Ships of the Russian fleet - participants in the Russo-Japanese War. There is probably no more disappointing defeat in Russian history.
But it was precisely the defeat in this war that finally “blown the brains” of the Russian court and the command of the army and navy. In 10 years, Russia will get involved in a new bloodbath - the First World War. And this will be the end of the empire.
The launch of the new ship took place in the presence of the august family. On the same day, another ship was launched, which was to play a huge role in the history of our country and in the life of Nicholas II - on May 11, 1900, the Aurora was launched - the last of three cruisers of the Diana type and the only domestic one a ship that has survived, albeit in a thoroughly rebuilt form, to this day.
the crew leaves the sunken battleship
it is possible that in the photo there is a boat under the command of midshipman S.N. Vasilev, who subsequently broke through to the port of Chifoo
sunken Pobeda
The ship was launched in 1900 and scuttled in Port Arthur on the night of September 19-20, 1904. Subsequently, it was raised by the Japanese, restored and put into operation under the name "Suo" (according to other sources, "Suvo"). Withdrawn from the combat core of the fleet in 1922. It is believed that in the same year it was dismantled for metal. According to other sources, it was used as a block until 1946.
Cruiser I rank "Aurora"
The fate of this ship is more than intricate - launched in 1900, the Aurora is the only ship of those years that has survived to this day. At least - the only one in Russia. Until recently, it was listed as part of the combat core of the Baltic Fleet. The ship became famous for the fact that on October 25, 1917 it fired a blank salvo towards the Winter Palace, which became the signal for the assault on it and the signal of the onset of an entire era in the history of Russia. Coincidence or irony of fate - the ship was launched in the presence of the last Russian emperor and became the last ship of the imperial Russian fleet that has survived to this day.
The 1st rank cruiser "Aurora" is permanently moored on Petrovskaya Embankment. Saint Petersburg
1984, the ship is being repaired. It will take its place at Petrovskaya Embankment only in 1987
Oranienbaum, 1944. "Aurora" sat on the ground after numerous bombings
in the Kronstadt dock, 1922
"Aurora" under repair at the Franco-Russian plant in St. Petersburg, 1917
"Aurora" during the First World War, Baltic Sea
on the roadstead of Manila, 1905
"Aurora" during sea trials, 1903
hull of the Aurora after launching, May 11, 1900
1st rank cruiser "Diana"
built in 1896. The 1st rank cruiser "Diana" became the first in a series of three ships of the same type, which received names from Greek and Roman mythology - Diana (Roman goddess of vegetation), Aurora (Greek goddess of the dawn), Pallas (foster sister of Athena, who was killed by Athena back in childhood, although this could have meant Athena herself Pallas). In 1922, the ship was sold to Germany and in 1925 dismantled for metal. Then he was excluded from the RKKF lists.
on the Small Kronstadt roadstead
under Japanese artillery fire, Port Arthur, 1904
"Diana" in Algeria, 1909-1910
in the dock
1st rank cruiser "Pallada"
The second of three Diana-class cruisers. Built in 1899. On December 8, 1904, she was sunk during shelling by siege artillery. In 1905, she was raised by the Japanese, restored and included in the Japanese fleet. Since 1920 - converted into a minelayer. On May 27, 1924, she was sunk during a demonstration bombing in honor of the anniversary of the Battle of Tsushima.
the cruiser "Pallada" under Japanese artillery fire. On the starboard side is the Pobeda EDB.
sunken "Pallada" in the harbor of Port Arthur, 1904
cruiser "Pallada" (in the background) and steamer "Izhora"
Squadron battleship "Poltava"
Construction began in 1892, commissioned in 1900. EBR "Poltava" became the lead ship of a series of three slightly different battleships. One of the three was the Petropavlovsk EDB, which was blown up by a mine at the very beginning Russo-Japanese War. Admiral S. O. Makarov died along with the ship.
Poltava sank in Port Arthur in 1904 after being shelled by Japanese siege artillery. Raised by the Japanese in 1905, restored and commissioned as the coastal defense battleship Tango. In 1915 it was bought out by the Russian Admiralty and re-enlisted in the Russian fleet under the name "Chesma". In March 1918, the ship was captured by the British and used as a floating prison. When leaving Arkhangelsk, the interventionists abandoned the ship (1920). In 1921 it was enlisted in the White Sea Fleet and scrapped in 1924.
in the dock of Kronstadt, 1900
"Poltava" and "Sevastopol" at the outfitting wall
"Poltava" after entry into service
sunken Poltava, Port Arthur, 1904
in a Japanese dock, 1905
Battleship "Tango", 1909-1910
already under the name "Chesma", Vladivostok, 1916
as part of the White Sea Flotilla, 1921
Squadron battleship "Emperor Nicholas I"
Entered service in 1891. In 1893, he crossed the Atlantic and took part in celebrations marking the 400th anniversary of the discovery of America. From 1893 to 1898 - service in the Mediterranean Sea. Under the command of P.P. Andreev, he participated in the Cretan peacekeeping operation. In 1898, under the command of S. O. Makarov, he moved to Vladivostok. In 1902 he returned to the Baltic. In 1904 - back to the Far East. After the battle on May 15, 1905, it was surrendered to the Japanese by order of Admiral Nebogatov. In the Japanese Navy it was put into combat service under the name "Iki". Sunk as a target in 19185 during firing training.
launching, 1889
at the dock, 1895
after the Battle of Tsushima
restoration work, already under the name "Iki"
"Iki" after entry into service
Armored cruiser 1st rank "Svetlana"
built in Le Havre. commissioned in 1898. Sunk during the Battle of Tsushima. In honor of the ship, the name "Svetlana" was given to a light cruiser laid down at the RBVZ in 1913. The second "Svetlana" after the revolution was renamed "Profintern", since 1925 - "Red Crimea". The ship was sunk in the 60s while testing missile weapons.
on the roadstead with raised flags
on a hike
The photo was probably taken near the outfitting wall
Armored cruiser "Russia"
Launched in 1895, commissioned in 1897. Represents a further development of "Rurik". In August 1904, in the battle of Ulsan Island, it was seriously damaged, returned to Vladivostok and during 1904-1905 was used as a floating fort in Novik Bay. In 1906 he came to Kronstadt, where major repairs took place from 1906 to 1909. In 1909 he was enlisted in the first reserve detachment, and in 1911 - in the cruiser detachment of the Baltic Fleet, transferred to Helsingfors. In 1917 he transferred to Kronshdatdt (Ice Campaign). Since 1918 - under conservation. In 1922, it was decommissioned and taken to Germany for scrapping. While being towed in a strong storm, she was washed up on the Develsey bank, in December 1922 she was refloated and taken to Kiel for dismantling. The twist of fate lies in the fact that during tests in 1897, the cruiser left Kronstadt in a strong storm and was thrown aground near the island.
cruiser hull after launching
in the dock after the Kronstadt incident
in dock during major repairs 1906-1909
cruiser on the move
after the battle near Ulsan Island
cruiser in Helsingfors
Squadron battleship "Eagle"
Launched in 1902. Commissioned in 1904. In the Battle of Tsushima, he received 76 hits, but remained afloat. He joined the detachment of Admiral Nebogatov and was captured on May 10, 1905. Joined the Japanese fleet under the name "Iwami". Destroyed during firing in 1924.
launching
Kronstadt raid, 1904
on the roadstead of Revel before leaving for the Far East
loading coal on the high seas
after battle
"sieve" sides
at the port of Maizuru
"Iwami" after entry into service
Attack of Japanese destroyers of the Russian squadron.
On the night of February 8 to 9 (January 26 to 27), 1904, 10 Japanese destroyers suddenly attacked the Russian squadron in the outer roadstead of Port Arthur. The squadron battleships Tsesarevich, Retvizan and the cruiser Pallada received heavy damage from the explosions of Japanese torpedoes and ran aground to avoid sinking. Japanese destroyers were damaged by return fire from the artillery of the Russian squadron IJN Akatsuki And IJN Shirakumo. Thus began the Russo-Japanese War.
On the same day, Japanese troops began landing troops in the area of the port of Chemulpo. While trying to leave the port and head to Port Arthur, the gunboat Koreets was attacked by Japanese destroyers, forcing it to return.
On February 9 (January 27), 1904, the battle of Chemulpo took place. As a result, due to the impossibility of a breakthrough, the cruiser “Varyag” was scuttled by their crews and the gunboat “Koreets” was blown up.
On the same day, February 9 (January 27), 1904, Admiral Jessen headed out to sea at the head of the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers to begin military operations to disrupt transport links between Japan and Korea.
On February 11 (January 29), 1904, near Port Arthur, near the San Shan-tao Islands, the Russian cruiser Boyarin was blown up by a Japanese mine.
On February 24 (February 11), 1904, the Japanese fleet tried to close the exit from Port Arthur by sinking 5 ships loaded with stone. The attempt was unsuccessful.
On February 25 (February 12), 1904, two Russian destroyers “Besstrashny” and “Impressive”, while going out for reconnaissance, came across 4 Japanese cruisers. The first managed to escape, but the second was driven into Blue Bay, where it was scuttled by order of Captain M. Podushkin.
On March 2 (February 18), 1904, by order of the Naval General Staff, the Mediterranean squadron of Admiral A. Virenius (battleship Oslyabya, cruisers Aurora and Dmitry Donskoy and 7 destroyers), heading to Port Arthur, was recalled to the Baltic Sea .
On March 6 (February 22), 1904, a Japanese squadron shelled Vladivostok. The damage was minor. The fortress was placed in a state of siege.
On March 8 (February 24), 1904, the new commander of the Russian Pacific squadron, Vice Admiral S. Makarov, arrived in Port Arthur, replacing Admiral O. Stark in this post.
On March 10 (February 26), 1904, in the Yellow Sea, while returning from reconnaissance in Port Arthur, he was sunk by four Japanese destroyers ( IJN Usugumo , IJN Shinonome , IJN Akebono , IJN Sazanami) Russian destroyer "Steregushchy", and "Resolute" managed to return to port.
Russian fleet in Port Arthur.
On March 27 (March 14), 1904, the second Japanese attempt to block the entrance to Port Arthur harbor by flooding fire ships was thwarted.
April 4 (March 22), 1904 Japanese battleships IJN Fuji And IJN Yashima Port Arthur was bombarded with fire from Golubina Bay. In total, they fired 200 shots and main caliber guns. But the effect was minimal.
On April 12 (March 30), 1904, the Russian destroyer Strashny was sunk by Japanese destroyers.
On April 13 (March 31), 1904, the battleship Petropavlovsk was blown up by a mine and sank with almost its entire crew while going to sea. Among the dead was Admiral S. O. Makarov. Also on this day, the battleship Pobeda was damaged by a mine explosion and was out of commission for several weeks.
April 15 (April 2), 1904 Japanese cruisers IJN Kasuga And IJN Nisshin fired at the inner roadstead of Port Arthur with throwing fire.
On April 25 (April 12), 1904, the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers sank a Japanese steamer off the coast of Korea IJN Goyo-Maru, coaster IJN Haginura-Maru and Japanese military transport IJN Kinsu-Maru, after which he headed to Vladivostok.
May 2 (April 19), 1904 by the Japanese, with the support of gunboats IJN Akagi And IJN Chōkai, destroyers of the 9th, 14th and 16th destroyer flotillas, a third and final attempt was made to block the entrance to Port Arthur harbor, this time using 10 transports ( IJN Mikasha-Maru, IJN Sakura-Maru, IJN Totomi-Maru, IJN Otaru-Maru, IJN Sagami-Maru, IJN Aikoku-Maru, IJN Omi-Maru, IJN Asagao-Maru, IJN Iedo-Maru, IJN Kokura-Maru, IJN Fuzan-Maru) As a result, they managed to partially block the passage and temporarily make it impossible for large Russian ships to exit. This facilitated the unhindered landing of the Japanese 2nd Army in Manchuria.
