Date of battle July 5, 1943 - August 23, 1943 This battle was included in modern history as one of the bloodiest battles of World War II. It is also known as the largest tank battle in the history of mankind.
Conditionally the Battle of Kursk can be divided into two stages:
- Kursk defensive (July 5 – 23)
- Oryol and Kharkov-Belgorod (July 12 – August 23) offensive operations.
The battle lasted 50 days and nights and influenced the entire subsequent course of hostilities.
Forces and means of the warring parties
Before the start of the battle, the Red Army concentrated an army of unprecedented numbers: the Central and Voronezh Front numbered more than 1.2 million soldiers and officers, over 3.5 thousand tanks, 20 thousand guns and mortars and more than 2800 aircraft different types. In reserve was the Steppe Front numbering: 580 thousand soldiers, 1.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns artillery installations, 7.5 thousand guns and mortars. Its air cover was provided by over 700 aircraft.
The German command managed to raise reserves and by the beginning of the battle it had fifty divisions with a total number of over 900 thousand soldiers and officers, 2,700 tanks and self-propelled guns, 10 thousand guns and mortars, as well as approximately 2.5 thousand aircraft. For the first time in the history of World War II, the German command used a large number of its latest equipment: Tiger and Panther tanks, as well as heavy self-propelled guns - Ferdinand.
As can be seen from the above data, the Red Army had an overwhelming superiority over the Wehrmacht, being on the defensive it could quickly respond to all offensive actions of the enemy.
Defensive operation
This phase of the battle began with a preemptive massive artillery preparation by the Red Army at 2.30 a.m., which was repeated at 4.30 a.m. German artillery preparation began at 5 am and the first divisions went on the offensive after it...
During bloody battles, German troops advanced 6-8 kilometers along the entire front line. The main attack took place at Ponyri station, a key railway junction on the Orel-Kursk line, and the village of Cherkasskoye, on the Belgorod-Oboyan highway section. In these directions, German troops managed to advance to Prokhorovka station. It was here that the largest tank battle of this war took place. On the Soviet side, 800 tanks under the command of General Zhadov took part in the battle, against 450 German tanks under the command of SS Oberstgruppenführer Paul Hausser. In the battle of Prokhorovka Soviet troops lost about 270 tanks - German losses amounted to over 80 tanks and self-propelled guns.
Offensive
On July 12, 1943, the Soviet command launched Operation Kutuzov. During which, after bloody local battles, Red Army troops pushed the Germans out to defensive line"Hagen" east of Bryansk. Fierce resistance German troops lasted until August 4, when the Belgorod group of fascists was liquidated and Belgorod was liberated.
On August 10, the Red Army launched an offensive in the Kharkov direction, and on August 23, the city was stormed. Urban fighting continued until August 30, but the day of the liberation of the city and the end of the Battle of Kursk is considered to be August 23, 1943.
The Battle of Kursk, which lasted from 07/05/1943 to 08/23/1943, is the turning point central event of the Great Patriotic War and a giant historical tank battle. The Battle of Kursk lasted 49 days.
Hitler had great hopes for this major offensive battle called “Citadel”; he needed a victory to raise the morale of the army after a series of failures. August 1943 became fatal for Hitler, as the countdown in the war began, the Soviet army confidently marched towards victory.
Intelligence service
Intelligence played an important role in the outcome of the battle. In the winter of 1943, intercepted encrypted information constantly mentioned the Citadel. Anastas Mikoyan (member of the CPSU Politburo) claims that Stalin received information about the Citadel project as early as April 12.
Back in 1942, British intelligence managed to crack the Lorenz code, which encrypted messages from the 3rd Reich. As a result, the summer offensive project was intercepted, as was information about the overall Citadel plan, location and force structure. This information was immediately transferred to the leadership of the USSR.
Thanks to the work of the Dora reconnaissance group, the Soviet command became aware of the deployment of German troops along the Eastern Front, and the work of other intelligence agencies provided information on other directions of the fronts.
Confrontation
The Soviet command was aware of the exact time of the start of the German operation. Therefore, the necessary counter-preparations were carried out. The Nazis began the assault on the Kursk Bulge on July 5 - this is the date the battle began. The main offensive attack of the Germans was in the direction of Olkhovatka, Maloarkhangelsk and Gnilets.
The command of the German troops sought to get to Kursk along the shortest route. However, the Russian commanders: N. Vatutin - Voronezh direction, K. Rokossovsky - Central direction, I. Konev - Steppe direction of the front, responded to the German offensive with dignity.
Kursk Bulge was supervised by talented generals from the enemy - General Erich von Manstein and Field Marshal von Kluge. Having received a repulse at Olkhovatka, the Nazis tried to break through at Ponyry with the help of the Ferdinand self-propelled guns. But here, too, they were unable to break through the defensive power of the Red Army.
From July 11, a fierce battle raged near Prokhorovka. The Germans suffered significant losses of equipment and people. It was near Prokhorovka that a turning point in the war occurred, and July 12 became a turning point in this battle for the 3rd Reich. The Germans struck immediately from the southern and western fronts.
One of the global tank battles took place. Hitler's army brought 300 tanks into the battle from the south, and 4 tank and 1 infantry divisions from the west. According to other sources, the tank battle consisted of about 1,200 tanks on both sides. The Germans were defeated by the end of the day, the movement of the SS corps was suspended, and their tactics turned defensive.
During the Battle of Prokhorovka, according to Soviet data, on July 11-12, the German army lost more than 3,500 people and 400 tanks. The Germans themselves estimated the losses of the Soviet army at 244 tanks. Operation Citadel lasted only 6 days, in which the Germans tried to advance.
