Creation of the Soviet nuclear bomb in terms of the complexity of scientific, technical and engineering problems, it is a significant, truly unique event that influenced the balance of political forces in the world after the Second World War. The solution to this problem in our country, which has not yet recovered from the terrible destruction and upheaval of four war years, became possible as a result of the heroic efforts of scientists, production organizers, engineers, workers and the entire people. The implementation of the Soviet atomic project required real scientific, technological and industrial revolution, which led to the emergence of the domestic nuclear industry. This labor feat paid off. Having mastered the secrets of nuclear weapons production, our Motherland long years ensured military-defense parity of the two leading states of the world - the USSR and the USA. The nuclear shield, the first link of which was the legendary RDS-1 product, still protects Russia today.
I. Kurchatov was appointed head of the Atomic Project. From the end of 1942, he began to gather the scientists and specialists needed to solve the problem. Initially, the general management of the atomic problem was carried out by V. Molotov. But on August 20, 1945 (a few days after the atomic bombing of Japanese cities), the State Defense Committee decided to create a Special Committee, headed by L. Beria. It was he who began to lead the Soviet atomic project.
The first domestic atomic bomb had the official designation RDS-1. It was deciphered in different ways: “Russia does it itself,” “The Motherland gives it to Stalin,” etc. But in the official resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated June 21, 1946, the RDS received the wording: “ Jet engine"WITH"".
The tactical and technical specifications (TTZ) indicated that the atomic bomb was being developed in two versions: using “heavy fuel” (plutonium) and using “light fuel” (uranium-235). Writing technical specifications for RDS-1 and subsequent development of the first Soviet atomic bomb RDS-1 was carried out taking into account the available materials according to the scheme of the US plutonium bomb tested in 1945. These materials were provided by Soviet foreign intelligence. An important source of information was K. Fuchs, a German physicist who participated in work on the nuclear programs of the USA and England.
Intelligence materials on the US plutonium bomb made it possible to avoid a number of mistakes when creating the RDS-1, significantly shorten its development time, and reduce costs. However, it was clear from the very beginning that many technical solutions the American prototype are not the best. Even on initial stages Soviet specialists could offer best solutions both the charge as a whole and its individual units. But the unconditional requirement of the country's leadership was to guarantee and with the least risk to obtain a working bomb by its first test.
The nuclear bomb had to be manufactured in the form of an aerial bomb weighing no more than 5 tons, with a diameter of no more than 1.5 meters and a length of no more than 5 meters. These restrictions were due to the fact that the bomb was developed in relation to the TU-4 aircraft, the bomb bay of which allowed the placement of a “product” with a diameter of no more than 1.5 meters.
As the work progressed, the need for a special research organization to design and develop the “product” itself became obvious. A number of studies conducted by Laboratory N2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences required their deployment in a “remote and isolated place.” This meant: it was necessary to create a special research and production center for the development of an atomic bomb.
Creation of KB-11
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The scientific and production activities of KB-11 were subject to the strictest secrecy. Her character and goals were a state secret of the utmost importance. Issues of security of the facility were in the center of attention from the first days.
April 9, 1946 a closed resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was adopted on the creation of a Design Bureau (KB-11) at Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences. P. Zernov was appointed head of KB-11, and Yu. Khariton was appointed chief designer.
The resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated June 21, 1946 determined strict deadlines for the creation of the facility: the first stage was to go into operation on October 1, 1946, the second - on May 1, 1947. The construction of KB-11 (“facility”) was entrusted to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. The “object” was supposed to occupy up to 100 square meters. kilometers of forests in the Mordovian Nature Reserve and up to 10 sq. kilometers in the Gorky region.
Construction was carried out without projects and preliminary estimates, the cost of work was taken at actual costs. The construction team was formed with the involvement of a “special contingent” - this is how prisoners were designated in official documents. The government created special conditions construction support. However, construction was difficult; the first production buildings were ready only at the beginning of 1947. Some of the laboratories were located in monastery buildings.
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The volume of construction work was great. There was a need to reconstruct plant No. 550 for the construction of a pilot plant on the existing premises. The power plant needed updating. It was necessary to build a foundry and press shop for working with explosives, as well as a number of buildings for experimental laboratories, testing towers, casemates, and warehouses. To carry out blasting operations, it was necessary to clear and equip large areas in the forest.
At the initial stage, there were no special premises for research laboratories - scientists had to occupy twenty rooms in the main design building. The designers, as well as the administrative services of KB-11, were to be housed in the reconstructed premises of the former monastery. The need to create conditions for arriving specialists and workers forced us to pay more and more attention to the residential village, which gradually acquired the features of a small town. Simultaneously with the construction of housing, a medical town was erected, a library, a cinema club, a stadium, a park and a theater were built.
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On February 17, 1947, by a decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR signed by Stalin, KB-11 was classified as a special security enterprise with the transformation of its territory into a closed security zone. Sarov was removed from the administrative subordination of the Mordovian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and excluded from all accounting materials. In the summer of 1947, the perimeter of the zone was taken under military protection.
Work in KB-11
The mobilization of specialists to the nuclear center was carried out regardless of their departmental affiliation. The leaders of KB-11 searched for young and promising scientists, engineers, and workers in literally all institutions and organizations of the country. All candidates for work in KB-11 underwent a special check by the state security services.
The creation of atomic weapons was the result of the work of a large team. But it consisted not of faceless “staff units”, but of bright personalities, many of which left a noticeable mark in the history of domestic and world science. Significant potential was concentrated here, both scientific, design, and performing, working.
In 1947, 36 researchers arrived to work at KB-11. They were seconded from various institutes, mainly from the USSR Academy of Sciences: Institute of Chemical Physics, Laboratory N2, NII-6 and the Institute of Mechanical Engineering. In 1947, KB-11 employed 86 engineering and technical workers.