On May 5 (April 22), 1904, the 2nd Japanese Army under the command of General Yasukata Oku, numbering about 38.5 thousand people, began landing on the Liaodong Peninsula, about 100 kilometers from Port Arthur.
On May 12 (April 29), 1904, four Japanese destroyers of the 2nd flotilla of Admiral I. Miyako began sweeping Russian mines in Kerr Bay. While performing its assigned task, destroyer No. 48 hit a mine and sank. On the same day, Japanese troops finally cut off Port Arthur from Manchuria. The siege of Port Arthur began.
Death IJN Hatsuse on Russian mines.
On May 15 (May 2), 1904, two Japanese battleships were blown up and sank at a minefield laid the day before by the minelayer Amur. IJN Yashima And IJN Hatsuse .
Also on this day, a collision of Japanese cruisers occurred near Elliot Island. IJN Kasuga And IJN Yoshino, in which the second sank from the damage received. And off the southeastern coast of Kanglu Island, the advice note ran aground IJN Tatsuta .
On May 16 (May 3), 1904, two Japanese gunboats collided during an amphibious operation southeast of the city of Yingkou. The boat sank as a result of the collision IJN Oshima .
On May 17 (May 4), 1904, a Japanese destroyer was hit by a mine and sank IJN Akatsuki .
On May 27 (May 14), 1904, not far from the city of Dalniy, the Russian destroyer Attentive hit rocks and was blown up by its crew. On the same day, Japanese advice note IJN Miyako hit a Russian mine and sank in Kerr Bay.
On June 12 (May 30), 1904, the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers entered the Korea Strait to disrupt Japan's sea communications.
On June 15 (June 2), 1904, the cruiser Gromoboy sank two Japanese transports: IJN Izuma-Maru And IJN Hitachi-Maru, and the cruiser "Rurik" sank a Japanese transport with two torpedoes IJN Sado-Maru. In total, the three transports carried 2,445 Japanese soldiers and officers, 320 horses and 18 heavy 11-inch howitzers.
On June 23 (June 10), 1904, the Pacific squadron of Rear Admiral V. Vitgoft made the first attempt to break through to Vladivostok. But when the Japanese fleet of Admiral H. Togo was discovered, she returned to Port Arthur without engaging in battle. At night of the same day, Japanese destroyers launched an unsuccessful attack on the Russian squadron.
On June 28 (June 15), 1904, the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers of Admiral Jessen again went to sea to disrupt the enemy’s sea communications.
On July 17 (July 4), 1904, near Skrypleva Island, the Russian destroyer No. 208 was blown up and sank in a Japanese minefield.
On July 18 (July 5), 1904, the Russian minelayer Yenisei hit a mine in Talienwan Bay and the Japanese cruiser sank IJN Kaimon .
On July 20 (July 7), 1904, the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers entered the Pacific Ocean through the Sangar Strait.
On July 22 (July 9), 1904, the detachment was detained with smuggled cargo and sent to Vladivostok with a prize crew of the English steamer Arabia.
On July 23 (July 10), 1904, the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers approached the entrance to Tokyo Bay. Here an English steamer with smuggled cargo was searched and sunk Night Commander. Also on this day, several Japanese schooners and a German steamer were sunk Tea, traveling with smuggled cargo to Japan. And the English steamer captured later Kalhas, after inspection, was sent to Vladivostok. The cruisers of the detachment also headed to their port.
On July 25 (July 12), 1904, a squadron of Japanese destroyers approached the mouth of the Liaohe River from the sea. The crew of the Russian gunboat "Sivuch", due to the impossibility of a breakthrough, after landing on the shore, blew up their ship.
On August 7 (July 25), 1904, Japanese troops fired at Port Arthur and its harbors for the first time from land. As a result of the shelling, the battleship Tsesarevich was damaged, and the squadron commander, Rear Admiral V. Vitgeft, was slightly wounded. The battleship Retvizan was also damaged.
On August 8 (July 26), 1904, a detachment of ships consisting of the cruiser Novik, the gunboat Beaver and 15 destroyers took part in Tahe Bay in shelling of the advancing Japanese troops, causing heavy losses.
Battle in the Yellow Sea.
On August 10 (July 28), 1904, during an attempt to break through the Russian squadron from Port Arthur to Vladivostok, a battle took place in the Yellow Sea. During the battle, Rear Admiral V. Vitgeft was killed, and the Russian squadron, having lost control, disintegrated. 5 Russian battleships, the cruiser Bayan and 2 destroyers began to retreat to Port Arthur in disarray. Only the battleship Tsesarevich, the cruisers Novik, Askold, Diana and 6 destroyers broke through the Japanese blockade. The battleship "Tsarevich", the cruiser "Novik" and 3 destroyers headed to Qingdao, the cruiser "Askold" and the destroyer "Grozovoy" - to Shanghai, the cruiser "Diana" - to Saigon.
On August 11 (July 29), 1904, the Vladivostok detachment set out to meet the Russian squadron, which was supposed to break out from Port Arthur. The battleship "Tsesarevich", the cruiser "Novik", the destroyers "Besshumny", "Besposhchadny" and "Besstrashny" arrived in Qingdao. The cruiser Novik, having loaded 250 tons of coal into bunkers, set out to sea with the goal of breaking through to Vladivostok. On the same day, the Russian destroyer Resolute was interned by the Chinese authorities in Chifoo. Also on August 11, the team scuttled the damaged destroyer Burny.
On August 12 (July 30), 1904, the previously interned destroyer Resolute was captured in Chifoo by two Japanese destroyers.
On August 13 (July 31), 1904, the damaged Russian cruiser Askold was interned and disarmed in Shanghai.
August 14 (August 1), 1904, four Japanese cruisers ( IJN Izumo , IJN Tokiwa , IJN Azuma And IJN Iwate) intercepted three Russian cruisers (Russia, Rurik and Gromoboy) heading towards the First Pacific Squadron. A battle took place between them, which went down in history as the Battle of the Korea Strait. As a result of the battle, the Rurik was sunk, and the other two Russian cruisers returned to Vladivostok with damage.
On August 15 (August 2), 1904, in Qingdao, German authorities interned the Russian battleship Tsarevich.
On August 16 (August 3), 1904, the damaged cruisers Gromoboy and Rossiya returned to Vladivostok. In Port Arthur, the proposal of the Japanese general M. Nogi to surrender the fortress was rejected. On the same day, in the Pacific Ocean, the Russian cruiser Novik stopped and inspected an English steamer Celtic.
On August 20 (August 7), 1904, a battle took place near Sakhalin Island between the Russian cruiser Novik and Japanese IJN Tsushima And IJN Chitose. As a result of the battle "Novik" and IJN Tsushima received serious damage. Due to the impossibility of repairs and the danger of the ship being captured by the enemy, the commander of the Novik, M. Schultz, decided to scuttle the ship.
On August 24 (August 11), 1904, the Russian cruiser Diana was interned by the French authorities in Saigon.
On September 7 (August 25), 1904, the submarine Forel was sent from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok by rail.
On October 1 (September 18), 1904, a Japanese gunboat was blown up by a Russian mine and sank near Iron Island. IJN Heiyen.
On October 15 (October 2), 1904, the 2nd Pacific Squadron of Admiral Z. Rozhestvensky left Libau for the Far East.
On November 3 (October 21), a Japanese destroyer was blown up by a mine placed by the Russian destroyer Skory and sank near Cape Lun-Wan-Tan IJN Hayatori .
On November 5 (October 23), 1904, in the inner roadstead of Port Arthur, after being hit by a Japanese shell, the ammunition of the Russian battleship Poltava detonated. As a result of this, the ship sank.
On November 6 (October 24), 1904, a Japanese gunboat hit a rock in the fog and sank near Port Arthur IJN Atago .
On November 28 (November 15), 1904, the submarine Dolphin was sent from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok by rail.
On December 6 (November 23), 1904, Japanese artillery, installed on the previously captured height No. 206, began a massive shelling of Russian ships stationed in the internal roadstead of Port Arthur. By the end of the day, they sunk the battleship Retvizan and suffered heavy damage to the battleship Peresvet. To remain intact, the battleship Sevastopol, the gunboat Brave and destroyers were taken out from under Japanese fire to the outer roadstead.
On December 7 (November 24), 1904, due to the impossibility of repairs after damage received from Japanese shelling, the battleship Peresvet was sunk by its crew in the western basin of Port Arthur harbor.
On December 8 (November 25), 1904, Japanese artillery sunk Russian ships in the internal roadstead of Port Arthur - the battleship Pobeda and the cruiser Pallada.
On December 9 (November 26), 1904, Japanese heavy artillery sank the cruiser Bayan, the minelayer Amur and the gunboat Gilyak.
December 25 (December 12), 1904 IJN Takasago During a patrol, she hit a mine laid by the Russian destroyer "Angry" and sank in the Yellow Sea between Port Arthur and Chieffo.
On December 26 (December 13), 1904, in the Port Arthur roadstead, the gunboat Beaver was sunk by Japanese artillery fire.
Submarines of the Siberian flotilla in Vladivostok.
On December 31 (December 18), 1904, the first four Kasatka-class submarines arrived in Vladivostok from St. Petersburg by rail.
On January 1, 1905 (December 19, 1904), in Port Arthur, by order of the crew command, the battleships Poltava and Peresvet, half-sunk in the internal roadstead, were blown up, and the battleship Sevastopol was sunk in the outer roadstead.
On January 2, 1905 (December 20, 1904), the commander of the defense of Port Arthur, General A. Stessel, gave the order to surrender the fortress. The siege of Port Arthur is over.
On the same day, before the surrender of the fortress, the clippers “Dzhigit” and “Robber” were sunk. The 1st Pacific Squadron was completely destroyed.
On January 5, 1905 (December 23, 1904), the submarine "Dolphin" arrived from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok by rail.
January 14 (January 1), 1905, by order of the commander of the Vladivostok port from the Forel submarines.
On March 20 (March 7), 1905, the 2nd Pacific Squadron of Admiral Z. Rozhdestvensky passed the Strait of Malacca and entered the Pacific Ocean.
On March 26 (March 13), 1905, the submarine “Dolphin” left Vladivostok for a combat position on Askold Island.
On March 29 (March 16), 1905, the submarine "Dolphin" returned to Vladivostok from combat duty near Askold Island.
On April 11 (March 29), 1905, torpedoes were delivered to Russian submarines in Vladivostok.
On April 13 (March 31), 1905, the 2nd Pacific Squadron of Admiral Z. Rozhestvensky arrived at Cam Ranh Bay in Indochina.
On April 22 (April 9), 1905, the submarine “Kasatka” set out on a combat mission from Vladivostok to the shores of Korea.
On May 7 (April 24), 1905, the cruisers Rossiya and Gromoboy left Vladivostok to disrupt the enemy’s sea communications.
On May 9 (April 26), 1905, the 1st detachment of the 3rd Pacific squadron of Rear Admiral N. Nebogatov and the 2nd Pacific squadron of Vice Admiral Z. Rozhestvensky united in Cam Ranh Bay.
On May 11 (April 28), 1905, the cruisers Rossiya and Gromoboy returned to Vladivostok. During the raid they sank four Japanese transport ships.
May 12 (April 29), 1905 for interception Japanese squad Three submarines were sent to Preobrazheniya Bay - "Dolphin", "Kasatka" and "Som". At 10 o'clock in the morning, near Vladivostok, near Cape Povorotny, the first battle involving a submarine took place. "Som" attacked the Japanese destroyers, but the attack ended in vain.