Equipment used
Soviet medium tanks T-34 (about 70%), heavy - KV-1S, KV-1, light - T-70, self-propelled artillery units, nicknamed "St. John's wort" by soldiers - SU-152, as well as SU-76 and SU-122, met in confrontation with German tanks Panther, Tiger, Pz.I, Pz.II, Pz.III, Pz.IV, which were supported by self-propelled guns "Elephant" (we have "Ferdinand").
Soviet guns were practically unable to penetrate the 200 mm frontal armor of the Ferdinands; they were destroyed with the help of mines and aircraft.
Also the Germans' assault guns were the StuG III and JagdPz IV tank destroyers. Hitler relied heavily on new technology, so the Germans delayed the offensive for 2 months in order to release 240 Panthers to the Citadel.
During the battle, Soviet troops received captured German Panthers and Tigers, abandoned by the crew or broken. After the breakdowns were repaired, the tanks fought on the side of the Soviet army.
List of forces of the USSR Army (according to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation):
- 3444 tanks;
- 2172 aircraft;
- 1.3 million people;
- 19,100 mortars and guns.
As a reserve force there was the Steppe Front, numbering: 1.5 thousand tanks, 580 thousand people, 700 aircraft, 7.4 thousand mortars and guns.
List of enemy forces:
- 2733 tanks;
- 2500 aircraft;
- 900 thousand people;
- 10,000 mortars and guns.
The Red Army had numerical superiority at the beginning of the Battle of Kursk. However, the military potential was on the side of the Nazis, not in quantity, but in the technical level of military equipment.
Offensive
On July 13, the German army went on the defensive. The Red Army attacked, pushing the Germans further and further, and by July 14 the front line had moved up to 25 km. Having battered the German defensive capabilities, on July 18 the Soviet army launched a counterattack with the aim of defeating the Kharkov-Belgorod German group. Soviet front offensive operations exceeded 600 km. On July 23, they reached the line of the German positions occupied before the offensive.
By August 3, the Soviet army consisted of: 50 rifle divisions, 2.4 thousand tanks, more than 12 thousand guns. On August 5 at 18:00 Belgorod was liberated from the Germans. From the beginning of August, the battle for the city of Oryol was fought, and on August 6 it was liberated. On August 10, soldiers of the Soviet army cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway road during the offensive Belgorod-Kharkov operation. On August 11, the Germans attacked in the vicinity of Bogodukhov, weakening the tempo of fighting on both fronts.
Heavy fighting lasted until August 14. On August 17, Soviet troops approached Kharkov, starting a battle on its outskirts. German troops carried out the final offensive in Akhtyrka, but this breakthrough did not affect the outcome of the battle. On August 23, an intense assault on Kharkov began.
This day itself is considered the day of the liberation of Kharkov and the end of the Battle of Kursk. Despite the actual fights with the remnants of the German resistance, which lasted until August 30.
Losses
According to different historical reports, losses in the Battle of Kursk vary. Academician Samsonov A.M. states that losses in the Battle of Kursk: more than 500 thousand wounded, killed and prisoners, 3.7 thousand aircraft and 1.5 thousand tanks.
Losses in the difficult battle on the Kursk Bulge, according to information from the research of G.F. Krivosheev, in the Red Army were:
- Killed, disappeared, captured - 254,470 people,
- Injured - 608,833 people.
Those. In total, human losses amounted to 863,303 people, with an average daily loss of 32,843 people.
Losses of military equipment:
- Tanks – 6064 pcs.;
- Aircraft – 1626 pcs.,
- Mortars and guns - 5244 pcs.
German historian Overmans Rüdiger claims that the losses German army were killed - 130,429 people. The losses of military equipment were: tanks - 1500 units; airplanes – 1696 pcs. According to Soviet information, from July 5 to September 5, 1943, more than 420 thousand Germans were killed, as well as 38.6 thousand prisoners.
Bottom line
Irritated, Hitler laid the blame for the failure in the Battle of Kursk on the generals and field marshals, whom he demoted, replacing them with more capable ones. However, later major offensives “Watch on the Rhine” in 1944 and the Balaton operation in 1945 also failed. After the defeat in the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the Nazis did not achieve a single victory in the war.
Battle of Kursk became one of the most important stages on the path to victory Soviet Union over Nazi Germany. In terms of scope, intensity and results, it ranks among the largest battles of the Second World War. The battle lasted less than two months. During this time, in a relatively small area, there was a fierce clash between huge masses of troops using the most modern military equipment of that time. More than 4 million people, over 69 thousand guns and mortars, more than 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns and up to 12 thousand combat aircraft were involved in the battles on both sides. From the Wehrmacht side, more than 100 divisions took part in it, which accounted for over 43 percent of the divisions located on the Soviet-German front. The tank battles that were victorious for the Soviet Army were the greatest in the Second World War. " If the battle of Stalingrad foreshadowed the decline of the Nazi army, then the battle of Kursk confronted it with disaster».
The hopes of the military-political leadership did not come true " third reich» for success Operation Citadel . During this battle, Soviet troops defeated 30 divisions, the Wehrmacht lost about 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, 3 thousand guns and more than 3.7 thousand aircraft.
