kilometers left to the front line with inside rings. On December 16, 1942, units of the Southwestern Front went on the offensive and over the next three days broke through his defenses. The Hotha group, which also included one Italian army, suffered heavy losses, its front completely crumbled. As a result of the counterattack, the outer line of the encirclement ring was moved away from the inner line by 200-250 kilometers, which finally deprived the 6th Army of any hope of breaking through in the near future.
By January 1943, the position of the Stalingrad group had completely deteriorated. On January 8, the Soviet command presented Paulus with an ultimatum to surrender, but Hitler categorically prohibited surrender. Then the Soviet troops launched an offensive operation to completely defeat the 6th Army (code name - Operation “Ring”), as a result of which Stalingrad was liberated, and the enemy soldiers and officers who were still alive by that time, led by Paulus himself, surrendered to captivity.
Results of the operation
As a result of Operation Uranus, German, Romanian, Hungarian, Italian, and Croatian units suffered a severe defeat. Their irretrievable losses amounted to more than 800 thousand soldiers and officers. During the fighting, more than 155 thousand soldiers and commanders of the Red Army were killed, and more than 300 thousand people were wounded. This operation demonstrated to the whole world the operational and tactical skill of the Red Army command and had a huge political effect - in the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and in the occupied territories, the victory on the Volga caused a general upsurge. In Germany, the defeat of the Stalingrad group was met with three days of mourning. In Italy, Hungary and Romania, which lost a significant part of their armed forces, the defeat became one of the reasons for the internal political crisis, which subsequently resulted in the overthrow of the leaders of these states and their withdrawal from the alliance with Hitler.
counter-offensive of troops of three Soviet fronts: Southwestern (general N.F. Vatutin), Stalingrad (general A.I. Eremenko) and Don (general K.K. Rokossovsky) to encircle and destroy the enemy group of troops in the Volga interfluve and Don in the fall of 1942. In the spring of 1942, enemy troops broke through the Soviet front and reached the Don in July. A threat was created to Stalingrad and North Caucasus. Stalingrad was the most important strategic point and a large industrial area. In addition, for both the Nazis and Soviet citizens, Stalingrad was a symbolic city. A. Hitler said more than once that Stalingrad was his destiny, and he must take it. In August 1942, Nazi troops crossed the Don. Soldiers of the 62nd Army Gen. IN AND. Chuikov, 64th Army General. M.S. Shumilov, divisions under the command of generals A.I. Rodimtseva, L.I. Gurtiev heroically defended the city. The German command was forced to withdraw the 4th Tank Army from the Caucasus direction and transfer it to Stalingrad. On August 23, 1942, German troops launched a new offensive with the goal of capturing Stalingrad with simultaneous attacks by the 6th and 4th armies in converging directions. On August 23, the Germans reached the Volga, and on September 13 they began the assault on Stalingrad. The most stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops forced the Germans to stop attacks and go on the defensive. The German command decided not to launch any more offensives in order to more thoroughly prepare “for the second Russian winter,” accumulate forces and go on the offensive again in the spring of 1943. In operational order No. 1 of the main command of the Nazi German ground forces dated October 14, 1942 it was said: “The Russians themselves were seriously weakened during the last battles and will not be able to have the same large forces in the winter of 1942/43 as they had last winter.” But that was not the case. By the fall of 1942, the enemy no longer had absolute superiority on the Soviet-German front, and the offensive capabilities of the German Wehrmacht were thoroughly undermined. In the first half of September 1942 at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and General Staff a plan emerged for the offensive operation of Soviet troops in the Stalingrad area under code name"Uranus".