On May 14 (May 1), 1905, the Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron under Admiral Z. Rozhestvensky left for Vladivostok from Indochina.
On May 18 (May 5), 1905, the submarine Dolphin sank near the quay wall in Vladivostok due to an explosion of gasoline vapors.
On May 29 (May 16), 1905, the battleship Dmitry Donskoy was scuttled by his crew in the Sea of Japan near the island of Dazhelet.
On May 30 (May 17), 1905, the Russian cruiser Izumrud landed on rocks near Cape Orekhov in St. Vladimir Bay and was blown up by its crew.
On June 3 (May 21), 1905, in the Philippines in Manila, American authorities interned the Russian cruiser Zhemchug.
On June 9 (May 27), 1905, the Russian cruiser Aurora was interned by the American authorities in the Philippines in Manila.
On June 29 (June 16), 1905, in Port Arthur, Japanese rescuers raised the Russian battleship Peresvet from the bottom.
On July 7 (June 24), 1905, Japanese troops began the Sakhalin landing operation to land troops of 14 thousand people. While Russian troops numbered only 7.2 thousand people on the island.
On July 8 (July 25), 1905, in Port Arthur, Japanese rescuers raised the sunken Russian battleship Poltava.
On July 29 (July 16), 1905, the Japanese Sakhalin landing operation ended with the surrender of Russian troops.
On August 14 (August 1), 1905, in the Tatar Strait, the Keta submarine launched an unsuccessful attack on two Japanese destroyers.
On August 22 (August 9), 1905, negotiations began in Portsmouth between Japan and Russia through the mediation of the United States.
On September 5 (August 23) in the USA in Portsmouth, a peace treaty was signed between the Empire of Japan and the Russian Empire. According to the agreement, Japan received the Liaodong Peninsula, part of the Chinese Eastern Railway from Port Arthur to the city of Changchun and South Sakhalin, Russia recognized the predominant interests of Japan in Korea and agreed to the conclusion of a Russian-Japanese fishing convention. Russia and Japan pledged to withdraw their troops from Manchuria. Japan's demand for reparations was rejected.
Content:
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………..3 pages.
Chapter 1 Squadron composition Pacific Ocean………………………………..…..8 pp.
1.1. Deployment and command staff of the Pacific Ocean squadron………..…..9 p.
1.2. Comparative characteristics Japanese and Russian fleets using the example of cruisers and battleships………………………………………………………..……...…..13 pp.
Chapter 2 Description of the most important battles of the Russian fleet and military operations during the Russo-Japanese War………………………………………….20 pp.
2.1. The ratio of enemy naval forces on the eve of the first naval battles………………………………………………………..…21 pp.
2.2. Beginning of naval battles: Chemulpo. The feat of “Varyag”……….…..22 p.
2.3. Blockade and defense of Port Arthur……………………………………...22 p.
2.4. The beginning of the Japanese Army's ground offensive in Manchuria. The first successes of the Russian fleet……………………………………………………......25 pp.
2.5. The death of the Russian fleet at Tsushima…………………………………26 p.
Chapter 3 Results of the Russo-Japanese War…………………………………...34 pp.
3.1. The reasons for Russia's defeat in the war……………………………..…..35 pp.
3.2. Analysis of the actions of the Russian fleet and its role in the military defeat..35 pp.
Conclusion………………………………………………………….……....37 p.
References……………………………………………………......41 pp.
Applications…………………………………………………………………………………44 pages.
Introduction
Relevance. The Russo-Japanese War of 1905 had political and economic prerequisites. Encountering resistance from China, Japan inflicted a crushing defeat on China during the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). The Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed following the war, recorded China's renunciation of all rights to Korea and the transfer of a number of territories to Japan, including the Liaodong Peninsula in Manchuria. These achievements of Japan sharply increased its power and influence, which did not meet the interests of the European powers, so Germany, Russia and France achieved a change in these conditions: the triple intervention undertaken with the participation of Russia led to Japan’s abandonment of the Liaodong Peninsula, and then to its transfer in 1898 year of Russia for rental use. Japan considered itself offended and began a victorious war. Well known historical fact None of his contemporaries doubt the defeat of Russia. It is believed that the mediocrity of Russian generals and the backwardness of weapons could not overcome the courage of Russian soldiers and officers, but the feat of the Varyag sailors. Defeat was a foregone conclusion. This position was formed in the recent past, which had ideologically determined attitudes about the “rotten tsarist regime.” The works of V.I. Lenin provide an analysis of two major defeats of the Russian armies and navy in the war of 1904-1905. (the fall of Port Arthur and the Tsushima defeat). V.I. Lenin mercilessly criticizes the command, generals, officers and the entire management apparatus of the tsarist armed forces. “The generals and commanders,” wrote Vladimir Ilyich, “turned out to be mediocrities and nonentities. The entire history of the 1904 campaign was, according to the authoritative testimony of one English military observer (in the Times), “a criminal disregard for the elementary principles of naval and land strategy.” The civil and military bureaucracy turned out to be just as parasitious and corrupt as during the days of serfdom.” In Lenin's analysis of the two historical events mentioned, one can find significant differences in assessing the degree of training of naval armed forces units Tsarist Russia who took part in the first period of the war (Port Arthur and 1904), and the second Pacific squadron, which was defeated at Tsushima. “It is believed that Russia’s material loss in the fleet alone amounts to three hundred million rubles,” wrote V. I. Lenin. “But even more important is the loss of tens of thousands of the best naval crew, the loss of an entire land army.” About Rozhdestvensky’s squadron, V.I. Lenin writes: “The crew was assembled from the woods and pine trees, the final preparations of the military ships for sailing were hastily completed, the number of these ships was increased by adding “old chests” to the new and strong battleships.” The Great Armada, just as huge, just as cumbersome, absurd, powerless, monstrous, like the entire Russian Empire...” - that’s what he called the second Russian Pacific squadron. . But even now these derogatory assessments of our defeats are known to every high school student. But is this so certain? The Japanese army and navy also had the advantage of experience in conducting combat operations in this area - during the successful war with China in 1890. The supply of ammunition and manpower to the theater of operations was difficult - the only living highway was the Chinese-Eastern Eastern Railway Railway, which had throughput only 9 trains per day. Our failures throughout the war become clear - in conditions of a threefold advantage of the enemy in manpower of 300 thousand against the Russians of 100 thousand, dispersed in the Irkutsk-Vladivostok-Port Arthur triangle. But we cannot speak in Leninist terms about our defeat. Russia has never lost a war like this, leading modern historians say. By August 1905, the Russians had 500,000 soldiers armed with machine guns, rapid-fire cannons, and the first airplanes against 300,000 thousand Japanese, already exhausted by the “Pyrrhic victory” at Mukden. The Japanese were the first to cry out for peace. And the Russian delegation at the peace negotiations in Portsmund had a strict order from Emperor Nicholas II: “Not a ruble of reparations, not a meter of Russian land.” The agreement on August 22, 1905 allocated half of Sakhalin to Japan. By this time, the tax burden in Japan had increased by 80%, in Russia by 2%. In May 1905, a meeting of the military council was held, where Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich reported that, in his opinion, for final victory it was necessary: a billion rubles of expenses, about 200 thousand losses and a year of military operations. After reflection, Nicholas II decided to enter into negotiations with the mediation of American President Roosevelt to conclude peace (which Japan had already proposed twice) from a position of strength, since Russia, unlike Japan, could wage war for a long time. Thus, the tsar agreed to peace, which to this day is regarded as an unconditional defeat in the Russian-Japanese war.
However, this study concerns only a particular aspect of this war - the actions of the Russian fleet. Neither in numbers nor in combat effectiveness could Russian ships compete with Japan. Very important advantage Japan had a developed infrastructure - the ports had convenient access to the sea, in contrast to the only developed military base in Russia - Port Arthur, which had a very difficult access to the sea due to a shallow fairway, so this base was blocked from the very beginning of hostilities. Vladivostok, and even more so the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, were separated from the theater of military operations by thousands of kilometers, which still had to be overcome through numerous minefields, Japanese squadrons and earth-based artillery batteries. Military intelligence was well aware of all the movements of the Russians, while our intelligence was often content with fragmentary and unreliable information. This is big picture events that took place from the point of view of modern historians. The actions of the Russian fleet are quite well known. However, specific aspects may be lost against the background of the overall picture of hostilities. It is precisely this description of the naval battles of the war that seems relevant based on the general picture of the war.
Object of study: Russian-Japanese War of 1905
Subject of research: the Russian fleet in this war
Target of this work– describe the actions of the Russian navy during the Russian-Japanese War of 1905, based on the general picture of defensive and offensive operations of the entire Russian army.
Tasks:
1. Analyze the composition of the Pacific squadron before the start of the war, its quantitative and qualitative characteristics.
2. Study the most important battles of the Russian fleet and military operations during the Russo-Japanese war
3. Summarize the Russo-Japanese War from the point of view of the participation of the Russian fleet
Elaboration in scientific literature: In the works of Alferov N. Bokhanov A.N. , Witte Oldenburg S.S. analyzed general position Russia 1904-1905 during the reign of Nicholas II. In the works of Bykov P. D. Kuropatkin A. N., Levitsky N. A., . , Tsarkov A. ., Shishov A. V.; the general course of military operations. Egoriev V.E. , Zolotarev V. A., Kozlov I. A., Klado N. V., Koktsinsky I. M., Nesoleny S. V. describe individual actions of the Russian fleet. Based on these and other sources, the author tried to reconstruct the participation of the Russian fleet in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.
Scientific and methodological basis of the study: analysis, synthesis, deduction, induction; general scientific methods scientific knowledge, applied on theoretical level knowledge, comparative historical method
Structure: course work consists of an introduction, three chapters, a conclusion and a list of references from 35 sources.
CHAPTER 1
COMPOSITION OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN SQUADRON
By the beginning of the war, the Japanese fleet had an almost twofold advantage in ships and their technical superiority over the Russian military Pacific Fleet - we do not take into account the campaign and death of the Baltic Fleet at Tsushima.
By 1904, Russian naval forces in the Far East consisted of the Pacific Squadron of the Baltic Fleet (detachments of battleships, reconnaissance cruisers and destroyers in Port Arthur and a detachment of cruisers in Vladivostok) and the Siberian Flotilla (2nd rank cruisers "Robber" and "Zabiyaka", auxiliary cruisers "Angara" and "Lena", gunboats "Bobr", "Sivuch", "Mandzhur", "Koreets" and "Gilyak", 2 mine cruisers, 12 destroyers of the "Falcon" type and destroyers Nos. 201, 202, 208-211). With the beginning of the war, all the ships became part of the Pacific Fleet, the command of which was appointed by Vice Admiral S.O. Makarov. On April 17, 1904, by order of the Maritime Department, the squadron located in the waters of the Far East became known as the “First Squadron of the Pacific Fleet”, and the ships being prepared to strengthen it in the Baltic were formed into the “Second Squadron of the Pacific Ocean”. The commanders were appointed: the fleet instead of the deceased S.S. Makarov - Vice Admiral N.I. Skrydlov, the "First Squadron" - Vice Admiral P.A. Bezobrazov (both were unable to arrive in Port Arthur), the "Second Squadron" " - Vice Admiral Z.P. Rozhestvensky. After the latter left for the Far East on 10/2/1904, on 11/22/1904 it was decided to equip the “Third Squadron of the Pacific Fleet” from the squadron battleships “Slava”, “Emperor Alexander II”, “Emperor Nikolai G”, coastal defense battleships “Admiral Ushakov” , "Admiral Senyavin", "General-Admiral Apraksin", cruisers of the 1st rank "Memory of Azov", "Vladimir Monomakh", 9 mine cruisers under construction and 8 destroyers of the "Falcon" class. In fact, instead of it, a "Separate detachment of ships" was sent the squadron battleship "Emperor Nikolai G", three coastal defense battleships and the cruiser "Vladimir Monomakh" under the command of Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov. He set out on a campaign on February 3, 1905, joining the 2nd Pacific Squadron on April 26, 1905, off the coast of Vietnam.