Taking into account the problems that had to be solved in KB-11, the order of formation of its main structural divisions. The first research laboratories began working in the spring of 1947 in the following areas:
laboratory N1 (head - M. Ya. Vasiliev) - testing structural elements a charge of explosives providing a spherically converging detonation wave;
laboratory N2 (A.F. Belyaev) – research on explosive detonation;
laboratory N3 (V.A. Tsukerman) – radiographic studies of explosive processes;
laboratory N4 (L.V. Altshuler) – determination of equations of state;
laboratory N5 (K.I. Shchelkin) - full-scale tests;
laboratory N6 (E.K. Zavoisky) - measurements of central frequency compression;
laboratory N7 (A. Ya. Apin) – development of a neutron fuse;
laboratory N8 (N.V. Ageev) - study of the properties and characteristics of plutonium and uranium for use in bomb construction.
The start of full-scale work on the first domestic atomic charge can be dated back to July 1946. During this period, in accordance with the decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated June 21, 1946, Yu. B. Khariton prepared the “Tactical and technical specifications for the atomic bomb.”
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The TTZ indicated that the atomic bomb was being developed in two versions. In the first of them, the working substance should be plutonium (RDS-1), in the second - uranium-235 (RDS-2). In a plutonium bomb, the transition through the critical state must be achieved by symmetrically compressing spherical plutonium with a conventional explosive (implosive version). In the second option, the transition through the critical state is ensured by combining masses of uranium-235 with the help of an explosive (“gun version”).
At the beginning of 1947, the formation of design units began. Initially, all design work was concentrated in a single research and development sector (RDS) KB-11, which was headed by V. A. Turbiner.
The intensity of work in KB-11 was very great from the very beginning and was constantly increasing, since the initial plans, very extensive from the very beginning, increased in volume and depth of elaboration every day.
Conducting explosive experiments with large explosive charges began in the spring of 1947 at the KB-11 experimental sites still under construction. The largest volume of research had to be carried out in the gas-dynamic sector. In connection with this, a large number of specialists were sent there in 1947: K. I. Shchelkin, L. V. Altshuler, V. K. Bobolev, S. N. Matveev, V. M. Nekrutkin, P. I. Roy, N. D. Kazachenko, V. I. Zhuchikhin, A. T. Zavgorodniy, K. K. Krupnikov, B. N. Ledenev, V. M. Malygin, V. M. Bezotosny, D. M. Tarasov, K. I. Panevkin, B. A. Terletskaya and others.
Experimental studies of charge gas dynamics were carried out under the leadership of K. I. Shchelkin, and theoretical questions were developed by a group located in Moscow, headed by Ya. B. Zeldovich. The work was carried out in close cooperation with designers and technologists.
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The development of “NZ” (neutron fuse) was undertaken by A.Ya. Apin, V.A. Alexandrovich and designer A.I. Abramov. To achieve the desired result, it was necessary to master new technology the use of polonium, which has a fairly high radioactivity. At the same time, it was necessary to develop complex system protection of materials in contact with polonium from its alpha radiation.
In KB-11, research and design work on the most precise element of the charge-capsule-detonator was carried out for a long time. This important direction was led by A.Ya. Apin, I.P. Sukhov, M.I. Puzyrev, I.P. Kolesov and others. The development of research required the territorial approach of theoretical physicists to the research, design and production base of KB-11. Since March 1948, a theoretical department began to be formed in KB-11 under the leadership of Ya.B. Zeldovich.
Due to the great urgency and high complexity of work in KB-11, new laboratories and production sites began to be created, and people seconded to them the best specialists The Soviet Union mastered new high standards and strict production conditions.
The plans drawn up in 1946 could not take into account many of the difficulties that opened up to the participants in the atomic project as they moved forward. By Decree CM N 234-98 ss/op dated 02/08/1948, the production time for the RDS-1 charge was extended to more late date- by the time parts of the plutonium charge are ready at Plant No. 817.
With regard to the RDS-2 option, by this time it became clear that it was not practical to bring it to the testing stage due to the relatively low efficiency of this option compared to the cost of nuclear materials. Work on RDS-2 was stopped in mid-1948.
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By resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated June 10, 1948, the following were appointed: first deputy chief designer of the “object” - Kirill Ivanovich Shchelkin; deputy chief designer of the facility - Alferov Vladimir Ivanovich, Dukhov Nikolay Leonidovich.
In February 1948, 11 scientific laboratories were hard at work in KB-11, including theorists under the leadership of Ya.B. Zeldovich, who moved to the site from Moscow. His group included D. D. Frank-Kamenetsky, N. D. Dmitriev, V. Yu. Gavrilov. The experimenters did not lag behind the theorists. The most important work was carried out in the departments of KB-11, which were responsible for detonating the nuclear charge. Its design was clear, and so was the detonation mechanism. In theory. In practice, it was necessary to carry out checks and carry out complex experiments again and again.
Production workers also worked very actively - those who had to translate the plans of scientists and designers into reality. A.K. Bessarabenko was appointed head of the plant in July 1947, N.A. Petrov became the chief engineer, P.D. Panasyuk, V.D. Shcheglov, A.I. Novitsky, G.A. Savosin, A.Ya. Ignatiev, V. S. Lyubertsev.
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In 1947, a second pilot plant appeared within the structure of KB-11 - for the production of parts from explosives, the assembly of experimental product units and the solution of many other important tasks. The results of calculations and design studies were quickly translated into specific parts, assemblies, and blocks. This, by the highest standards, responsible work was carried out by two factories under KB-11. Plant No. 1 manufactured many parts and assemblies of the RDS-1 and then assembled them. Plant No. 2 (its director was A. Ya. Malsky) was engaged in the practical solution of various problems associated with the production and processing of parts from explosives. The assembly of the explosive charge was carried out in a workshop led by M. A. Kvasov.
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Each stage passed posed new tasks for researchers, designers, engineers, and workers. People worked 14-16 hours a day, completely dedicating themselves to their work. On August 5, 1949, a plutonium charge manufactured at Combine No. 817 was accepted by a commission headed by Khariton and then sent by letter train to KB-11. Here, on the night of August 10-11, a control assembly of a nuclear charge was carried out. She showed: RDS-1 corresponds technical requirements, the product is suitable for testing at the test site.