The operation plan was developed in detail with the involvement of the commanders of the military branches in this work, as well as taking into account the proposals of the commanders of the fronts in the Stalingrad direction. In the summer of 1942, in the area of the Middle Don, Stalingrad and further south along the Sarpinsky lakes, the main forces of Army Group B operated: troops of the 8th Italian, 3rd and 4th Romanian armies and the 6th and 4th tank German armies. This group consisted of more than a million people, 675 tanks and assault guns, more than 10 thousand guns and mortars. Army Group B was supported by the 4th air fleet and the 8th Air Corps. When choosing decisive strikes, it was taken into account that the main enemy grouping was in the Stalingrad area - the 6th and 4th German tank armies, and its flanks on the middle reaches of the Don and south of Stalingrad were covered mainly by Italian and Romanian troops, which had relatively low equipment and combat effectiveness . Main role The Southwestern Front was to play in Operation Uranus. The troops of the Southwestern Front launched attacks from bridgeheads on the right bank of the Don in the Serafimovich and Kletskaya areas. The Stalingrad Front advanced from the Sarpinsky Lakes region. The strike groups of both fronts were supposed to unite in the area of Kalach - Sovetsky Farm and thereby complete the encirclement of the main enemy forces (6th and 4th German armies) near Stalingrad. Next, separate troops of the Southwestern Front from the bridgeheads southwest of Serafimovich and in the Kletskaya area were supposed to break through the defenses of the 3rd Romanian Army and go to the rear of the Stalingrad group in order to cut off all its routes to retreat. Thus, the Southwestern Front and Stalingrad created an outer ring of encirclement of the enemy group. The Don Front carried out auxiliary operations, and he created inner ring Encircling the enemy in the small bend of the Don. In the first half of November, in deep secrecy, large forces of Soviet troops were drawn up to Stalingrad, and huge flows of military cargo were transferred. On the eve of the battle, the balance of forces was approximately the same, with the exception of a slight superiority Soviet side in tanks. On November 19, 1942, the troops of the Southwestern Front and the right wing of the Don Front went on the offensive, and on November 20, the troops of the Stalingrad Front. On November 23, the main forces of the 6th Army and 4th Tank Armies (330 thousand people) were surrounded. On November 16, the troops of the South-Western and Voronezh fronts, by attacking Morozovsk and Kantemirovka, thwarted the German plans to relieve the siege of Stalingrad. Attempts to organize supplies German troops failed through the air. On January 26, the encircled group of enemy troops was divided into two parts by Soviet troops, after which mass surrender began. On January 31, 1943, the commander of the 6th Army, Field Marshal F. von Paulus, surrendered. In total, 91 thousand people were captured. National mourning was declared in Germany.
On November 19-20, 1942, Soviet troops made a breakthrough on both flanks, on the Don and south of Stalingrad, and began to envelop the German armies. The German command did not expect such a large-scale offensive, and all enemy attempts to prevent the encirclement turned out to be late and weak.
The idea of the operation
The idea of an offensive operation in the Stalingrad area was discussed at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command already in the first half of September 1942. “At this time,” writes Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, “we were finishing the formation and preparation of strategic reserves, which largely consisted of tank and mechanized units and formations, mostly armed with medium and heavy tanks; reserves of other military equipment and ammunition were created. All this allowed Headquarters to draw a conclusion already in September 1942 about the possibility and advisability of delivering a decisive blow to the enemy in the near future... When discussing these issues at Headquarters, in which General G.K. Zhukov and I took part, it was determined that the planned counter-offensive should include two main operational tasks: one to encircle and isolate the main group of German troops operating directly in the city area and the other to destroy this group.”
After the war, the Stalingrad offensive operation, like any victory, had many fathers. N. Khrushchev claimed that, together with the commander of the Stalingrad Front, A. I. Eremenko, he presented a plan for a future counteroffensive to Headquarters at the end of September. Eremenko himself said in his memoirs that he put forward the idea of Stalingrad counterattacks right on the day of his appointment as front commander. We can say that in the second half of September the idea of a counteroffensive was in the air. Fleet Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov indicated the real author, who took responsibility for the implementation of the plan: “It must be said frankly that with the enormous and sometimes decisive importance of the role of the commanders who carried out the operation plans, the emergence of the idea at Headquarters and the will of the Supreme Commander The commander-in-chief determined the success of the battle.”