1.1. Deployment and command staff of the Pacific squadron
Squadron headquarters:
Squadron leader: Vice Admiral O.V. Stark (flag on "Petropavlovsk") Vice Admiral S.O. Makarov 02.24-31.03 (fleet commander), Rear Admiral P.P. Ukhtomsky 03.31-2.04 and 07.28-24.08 , Admiral General E.I. Alekseev 3.04-22.04, Rear Admiral V.K. Vitgeft (v.i.d.) 04.22-28.07, captain of the first rank, from 29.08 Rear Admiral R.N. Viren 08.24-20.12)
Chief of Staff: Captain First Rank A.A. Eberhard
Senior flag officer: Lieutenant G.V. Dukelsky
Flag officers: Lieutenant N.N. Azaryev, Lieutenant S.V. Sheremetyev, midshipman I.M. Smirnov
Flagship miner: Lieutenant V.S. Denisov
Flagship artilleryman: lieutenant (2nd rank) A.K. Myakishev
Flagship navigator: sub A.A. Korobitsyn
Subsequently, the composition of the headquarters changed several times, and listing all ranks within the framework of this directory is not possible.
Junior flagship: Rear Admiral P.P. Ukhtomsky (flag on "Peresvet")
Flag officer: Lieutenant M.M. Stavraki
Junior flagship: Rear Admiral M.P. Molas (detachment of cruisers, flag on the Bayan)
Junior flagship: Rear Admiral M.F. Loschinsky (base security)
In Port Arthur:
Battleship "Petropavlovsk" - captain of the first rank N.M. Yakovlev
Battleship "Tsesarevich" - captain of the first rank I.K. Grigorovich (captain of the first rank N.M. Ivanov 2nd from 12.05, captain of the second rank D.P. Shumov 27.3-1 1.5 and 29.7-2.08)
Battleship "Retvizan" - captain of the first rank E.N. Shchensnovich
"Battleship "Peresvet" - captain of the first rank V.A. Boysman (captain of the second rank A. Dmitriev 2nd from 29.07)
Battleship "Victory" - cap. 1 rub. V.M. Steamed (captain of the first rank V.S. Sarnavsky 9-14.06)
Battleship "Poltava" - captain of the first rank I.P. Uspensky
Battleship "Sevastopol" - cap. 1 rub. N.K. Chernyshev (captain of the second rank, from 2.07 captain of the first rank I.O. Essen
from 17.03)
Cruiser 1st rank "Bayan" - captain of the first rank R.N. Viren (captain of the second rank F.N. Ivanov 6th from 24.08)
Cruiser 1st rank "Pallada" - captain of the first rank P.V. Kossovich (first rank captain V.S. Sarnavsky from 3.02,
captain of the second rank P.F. Ivanov 8th 9-14.06)
Cruiser 1st rank "Diana" - captain of the first rank V.K. Zalessky
(Captain of the first rank N.M. Ivanov 2nd 15.02-11.05, captain of the second rank A.A. Liven 1 1.05-27.08)
Cruiser 1st rank "Askold" - captain first rank K.A. Grammatchikov
Cruiser 2nd rank "Boyarin" - captain of the second rank V.F. Sarychev
Cruiser 2nd rank "Novik" - captain of the second rank N.O. Essen (captain of the second rank M.F. Shultz from 1 8.03)
Cruiser 2nd rank "Zabiyaka" - captain of the second rank A.V. Lebedev (captain of the second rank Davydov 1 -1 4.03, captain of the second rank Nazarevsky from 14.03)
Gunboat "Gremyashchy - captain of the second rank M.I. Nikolsky (captain of the second rank A.K. Tsvingman from 1 9.05)
Gunboat "Brave" - captain of the second rank Davydov (captain of the second rank A.V. Lebedev 1.03-22.05, captain of the second rank A.M. Lazarev from 22.05)
Gunboat "Gilyak" - captain of the second rank A.V. Alekseev (captain of the second rank N.V. Stronsky 4th from 18.04)
Gunboat "Beaver" - captain of the second rank M.V. Bubnov (captain of the second rank A.A. Liven 10.03-1 1.05, captain of the second rank V.V. Sheltinga from 1 1.05)
Mine transport "Yenisei" - captain of the second rank V.A. Stepanov
Mine transport "Amur" - captain of the second rank Bernatovich (captain of the second rank P.F. Ivanov 8th 18.03-24.07, captain of the second rank E.N. Odintsov from 24.08)
Mine cruiser "Vsadnik" - captain of the second rank N.V. Stronsky 4th (captain of the second rank A.M. Lazarev 1 7.04-2 1.05, captain of the second rank L.P. Opatsky from 22.05)
Mine cruiser "Gaydamak" - captain of the second rank P.F. Ivanov 8th (lieutenant, then captain of the second rank V.V. Kolyubakin from 18.03)
The first detachment of destroyers - chief captain of the first rank N.A. Matusevich until 27.02 (captain of the second rank F.R. Skorupo acting, captain of the second rank E.P. Eliseev from 25.03, Lt. A.S. Maksimov acting )
Destroyer "Battle" - captain of the second rank E.P. Eliseev (Lieutenant A.M. Kosinsky 2nd 10.06-18.07, Lieutenant S.L. Khmelev from 18.07)
Destroyer "Bditelny" - Lieutenant S.L. Khmelev (Lieutenant A.M. Kosinsky 2nd 18.07-1.11, Lieutenant V.I. Lepko from 1.11)
Destroyer "Besposhchadny" - Lieutenant V.M. Lukin (captain of the second rank F.V. Rimsky-Korsakov 25.03-1 6.07, Lieutenant D.S. Mikhailov 2-Y1 6.07-2.08)
Destroyer "Besstrashny" - captain of the second rank G.V. Zimmerman (Lieutenant I.I. Skorokhodov 5.02-14.03, Lieutenant P.L. Trukhachev from 14.03)
Destroyer "Silent" - captain of the second rank F.R. Skorupo (Lieutenant A.S. Maksimov from 23.03)
Destroyer "Attentive" - captain of the second rank A.M. Simon (Lieutenant I.V. Stetsenko 2nd from 5.02).
Destroyer "Impressive" - Lieutenant M.S. Podushkin
Destroyer "Hardy" - Lieutenant P.A. Richter (before 7.05 and 10.06-11.08) Lieutenant A.I. Nepenin 10.05-10.06)
Destroyer "Vlastny" - Lieutenant V.N. Kartsev (before 12.06 and 12.09-20.12), Lieutenant D.N. Verderevsky 12-22.06, Lieutenant Mikhailov 2nd 22.06-1 3.07, Lieutenant A.A. Kovalevsky 1 3.07- 7.00, Lieutenant V.D. Tyrkov 2nd 7-12.09)
Destroyer "Grozovoy" - Lieutenant V.V. Sheltinga (Lieutenant V.M. Lukin 8-12.05, Lieutenant A.A. Brovtsyn 12.05-3.08)
Destroyer "Boiky" - captain of the second rank A.M. Simon (second-rank captain A.K. Tswingman 1 4.02-1 9.05, Lieutenant I.I. Podyapolsky 19.05-1.11, Lieutenant G.O. Gadd 1-7.1 1, Lieutenant M.A. Behrens 7.1 1-20.12)
Destroyer "Burny" - captain of the second rank Pogorelsky (Lieutenant I.I. Podyapolsky 8-1 8.03, Lieutenant N.N. Azaryev 18.03-3.04, Lieutenant N.D. Tyrkov 3rd 3.04-29.07)
1.2. Comparative characteristics of the Japanese and Russian fleets using the example of cruisers and battleships
By the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, cruisers, powerful, modern, and fast, became the main combat force of the Russian fleet. They were called upon to cut off the supply of island Japan, which was heavily dependent on mainland supplies of raw materials, food, goods, trade, etc. Despite the significant failures of the Russian fleet in the war, it was the cruisers that inflicted the greatest damage on Imperial Japan at sea. Therefore, it would be appropriate to compare the combat effectiveness of the cruisers of Russia and Japan - or, more precisely, the cruisers of the USA and England, which cost Japan the most modern warships on their military lines.
TABLE 1 Elements of Russian cruisers of the Vladivostok detachment
Japan, ordering ships from Europe and blindly following English shipbuilding models at that time, chose very good option cruiser, which was a response to the “Russian colossi”.
It is interesting to note how Brassey (1899) praised the new Japanese cruisers at that time: “The Japanese Asama and those of the same type are excellent ships. Their hull is well protected... There is not a single cruiser in the world that is so well armored. They have very powerful artillery, well located.”
Indeed, from the point of view of the “response” to the construction of Russian cruisers, the Japanese (or rather, the British for their Japanese students) could hardly have done better. Six Japanese cruisers ("Asama", "Tokiwa", "Iwate", "Izumo", "Yakumo", "Azuma"), almost identical in their elements (Table 2), had superiority over their Russian rivals, who were part of the Vladivostok detachment, several advantages:
1) Much better armor, in particular artillery protection.
2) The arrangement of 203-mm guns in pairs in the turrets, which made it possible to concentrate twice as many guns of this caliber on board,
3) Smaller displacement (9,300-9,700 m instead of 11-12 thousand for Russian cruisers), and therefore smaller sizes and smaller affected areas.
4) Some superiority in speed (20-21 knots instead of 18.0-19.8).
The superiority of Russian cruisers was determined only by their greater cruising range. It is impossible to deny the importance of this operational-tactical element for a cruiser in general and, in particular, for one that is intended for operations on ocean communications. But given the changed situation, this quality of Russian cruisers could hardly compensate for the above-mentioned shortcomings in other elements.