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Research in the field of nuclear physics in the USSR has been carried out since 1918. In 1937, Europe's first cyclotron was launched at the Radium Institute in Leningrad. On November 25, 1938, by decree of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences (AS), a permanent commission on the atomic nucleus was created. It included Sergei Ivanovich Vavilov, Abram Iofe, Abram Alikhanov, Igor Kurchatov and others (in 1940 they were joined by Vitaly Khlopin and Isai Gurevich). By this time, nuclear research was carried out in more than ten scientific institutes. In the same year, the Commission on Heavy Water was formed under the USSR Academy of Sciences, which was later transformed into the Commission on Isotopes.
The first atomic bomb was given the designation RDS-1. This name comes from a government decree, where the atomic bomb was coded as a “special jet engine,” abbreviated as RDS. The designation RDS-1 came into widespread use after the test of the first atomic bomb and was deciphered in different ways: “Stalin’s jet engine”, “Russia does it itself”.
In September 1939, construction began on a powerful cyclotron in Leningrad, and in April 1940 it was decided to build a pilot plant to produce approximately 15 kg of heavy water per year. But due to the outbreak of war, these plans were not realized. In May 1940, N. Semenov, Ya. Zeldovich, Yu. Khariton (Institute of Chemical Physics) proposed a theory of the development of a nuclear chain reaction in uranium. In the same year, work was accelerated to search for new deposits of uranium ores. In the late 30s - early 40s, many physicists already imagined how general outline should look like an atomic bomb. The idea is to quickly concentrate in one place a certain (more than critical mass) amount of material that is fissile under the influence of neutrons (with the emission of new neutrons). After which an avalanche-like increase in the number of atomic decays will begin in it - a chain reaction with the release huge amount energy - an explosion will occur. The problem was obtaining a sufficient amount of fissile material. The only such substance found in nature in acceptable quantities is the isotope of uranium with a mass number (the total number of protons and neutrons in the nucleus) of 235 (uranium-235). In natural uranium, the content of this isotope does not exceed 0.71% (99.28% uranium-238); moreover, the content of natural uranium in the ore is, at best, 1%. The isolation of uranium-235 from natural uranium was sufficient complex problem. An alternative to uranium, as it soon became clear, was plutonium-239. It is practically never found in nature (it is 100 times less than uranium-235). It is possible to obtain it in an acceptable concentration in nuclear reactors by irradiating uranium-238 with neutrons. Building such a reactor presented another problem.
Explosion of RDS-1 on August 29, 1949 at the Semipalatinsk test site. The power of the bomb was more than 20 kt. The 37-meter tower on which the bomb was mounted was obliterated, leaving a crater 3 m in diameter and 1.5 m deep underneath, covered with a melted glass-like substance.
The third problem was how it was possible to collect the required mass of fissile material in one place. In the process of even very rapid convergence of subcritical parts, fission reactions begin in them. The energy released in this case may not allow most of the atoms to “take part” in the fission process, and they will fly apart without having time to react.
In 1940, V. Spinel and V. Maslov from the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology submitted an application for the invention of an atomic weapon based on the use of a chain reaction of spontaneous fission of a supercritical mass of uranium-235, which is formed from several subcritical ones, separated by an explosive impenetrable to neutrons, destroyed by detonation ( although the “workability” of such a charge is highly doubtful, a certificate for the invention was nevertheless obtained, but only in 1946). The Americans intended to use the so-called cannon design for their first bombs. It actually used a cannon barrel, with the help of which one subcritical part of the fissile material was shot into another (it soon became clear that such a scheme was not suitable for plutonium due to insufficient closing speed).
On April 15, 1941, a resolution was issued by the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) on the construction of a powerful cyclotron in Moscow. But after the start of the Great Patriotic War Almost all work in the field of nuclear physics was stopped. Many nuclear physicists ended up at the front or were reoriented to other, as it seemed then, more pressing topics.
Since 1939, both the GRU of the Red Army and the 1st Directorate of the NKVD have been collecting information on the nuclear issue. The first message about plans to create an atomic bomb came from D. Cairncross in October 1940. This issue was discussed at the British Science Committee, where Cairncross worked. In the summer of 1941, the Tube Alloys project to create an atomic bomb was approved. By the beginning of the war, England was one of the leaders in nuclear research, largely thanks to German scientists who fled here when Hitler came to power, one of them was KPD member K. Fuchs. In the fall of 1941, he went to the Soviet Embassy and reported that he had important information about a powerful new weapon. To communicate with him, S. Kramer and radio operator “Sonya” - R. Kuchinskaya were allocated. The first radiograms to Moscow contained information about the gas diffusion method for separating uranium isotopes and about a plant in Wales being built for this purpose. After six transmissions, communication with Fuchs was lost. At the end of 1943, Soviet intelligence officer in the United States Semenov (“Twain”) reported that E. Fermi carried out the first nuclear chain reaction in Chicago. The information came from the physicist Pontecorvo. At the same time, closed secrets were received from England through foreign intelligence scientific works Western scientists on atomic energy for the years 1940-1942. They confirmed that great progress had been made in creating the atomic bomb. The wife of the famous sculptor Konenkov also worked for intelligence, and she became close to the leading physicists Oppenheimer and Einstein for a long time influenced them. Another resident in the USA, L. Zarubina, found a way to L. Szilard and was included in Oppenheimer’s circle of people. With their help, it was possible to introduce reliable agents into Oak Ridge, Los Alamos and the Chicago Laboratory - centers of American nuclear research. In 1944, information on the American atomic bomb was transmitted to Soviet intelligence by: K. Fuchs, T. Hall, S. Sake, B. Pontecorvo, D. Greenglass and the Rosenbergs.