Construction of defensive lines. Kursk Bulge, 1943
Particularly severe defeats were inflicted on the Nazi tank formations. Of the 20 tank and motorized divisions that took part in the Battle of Kursk, 7 were defeated, and the rest suffered significant losses. Nazi Germany could no longer fully compensate for this damage. To the Inspector General of the German Armored Forces Colonel General Guderian I had to admit:
« As a result of the failure of the Citadel Offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. Armored troops, replenished with such great difficulty, due to large losses in people and equipment on for a long time were put out of action. Their timely restoration for conducting defensive actions on the eastern front, as well as for organizing defense in the West, in case of a landing force that the Allies threatened to land next spring, was called into question... and there were no more calm days on the eastern front. The initiative has completely passed to the enemy...».
Before Operation Citadel. From right to left: G. Kluge, V. Model, E. Manstein. 1943
Before Operation Citadel. From right to left: G. Kluge, V. Model, E. Manstein. 1943
Soviet troops are ready to meet the enemy. Kursk Bulge, 1943 ( see comments to the article)
The failure of the offensive strategy in the East forced the Wehrmacht command to seek new ways of waging war in order to try to save fascism from the impending defeat. It hoped to transform the war into positional forms, to gain time, hoping to split the anti-Hitler coalition. West German historian W. Hubach writes: " On the eastern front, the Germans made a last attempt to seize the initiative, but to no avail. The failed Operation Citadel proved to be the beginning of the end for the German army. Since then, the German front in the East has never stabilized.».
Crushing defeat Nazi German armies on the Kursk Bulge testified to the increased economic, political and military power of the Soviet Union. The victory at Kursk was the result of a great feat of the Soviet Armed Forces and the selfless labor of the Soviet people. This was a new triumph of the wise policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet government.
Near Kursk. At the observation post of the commander of the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps. From left to right: N. S. Khrushchev, commander of the 6th Guards Army, Lieutenant General I. M. Chistyakov, corps commander, Major General N. B. Ibyansky (July 1943)
Planning Operation Citadel , the Nazis had high hopes for new equipment - tanks " tiger" And " panther", assault guns " Ferdinand", airplanes " Focke-Wulf-190A" They believed that the new weapons received by the Wehrmacht would surpass the Soviet military equipment and ensure victory. However, this did not happen. Soviet designers created new models of tanks, self-propelled artillery units, aircraft, and anti-tank artillery, which in terms of their tactical and technical characteristics were not inferior to, and often surpassed, similar enemy systems.
Fighting on the Kursk Bulge , Soviet soldiers constantly felt the support of the working class, the collective farm peasantry, and the intelligentsia, who armed the army with excellent military equipment and provided it with everything necessary for victory. Figuratively speaking, in this grandiose battle, a metal worker, a designer, an engineer, and a grain grower fought shoulder to shoulder with an infantryman, a tankman, an artilleryman, a pilot, and a sapper. The military feat of the soldiers merged with the selfless work of home front workers. The unity of the rear and the front, forged by the Communist Party, created an unshakable foundation for the military successes of the Soviet Armed Forces. Much credit for the defeat of the Nazi troops near Kursk belonged to the Soviet partisans, who launched active operations behind enemy lines.
Battle of Kursk had great value for the course and outcome of events on the Soviet-German front in 1943. It created favorable conditions for the general offensive of the Soviet Army.
had the greatest international significance. It had a great influence on the further course of the Second World War. As a result of the defeat of significant Wehrmacht forces, profitable terms for the landing of Anglo-American troops in Italy in early July 1943. The defeat of the Wehrmacht at Kursk directly influenced the plans of the fascist German command related to the occupation of Sweden. The previously developed plan for the invasion of Hitler's troops into this country was canceled due to the fact that the Soviet-German front absorbed all the enemy's reserves. Back on June 14, 1943, the Swedish envoy in Moscow stated: “ Sweden understands perfectly well that if it still remains out of the war, it is only thanks to the military successes of the USSR. Sweden is grateful to the Soviet Union for this and speaks directly about it».
Increased losses on the fronts, especially in the East, the severe consequences of total mobilization and the growing liberation movement in European countries affected the internal situation in Germany and the morale of German soldiers and the entire population. Distrust in the government increased in the country, critical statements against the fascist party and government leadership became more frequent, and doubts about achieving victory grew. Hitler further intensified repression to strengthen the “internal front.” But neither the bloody terror of the Gestapo nor the colossal efforts of Goebbels’s propaganda machine could neutralize the impact that the defeat at Kursk had on the morale of the population and the Wehrmacht soldiers.
Near Kursk. Direct fire at the advancing enemy
Huge losses of military equipment and weapons placed new demands on the German military industry and further complicated the situation with human resources. Attraction to industry, Agriculture and transport of foreign workers, to whom Hitler’s “ new order"was deeply hostile, undermined the rear of the fascist state.
After the defeat in Battle of Kursk Germany's influence on the states of the fascist bloc weakened even more, the internal political situation of the satellite countries worsened, and the foreign policy isolation of the Reich increased. The catastrophic result of the Battle of Kursk for the fascist elite predetermined the further cooling of relations between Germany and neutral countries. These countries have reduced supplies of raw materials and materials " third reich».
Victory of the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk raised the authority of the Soviet Union even higher as a decisive force opposing fascism. The whole world looked with hope at the socialist power and its army, bringing deliverance to humanity from the Nazi plague.
Victorious completion of the Battle of Kursk strengthened the struggle of the peoples of enslaved Europe for freedom and independence, intensified the activities of numerous groups of the Resistance movement, including in Germany itself. Under the influence of the victories at the Kursk Bulge, the peoples of the countries of the anti-fascist coalition began to come out even more decisively with demands for opening as quickly as possible second front in Europe.