The Vladivostok cruisers had the same shortcomings as most ships of the Russian fleet, resulting from the low level of productive forces of Tsarist Russia, the backwardness of shipbuilding technology, led by a bureaucratic, detached from the fleet, insufficiently studied the experience of advanced foreign countries, corrupt apparatus of the Navy Ministry. The unfavorable location of the artillery, its insufficient armor protection, low speed and, as it turned out later, unusable artillery shells - all this gave significant advantages to the enemy - Japanese armored cruisers built according to the latest English samples abroad, taking into account the shortcomings of Russian cruisers. Despite the general commonality of type (“Rurik”, “Russia” and “Gromoboy”) and a number of positive qualities of these ships, they had shortcomings characteristic of the entire composition of the Russian fleet, characterized by the term “museum of samples” current at that time. This led to the need during operations to match the oldest slow-moving ship, the Rurik. The Bogatyr accident deprived the formation of Vladivostok cruisers of a high-speed reconnaissance aircraft at the beginning of the active period of their activity. If the second Pacific squadron was truly ingloriously defeated by the Togolese fleet near Tsushima, then more positive examples can be found in the actions of the formations and ships of the Port Arthur and Vladivostok squadrons. The ships were distinguished by the same backwardness in technology, organized and controlled by the same bureaucratic, uneducated, corrupt maritime ministry of the doomed Russian feudal-bourgeois empire. However, with all this, some Port Arthur ships (minelayer "Amur", battleship "Retvizan", etc.) and Vladivostok cruisers achieved a number of successes - in this war of 1904 - 1905, characterized by almost complete defeats. Despite all the shortcomings and mistakes, the Vladivostok cruisers over the course of a number of months in 1904 dealt significant blows to the Japanese transport fleet and Japanese maritime trade. These blows were painfully perceived by the Japanese economy, Japanese “public opinion” and stock exchange circles far beyond Japan. Confirmed by a number of foreign sources, the sinking of siege artillery carried by Japanese troop transports could not help but help slow down the actions of the enemy besieging Port Arthur. The successes of Russian cruisers over a certain period of time led to the undermining of the authority of Kamimura's Japanese cruiser squadron in Japan. The task of diverting part of the Japanese naval forces from the Port Arthur direction by Vladivostok cruisers was nevertheless completed. In certain decades of 1904, Kamimura's cruisers were diverted to the northern part of the Sea of Japan. During the entire period of active activity of the detachment, the armored cruisers Kamimura and the light cruisers Uriu were forced to be based separately from the Japanese fleet, not near the Kwantung Peninsula (like the entire fleet), but in the Tsushima Strait
If Yegoryev’s position (remember, this is 1939) for ideological reasons was forced to take into account the opinion of Lenin V.I. (he has many articles about “mediocre admirals and generals of the tsarist army who lost the Battle of Tsushima and a number of land battles”), then the opinion of the modern author Nesoleny S.V. not limited by censorship restrictions. However, he also characterizes Russian cruisers very positively: “The situation was even worse with armored cruisers. There were only 4 of them versus 8 for the Japanese and, in addition, the Russian cruisers were inferior to the Japanese in a number essential elements. Bayan's artillery was two times inferior to any of the armored cruisers of the Japanese fleet. When ordering the Bayan in France from the Forges and Chantiers company according to the design of the prominent French shipbuilder M. Lagan, the Marine Technical Committee included joint operations with squadron battleships in the task of this cruiser. But weak artillery armament did not allow the Bayan to be used in squadron combat as effectively as the Japanese used their armored cruisers. At the same time, during military operations, "Bayan" will show more high efficiency than Russian armored cruisers (although its cost was higher than that of the best armored cruisers "Askold" (full cost with weapons and ammunition 5 million rubles in gold) and "Bogatyr" (5.5 million rubles) - "Bayan" (without weapons it cost almost 6.3 million rubles).
“Gromoboy”, “Russia” and “Rurik” were created primarily for cruising operations with the aim of disrupting maritime trade, but were not suitable for squadron combat. They were inferior to the Japanese armored cruisers in armor (including artillery protection), speed and broadside strength: their 203 mm guns were located in side mounts so that only two out of four guns could fire on one side. Japanese cruisers had 203 mm guns located in turrets and all four guns could fire on any side. Only on the cruiser Gromoboy did they try to take into account the requirements of squadron combat to some extent, and for this purpose, two bow 8-inch guns and twelve 6-inch guns were placed in armored casemates. In a heavy battle on August 1, 1904, this allowed the cruiser to confidently withstand the fire of Japanese tower cruisers."
If cruisers operated far from naval bases, mainly in the ocean, then battleships took part in hostilities on the inland seas between Japan, Korea and China, in the Yellow, Japanese, and Okhotsk seas.
Therefore, our comparison of the two opposing navies will be incomplete unless we compare the battleships of Russia and Japan.
“The Japanese squadron battleships were the same type of ships of the latest construction, while the Russian squadron battleships, built according to various shipbuilding programs with a time interval of up to seven years, belonged to four various types ships with different tactical and technical data.
Most of the Russian ships were inferior in tactical and technical characteristics to the Japanese. Three Russian battleships - Petropavlovsk, Sevastopol and Poltava - were already outdated ships. By the beginning of hostilities, ships of the Poltava type could no longer compete on an equal footing with the newest Japanese battleships of the Mikasa type. Jane's famous reference book for 1904 correlated their fighting strength as 0.8 to 1.0 in favor of the latter20. In addition, the Sevastopol vehicles, manufactured by the Franco-Russian plant in St. Petersburg, were distinguished by low quality manufacturing and assembly. Even during official tests in 1900, Sevastopol was unable to reach the contract speed (16 knots), and by the beginning of hostilities it was difficult to reach 14. The unreliable power plant was the main drawback of this ship, which seriously reduced its combat effectiveness.
The two squadron battleships Peresvet and Pobeda were significantly weaker than any battleship, as they had 254 mm main-caliber artillery and insufficient armor. The battleships "Peresvet" and "Pobeda", the same type as the "Oslyabya", were more suitable for the type of strong armored cruisers, but for cruisers their speed was low. And only the two newest battleships “Tsesarevich” and “Retvizan”, both built abroad, were not inferior in their tactical and technical data to the best Japanese battleships. The diversity of Russian ships made it difficult to use them, especially to control them in battle, which reduced the combat power of the squadron. The Russian battleships that were part of the First Pacific Squadron were built according to three (!) shipbuilding programs.
In addition to all of the above, one more thing should be noted significant drawback, which affected the combat readiness of Russian ships, namely, the imperfection of Russian shells."
Thus, neither in numbers nor in combat effectiveness, Russian ships could compete with Japan in this war.
.
Chapter 2
Description of the most important battles of the Russian fleet and military operations during the Russo-Japanese War
A sudden, without an official declaration of war, attack by the Japanese fleet on the Russian squadron on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur on the night of January 27 (February 9), 1904, led to the disabling of several of the strongest ships of the Russian squadron and ensured the unhindered landing of Japanese troops in Korea in February 1904. In May 1904, taking advantage of the inaction of the Russian command, the Japanese landed their troops on the Kwantung Peninsula and cut off the railway connection between Port Arthur and Russia. The siege of Port Arthur was begun by Japanese troops by the beginning of August 1904, and on December 20, 1904 (January 2, 1905) the garrison of the fortress was forced to surrender. The remains of the Russian squadron in Port Arthur were sunk by Japanese siege artillery or blown up by their own crew.
In February 1905, the Japanese forced the Russian army to retreat to general battle at Mukden, and on May 14 (27), 1905 - May 15 (28), 1905, in the Battle of Tsushima they defeated the Russian squadron transferred to the Far East from the Baltic. The reasons for the failures of the Russian armies and navy and their specific defeats were due to many factors, but the main ones were the incompleteness of military-strategic preparation, the colossal distance of the theater of military operations from the main centers of the country and the army, and the extremely limited communication networks. In addition, starting from January 1905, a revolutionary situation arose and developed in Russia.
The war ended with the Treaty of Portsmouth, signed on August 23 (September 5), 1905, which recorded Russia’s cession to Japan of the southern part of Sakhalin and its lease rights to the Liaodong Peninsula and the South Manchurian Railway.
Here short description major events this war. What are the actions of our fleet?
2.1. Ratio of enemy naval forces
on the eve of the first naval battles
The main theater of military operations was the Yellow Sea, in which the Japanese United Fleet under the command of Admiral Heihachiro Togo blocked the Russian squadron in Port Arthur. In the Sea of Japan, the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers was opposed by the 3rd Japanese squadron, whose task was to counter raider attacks by Russian cruisers on Japanese communications.
The balance of forces of the Russian and Japanese fleets in the Yellow and Seas of Japan, by type of ship
Theaters of war Yellow Sea
Japanese Sea
Types of ships Russian squadron in Port Arthur Japanese United Fleet (1st and 2nd squadrons) Vladivostok cruiser detachment
Japanese 3rd Squadron
Squadron battleships
7 6 0 0
Armored cruisers
1 6 3 0
Large armored cruisers (over 4000 tons)
4 4 1 4
Small armored cruisers
2 4 0 7
Mine cruisers and minelayers 4 2 0 0
Seaworthy gunboats
7 2 3 7
Destroyers
22 19 0 0
Destroyers
0 16 17 12
The core of the Japanese United Fleet - including 6 squadron battleships and 5 armored cruisers - was built in Great Britain between 1896 and 1901. These ships were superior to their Russian counterparts in many respects, such as speed, range, armor coefficient, etc. In particular, Japanese naval artillery was superior to Russian in terms of projectile weight (of the same caliber) and technical rate of fire, as a result of which the broadside (total weight fired shells) of the Japanese United Fleet during the battle in the Yellow Sea was about 12,418 kg versus 9,111 kg for the Russian squadron in Port Arthur, that is, it was 1.36 times more. In addition to the 6 squadron battleships of the “first line”, the Japanese Navy had 2 more older battleships (“Chin-Yen”, German-built, a trophy of the Sino-Japanese War, and “Fuso” British-built).
It is also worth noting the qualitative difference in the shells used by the Russian and Japanese fleets - the content of explosives in Russian shells of the main calibers (12", 8", 6") was 4-6 times lower. At the same time, the melinite used in Japanese shells was The explosion power was approximately 1.2 times higher than the pyroxylin used in Russian ones.
In the very first battle on January 27, 1904, near Port Arthur, the powerful destructive effect of Japanese heavy high-explosive shells on unarmored or lightly armored structures, which did not depend on the firing range, was clearly demonstrated, as well as the significant armor-piercing ability of Russian light armor-piercing shells at short distances (up to 20 cables) . The Japanese made the necessary conclusions and in subsequent battles, having superior speed, tried to maintain a firing position 35-45 cables away from the Russian squadron.
However, the powerful but unstable shimosa collected its “tribute” - the destruction from the explosions of its own shells in the gun barrels when fired caused almost more damage to the Japanese than hits from Russian armor-piercing shells. It is worth mentioning the appearance in Vladivostok by April 1905 of the first 7 submarines, which, although they did not achieve significant military successes, were still an important deterrent that significantly limited the actions of the Japanese fleet in the area of Vladivostok and the Amur Estuary during the war.
At the end of 1903, Russia sent the battleship Tsarevich and the armored cruiser Bayan, which had just been built in Toulon, to the Far East; followed by the battleship Oslyabya and several cruisers and destroyers. Russia’s strong trump card was the ability to equip and transfer from Europe another squadron, approximately equal in number to that which was in the Pacific at the beginning of the war. It should be noted that the beginning of the war caught a fairly large detachment of Admiral A. A. Virenius halfway to the Far East, moving to reinforce the Russian squadron in Port Arthur. This set strict time limits for the Japanese, both for the beginning of the war (before the arrival of Virenius’s detachment) and for the destruction of the Russian squadron in Port Arthur (before the arrival of help from Europe). The ideal option for the Japanese was the blockade of the Russian squadron in Port Arthur with its subsequent death after the capture of Port Arthur by the Japanese troops besieging it.
The Suez Canal was too shallow for the newest Russian battleships of the Borodino type, the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits were closed to the passage of Russian warships from a fairly powerful Black Sea squadron. The only route for meaningful support for the Pacific fleet was from the Baltic around Europe and Africa.
2.2. Beginning of naval battles: Chemulpo. Feat of "Varyag"
On the night of January 27 (February 9), 1904, before the official declaration of war, 8 Japanese destroyers conducted a torpedo attack on the ships of the Russian fleet stationed on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur. As a result of the attack, two of the best Russian battleships (Tsesarevich and Retvizan) and the armored cruiser Pallada were disabled for several months.
On January 27 (February 9), 1904, a Japanese squadron consisting of 6 cruisers and 8 destroyers forced the armored cruiser "Varyag" and the gunboat "Koreets" located in the Korean port of Chemulpo into battle. After a 50-minute battle, the Varyag, which received heavy damage, was scuttled, and the Koreets was blown up.
2.3. Blockade and defense of Port Arthur
On the morning of February 24, the Japanese attempted to scuttle 5 old transports at the entrance to Port Arthur harbor in order to trap the Russian squadron inside. The plan was foiled by the Retvizan, which was still in the outer roadstead of the harbor.
On March 2, Virenius’s detachment received an order to return to the Baltic, despite the protests of S. O. Makarov, who believed that he should continue further to the Far East.