At the beginning of February 1944, People's Commissar of the NKVD L. Beria held an extended meeting The first Soviet nuclear bomb and its chief designer Yu. Khariton, heads of NKVD intelligence. During the meeting, a decision was made to coordinate the collection of information on the atomic problem. coming through the NKVD and the GRU of the Red Army. and its generalization to create department “C”. On September 27, 1945, the department was organized, leadership was entrusted to the GB Commissioner P. Sudoplatov. In January 1945, Fuchs transmitted a description of the design of the first atomic bomb. Among other things, intelligence obtained materials on the electromagnetic separation of uranium isotopes, data on the operation of the first reactors, specifications for the production of uranium and plutonium bombs, data on the design of a focusing explosive lens system and the size of the critical mass of uranium and plutonium, on plutonium-240, on time and sequence operations for the production and assembly of a bomb, the method of activating the bomb initiator; about the construction of isotope separation plants, as well as diary entries about the first test explosion of an American bomb in July 1945.
Information received through intelligence channels facilitated and accelerated the work of Soviet scientists. Western experts believed that an atomic bomb in the USSR could be created no earlier than in 1954-1955, but its first test took place already in August 1949.
In April 1942, the People's Commissar of the Chemical Industry M. Pervukhin, by order of Stalin, was familiarized with materials on work on the atomic bomb abroad. Pervukhin proposed selecting a group of specialists to evaluate the information presented in this report. On Ioffe’s recommendation, the group included young scientists Kurchatov, Alikhanov and I. Kikoin. On November 27, 1942, the State Defense Committee issued a decree “On uranium mining”. The resolution provided for the creation of a special institute and the start of work on geological exploration, extraction and processing of raw materials. Beginning in 1943, the People's Commissariat of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy (NKCM) began mining and processing uranium ore at the Tabashar mine in Tajikistan with a plan of 4 tons of uranium salts per year. At the beginning of 1943, previously mobilized scientists were recalled from the front.
In pursuance of the resolution of the State Defense Committee, on February 11, 1943, Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences was organized, the head of which was Kurchatov (in 1949 it was renamed Laboratory measuring instruments USSR Academy of Sciences - LIPAN, in 1956, on its basis, the Institute of Atomic Energy was created, and currently it is the Russian Research Center "Kurchatov Institute"), which was supposed to coordinate all work on the implementation of the atomic project.
In 1944, Soviet intelligence received a reference book on uranium-graphite reactors, which contained very valuable information on determining reactor parameters. But the country did not yet have the uranium necessary to power even a small experimental nuclear reactor. On September 28, 1944, the government obliged the NKCM USSR to hand over uranium and uranium salts to the State Fund and entrusted the task of storing them to Laboratory No. 2. In November 1944, a large group of Soviet specialists, under the leadership of the head of the 4th special department of the NKVD V. Kravchenko, left for the liberated Bulgaria, to study the results of geological exploration of the Gotensky deposit. On December 8, 1944, the State Defense Committee issued a decree on the transfer of the mining and processing of uranium ores from the NKMC to the 9th Directorate of the NKVD, created in the Main Directorate of Mining and Metallurgical Enterprises (GU GMP). In March 1945, Major General S. Egorov, who had previously held the position of deputy, was appointed head of the 2nd department (mining and metallurgical) of the 9th Directorate of the NKVD. Head of the Main Department of Dalstroy. In January 1945, as part of the 9th Directorate, on the basis of separate laboratories of the State Institute of Rare Metals (Giredmet) and one of the defense plants, NII-9 (now VNIINM) was organized to study uranium deposits, solve problems of processing uranium raw materials, obtaining metallic uranium and plutonium . By this time, approximately one and a half tons of uranium ore per week were arriving from Bulgaria.
Since March 1945, after the NKGB received information from the United States about the design of an atomic bomb based on the principle of implosion (compression of fissile material by the explosion of a conventional explosive), work began on new scheme which had obvious advantages over the cannon. In a note from V. Makhanev to Beria in April 1945 about the timing of the creation of the atomic bomb, it was said that the diffusion plant at Laboratory No. 2 for the production of uranium-235 was supposed to be launched in 1947. Its productivity was supposed to be 25 kg of uranium per year, which should be enough for two bombs (in fact, the American uranium bomb required 65 kg of uranium-235).
During the battle for Berlin on May 5, 1945, the property of the Physical Institute of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society was discovered. On May 9, a commission headed by A. Zavenyagin was sent to Germany to search for scientists working there on the Uranium project and accept materials on the uranium problem. A large group of German scientists was taken to the Soviet Union along with their families. Among them were Nobel laureates G. Hertz and N. Riehl, I. Kurchatov, professors R. Deppel, M. Volmer, G. Pose, P. Thyssen, M. von Ardene, Geib (in total about two hundred specialists, including 33 doctors of science ).
The creation of a nuclear explosive device using plutonium-239 required the construction of an industrial nuclear reactor to produce it. Even a small experimental reactor required about 36 tons of uranium metal, 9 tons of uranium dioxide and about 500 tons of pure graphite. If the graphite problem was solved by August 1943 - it was possible to develop and master a special technological process for producing graphite of the required purity, and in May 1944 its production was established at the Moscow Electrode Plant, then by the end of 1945 the country did not have the required amount of uranium. The first technical specifications for the production of uranium dioxide and uranium metal for a research reactor were issued by Kurchatov in November 1944. In parallel with the creation of uranium-graphite reactors, work was carried out on reactors based on uranium and heavy water. The question arises: why was it necessary to “spread forces” so much and move simultaneously in several directions? Justifying the need for this, Kurchatov in his Report in 1947 gives the following figures. The number of bombs that could be obtained from 1000 tons of uranium ore using different methods is 20 using a uranium-graphite boiler, 50 using the diffusion method, 70 using the electromagnetic method, 40 using “heavy” water. At the same time, boilers with “heavy” water, although they have a number of significant disadvantages, have the advantage that they allow the use of thorium. Thus, although the uranium-graphite boiler made it possible to create an atomic bomb in the shortest possible time, it had the worst result in terms of complete use of raw materials. Taking into account the experience of the United States, where gas diffusion was chosen from four methods of uranium separation studied, on December 21, 1945, the government decided to build plants No. 813 (now the Ural Electro-Mechanical Plant in the city of Novouralsk) to produce highly enriched uranium-235 by gas diffusion and No. 817 (Chelyabinsk-40, now the Mayak chemical plant in the city of Ozersk) to produce plutonium.