The counteroffensive plan, codenamed “Uranus,” was distinguished by its boldness of concept. Southwestern offensive. The Don and Stalingrad fronts were supposed to unfold over an area of 400 square meters. km. The troops maneuvering to encircle the enemy had to fight a distance of up to 120 - 140 km from the north and up to 100 km from the south. They planned to create two fronts to encircle the enemy group - internal and external.
“The directions of Russian attacks,” writes the German general and military historian Kurt Tippelskirch, “were determined by the very outline of the front line: the left flank of the German group stretched almost 300 km from Stalingrad to the Don bend in the Novaya Kalitva area, and the short right flank, where especially weak forces, began at Stalingrad and was lost in the Kalmyk steppe.”
Large forces were concentrated in the Stalingrad direction. The Southwestern Front was reinforced by two tank (1st and 26th) and one cavalry (8th) corps, as well as a number of tank and artillery formations and units. The Stalingrad Front was reinforced by the 4th Mechanized and 4th Cavalry Corps, three mechanized and three tank brigades. The Don Front received three rifle divisions for reinforcement. In just a relatively short period of time (from October 1 to November 18), four tank, two mechanized and two cavalry corps, 17 separate tank brigades and regiments, 10 rifle divisions and 6 brigades, 230 artillery and mortar regiments. The Soviet troops consisted of about 1,135 thousand people, about 15 thousand guns and mortars, over 1.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces. The composition of the front air forces was increased to 25 aviation divisions, which had over 1.9 thousand combat aircraft. The total number of estimated divisions on three fronts reached 75. However, this powerful grouping of Soviet troops had a peculiarity - about 60% of the troops were young recruits who did not yet have combat experience.
As a result of the massing of forces and means in the directions of the main attacks of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts, a significant superiority of Soviet troops over the enemy was created: in people - by 2-2.5 times, in artillery and tanks - by 4-5 times or more. The decisive role in delivering attacks was assigned to 4 tank and 2 mechanized corps.
German anti-aircraft battery captured by soldiers of the Soviet 21st Army near Stalingrad
In early November, Army General G.K. Zhukov, Colonel General A.M. Vasilevsky, Artillery Colonel General N.N. Voronov and other representatives of Headquarters again arrived in the Stalingrad area. They were supposed to carry out, together with the command of the fronts and armies, directly on the ground preparatory work for the implementation of the Uranus plan. On November 3, Zhukov held a final meeting with the troops of the 5th Tank Army of the Southwestern Front. In addition to the front and army command, it was attended by commanders of corps and divisions, whose troops were intended to attack in the direction of the main attack. On November 4, the same meeting was held in the 21st Army of the Southwestern Front with the participation of the commander of the Don Front. On November 9 and 10, meetings were held with army commanders, formation commanders and the command of the Stalingrad Front.
In the northern sector, the 5th Tank and 21st Armies of the Southwestern Front under the command of N.F. Vatutin, which delivered the main blow, were to attack from the bridgehead southwest of Serafimovich and from the Kletskaya area, were to break through the defenses of the 3rd Romanian army and develop an offensive to the southeast in general direction on Kalach. The troops of the Don Front under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky - part of the 65th (former 4th Tank) and 24th Armies - launched auxiliary attacks in the general direction of the Vertyachiy farmstead with the aim of encircling enemy forces in the small bend of the Don and cutting them off from the main German group in the Stalingrad area. The strike group of the Stalingrad Front under the command of A. I. Eremenko (51st, 57th and 64th armies) was tasked with launching an offensive from the area of lakes Sarpa, Tsatsa, Barmantsak in the northwestern direction to connect with the troops of the Southwestern front.