The successes of the Soviet Army affected the position of the ruling circles of the USA and England. In the midst of the Battle of Kursk President Roosevelt in a special message to the head of the Soviet government he wrote: “ During a month of gigantic battles, your armed forces, with their skill, their courage, their dedication and their tenacity, not only stopped the long-planned German offensive, but also launched a successful counter-offensive, which has far-reaching consequences..."
The Soviet Union can rightly be proud of its heroic victories. In the Battle of Kursk The superiority of Soviet military leadership and military art manifested itself with renewed vigor. It showed that the Soviet Armed Forces are a well-coordinated organism in which all types and types of troops are harmoniously combined.
The defense of Soviet troops near Kursk withstood severe tests and achieved my goals. The Soviet Army was enriched with the experience of organizing a deeply layered defense, stable in anti-tank and anti-aircraft terms, as well as the experience of decisive maneuver of forces and means. Pre-created strategic reserves were widely used, most of which were included in the specially created Steppe District (front). His troops increased the depth of defense on a strategic scale and took an active part in the defensive battle and counter-offensive. For the first time in the Great Patriotic War, the total depth of the operational formation of defensive fronts reached 50–70 km. The massing of forces and assets in the directions of expected enemy attacks, as well as the overall operational density of troops in defense, have increased. The strength of defense has increased significantly due to the saturation of troops with military equipment and weapons.
Anti-tank defense reached a depth of up to 35 km, the density of artillery anti-tank fire increased, barriers, mining, anti-tank reserves and mobile barrage units found wider use.
German prisoners after the collapse of Operation Citadel. 1943
German prisoners after the collapse of Operation Citadel. 1943
A major role in increasing the stability of the defense was played by the maneuver of second echelons and reserves, which was carried out from the depths and along the front. For example, during the defensive operation on the Voronezh Front, the regrouping involved about 35 percent of all rifle divisions, over 40 percent of anti-tank artillery units and almost all individual tank and mechanized brigades.
In the Battle of Kursk For the third time during the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Armed Forces successfully carried out a strategic counteroffensive. If the preparation for a counteroffensive near Moscow and Stalingrad took place in a situation of heavy defensive battles with superior enemy forces, then different conditions developed near Kursk. Thanks to the successes of the Soviet military economy and targeted organizational events in preparing reserves, the balance of forces had already developed in favor of the Soviet Army by the beginning of the defensive battle.
During the counteroffensive, Soviet troops showed high skill in organizing and conducting offensive operations in summer conditions. Right choice the moment of transition from defense to counteroffensive, close operational-strategic interaction of five fronts, a successful breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses prepared in advance, the skillful conduct of a simultaneous offensive on a wide front with strikes in several directions, the massive use of armored forces, aviation and artillery - all this was of enormous importance to defeat the strategic groups of the Wehrmacht.
In the counteroffensive, for the first time during the war, second echelons of fronts began to be created as part of one or two combined arms armies (Voronezh Front) and powerful groupings of mobile troops. This allowed the front commanders to build up attacks of the first echelon and develop success in depth or towards the flanks, break through intermediate defensive lines, and also repel strong counterattacks of Nazi troops.
The art of war was enriched in the Battle of Kursk all types of armed forces and branches of the military. In defense, artillery was more decisively massed in the direction of the enemy's main attacks, which ensured the creation of higher operational densities compared to previous defensive operations. The role of artillery in the counteroffensive increased. The density of guns and mortars in the direction of the main attack of the advancing troops reached 150 - 230 guns, and the maximum was 250 guns per kilometer of front.
Soviet tank troops in the Battle of Kursk successfully solved the most complex and varied tasks both in defense and offensive. If until the summer of 1943 tank corps and armies were used in defensive operations primarily to carry out counterattacks, then in the Battle of Kursk they were also used to hold defensive lines. This achieved greater depth of operational defense and increased its stability.
During the counteroffensive, armored and mechanized troops were used en masse, being the main means of front and army commanders in completing a breakthrough of enemy defenses and developing tactical success into operational success. At the same time, the experience of combat operations in the Oryol operation showed the inexpediency of using tank corps and armies to break through positional defenses, since they suffered heavy losses in carrying out these tasks. In the Belgorod-Kharkov direction, the completion of the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone was carried out by advanced tank brigades, and the main forces of tank armies and corps were used for operations in operational depth.
Soviet military art in the use of aviation has risen to a new level. IN Battle of Kursk the massing of front-line aviation and aviation forces was carried out more decisively long range in the main directions, their interaction with ground forces has improved.
A new form of using aviation in a counteroffensive was fully applied - an air offensive, in which attack and bomber aircraft continuously impacted enemy groups and targets, providing support to ground forces. In the Battle of Kursk, Soviet aviation finally gained strategic air supremacy and thereby contributed to the creation of favorable conditions for subsequent offensive operations.
Successfully passed the test at the Battle of Kursk organizational forms combat arms and special forces. Tank armies new organization, as well as artillery corps and other formations played important role in winning victory.
In the Battle of Kursk, the Soviet command demonstrated a creative, innovative approach to solving the most important tasks of the strategy , operational art and tactics, its superiority over the Nazi military school.
Strategic, front-line, army and military logistics agencies acquired great experience comprehensive provision of troops. Characteristic feature The organization of the rear was to bring rear units and institutions closer to the front line. This ensured an uninterrupted supply of troops with material resources and timely evacuation of the wounded and sick.
The enormous scope and intensity of the fighting required a large amount of material resources, primarily ammunition and fuel. During the Battle of Kursk, the troops of the Central, Voronezh, Steppe, Bryansk, South-Western and left wing of the Western Fronts were supplied by rail with 141,354 wagons with ammunition, fuel, food and other supplies from central bases and warehouses. By air, 1,828 tons of various supplies were delivered to the troops of the Central Front alone.