In the spring of 1948, the two-year period allotted by Stalin to create the Soviet atomic bomb expired. But by this time, let alone bombs, there were no fissile materials for its production. A government decree of February 8, 1948 set a new deadline for the production of the RDS-1 bomb - March 1, 1949.
The first industrial reactor “A” at Plant No. 817 was launched on June 19, 1948 (it reached its design capacity on June 22, 1948 and was decommissioned only in 1987). To separate produced plutonium from nuclear fuel, a radiochemical plant (plant “B”) was built as part of plant No. 817. Irradiated uranium blocks were dissolved and chemical methods plutonium was separated from uranium. The concentrated plutonium solution was subjected to additional purification from highly active fission products in order to reduce its radiation activity when supplied to metallurgists. In April 1949, Plant B began manufacturing bomb parts from plutonium using NII-9 technology. At the same time, the first heavy water research reactor was launched. The development of the production of fissile materials was difficult with numerous accidents during the elimination of the consequences of which there were cases of overexposure of personnel (at that time no attention was paid to such trifles). By July, a set of parts for the plutonium charge was ready. To carry out physical measurements, a group of physicists under the leadership of Flerov went to the plant, and a group of theorists under the leadership of Zeldovich went to the plant to process the results of these measurements, calculate the efficiency values and the probability of an incomplete explosion.
On August 5, 1949, the plutonium charge was accepted by the commission headed by Khariton and sent by letter train to KB-11. By this time, work on creating an explosive device was almost completed here. Here, on the night of August 10-11, a control assembly of a nuclear charge was carried out, which received the index 501 for the RDS-1 atomic bomb. After this, the device was dismantled, the parts were inspected, packaged and prepared for shipment to the landfill. Thus, the Soviet atomic bomb was made in 2 years 8 months (in the USA it took 2 years 7 months).
The test of the first Soviet nuclear charge 501 was carried out on August 29, 1949 at the Semipalatinsk test site (the device was located on a tower). The power of the explosion was 22 kt. The design of the charge was similar to the American “Fat Man”, although electronic filling was a Soviet design. The atomic charge was a multilayer structure in which plutonium was transferred to a critical state by compression by a converging spherical detonation wave. At the center of the charge was placed 5 kg of plutonium, in the form of two hollow hemispheres, surrounded by a massive shell of uranium-238 (tamper). This shell, the first Soviet nuclear bomb, served to inertially contain the core inflating during the chain reaction, so that as much of the plutonium as possible had time to react and, in addition, served as a reflector and moderator of neutrons (neutrons with low energies are most effectively absorbed by plutonium nuclei, causing their fission ). The tamper was surrounded by an aluminum shell, which ensured uniform compression of the nuclear charge by the shock wave. A neutron initiator (fuse) was installed in the cavity of the plutonium core - a beryllium ball with a diameter of about 2 cm, coated with a thin layer of polonium-210. When the nuclear charge of a bomb is compressed, the nuclei of polonium and beryllium come closer together, and the alpha particles emitted by radioactive polonium-210 knock out neutrons from beryllium, which initiate a nuclear chain reaction of fission of plutonium-239. One of the most complex units was the explosive charge, which consisted of two layers. The inner layer consisted of two hemispherical bases made of an alloy of TNT and hexogen, the outer layer was assembled from individual elements that had different detonation rates. The outer layer, designed to form a spherical converging detonation wave at the base of the explosive, is called the focusing system.
For safety reasons, the installation of the unit containing fissile material was carried out immediately before using the charge. For this purpose, the spherical explosive charge had a through conical hole, which was closed with a plug made of explosives, and in the outer and inner casings there were holes that were closed with lids. The power of the explosion was due to the nuclear fission of about a kilogram of plutonium; the remaining 4 kg did not have time to react and were uselessly dispersed. During the implementation of the RDS-1 creation program, many new ideas arose for improving nuclear charges (increasing the utilization rate of fissile material, reducing dimensions and weight). New types of charges have become more powerful, more compact and “more elegant” compared to the first.
In the second half of the 40s, the leadership of the country of the Soviets was quite concerned that America already had weapons unprecedented in their destructive power, and Soviet Union- not yet. Immediately after the end of World War II, the country was extremely wary of US superiority, whose plans were not only to weaken the position of the USSR in a constant arms race, but perhaps even destroy it through nuclear strike. In our country, the fate of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was well remembered.
In order to prevent the threat from constantly looming over the country, it was urgently necessary to create our own, powerful and terrifying weapons. Your own atomic bomb. It was very helpful that in their research, Soviet scientists could use data on German V-missiles obtained during the occupation, as well as apply other research obtained from Soviet intelligence in the West. For example, very important data was secretly transmitted, risking their lives, by American scientists themselves, who understood the need for nuclear balance.
After the terms of reference were approved, large-scale activities began to create an atomic bomb.
The leadership of the project was entrusted to the outstanding nuclear scientist Igor Kurchatov, and a specially created committee, which was supposed to control the process, was headed by.
During the research process, the need arose for a special research organization at whose sites this “product” would be designed and developed. The research, which was carried out by Laboratory N2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences, required a remote and preferably deserted place. In other words, it was necessary to create a special center for the development of nuclear weapons. Moreover, what is interesting is that the development was carried out simultaneously in two versions: using plutonium and uranium-235, heavy and light fuel, respectively. Another feature: the bomb had to be of a certain size:
- no more than 5 meters long;
- with a diameter of no more than 1.5 meters;
- weighing no more than 5 tons.