Support for the advancing troops was provided by: on the Southwestern Front - the 2nd and 17th Air Armies, on Stalingrad - the 8th Air Army, on the Don - the 16th Air Army. Stalin attached importance to air preparation for the operation special meaning. On November 12, the Supreme Commander conveyed to Zhukov that if the air preparation for the operation on the Stalingrad and Southwestern fronts was unsatisfactory, then the operation would end in failure. War experience shows, he noted, that the success of an operation depends on air superiority. Soviet aviation must perform three tasks: 1) concentrate its operations in the offensive area shock units, suppress German aviation and firmly cover your troops; 2) pave the way for the advancing units by systematically bombing the German troops facing them; 3) pursue the retreating enemy troops through systematic bombing and assault operations in order to completely disrupt them and prevent them from gaining a foothold on the nearest defense lines. Much attention was given to strengthening the air armies of the fronts. In November, the 1st Mixed Aviation Corps arrived from the Headquarters reserve to the 17th Air Army, and the 2nd Mixed Aviation Corps to the 8th Air Army. It was also decided to use large aviation forces during the counteroffensive. long range.
The strike groups of Soviet troops, concentrated north and south of Stalingrad, were supposed to defeat the flanks of the enemy’s Stalingrad group and close the encirclement ring around it in the Sovetsky, Kalach area with an enveloping movement. After the destruction of the enemy's Stalingrad group, our troops had to build on their success towards Rostov, defeat German troops in the North Caucasus, and launch an offensive in the Donbass, in the Kursk, Bryansk, and Kharkov directions.
The Soviet command, which widely used methods of camouflage and disinformation, this time managed to mislead the enemy regarding the place, time of the strike and the forces with which it was supposed to be delivered. Thus, only in order to deceive German aerial reconnaissance, 17 bridges were built in various places across the Don, but only 5 of them were supposed to be actually used. As previously noted, the enemy did not expect a large-scale Russian offensive in the Stalingrad area. The greatest threat was seen against Army Group Center. The Supreme Command of the Ground Forces (OKH) discussed the possibility of a winter offensive by Russian troops against the Rzhev salient; There is also the possibility of a Russian offensive against the northern flank of Army Group B with access to Rostov and the Sea of Azov. The command of the 6th Army and Army Group B monitored the concentration of Soviet forces on the bridgeheads at Kletskaya and Serafimovich, predicted an imminent enemy offensive in their zone, but underestimated its scale. Thus, despite reports that the Russians were preparing for an offensive, the OKH ordered the offensive to continue to capture Stalingrad, despite the objections of the commander of the 6th Army. Most of the staff generals agreed that the Russians did not have the strength to deliver sufficiently powerful blows, that the enemy had been bled dry by the fighting in Stalingrad, and in this they had miscalculated greatly.
A column of Romanian soldiers captured at Stalingrad moves past a truck with Red Army soldiers
Thus, even if the enemy command at Stalingrad in the fall of 1942 began to notice signs of an impending offensive by Soviet troops, it had no clear idea of its scale, time, composition of strike groups, or direction of the main attacks. The high command of the German troops, located far from the front, turned out to be even less able to correctly assess the true extent of the danger that threatened its Stalingrad group.
Colonel General Jodl, chief of staff of the operational leadership of the OKW (Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht), subsequently admitted the complete surprise of the Soviet offensive for the high command: “We completely overlooked the concentration of large Russian forces on the flank of the 6th Army (on the Don). We had absolutely no idea about the strength of Russian troops in this area. There was nothing here before, and suddenly a blow of great force was struck, which was of decisive importance.” The surprise factor has become important advantage Red Army.