The medical service of the fronts, armies and formations has been enriched with experience in carrying out preventive and sanitary and hygienic measures, skillful maneuver of the forces and means of medical institutions, and the widespread use of specialized medical care. Despite the significant losses suffered by the troops, many wounded during the Battle of Kursk, thanks to the efforts of military doctors, returned to duty.
Hitler's strategists for planning, organizing and leading Operation Citadel used old, standard methods and methods that did not correspond to the new situation and were well known to the Soviet command. This is recognized by a number of bourgeois historians. So, the English historian A. Clark at work "Barbarossa" notes that the fascist German command again relied on a lightning strike with the widespread use of new military equipment: Junkers, short intensive artillery preparation, close interaction between a mass of tanks and infantry... without due consideration of the changed conditions, except for a simple arithmetic increase in the relevant components." West German historian W. Goerlitz writes that the attack on Kursk was basically carried out “in in accordance with the scheme of previous battles - tank wedges acted to cover from two directions».
Reactionary bourgeois researchers of the Second World War made great efforts to distort events near Kursk . They are trying to rehabilitate the Wehrmacht command, gloss over its mistakes and all the blame for failure of Operation Citadel blamed on Hitler and his closest associates. This position was put forward immediately after the end of the war and has been stubbornly defended to this day. Thus, the former chief of the general staff of the ground forces, Colonel General Halder, was still at work in 1949 "Hitler as a commander", deliberately distorting the facts, claimed that in the spring of 1943, when developing a war plan on the Soviet-German front, “ The commanders of army groups and armies and Hitler's military advisers from the main command of the ground forces tried unsuccessfully to overcome the great operational threat created in the East, to direct him to the only path that promised success - the path of flexible operational leadership, which, like the art of fencing, lies in rapid alternation of cover and strike and compensates for the lack of strength with skillful operational leadership and high fighting qualities of the troops...».
Documents show that miscalculations in planning the armed struggle on the Soviet-German front were made by both the political and military leadership of Germany. The Wehrmacht intelligence service also failed to cope with its tasks. Statements about the non-involvement of the German generals in the development of the most important political and military decisions contradict the facts.
The thesis that the offensive of Hitler’s troops near Kursk had limited goals and that failure of Operation Citadel cannot be considered as a phenomenon of strategic importance.
In recent years, works have appeared that give a fairly close to objective assessment of a number of events of the Battle of Kursk. American historian M. Caidin in the book "Tigers" are burning" characterizes the Battle of Kursk as " greatest land battle ever fought in history”, and does not agree with the opinion of many researchers in the West that it pursued limited, auxiliary” goals. " History deeply doubts, - writes the author, - in German statements that they did not believe in the future. Everything was decided at Kursk. What happened there determined the future course of events" The same idea is reflected in the annotation to the book, where it is noted that the battle of Kursk “ broke the back of the German army in 1943 and changed the entire course of the Second World War... Few outside Russia understand the enormity of this stunning clash. In fact, even today the Soviets feel bitterness as they see Western historians downplaying the Russian triumph at Kursk».
Why did the last attempt of the fascist German command to carry out a major victorious offensive in the East and regain the lost strategic initiative fail? The main reasons for failure Operation Citadel the increasingly stronger economic, political and military power of the Soviet Union, the superiority of Soviet military art, and the boundless heroism and courage of Soviet soldiers appeared. In 1943, the Soviet military economy produced more military equipment and weapons than industry fascist Germany, which used the resources of the enslaved countries of Europe.
But the growth of the military power of the Soviet state and its Armed Forces was ignored by Nazi political and military leaders. Underestimation of the capabilities of the Soviet Union and overestimation own strength were an expression of the adventurism of the fascist strategy.
From a purely military point of view, complete failure of Operation Citadel to a certain extent was due to the fact that the Wehrmacht failed to achieve surprise in the attack. Thanks to the efficient work of all types of reconnaissance, including airborne, the Soviet command knew about the impending offensive and took the necessary measures. The military leadership of the Wehrmacht believed that no defense could resist powerful tank rams, supported by massive air operations. But these predictions turned out to be unfounded; at the cost of huge losses, the tanks only slightly wedged themselves into the Soviet defenses north and south of Kursk and got stuck on the defensive.
An important reason collapse of Operation Citadel The secretiveness of the preparation of Soviet troops for both a defensive battle and a counteroffensive was revealed. The fascist leadership did not have a complete understanding of the plans of the Soviet command. In preparation for July 3, that is, the day before German offensive near Kursk, department for the study of the armies of the East “Assessment of enemy actions during Operation Citadel there is not even a mention of the possibility of a counteroffensive by Soviet troops against Wehrmacht strike forces.
The major miscalculations of fascist German intelligence in assessing the forces of the Soviet Army concentrated in the area of the Kursk salient are convincingly evidenced by the report card of the operational department of the General Staff of the German Army Ground Forces, prepared on July 4, 1943. It even contains information about the Soviet troops deployed in the first operational echelon are reflected inaccurately. German intelligence had very sketchy information about the reserves located in the Kursk direction.
At the beginning of July, the situation on the Soviet-German front and possible solutions The Soviet command was assessed by the political and military leaders of Germany, essentially, from the same positions. They firmly believed in the possibility of a major victory.