Such strict parameters of a deadly weapon were explained simply: the bomb was developed for a specific model of aircraft: the TU-4, the hatch of which did not allow larger objects to pass through.
The first Soviet nuclear weapon had the abbreviation RDS-1. Unofficial transcripts were different, from: “The Motherland gives to Stalin,” to: “Russia does it itself,” but in official documents it was interpreted as: “Jet engine “C”.” In the summer of 1949, the most important event for the USSR and the whole world took place: in Kazakhstan, at the Semipalatinsk test site, a deadly weapon was tested. This happened at 7.00 local time and at 4.00 Moscow time.
This happened on a tower 37 and a half meters high, which was installed in the middle of a twenty-kilometer field. The power of the explosion was 20 kilotons of TNT.
This event once and for all ended the nuclear dominance of the United States, and the USSR began to proudly be called the second, after the United States, nuclear power in the world.
A month later, TASS told the world about the successful testing of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union, and a month later the scientists who worked on the invention of the atomic bomb were awarded. All of them received high awards and substantial state prizes.
Today, a model of that same bomb, namely: the body, the RDS-1 charge and the remote control with which it was detonated, is located in the country’s first nuclear weapons museum. The museum, which stores authentic samples of legendary products, is located in the city of Sarov, Nizhny Novgorod region.
American Robert Oppenheimer and Soviet scientist Igor Kurchatov are officially recognized as the fathers of the atomic bomb. But in parallel, deadly weapons were also being developed in other countries (Italy, Denmark, Hungary), so the discovery rightfully belongs to everyone.
The first to tackle this issue were German physicists Fritz Strassmann and Otto Hahn, who in December 1938 were the first to artificially split the atomic nucleus of uranium. And six months later, the first reactor was already being built at the Kummersdorf test site near Berlin and uranium ore was urgently purchased from the Congo.
“Uranium Project” - the Germans start and lose
In September 1939, the “Uranium Project” was classified. 22 reputable research centers were invited to participate in the program, and the research was supervised by Minister of Armaments Albert Speer. The construction of an installation for separating isotopes and the production of uranium to extract the isotope from it that supports the chain reaction was entrusted to the IG Farbenindustry concern.
For two years, a group of the venerable scientist Heisenberg studied the possibility of creating a reactor with heavy water. A potential explosive (uranium-235 isotope) could be isolated from uranium ore.
But an inhibitor is needed to slow down the reaction - graphite or heavy water. Choosing the latter option created an insurmountable problem.
The only plant for the production of heavy water, which was located in Norway, was disabled by fighters after the occupation local resistance, and small reserves of valuable raw materials were exported to France.
The rapid implementation of the nuclear program was also hindered by the explosion of an experimental nuclear reactor in Leipzig.
Hitler supported the uranium project as long as he hoped to obtain a super-powerful weapon that could influence the outcome of the war he started. After government funding was cut, the work programs continued for some time.
In 1944, Heisenberg managed to create cast uranium plates, and a special bunker was built for the reactor plant in Berlin.
It was planned to complete the experiment to achieve a chain reaction in January 1945, but a month later the equipment was urgently transported to the Swiss border, where it was deployed only a month later. The nuclear reactor contained 664 cubes of uranium weighing 1525 kg. It was surrounded by a graphite neutron reflector weighing 10 tons, and one and a half tons of heavy water were additionally loaded into the core.
On March 23, the reactor finally started working, but the report to Berlin was premature: the reactor did not reach a critical point, and the chain reaction did not occur. Additional calculations showed that the mass of uranium must be increased by at least 750 kg, proportionally adding the amount of heavy water.
But supplies of strategic raw materials were at their limit, as was the fate of the Third Reich. On April 23, the Americans entered the village of Haigerloch, where the tests were carried out. The military dismantled the reactor and transported it to the United States.
The first atomic bombs in the USA
A little later, the Germans began developing the atomic bomb in the USA and Great Britain. It all started with a letter from Albert Einstein and his co-authors, emigrant physicists, sent in September 1939 to US President Franklin Roosevelt.
The appeal emphasized that Nazi Germany was close to creating an atomic bomb.
Stalin first learned about work on nuclear weapons (both allied and adversary) from intelligence officers in 1943. They immediately decided to create a similar project in the USSR. Instructions were issued not only to scientists, but also to intelligence services, for which obtaining any information about nuclear secrets became a major task.
The invaluable information about the developments of American scientists that Soviet intelligence officers were able to obtain significantly advanced the domestic nuclear project. It helped our scientists avoid ineffective search paths and significantly speed up the time frame for achieving the final goal.
Serov Ivan Aleksandrovich - head of the bomb creation operation
Of course, the Soviet government could not ignore the successes of German nuclear physicists. After the war, a group of Soviet physicists, future academicians, were sent to Germany in the uniform of colonels of the Soviet army.
Ivan Serov, the first deputy people's commissar of internal affairs, was appointed head of the operation, this allowed scientists to open any doors.
In addition to their German colleagues, they found reserves of uranium metal. This, according to Kurchatov, shortened the development time of the Soviet bomb by at least a year. More than one ton of uranium and leading nuclear specialists were taken out of Germany by the American military.
Not only chemists and physicists were sent to the USSR, but also qualified labor– mechanics, electricians, glassblowers. Some of the employees were found in prison camps. In total, about 1,000 German specialists worked on the Soviet nuclear project.
German scientists and laboratories on the territory of the USSR in the post-war years
A uranium centrifuge and other equipment, as well as documents and reagents from the von Ardenne laboratory and the Kaiser Institute of Physics were transported from Berlin. As part of the program, laboratories “A”, “B”, “C”, “D” were created, headed by German scientists.
The head of Laboratory “A” was Baron Manfred von Ardenne, who developed a method for gas diffusion purification and separation of uranium isotopes in a centrifuge.
For the creation of such a centrifuge (only in industrial scale) in 1947 he received the Stalin Prize. At that time, the laboratory was located in Moscow, on the site of the famous Kurchatov Institute. Each German scientist’s team included 5-6 Soviet specialists.