Relying on the capture of Stalingrad at any cost and setting more and more new deadlines for this, the high command, using up its reserves in these attempts, practically lost the opportunity to radically strengthen the position of its troops on the southern strategic flank. In mid-November, the enemy had only six divisions as operational reserves in the Stalingrad direction, which were scattered along a wide front. The command of Army Group B began to withdraw some divisions to reserve and planned to regroup the troops of the 6th and 4th Tank armies in order to create a deeper operational formation and strengthen the flanks of their group. The 22nd German Tank Division in the Perelazovsky area and the 1st Romanian Tank Division behind the 3rd Romanian Army at the turn of the river were withdrawn and subordinated to the 48th Tank Corps. Chir in the Chernyshevskaya district. South of Stalingrad, the 4th Romanian Army was transferred to the area east of Kotelnikovo in early October (initially its divisions were part of the German 4th Tank Army) in order to strengthen the right flank of the Stalingrad group. But these measures were late and insufficient to radically change the situation.
Breaking through enemy defenses
November 19. On November 19, 1942, the troops of the Southwestern and right wing of the Don Front went on the offensive. The enemy's defense was broken through simultaneously in several areas. The weather was foggy and non-flying. Therefore, we had to abandon the use of aviation. At 7:30 a.m., a salvo of Katyusha rocket launchers began the artillery preparation. 3,500 guns and mortars destroyed the enemy's defenses. Fire was conducted for one hour for destruction and twenty minutes for suppression. The artillery barrage caused great damage to the enemy.
At 8 hours 50 minutes, the rifle divisions of the 5th Tank Army of P. L. Romanenko and the 21st Army of I. M. Chistyakov, together with tanks for direct infantry support, went on the attack. The first echelon of the 5th Tank Army included the 14th and 47th Guards, 119th and 124th Rifle Divisions. Despite powerful artillery preparation, at first the Romanians stubbornly resisted. The enemy's firing points that remained unsuppressed seriously slowed down the movement of our troops. By 12 o'clock, having overcome the first position of the enemy's main defense line, the Soviet divisions had advanced only 2 - 3 km. Then the army commander decided to bring into battle the success development echelon - the 1st and 26th tank corps. The enemy's defense had still not been broken through, and there was no gap for mobile formations to enter the breakthrough. Tank formations overtook the infantry and broke through the enemy's defenses with a powerful blow. The Romanian troops fled and began to surrender. The enemy's rear line was immediately overcome.
Thus, the mobile group of the 5th Tank Army - the 1st and 26th Tank Corps - by the middle of the first day of the offensive, completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense and developed further actions in operational depth, paving the way for the infantry. The 8th Cavalry Corps was introduced into the resulting gap (16 km along the front and in depth) in the afternoon.
Artillerymen - guardsmen inspect captured German 150-mm six-barreled rocket mortars "Nebelwerfer" 41 (15 cm Nebelwerfer 41) on the Stalingrad front
Soviet light tank T-70 with troops on armor on the Stalingrad front
Soviet soldiers near a T-26 tank on the outskirts of a liberated village near Stalingrad
The enemy resisted, bringing operational reserves into the battle. The 1st Romanian Tank Division (it had only light Czechoslovak and French captured tanks) from the Perelazovsky area was moved to the front to help its infantry divisions. In addition, the enemy command sent the 7th Cavalry, 1st Motorized and 15th Infantry Divisions to the area of Pronin, Ust-Medvedetsky, Nizhne-Fomikhinsky, which temporarily delayed the advance of Soviet units there. Stubborn enemy resistance in front of the front of the 14th Guards Rifle Division created a threat to the right flank of the 5th Tank Army and delayed the advance of the left flank of the 1st Guards Army.
The 21st Army advanced from the Kletskaya area on a front of 14 km. In the first echelon of the army, the 96th, 63rd, 293rd and 76th rifle divisions attacked. The enemy offered stubborn resistance here too: the 96th and 63rd Rifle Divisions advanced slowly. The 293rd and 76th rifle divisions operated more successfully in the direction of the main attack. The commander of the 21st Army, Chistyakov, also used his mobile formations to complete the breakthrough of the enemy defense. A mobile group consisting of the 4th Tank and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps was thrown into the attack.