Soviet soldiers in the battles of Kursk showed courage, resilience and mass heroism. The Communist Party and the Soviet government highly appreciated the greatness of their feat. Military orders sparkled on the banners of many formations and units, 132 formations and units received the guards rank, 26 formations and units were awarded the honorary names of Oryol, Belgorod, Kharkov and Karachev. More than 100 thousand soldiers, sergeants, officers and generals were awarded orders and medals, over 180 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, including private V.E. Breusov, division commander Major General L.N. Gurtiev, platoon commander Lieutenant V.V. Zhenchenko, battalion Komsomol organizer Lieutenant N.M. Zverintsev, battery commander Captain G.I. Igishev, private A.M. Lomakin, platoon deputy commander, senior sergeant Kh.M. Mukhamadiev, squad commander Sergeant V.P. Petrishchev, gun commander Junior Sergeant A.I. Petrov, Senior Sergeant G.P. Pelikanov, Sergeant V.F. Chernenko and others.
Victory of Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge testified to the increased role of party political work. Commanders and political workers, party and Komsomol organizations helped the personnel understand the significance of the upcoming battles, their role in defeating the enemy. By personal example, the communists attracted the fighters with them. Political agencies took measures to maintain and replenish party organizations in their divisions. This ensured continuous party influence over all personnel.
An important means of mobilizing soldiers for military exploits was the promotion of advanced experience and the popularization of units and subunits that distinguished themselves in battle. The orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, declaring gratitude to the personnel of distinguished troops, had great inspiring power - they were widely promoted in units and formations, read out at rallies, and distributed through leaflets. Extracts from the orders were given to each soldier.
The increase in the morale of Soviet soldiers and confidence in victory was facilitated by timely information from personnel about events in the world and in the country, about the successes of the Soviet troops and the defeats of the enemy. Political agencies and party organizations, carrying out active work to educate personnel, played an important role in achieving victories in defensive and offensive battles. Together with their commanders, they held high the banner of the party and were bearers of its spirit, discipline, steadfastness and courage. They mobilized and inspired soldiers to defeat the enemy.
« The giant battle on the Oryol-Kursk Bulge in the summer of 1943, noted L. I. Brezhnev , – broke the back of Nazi Germany and incinerated its armored shock troops. The superiority of our army in combat skills, weapons, and strategic leadership has become clear to the whole world.».
The victory of the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk opened up new opportunities for the fight against German fascism and the liberation of Soviet lands temporarily captured by the enemy. Firmly holding the strategic initiative. The Soviet Armed Forces increasingly launched a general offensive.
After the Battle of Stalingrad, which ended in disaster for Germany, the Wehrmacht attempted revenge the following year, 1943. This attempt went down in history as the Battle of Kursk and became the final turning point in the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War.
Background to the Battle of Kursk
During the counteroffensive from November 1942 to February 1943, the Red Army managed to defeat a large group of Germans, encircle and force the 6th Wehrmacht Army to surrender at Stalingrad, and liberate very large territories. Thus, in January-February, Soviet troops managed to capture Kursk and Kharkov and thereby cut through the German defenses. The gap reached approximately 200 kilometers in width and 100-150 in depth.
Realizing that a further Soviet offensive could lead to the collapse of the entire Eastern Front, the Nazi command in early March 1943 took a series of energetic actions in the Kharkov area. Very quickly, a strike force was created, which by March 15 again captured Kharkov and attempted to cut off the ledge in the Kursk area. However, here the German advance was stopped.
As of April 1943, the line of the Soviet-German front was practically flat along its entire length, and only in the Kursk area did it bend, forming a large ledge jutting into the German side. The configuration of the front made it clear where the main battles would unfold in the summer campaign of 1943.
Plans and forces of the parties before the Battle of Kursk
In the spring, heated debate broke out among the German leadership regarding the fate of the summer 1943 campaign. Some of the German generals (for example, G. Guderian) generally proposed to refrain from an offensive in order to accumulate forces for a large-scale offensive campaign in 1944. However, most German military leaders were strongly in favor of the offensive already in 1943. This offensive was supposed to be a kind of revenge for the humiliating defeat at Stalingrad, as well as the final turning point of the war in favor of Germany and its allies.
Thus, in the summer of 1943, the Nazi command again planned an offensive campaign. However, it is worth noting that from 1941 to 1943 the scale of these campaigns steadily decreased. So, if in 1941 the Wehrmacht led an offensive along the entire front, then in 1943 it was only a small section of the Soviet-German front.
The meaning of the operation, called “Citadel,” was the offensive of large Wehrmacht forces at the base of the Kursk Bulge and their strike at general direction to Kursk. The Soviet troops located in the bulge would inevitably be surrounded and destroyed. After this, it was planned to launch an offensive into the gap created in the Soviet defense and reach Moscow from the southwest. This plan, if it had been successfully implemented, would have become a real disaster for the Red Army, because there were a very large number of troops in the Kursk ledge.
The Soviet leadership learned important lessons in the spring of 1942 and 1943. Thus, by March 1943, the Red Army was thoroughly exhausted by offensive battles, which led to defeat near Kharkov. After this, it was decided not to begin the summer campaign with an offensive, since it was obvious that the Germans were also planning to attack. Also, the Soviet leadership had no doubt that the Wehrmacht would advance precisely on the Kursk Bulge, where the configuration of the front line contributed most to this.
That is why, after weighing all the circumstances, the Soviet command decided to exhaust the German troops, inflict serious losses on them and then go on the offensive, finally securing the turning point in the war in favor of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.