On March 8, 1904, Admiral Makarov and the famous shipbuilder N.E. Kuteynikov arrived in Port Arthur, along with several wagons of spare parts and equipment for repairs. Makarov immediately took energetic measures to restore the combat effectiveness of the Russian squadron, which led to an increase in military spirit in the fleet.
On March 27, the Japanese again tried to block the exit from Port Arthur harbor, this time using 4 old vehicles filled with stones and cement. The transports, however, were sunk too far from the harbor entrance.
On March 31, while going to sea, the battleship Petropavlovsk hit 3 mines and sank within two minutes. 635 sailors and officers were killed. These included Admiral Makarov and the famous battle painter Vereshchagin. The battleship Pobeda was blown up and out of commission for several weeks.
On May 3, the Japanese made a third and final attempt to block the entrance to Port Arthur harbor, this time using 8 transports. As a result, the Russian fleet was blocked for several days in the harbor of Port Arthur, which cleared the way for the landing of the 2nd Japanese Army in Manchuria.
Of the entire Russian fleet, only the Vladivostok cruiser detachment (“Russia”, “Gromoboy”, “Rurik”) retained freedom of action and during the first 6 months of the war several times went on the offensive against the Japanese fleet, penetrating the Pacific Ocean and being off the Japanese coast, then , leaving again for the Korea Strait. The detachment sank several Japanese transports with troops and guns, including on May 31, Vladivostok cruisers intercepted the Japanese transport Hi-tatsi Maru (6175 brt), on board which were 18,280-mm mortars for the siege of Port Arthur, which made it possible to tighten the siege of Port Arthur for several months.
2.4. The beginning of the Japanese Army's ground offensive in Manchuria. The first successes of the Russian fleet
On April 18 (May 1), the 1st Japanese Army, numbering about 45 thousand people, crossed the Yalu River and in a battle on the Yalu River defeated the eastern detachment of the Russian Manchurian Army under the command of M. I. Zasulich, numbering about 18 thousand people. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria began. Landing of the 2nd Japanese Army on the Liaodong Peninsula. Photo from Japanese archives On April 22 (May 5), the 2nd Japanese Army under the command of General Yasukata Oku, numbering about 38.5 thousand people, began landing on the Liaodong Peninsula, about 100 kilometers from Port Arthur. The landing was carried out by 80 Japanese transports and continued until April 30 (May 13). The Russian units, numbering about 17 thousand people, under the command of General Stessel, as well as the Russian squadron in Port Arthur under the command of Vitgeft, did not take active actions to counter the Japanese landing.
If the 2nd Japanese Army landed without losses, then the Japanese fleet, which supported the landing operation, suffered very significant losses.
On May 2 (15), 2 Japanese battleships, the 12,320-ton Yashima and the 15,300-ton Hatsuse, were sunk after hitting a minefield laid by the Russian mine transport Amur. In total, during the period from May 12 to 17, the Japanese fleet lost 7 ships (2 battleships, a light cruiser, a gunboat, a notice, a fighter and a destroyer), and 2 more ships (including the armored cruiser Kasuga) went for repairs in Sasebo.
But after the surrender of Port Arthur and the defeat at Mukden, the Russians were only separated from the end of this war by the Tragedy of Tsushima
2.5. The death of the Russian fleet at Tsushima
May 14 (27) - May 15 (28), 1905, in the Battle of Tsushima, the Japanese fleet almost completely destroyed the Russian squadron transferred to the Far East from the Baltic under the command of Vice Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky. Of its 17 ships of rank 1, 11 were killed, 2 were interned, and 4 fell into enemy hands. Of the 2nd rank cruisers, two were killed, one was disarmed, and only one (the yacht Almaz) reached Vladivostok, where only two of nine destroyers also arrived. Of the 14,334 Russian sailors who took part in the battle, 5,015 people, including 209 officers and 75 conductors, were killed, drowned or died from wounds, and 803 people were wounded. Many wounded, including the squadron commander (a total of 6,106 officers and lower ranks) were captured.
Tsushima naval battle, which took place on May 14-15, 1905 near the island of Tsushima in the eastern part of the Korea Strait, became the most tragic disaster in the history of the Russian navy, and the most severe defeat for Russia during the Russo-Japanese War. The ratio of Russian and Japanese losses following the Tsushima battle is simply terrifying: the Japanese had only 117 people killed then, but the Russians had 5,045 killed and 6,016 captured, that is, the loss ratio was 1:95 (!), and taking into account the destruction 28 ships, including 7 battleships, the Russian fleet virtually ceased to exist after Tsushima.
What are the reasons for such a terrible defeat? Let's name a few of them.
1. Technical unpreparedness. Outdated, but in case of timely modernization (especially artillery), quite combat-ready battleships “Emperor Alexander II”, “Emperor Nicholas I”, “Navarin”, “Sisoy the Great” and the armored cruiser “Admiral Nakhimov” were in the Baltic. Most of the ships were recently transferred from Port Arthur, just for modernization and repair, but the replacement of artillery was never carried out on any ship, and the hasty repair of the Navarina's mechanisms even worsened its pre-repair characteristics. All this subsequently turned the listed ships into floating targets for Tsushima. This was a serious miscalculation of the fleet leadership, the Navy Ministry and Russian diplomacy. Thus, having a significantly superior Japanese fleet and an obvious threat of war, the Russian fleet (as well as the army) in the Far East was not ready when it began. In the reserve of the Baltic Fleet, there were three more coastal defense battleships of the Admiral Ushakov type. These lightly armored ships had powerful artillery and, although they were not designed for linear combat, could provide significant assistance to the troops defending Port Arthur (as confirmed by the active use by the Japanese of the old Chinese battleship). The Borodino-class battleships were in a state of completion (the first one had already entered service). This, the largest series of battleships in the history of the Russian fleet (5, “Slava” was completed after the war), was supposed to form the backbone of a new, modern fleet. However, as a result of inconsistency in the government (or successful actions of British agents), their commissioning was postponed from 1903 to 1904-1905, and Russian diplomacy was unable to delay negotiations until this point. The weakness of the armor of Russian ships and the superiority of Japanese artillery also played a role. Here is a comparison table:
2. Combat unpreparedness. A direct participant in the Battle of Tsushima, who served on the battleship "Eagle", A.S. Novikov-Priboy wrote the book “Tsushima” and in this book he describes in great detail all the events that preceded the battle, the battle itself, and what happened to the Russian sailors in Japanese captivity. Particularly interesting are the small details that make up the overall picture, explaining why the Tsushima disaster simply could not help but happen. The situation in the Russian fleet at the beginning of the 20th century was such that it would have been simply surprising if Russia had won at Tsushima.
The Japanese victory at Tsushima is not at all explained by their numerical superiority - the forces of the parties were equal, and in terms of battleships the Russians even had a significant superiority over the Japanese!
The Japanese victory cannot be explained by the qualitative superiority of their naval artillery shells - although "shimoza", that is, high-explosive shells filled with melinite, produced more fragments during the explosion and a stronger blast wave, Russian shells certainly surpassed them in armor penetration.
The problem was different - Russian shells, as a rule, did not hit the target! For the simple reason that Russian commissars (naval gunners) simply did not know how to shoot accurately!
When the Russian squadron (in fact, it was the entire Baltic Fleet in full force) under the command of Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky sailed to the Far East to help the besieged Port Arthur, the fleet command simply did not bother to train
A.S. Novikov-Priboy in his book "Tsushima" describes the daily life of the fleet, and most of the time was not spent on combat training, and for... cleaning. The command, more than anything else, was concerned that everything on the ships would shine and sparkle.
In philosophical terms, there is a predominance of form over content.
A.S. Novikov-Priboi in his book “Tsushima” gives an example of how back in 1902, the Baltic Fleet (commanded by the same Admiral Rozhdestvensky) staged demonstration shooting in the presence of Emperor Nicholas II and the German Kaiser Wilhelm II, who came to visit - the target shields were fixed like this it was weak that they fell from the air wave caused by the shells flying past, and the distinguished guests, seeing how the shields were falling one after another, thought that all the targets were definitely hit. Nicholas II was so shocked by such “unsurpassed accuracy” that Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky was enlisted in the retinue of His Imperial Majesty by the highest decree.
Yes, Russian admirals knew how to curry favor with their superiors, and in the matter of showing off and deception they were ahead of the rest. But they never got around to preparing their fleet for a real war.
Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky remembered that he needed to learn to shoot for real only when the Russian squadron approached the island of Madagascar! We conducted training shooting, and according to their results, not a single shell hit the target! And this is in ideal conditions, during exercises, without any opposition from the enemy!
After this, it’s generally surprising how, during the Battle of Tsushima, the Russians sometimes managed to hit Japanese ships; perhaps these were purely accidental hits.
In the Russian fleet of the early 20th century, there were problems not only with the combat training of the “lower ranks”, but also with the tactical and strategic thinking of the admirals. For some reason, the Russian admirals of that time adhered to linear tactics, the inconsistency of which was proven back in the 18th century by the English admiral G. Nelson and the Russian admiral F.F. Ushakov.
If, with linear tactics, the ships of the opposing sides line up opposite each other in two lines, and each ship begins to shoot at the enemy ship that is opposite it, then Admiral F.F. Ushakov, for example, used completely new naval combat tactics.
Its essence was to go around the enemy squadron from the front, and with all your might simultaneously begin shelling the ship in front (usually the flagship), and after it, due to the concentration of all efforts on one target, is destroyed in the shortest possible time, attack with all your might the next ship, and so on. Roughly speaking, Ushakov acted on the “all against one” principle, shooting enemy ships one by one. Therefore, he never lost a single battle in his entire life.
In the squadron Z.P. Rozhestvensky sailed the battleship "Admiral Ushakov", but for some reason the Russian admirals completely forgot about Ushakov's tactics, which became one of the reasons for the Tsushima tragedy, a real disaster for the Russian fleet.
But the commander of the Japanese fleet, Admiral Heihachiro Togo, knew very well about Ushakov’s tactics, and he defeated the Russian fleet during the Battle of Tsushima precisely according to Ushakov’s method - the Japanese ships bypassed the Russian squadron in front, and with a consistent concentration of fire they shot one ship after another.
3. Psychological unpreparedness. One cannot help but mention the oppressive moral situation that developed in the Russian fleet on the eve of the Battle of Tsushima. A.S. Novikov-Priboy in his book “Tsushima” writes that scuffles (literally - a natural beating in the face) were the most common, everyday occurrence in the navy. Non-commissioned officers beat sailors, officers beat both sailors and non-commissioned officers. As A.S. says in Tsushima. Novikov-Priboy, “my non-commissioned officer rank gave me a decent advantage over ordinary sailors: if I hit one of them, in the worst case, I would be put in a punishment cell for several days; if a private did this to me, he risked going to prison However, there was nothing to be proud of here. big advantage the officer used before me: if he beats me, even for no reason, then they won’t even reprimand him; if I hit him, even if fairly, then I am threatened with the death penalty." Admiral Z.P. Rozhestvensky himself distinguished himself most in the matter of beating sailors. The entire book of A.S. Novikov-Priboi "Tsushima" is permeated with descriptions of the massacre committed by Admiral Rozhestvensky : either he knocked the sailor down with one blow and knocked out four teeth at once, then his blows to the ear burst the eardrums and the sailors went deaf, then he hit the sailor on the head with binoculars, and the binoculars split into pieces, etc. What kind of relationship could have been between the sailors and the officers and admirals beating them, what kind of “combat partnership” can we be talking about here?
As we can see, the Russian fleet, sailing to the Far East, and meeting the Japanese near the island of Tsushima, was a rather curious sight: admirals and officers who did not know the basics of naval tactics; gunners who cannot hit the target; sailors with knocked out teeth and burst eardrums.
Could such a fleet defeat anyone?