Later, laboratory “A” was taken to Sukhumi, where a physical and technical institute was created on its basis. In 1953, Baron von Ardenne became a Stalin laureate for the second time.
Laboratory B, which conducted experiments in the field of radiation chemistry in the Urals, was headed by Nikolaus Riehl, a key figure in the project. There, in Snezhinsk, the talented Russian geneticist Timofeev-Resovsky, with whom he had been friends back in Germany, worked with him. The successful test of the atomic bomb brought Riehl the star of Hero of Socialist Labor and the Stalin Prize.
Research at Laboratory B in Obninsk was led by Professor Rudolf Pose, a pioneer in the field of nuclear testing. His team managed to create fast neutron reactors, the first nuclear power plant in the USSR, and projects for reactors for submarines.
On the basis of the laboratory, the Physics and Energy Institute named after A.I. was later created. Leypunsky. Until 1957, the professor worked in Sukhumi, then in Dubna, at the Joint Institute of Nuclear Technologies.
Laboratory “G”, located in the Sukhumi sanatorium “Agudzery”, was headed by Gustav Hertz. The nephew of the famous 19th century scientist gained fame after a series of experiments that confirmed the ideas of quantum mechanics and the theory of Niels Bohr.
The results of his productive work in Sukhumi were used to create an industrial installation in Novouralsk, where in 1949 the first Soviet bomb RDS-1 was filled.
The uranium bomb that the Americans dropped on Hiroshima was a cannon type. When creating the RDS-1, domestic nuclear physicists were guided by the Fat Boy - the “Nagasaki bomb”, made of plutonium according to the implosive principle.
In 1951, Hertz was awarded the Stalin Prize for his fruitful work.
German engineers and scientists lived in comfortable houses; they brought their families, furniture, paintings from Germany, they were provided with decent salaries and special food. Did they have the status of prisoners? According to Academician A.P. Aleksandrov, an active participant in the project, they were all prisoners in such conditions.
Having received permission to return to their homeland, the German specialists signed a non-disclosure agreement about their participation in the Soviet nuclear project for 25 years. In the GDR they continued to work in their specialty. Baron von Ardenne was a two-time winner of the German National Prize.
The professor headed Physics Institute in Dresden, which was created under the auspices of the Scientific Council for the Peaceful Applications of Atomic Energy. The Scientific Council was headed by Gustav Hertz, who received the National Prize of the GDR for his three-volume textbook on atomic physics. Here in Dresden, in Technical University, Professor Rudolf Pose also worked.
The participation of German specialists in the Soviet atomic project, as well as the achievements of Soviet intelligence, do not diminish the merits of Soviet scientists who, with their heroic work, created domestic atomic weapons. And yet, without the contribution of each participant in the project, the creation nuclear industry and a nuclear bomb would stretch on indefinitely
The first Soviet charge for an atomic bomb was successfully tested at the Semipalatinsk test site (Kazakhstan).
This event was preceded by long and difficult work by physicists. The beginning of work on nuclear fission in the USSR can be considered the 1920s. Since the 1930s, nuclear physics has become one of the main directions of domestic physical science, and in October 1940, for the first time in the USSR, a group of Soviet scientists made a proposal to use atomic energy for weapons purposes, submitting an application to the Invention Department of the Red Army "On the use of uranium as a explosive and toxic substances."
The war that began in June 1941 and the evacuation of scientific institutes dealing with problems of nuclear physics interrupted work on the creation of atomic weapons in the country. But already in the autumn of 1941, the USSR began to receive intelligence information about secret intensive research work being carried out in Great Britain and the USA aimed at developing methods for using atomic energy for military purposes and creating explosives of enormous destructive power.
This information forced, despite the war, to resume work on uranium in the USSR. On September 28, 1942, the secret decree of the State Defense Committee No. 2352ss “On the organization of work on uranium” was signed, according to which research on the use of atomic energy was resumed.
In February 1943, Igor Kurchatov was appointed scientific director of work on the atomic problem. In Moscow, headed by Kurchatov, Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences was created (now the National Research Center"Kurchatov Institute"), which began to research atomic energy.
Initially, the general management of the atomic problem was carried out by the Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee (GKO) of the USSR, Vyacheslav Molotov. But on August 20, 1945 (a few days after the US atomic bombing of Japanese cities), the State Defense Committee decided to create a Special Committee, headed by Lavrentiy Beria. He became the curator of the Soviet atomic project.
At the same time, for the direct management of research, design, engineering organizations and industrial enterprises, engaged in the Soviet nuclear project, the First Main Directorate was created under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (later the Ministry of Medium Engineering of the USSR, now the State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom). Boris Vannikov, who had previously been the People's Commissar of Ammunition, became the head of the PGU.
In April 1946, the design bureau KB-11 (now the Russian Federal Nuclear Center - VNIIEF) was created at Laboratory No. 2 - one of the most secret enterprises for the development of domestic nuclear weapons, the chief designer of which was Yuli Khariton. Plant No. 550 of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, which produced artillery shell casings, was chosen as the base for the deployment of KB-11.
The top-secret facility was located 75 kilometers from the city of Arzamas (Gorky region, now Nizhny Novgorod region) on the territory of the former Sarov Monastery.
KB-11 was tasked with creating an atomic bomb in two versions. In the first of them, the working substance should be plutonium, in the second - uranium-235. In mid-1948, work on the uranium option was stopped due to its relatively low efficiency compared to the cost of nuclear materials.
The first domestic atomic bomb had the official designation RDS-1. It was deciphered in different ways: “Russia does it itself,” “The Motherland gives it to Stalin,” etc. But in the official decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of June 21, 1946, it was encrypted as “Special jet engine (“S”).
The creation of the first Soviet atomic bomb RDS-1 was carried out taking into account the available materials according to the scheme of the US plutonium bomb tested in 1945. These materials were provided by Soviet foreign intelligence. An important source of information was Klaus Fuchs, a German physicist who participated in work on the nuclear programs of the USA and Great Britain.