The 4th Tank Corps, under the command of Major General of Tank Forces A.G. Kravchenko, moved in two echelons, along two routes, and solved the problem of breaking through enemy defenses. On the night of November 20, the right column of the 4th Tank Corps, consisting of the 69th and 45th Tank Brigades, reached the area of the Pervomaisky state farm, Manoilin and broke through 30-35 km. By the end of November 19, the left column of the corps, consisting of the 102nd tank and 4th motorized rifle brigades, had advanced to a depth of 10-12 km and reached the area of Zakharov and Vlasov, where it encountered stubborn enemy resistance.
The 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps under the command of Major General I. A. Pliev, fighting with the retreating enemy, advanced in the direction of Verkhne-Buzinovka, Evlampievsky, Bolshenabatovsky. In his memoirs, the former commissar of the 3rd Cavalry Corps of the Guard, Colonel D.S. Dobrushin, writes: “The 32nd and 5th Cavalry Divisions marched in the first echelon, the 6th Guards in the second. The order of the corps commander was this: to bypass pockets of enemy resistance - they will either cease to exist or will be destroyed by the infantry following the cavalry. On the line of the villages of Nizhnyaya and Verkhnyaya Buzinovka, the enemy, trying to hold back the advance of our units, opened strong artillery and mortar fire. The artillery of the advancing units turned around and took up firing positions. An artillery duel has begun." General Pliev decided to bypass Nizhne-Buzinovka from the south with units of the 6th Guards Cavalry Division and attack the enemy from the rear. “The regiments went out at a trot in the given directions. At this time, units of the 5th and 32nd Cavalry Divisions, together with T-34 tanks, were advancing from the front to the enemy trench line. The battle had already lasted two hours. The commander of the neighboring army, General Kuznetsov, arrived and began to express dissatisfaction with the fact that the corps was marking time. At this time, soldiers began to jump out of the enemy trenches in disarray. The horsemen struck from the rear. Soon the enemy’s defenses were penetrated to the full depth.”
As a result, the mobile formations of the strike group of the Southwestern Front completed the breakthrough of the enemy defense and began to move south into the enemy’s operational depth, destroying his reserves, headquarters and retreating units. At the same time, the rifle divisions, advancing behind the mobile formations, completed the clearing settlements and captured the remnants of the defeated enemy troops. Our troops advanced 25 - 35 km, broke through the defenses of the Romanian 3rd Army in two areas: southwest of Serafimovich and in the Kletskaya area. The Romanian 2nd and 4th Army Corps were defeated, and their remnants with the 5th Army Corps were flanked.
Romanian prisoners of war captured near the village of Raspopinskaya near the city of Kalach
Don Front. The troops of the Don Front also went on the offensive on November 19. The main blow was delivered by formations of the 65th Army under the command of P.I. Batov. At 7 o'clock 30 min. regiments of heavy guards mortars fired the first salvo. At 8 o'clock. 50 min. The infantry went on the attack. The enemy put up stubborn resistance and counterattacked. Our troops had to overcome strong enemy resistance in an area inaccessible to the attackers. “Let the reader imagine this area: winding deep ravines abut a chalk cliff, its steep walls rise 20-25 meters. There is almost nothing to grab onto with your hand. Feet slide on the soaked chalk. ... It was visible how the soldiers ran up to the cliff and climbed up. Soon the entire wall was covered with people. They broke down, fell, supported each other and stubbornly crawled up.”
By the end of the day, the troops of the 65th Army with their right flank advanced into the depth of the enemy's position up to 4 - 5 km, without breaking through the main line of his defense. The 304th Infantry Division of this army, after a stubborn battle, occupied Melo-Kletsky.
Soviet soldiers in the battle for the Red October plant during the Battle of Stalingrad. November 1942
The assault group of the 13th Guards Division clears houses in Stalingrad
To be continued…