What brief conclusions can we draw based on the material presented in this chapter? The feat of the "Varyag" and the successful actions of Russian cruisers to blockade Japan of supplies from the mainland, individual daring raids of destroyers that sank several large warships and transports could not turn the general course of the war. The only naval base of the Russian army is Port Arthur after heroic defense fell, and Admiral Rozhdestvensky's Baltic Fleet was completely destroyed during Russia's largest defeat in naval operations - the Tsushima tragedy. Neither the Vladivostok squadron nor the Black Sea squadron could significantly help in these battles - the Dardanelles were blocked, and the path from Vladivostok was both long and dangerous. Japan, on the other hand, had excellent naval bases, multiple superiority during major combat operations, and excellent reconnaissance. So on March 31, while going to sea, the battleship Petropavlovsk hit 3 mines and sank within two minutes. 635 sailors and officers were killed. But the Japanese did not lose a single ship or a single person. The number of those killed included Admiral Makarov and the famous battle painter Vereshchagin - the Japanese knew about the movements of the most dangerous admiral for them and did everything to destroy him. Their mines were raised in front of the Petropavlovsk's bow, and its fate was sealed.
However, critics of the Russian army and navy, when listing our defeats, forget about two wars of the 20th century - World War 2 and Vietnam of 1966-1976. In these wars, the United States could take into account the experience of our defeats. But Pearl Harbor and Vietnam show how difficult it is to fight far from your main bases. In the first case, the Americans were defeated at their own naval base...
. Chapter 3
Results of the Russo-Japanese War
Strengths of the parties
300,000 soldiers 500,000 soldiers
Russian military losses:
killed: 47,387;
wounded, shell-shocked: 173,425;
died from wounds: 11,425;
died from disease: 27,192;
total permanent losses: 86,004, killed: 32,904;
wounded, shell-shocked: 146,032;
died from wounds: 6,614;
died from disease: 11,170;
captured: 74,369;
total deadweight loss: 50,688
The Japanese army lost killed, according to various sources, from 49 thousand (B. Ts. Urlanis) to 80 thousand (Doctor of Historical Sciences I. Rostunov), while the Russian from 32 thousand (Urlanis) to 50 thousand (Rostunov) or 52,501 people (G. F. Krivosheev). Russian losses in battles on land were half that of the Japanese. In addition, 17,297 Russian and 38,617 Japanese soldiers and officers died from wounds and illnesses (Urlanis). The incidence in both armies was about 25 people. per 1000 per month, however, the mortality rate in Japanese medical institutions was 2.44 times higher than the Russian figure.
In his memoirs, Witte admitted: “It was not Russia that was defeated by the Japanese, not the Russian army, but our order, or more correctly, our boyish management of the 140 million population in last years» .
3.1. Reasons for Russia's defeat in the war
General Kuropatkin, Commander-in-Chief of the Manzhchurian Army, in the opinion of many, the main culprit of our defeat in the Russian-Japanese War, in his memoirs names the following among our reasons for defeat:
1. The small role of our fleet during the war with Japan.
2. The weakness of the Siberian Railway and the East China Railway.
3. Lack of diplomatic preparation for the free use of our armed forces to fight Japan.
4. Late mobilization of reinforcements assigned to the Far East.
5. Disadvantages of “private mobilizations”.
6. Transfer to the reserve from the districts of European Russia during the war
7. Untimely staffing of the active army with officers and lower ranks.
8. Weakening during the war the disciplinary rights of commanders to impose punishments on lower ranks.
9. Slowdown in the advancement of those who distinguished themselves in the war.
10. Our shortcomings in technical terms.
3.2. Analysis of the actions of the Russian fleet and its role in military defeat
As we can see, the land general puts the mistakes of the Russian fleet in the first place. The general's notes in Russia caused such a negative resonance that they were published in Germany - in 1908 and 1911. So what exactly is the fault of the domestic naval forces in this war, according to the general? He believes that in many ways we underestimated Japan's military power and missed its militaristic plans and preparations. He writes: “If our fleet had been successful over the Japanese, then military operations on the mainland would have been unnecessary. But even without victory over the Japanese fleet, until the Japanese acquired complete supremacy at sea, they would have been forced to leave significant forces to guard their coasts and, most importantly, could not risk landing on the Liaodong Peninsula; forced to move through Korea, they would give us time to concentrate. With an unexpected night attack on our fleet in Port Arthur, before the declaration of war, Japan gained a temporary advantage in the armored fleet and widely used this advantage, gaining supremacy at sea. Our fleet, especially after the death of adm. Makarov, during the most important period of concentration of Japanese troops, did not offer any resistance to the Japanese. When they landed, even near Port Arthur, we did not even make attempts to interfere with these operations. The consequences of this situation turned out to be very painful... Having gained supremacy at sea, Japan could move against our ground forces its entire army, without worrying about protecting its shores... This, contrary to our calculations, gave Japan the opportunity to field superior forces against us in the first period... Having become the master of the seas, Japan was able to transport all the supplies they needed to the armies by sea.”
Kuropatkin’s criticism would be fair if, when speaking about the remoteness of the theater of main combat operations from the main forces of Russia, he took into account not only the difficulties for the ground forces, but also spoke about the fleet...
Conclusion
The Russian fleet played important role in the defense of Port Arthur and the suppression of military supplies to Japan, he carried out a number of successful operations. But in general, he was plagued by failures associated both with technical backwardness in comparison with the latest Japanese ships, and with failures in strategy - the defeat at Tsushima clearly reveals both of these factors. The distance from the main naval bases is another factor in our defeats at sea.
During the armed struggle in the land and sea theaters, Japan achieved major successes. But this required enormous strain on her material and moral resources. The economy and finances were depleted. Dissatisfaction with the war grew among broad sections of the population.
Despite the fact that the war, as S. Yu Witte put it, ended in a “decent” peace, ego could not obscure the fact of the defeat suffered by Russia.
But Japan managed to end the war on time. “If the negotiations had broken down and hostilities had resumed,” writes the American historian H. Barton, “then Japan would not have had the troops to achieve an early victory.” The war placed a heavy burden on the shoulders of the working masses. It cost the peoples of both states great sacrifices. Russia lost about 270 thousand people, including more than 50 thousand killed. Japanese losses were estimated at 270 thousand people, including more than 86 thousand killed.
The noted phenomena did not go unnoticed by foreign observers. Thus, the English military observer Norrigaard, who was with the Japanese army during the siege of Port Arthur, testified to the turning point in the patriotic mood that had occurred in Japan since the spring of 1905. According to him, reservists from the main districts in Japan (Yokohama, Kobe and Osaka) expressed to him a desire to end the war as quickly as possible. He also mentions that one of the Japanese army regiments, recruited from these districts, refused to go on the attack.
The country's international position has worsened. The United States of America, which played a large role in starting the war, was concerned about Japan's successes. Its strengthening was not in their interests. Therefore, they wanted both warring parties to reconcile as quickly as possible. England took a similar position. Bound by an alliance with Japan, she nevertheless began to refuse her financial support.
Japan found itself in an almost hopeless situation. Further continuation of the war turned out to be impossible. There was only one thing left to do - to look for a way to make peace with Russia. Immediately after the Battle of Tsushima, the Japanese ambassador to the United States was instructed to contact President Theodore Roosevelt with a request for mediation. Roosevelt agreed. The American ambassador in St. Petersburg received instructions to persuade Russia to negotiate.
Russia was in a different position than Japan. She had enough strength and resources to win the war even after the Tsushima disaster. Military resources were enormous. However, the tsarist government was also interested in concluding peace as quickly as possible. The decisive factor was the desire to free one’s hands in the Far East in order to fight the revolution that had begun. May 24 (June 6), 1905. A special meeting in Tsarskoe Selo called for an immediate end to the war. The next day, Nicholas II informed the US ambassador that Russia was ready to begin negotiations with Japan.
On July 27 (August 9), 1905, a peace conference opened in Portsmouth (USA). The Japanese delegation was headed by Foreign Minister Komura, the Russian delegation by Chairman of the Council of Ministers S. Yu. Witte. The negotiations ended on August 23 (September 5) with the signing of a peace treaty. The Russian delegation was forced to agree with the claims of the Japanese side: to renounce the lease of Kwantung in favor of Japan and cede to it the southern part of Sakhalin up to the 50th parallel. Only after the Second World War, as a result of the defeat of militaristic Japan, was our country able to restore its legal rights to the original Russian territories - Kurile Islands and Sakhalin.
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At the beginning of the 20th century. military shipbuilding developed at a rapid pace. At this time, squadron battleships replaced battery battleships. The most important innovation on ships of this type was the installation of main-caliber turret artillery, although, due to inertia, medium- and small-caliber artillery placed on board was retained. It was believed that it would be effective in repelling attacks from destroyers and in damaging weakly armored parts of an enemy battleship. The main caliber artillery tower on battleships from the Russo-Japanese War was a complex technical structure. The structure of such a tower is shown in Fig. 1.
Fig.1. Construction of the main caliber artillery turret of the Russian battleship "Retvizan" during the Russo-Japanese War.
Twin 305 mm Gun Turret - a turret with two 305 mm guns; The 12 inch/ 40 caliber M1892 gun was effective out to approximately 10,000 yards - the M1892 gun with a 12 inch caliber and a 40 caliber barrel had an effective firing range of about 9000 m; 1. Armored door - armored door; 2. Armored commander’s cupola - armored cap of the tower commander; 3. Breech - gun bolt; 4. Gun layer’s cupola - gunner’s armored cap; 5. Muzzle sight - front sight; 6. Pinion for cannons - trunnions; 7. Electrical controls for gun laying - electric drives for gun guidance systems; 8. Turret gear rotation - roller of the turret rotation system; 9. Handwheel for turret rotation - steering wheel for manual rotation of the turret; 10. Battery charger - charger in down position; 11. Electrical controls for ammunition feed - electric drive of the ammunition supply system; 12. Armored barbettes - armored barbettes.
Main caliber turret control
The turret commander received the calculated range to the target from the gunnery officer on the bridge through a system of electrical dials installed in the turret. If an artillery officer set his dial to 5,000 yards, then this data was instantly transmitted to the turret commanders, and their dials were also set to that distance. The bearing and azimuth of the main artillery battery were then set manually or using electrical devices. Powder charges and the projectile were lifted from the hold by an electric trolley, placed on a special tray and then fed into the gun barrel. The loading procedure for the main caliber guns of Russian battleships took 30-60 seconds. slower than Japanese ships. But given the limited ammunition for the main caliber guns, this was unlikely to have a significant effect during the long-term battle. The guns were then fired using an electric switch on Japanese ships and using a cord on Russian ships.
Fig.2. The pride of the Japanese fleet is the battleship Mikasa in an English dry dock in 1902. Ordered in 1896, the Majestic class battleship Mikasa served as Admiral Togo's flagship during the Russo-Japanese War.
Navies in the period 1888-1905. underwent re-equipment, as the first squadron battleships appeared, which later formed a class of battleships and replaced ships of previous generations. New technical solutions in the field of naval artillery, armor protection, explosives, communications and battle control have made truly revolutionary changes.
Now both Japan and Russia based their naval power on ships of the line with twelve-inch main guns, mostly of British and French construction. Both sides were preparing their navies for war, and in a period of rapid technological change, it was easy to make mistakes that would prove costly on the battlefield. During the war for supremacy at sea in 1904-1905. this was the first and last clash of approximately equal battleships before the advent of submarines and combat aircraft.
Rice. 3. Russian battleships "Sisoi the Great" (in the foreground) and "Navarin" (in the background), participants in the Battle of Tsushima, which decided the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War.
When developing the concept of a battleship between 1873 and 1895. Three main problems were solved, without which the concept could not be implemented.