Intelligence materials on the American plutonium charge for an atomic bomb made it possible to reduce the time needed to create the first Soviet charge, although many of the technical solutions of the American prototype were not the best. Even at the initial stages, Soviet specialists could offer the best solutions for both the charge as a whole and its individual components. Therefore, the first atomic bomb charge tested by the USSR was more primitive and less effective than the original version of the charge proposed by Soviet scientists in early 1949. But in order to guarantee and in a short time show that the USSR also has atomic weapons, it was decided to use a charge created according to the American scheme in the first test.
The charge for the RDS-1 atomic bomb was a multilayer structure in which the active substance, plutonium, was transferred to a supercritical state by compressing it through a converging spherical detonation wave in the explosive.
RDS-1 was an aircraft atomic bomb weighing 4.7 tons, with a diameter of 1.5 meters and a length of 3.3 meters. It was developed in relation to the Tu-4 aircraft, the bomb bay of which allowed the placement of a “product” with a diameter of no more than 1.5 meters. Plutonium was used as fissile material in the bomb.
To produce an atomic bomb charge in the city of Chelyabinsk-40 at Southern Urals a plant was built under the conditional number 817 (now the Federal State Unitary Enterprise Mayak Production Association). The plant consisted of the first Soviet industrial reactor for producing plutonium, a radiochemical plant for separating plutonium from uranium irradiated in the reactor, and a plant for producing products from metallic plutonium.
The plant's reactor 817 was brought to its design capacity in June 1948, and a year later the enterprise received required amount plutonium to make the first charge for an atomic bomb.
The site for the test site where it was planned to test the charge was chosen in the Irtysh steppe, approximately 170 kilometers west of Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan. A plain with a diameter of approximately 20 kilometers, surrounded from the south, west and north by low mountains, was allocated for the test site. In the east of this space there were small hills.
Construction of the landfill, which received the name training ground No. 2 of the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the USSR (later the Ministry of Defense of the USSR), was started in 1947, and by July 1949 it was basically completed.
For testing at the test site, an experimental site with a diameter of 10 kilometers was prepared, divided into sectors. It was equipped with special facilities to ensure testing, observation and recording of physical research. In the center of the experimental field, a metal lattice tower 37.5 meters high was mounted, designed to install the RDS-1 charge. At a distance of one kilometer from the center, an underground building was built for equipment recording light, neutron and gamma fluxes nuclear explosion. To study the impact of a nuclear explosion, sections of metro tunnels, fragments of airfield runways were built on the experimental field, samples of aircraft, tanks, artillery rocket launchers, and ship superstructures were placed various types. To ensure the operation of the physical sector, 44 structures were built at the test site and a cable network with a length of 560 kilometers was laid.
In June-July 1949, two groups of KB-11 workers with auxiliary equipment and household supplies were sent to the test site, and on July 24 a group of specialists arrived there, which was supposed to be directly involved in preparing the atomic bomb for testing.
On August 5, 1949, the government commission for testing the RDS-1 gave a conclusion that the test site was completely ready.
On August 21, a plutonium charge and four neutron fuses were delivered to the test site by a special train, one of which was to be used to detonate a warhead.
On August 24, 1949, Kurchatov arrived at the training ground. By August 26, all preparatory work at the site was completed. The head of the experiment, Kurchatov, gave the order to test the RDS-1 on August 29 at eight o'clock in the morning local time and to carry out preparatory operations starting at eight o'clock in the morning on August 27.
On the morning of August 27, assembly of the combat product began near the central tower. On the afternoon of August 28, demolition workers carried out a final full inspection of the tower, prepared the automation for detonation and checked the demolition cable line.
At four o'clock in the afternoon on August 28, a plutonium charge and neutron fuses for it were delivered to the workshop near the tower. The final installation of the charge was completed by three o'clock in the morning on August 29. At four o'clock in the morning, installers rolled the product out of the assembly shop along a rail track and installed it in the tower's freight elevator cage, and then lifted the charge to the top of the tower. By six o'clock the charge was equipped with fuses and connected to the blasting circuit. Then the evacuation of all people from the test field began.
Due to the worsening weather, Kurchatov decided to postpone the explosion from 8.00 to 7.00.
At 6.35, the operators turned on the power to the automation system. 12 minutes before the explosion the field machine was turned on. 20 seconds before the explosion, the operator turned on the main connector (switch) connecting the product to the automatic control system. From that moment on, all operations were performed by an automatic device. Six seconds before the explosion, the main mechanism of the machine turned on the power of the product and some of the field instruments, and one second turned on all the other instruments and issued an explosion signal.
At exactly seven o'clock on August 29, 1949, the entire area was illuminated with a blinding light, which signaled that the USSR had successfully completed the development and testing of its first atomic bomb charge.
The charge power was 22 kilotons of TNT.
20 minutes after the explosion, two tanks equipped with lead protection were sent to the center of the field to conduct radiation reconnaissance and inspect the center of the field. Reconnaissance determined that all structures in the center of the field had been demolished. At the site of the tower, a crater gaped; the soil in the center of the field melted, and a continuous crust of slag formed. Civil buildings and industrial structures were completely or partially destroyed.
The equipment used in the experiment made it possible to carry out optical observations and measurements of heat flow, shock wave parameters, characteristics of neutron and gamma radiation, determine the level of radioactive contamination of the area in the area of the explosion and along the trail of the explosion cloud, and study the impact of the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion on biological objects.
For the successful development and testing of a charge for an atomic bomb by several closed decrees of the Presidium Supreme Council USSR on October 29, 1949, orders and medals of the USSR were awarded to a large group of leading researchers, designers, and technologists; many were awarded the title of Stalin Prize laureates, and more than 30 people received the title of Hero of Socialist Labor.
As a result of the successful test of the RDS-1, the USSR abolished the American monopoly on the possession of atomic weapons, becoming the second nuclear power in the world.