To attack Kursk, the German leadership concentrated a very large group, numbering 50 divisions. Of these 50 divisions, 18 were tank and motorized. From the sky the German group was covered by aircraft of the 4th and 6th air fleets Luftwaffe. Thus, the total number of German troops at the beginning of the battle of Kursk was approximately 900 thousand people, about 2,700 tanks and 2,000 aircraft. Due to the fact that the northern and southern Wehrmacht groupings on the Kursk Bulge were part of different army groups (“Center” and “South”), leadership was exercised by the commanders of these army groups - Field Marshals Kluge and Manstein.
The Soviet group on the Kursk Bulge was represented by three fronts. The northern face of the ledge was defended by troops of the Central Front under the command of Army General Rokossovsky, the southern by troops of the Voronezh Front under the command of Army General Vatutin. Also in the Kursk ledge were the troops of the Steppe Front, commanded by Colonel General Konev. The general leadership of the troops in the Kursk salient was carried out by Marshals Vasilevsky and Zhukov. The number of Soviet troops was approximately 1 million 350 thousand people, 5000 tanks and about 2900 aircraft.
Beginning of the Battle of Kursk (5 – 12 July 1943)
On the morning of July 5, 1943, German troops launched an offensive on Kursk. However, the Soviet leadership knew about the exact time of the start of this offensive, thanks to which it was able to take a number of countermeasures. One of the most significant measures was the organization of artillery counter-training, which made it possible to inflict serious losses in the first minutes and hours of the battle and significantly reduce the offensive capabilities of the German troops.
However, the German offensive began and achieved some successes in the early days. The first line of Soviet defense was broken through, but the Germans failed to achieve serious success. On the northern front of the Kursk Bulge, the Wehrmacht struck in the direction of Olkhovatka, but, having failed to break through the Soviet defense, they turned away settlement Ponyri. However, here too the Soviet defense was able to withstand the onslaught of German troops. As a result of the battles on July 5-10, 1943, the German 9th Army suffered terrible losses in tanks: about two-thirds of the vehicles were out of action. On July 10, army units went on the defensive.
The situation unfolded more dramatically in the south. Here, in the first days, the German army managed to wedge itself into the Soviet defenses, but never broke through it. The offensive was carried out in the direction of the settlement of Oboyan, which was held by Soviet troops, who also inflicted significant damage on the Wehrmacht.
After several days of fighting, the German leadership decided to shift the direction of the attack to Prokhorovka. Implementing this solution would make it possible to cover large territory than planned. However, here units of the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army stood in the way of the German tank wedges.
On July 12, one of the largest tank battles in history. On the German side, approximately 700 tanks took part in it, while on the Soviet side - about 800. Soviet troops launched a counterattack on Wehrmacht units in order to eliminate the enemy’s penetration into the Soviet defense. However, this counterattack did not achieve significant results. The Red Army only managed to stop the advance of the Wehrmacht in the south of the Kursk Bulge, but it was possible to restore the situation at the beginning of the German offensive only two weeks later.
By July 15, having suffered huge losses as a result of continuous violent attacks, the Wehrmacht had practically exhausted its offensive capabilities and was forced to go on the defensive along the entire length of the front. By July 17, the withdrawal of German troops to their original lines began. Taking into account the developing situation, as well as pursuing the goal of inflicting a serious defeat on the enemy, the Supreme High Command Headquarters already on July 18, 1943 authorized the transition of Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge to a counteroffensive.
Now the German troops were forced to defend themselves in order to avoid a military catastrophe. However, Wehrmacht units, seriously exhausted in offensive battles, could not offer serious resistance. The Soviet troops, reinforced with reserves, were full of power and readiness to crush the enemy.
To defeat the German troops covering the Kursk Bulge, two operations were developed and carried out: “Kutuzov” (to defeat the Oryol group of the Wehrmacht) and “Rumyantsev” (to defeat the Belgorod-Kharkov group).
As a result of the Soviet offensive, the Oryol and Belgorod groups of German troops were defeated. On August 5, 1943, Orel and Belgorod were liberated by Soviet troops, and the Kursk Bulge practically ceased to exist. On the same day, Moscow for the first time saluted the Soviet troops who liberated the cities from the enemy.
The last battle of the Battle of Kursk was the liberation of the city of Kharkov by Soviet troops. The battles for this city became very fierce, but thanks to the decisive onslaught of the Red Army, the city was liberated by the end of August 23. It is the capture of Kharkov that is considered the logical conclusion of the Battle of Kursk.
Losses of the parties
Estimates of the losses of the Red Army, as well as the Wehrmacht troops, have different estimates. Even more unclear are the large differences between the estimates of the parties' losses in different sources.
Thus, Soviet sources indicate that during the Battle of Kursk the Red Army lost about 250 thousand people killed and about 600 thousand wounded. Moreover, some Wehrmacht data indicate 300 thousand killed and 700 thousand wounded. Armored vehicle losses range from 1,000 to 6,000 tanks and self-propelled guns. Soviet aviation losses are estimated at 1,600 aircraft.
However, regarding the assessment of Wehrmacht losses, the data differ even more. According to German data, the losses of German troops ranged from 83 to 135 thousand people killed. But at the same time, Soviet data indicate the number of dead Wehrmacht soldiers at approximately 420 thousand. The losses of German armored vehicles range from 1,000 tanks (according to German data) to 3,000. Aviation losses amount to approximately 1,700 aircraft.
Results and significance of the Battle of Kursk
Immediately after the Battle of Kursk and directly during it, the Red Army began a series of large-scale operations with the aim of liberating Soviet lands from German occupation. Among these operations: “Suvorov” (operation to liberate Smolensk, Donbass and Chernigov-Poltava.