1. The design of tower artillery on rotating barbettes was developed, and it was necessary to solve related issues in each specific case - what caliber guns should be placed in the towers, and what should be the volume of ammunition.
2. It was necessary to determine what the layout of artillery on board the battleship should be and the layout of the optimal placement of armor protection on the ship’s hull.
3. It was necessary to resolve the issue of choosing the maximum speed of the battleship and the range of autonomous navigation.
The first battleships had a limited amount of artillery and slow-loading main caliber guns, which meant a low rate of fire. On early-built battleships, the turrets were too heavy, and designers had to recess the turrets into the hull of the battleship to increase stability.
The invention of rotating barbettes reduced the weight of the tower and made it possible to place them higher without losing the seaworthiness and stability of the ship. At the early stage of development of battleships, shells from smoothbore guns could not penetrate even single-layer armor.
But in 1863, a version of an armor-piercing projectile was developed in Great Britain, designated "Palliser", which penetrated armor up to 10 inches thick. Although the appearance in the 1870s. multilayer armor reduced the vulnerability of battleships to enemy armor-piercing shells, which in turn led to the emergence of larger caliber artillery and greater firepower.
French scientists developed a new explosive known as melinite and smokeless powder. Britain acquired patents for both inventions and improved them in 1889.
The only problem that engineers of all naval powers tried to solve was increasing the rate of fire of main-caliber artillery. This was the state of the fleets that used, to one degree or another, these achievements of engineering before the war of 1904-1905.
Rice. 4. French-built Russian battleship "Tsesarevich" during sea trials in Toulon in 1903. For its time, it was one of the most modern battleships with hull lines tapering upward, a belt of armor plates, armored decks and auxiliary artillery in the form of towers with twin guns.
Battleship "Borodino" - characteristics
Displacement - 14181 t
Total length - 121 m
Width - 23.2 m
Draft - 8.24-8.9 m
Power plant: 20 Belleville boilers, two 4-cylinder main double-acting triple expansion steam engines with a total capacity of 16,300 hp. With.
Ships of the Russian fleet - participants in the Russo-Japanese War. There is probably no more disappointing defeat in Russian history.
1st rank cruiser "Askold"
Laid down in 1898 in Kiel (Germany). Shipyard - "Germany" (Deutschland). Launched in 1900. Entered service in 1902. In 1903 he went to the Far East. One of the most actively operating ships. In July 1904, he took part in an unsuccessful breakthrough to Vladivostok. Together with the cruiser Novik (later sunk in Korsakov Bay on Sakhalin), he managed to escape the encirclement. Unlike Novik, Askold went to the nearest port - Shanghai, where he was interned until the end of the war. After the end of the Russo-Japanese War, he became part of the Siberian Flotilla and was stationed in Vladivostok. During WWII he participated in various military operations together with Allied ships against the squadron of Admiral Spee. After that, he went to the Mediterranean Sea, participated in the Dardanelles operation (a joint operation of allied land and naval forces against the Ottoman Empire, the goal of which was a breakthrough to Constantinople, ended in the failure of the coalition forces despite the numerical advantage over the Ottomans). After which he went to Toulon, where he was undergoing repairs (spring 1916 - summer 1917). From Toulon the cruiser went to Murmansk, where it became part of the Arctic Ocean fleet. In 1918, in the Kola Bay, it was captured by the British and became part of the British fleet under the name "Glory IV". Bought out in 1922 Soviet Russia. Due to the unsatisfactory condition of the hull and mechanisms, it was decided to sell the cruiser for scrap. Also in 1922, "Askold" was dismantled for metal in Hamburg.
During the Dardanelles operation, Askold fought alongside the British cruiser HMS Talbot - the same one that the Varyag team switched to.
before launching
hull "Askold" (left) in the water
at the outfitting wall - installation of the bow pipe, 1901
the cruiser has almost taken on its final form, winter 1901
drydocking in the Blom & Foss floating dock, Hamburg, 1901
sea trials, 1901
additional installation of the navigation bridge, autumn 1901, Kiel, Germany
acceptance tests. Since the cruiser has not yet been enlisted in the navy, there is a state (tricolor) flag on the flagpole, and not a naval (Andreevsky) flag
in the Kiel Canal, 1902
Great Kronstadt raid, 1902
already part of the Baltic Fleet, 1902
Dalian Bay, 1903
Port Arthur, 1904. The cruiser has already been repainted in the standard combat paint of the Pacific formations of those years - dark olive
on a combat course, 1904
during the Dardanelles operation, 1915
in Toulon, 1916
as part of the Arctic Ocean flotilla, 1917
note from the magazine "Niva", 1915
drawing and axonometric projection, "Modelist-Constructor" magazine. An axonometric view of anti-mine networks shows them in combat position
"Askold" during service on the Baltic Sea, modern drawing
livery of the cruiser "Askold" during service in the Pacific Ocean
livery of the cruiser "Askold" during combat operations in the Mediterranean Sea
Laid down at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg on September 5, 1899, launched on July 21, 1901 and commissioned on June 20, 1904. Before moving to Libau and further to the Far East, it was equipped with a Guards crew.
In the Battle of Tsushima he led a column of Russian ships. Having received heavy damage to the bow, it gave way to the lead ship of the Borodino EBR. Due to the loss of speed, he found himself under fire from the armored cruisers Nissin and Kassuga. A fire broke out on board. Water entering through the holes worsened the situation and at 18:50 on May 14, 1905, the ship capsized and sank. The entire crew died. In the same year, he was formally excluded from the lists of the fleet.
Before leaving for Port Arthur, Captain 1st Rank, crew commander of the EBR "Emperor Alexander III" Nikolai Mikhailovich Bukhvostov said 2:
You wish us victory. Needless to say, how much we wish for her. But there will be no victory! I'm afraid that we will lose half the squadron along the way, and if this does not happen, then the Japanese will defeat us: they have a more serviceable fleet and they are real sailors. I guarantee one thing - we will all die, but we will not give up.
The squadron reached the Tsushima Strait without losses, and died there. But the honor remained untarnished. N. M. Bukhvostov and his crew died all together. Your coffin is an armadillo. Your grave is the cold depths of the ocean. And your faithful sailors' family is your centuries-old guard... 1
squadron battleship "Emperor Alexander III"
before launching, 1901
during outfitting work at the Baltic Shipyard
transition from St. Petersburg to Kronstadt
in the dry dock of Kronstadt, 1903
at the Kronstadt roadstead, 1904
August 1904
on the Revel roadstead, September 1904
view of the starboard side, a crane with a steam boat is given away
at one of the stops during the transition to the Far East, from left to right - EDB "Navarin", EDB "Emperor Alexander III", "Borodino"
The armored cruiser "Rurik" is the last ship of its class with full sail weapons in the Russian Navy
The last Russian cruiser with full sails. Development of the project "Memory of Azov". Subsequent ships - "Russia" and "Gromoboy" became a development of this project(initially it was planned to build them according to the same project as “Rurik”). The main task is to conduct combat operations and raiding operations on British and German communications. The peculiarity of the ship was that when loading additional coal reserves, it could travel from St. Petersburg to the nearest Far Eastern bases for additional coal loading at a 10-knot speed.
Construction began at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg in September 1889. Officially laid down in May 1890. Launched October 22, 1892. Entered service in October 1895. Transferred from the Baltic Sea to the Far East to the 1st Pacific Squadron,
arrived in Nagasaki on April 9, 1896. He was part of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment. In the battle on August 1, 1904 near Fr. Ulsan was flooded by the crew as a result of the damage received. Of the 796 crew members, 139 were killed and 229 were injured.
on a voyage, view of the deck from the top of the foremast
painting the side in preparation for the show 
on a hike
"Rurik" in black paint
"Rurik" in Nagasaki, 1896
in the eastern basin of Port Arthur
in the dock of Vladivostok 
Port Arthur
cruiser on a voyage, Far East
the cruiser's stem - the decoration of the bow is clearly visible - the legacy of the "nose figures" of sailing ships
squadron battleship "Sevastopol"
Laid down on March 22, 1892. Launched May 25, 1895. Entered service on July 15, 1900. Participated in the battle in the Yellow Sea. On December 20, 1904, on the eve of the surrender of Port Arthur, it was scuttled by its crew. The last ship of the Poltava class.
near Galerny Island before being transferred for completion to Kronstadt, 1898
"Sevastopol" and "Petropavlovsk" in Vladivostok, 1901
on the right (near the wall) is the Sevastopol EDB. A crane carries a faulty 12-inch gun from the Tsesarevich, Port Arthur, 1904
EDB "Sevastopol" on the march
"Sevastopol", "Poltava" and "Petropavlovsk" near the wall of the eastern basin of Port Arthur, 1901-1903
ventilation deflector torn by a shell, 1904
in Port Arthur. Ahead - stern to the photographer - "Tsesarevich", in the distance in the background - "Askold"
in Port Arthur, campaign of 1904, on the right is the stern of the Sokol-class destroyer, on the left is the stern of the Novik
after being hit by a Japanese torpedo in White Wolf Bay, December 1904
sailors leave for the land front. after this, the Sevastopol EDB will be sunk in the internal roadstead of Port Arthur on the eve of the surrender of the fortress
Squadron battleship "Sevastopol", color postcard
Armored cruiser of rank II "Boyarin"
Laid down at Burmeister og Wein, Copenhagen, Denmark in early 1900. The official laying took place on September 24, 1900. On May 26, 1901 it was launched.
Entered service in October 1902. On October 27, 1902, the cruiser left Kronstadt and on May 10, 1903, arrived in Port Arthur.
It was blown up by a Russian mine near the port of Dalniy on January 29, 1904 (6 people died). The team abandoned the ship, which remained afloat for another two days and only sank after a repeated explosion at a minefield.
still under the Danish flag, sea trials, 1902
1902 - St. Andrew's flag is already on the flagpole. Before moving to Kronstadt.
"Boyarin" in the Far East, 1903 
in the Denmark Strait, 1903
in Toulon
Port Arthur, 1904
Armored cruiser II rank "Boyarin", photo postcard
1 - these are stanzas from the poem "In Memory of Admiral Makarov". Its author is S. LOBANOVSKY, a cadet of the Vladimir Kyiv Cadet Corps, graduated in 1910. It is completely engraved on the pedestal of the monument to Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov in Kronstadt. But these drains are a memory to all those who remained with their crew, with their ship, until the last. Such as N. M. Bukhvostov, S. O. Makarov and many others...
Sleep, northern knight, sleep, honest Father,
Taken untimely by death, -
Not laurels of victory - crown of thorns
You accepted with a fearless squad.
Your coffin is an armadillo, your grave
Cold depths of the ocean
And faithful sailors' family
Your age-old protection.
Shared laurels, from now on with you
They also share eternal peace.
The jealous sea will not betray the land
A hero who loved the sea -
In a deep grave, in a mysterious darkness
Cherishing him and peace.
And the wind will sing a dirge over him,
Hurricanes will cry with rain
And the shroud will be spread with a thick cover
There are thick fogs over the sea;
And the clouds, frowning, the last fireworks
The thunder will be given to him with a roar.
Let me remind you that Admiral Makarov died along with the Petropavlovsk nuclear submarine, which was blown up by a mine in Vladivostok. The Russian battle painter Vasily Vasilyevich Vereshchagin (author of the paintings “The Apotheosis of War”, “Before the Attack at Plevna”, “Napoleon on the Borodino Heights”, “Skobelev at Plevna”, etc.) also died along with the ship.
2 - who regularly follows the TV project "Living History" of the TV channel "Channel 5 - St. Petersburg", could have heard this quote in one of the parts of the film about the Russian fleet "Yablochko". True, Sergei Shnurov shortened it - he removed the words regarding the loss of ships during the voyage.