Thus, the victory at Kursk opened up vast operational scope for action for the Soviet troops. German troops, bloodless and defeated as a result of the summer battles, ceased to be a serious threat until December 1943. However, this does not mean at all that the Wehrmacht was not strong at that time. On the contrary, snapping furiously, the German troops sought to hold at least the Dnieper line.
For the Allied command, which landed troops on the island of Sicily in July 1943, the battle of Kursk became a kind of “help”, since the Wehrmacht was no longer able to transfer reserves to the island - the Eastern Front was a higher priority. Even after the defeat at Kursk, the Wehrmacht command was forced to transfer fresh forces from Italy to the east, and in their place send units battered in battles with the Red Army.
For the German command, the battle of Kursk became the moment when plans to defeat the Red Army and defeat the USSR finally became an illusion. It became clear that for quite a long time the Wehrmacht would be forced to refrain from conducting active operations.
The Battle of Kursk marked the completion of a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War. After this battle, the strategic initiative finally passed into the hands of the Red Army, thanks to which, by the end of 1943, vast territories of the Soviet Union were liberated, including such large cities as Kyiv and Smolensk.
Internationally, the victory in the Battle of Kursk became the moment when the peoples of Europe enslaved by the Nazis took heart. The people's liberation movement in European countries began to grow even faster. Its culmination came in 1944, when the decline of the Third Reich became very clear.
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Preparation of the Kursk strategic defensive operation (April - June 1943)
6.4. Directive of the Supreme High Command Headquarters on the creation of a Reserve Front (from 15.4 - Steppe Military District) consisting of 5 combined arms, 1 tank and 1 air armies and several rifle, cavalry, tank (mechanized) corps.
8.4. Report of Marshal G.K. Zhukov to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the possible actions of the Germans and Soviet troops in the spring and summer of 1943 and on the advisability of switching to a deliberate defense in the Kursk region.
10.4. Request General Staff commanders of the front troops about their considerations in assessing the situation and possible actions of the enemy.
12–13.4. The Supreme Command Headquarters, based on the report of Marshals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky, General A.I. Antonov, as well as taking into account the considerations of the front commanders, made a preliminary decision to switch to deliberate defense in the Kursk region.
15.4. Order No. 6 of the Wehrmacht headquarters on preparations for the offensive operation near Kursk (code name “Citadel”)
6–8.5. Operations of the Soviet Air Force to destroy enemy aircraft at airfields and in the air on the central sector of the Soviet-German front.
8.5. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command advises the commanders of the Bryansk, Central, Voronezh and South-Western fronts on the timing of a possible enemy offensive.
10.5. Directive of the Supreme High Command Headquarters to the commander of the troops of the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh and Southwestern fronts on improving defense.
May June. Organization of defense in the zones of the Bryansk, Central, Voronezh and Southwestern fronts, creation of deeply echeloned defensive lines, replenishment of troops, accumulation of reserves and materiel. Continuation of Soviet Air Force operations to destroy enemy aircraft at airfields and in the air.
2.7. Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to the commanders of the front troops indicating the deadlines possible start enemy offensive (3–6.7).
4.7. The Germans conducted reconnaissance in force in the defense zones of the 6th and 7th Guards. armies of the Voronezh Front. The offensive of several reinforced enemy battalions was repulsed.
5.7. At 02:20 Based on reconnaissance data about the time of the start of the German offensive (scheduled for 03:00 minutes 5.7), artillery counter-preparation was carried out and air strikes were carried out on enemy troops concentrated in the initial areas.
5.7. The Germans, with the main forces of Army Groups "Center" and "South", went on the offensive on the northern (05:30) and southern (06:00) fronts of the Kursk bulge, delivering massive attacks in the general direction of Kursk.
The operation involved troops of the Central Front (commanded by General K.K. Rokossovsky) - 48, 13, 70, 65, 60th, 2nd Tank, 16th Air Armies, 9th and 19th Tank Corps - in the Oryol direction; Voronezh Front (commander General N.F. Vatutin) - 38th, 40th, 6th Guards, 7th Guards, 69th, 1st Guards. Tank, 2nd Air Army, 35th Guards. sk, 5th guards tk - in the Belgorod direction. In their rear, strategic reserves were deployed, united in the Steppe Military District (since July 9, Steppe Front, commander General I.S. Konev) - 4th Guards, 5th Guards, 27th, 47th, 53rd, 5th Guards. tank, 5th air army, one sk, three tk, three mk and three kk - with the task of preventing a deep breakthrough of the enemy, and when going on a counteroffensive, increase the force of the strike.
5.7. At 05:30 the strike force of the 9th German Army (9 divisions, including 2 tank divisions; 500 tanks, 280 assault guns), with aviation support, attacked positions at the junction of the 13th (General N.P. Pukhov) and 70th (General I. V. Galanin) armies in a sector of 45 km, concentrating the main efforts in the Olkhovat direction. By the end of the day, the enemy managed to wedge 6–8 km into the army’s defenses and reach the second defensive line.
6.7. By the decision of the front commander, a counterattack was launched against the wedged enemy in the Olkhovatka area by part of the forces of the 13th and 2nd tank armies and the 19th tank army. The enemy's advance here was stopped.
7.7. The Germans transferred the main efforts to the 13th Army zone in the direction of Ponyri. Counterattacks of the 15th and 18th Guards. sk and 3 tk.
7-11.7. Repeated attempts by the German 9th Army to break through the defenses of the Central Front were unsuccessful. During the seven days of the offensive, the enemy advanced only 10–12 km.
12.7. The transition of the 9th German Army to defense in the Central Front. Completion of the defensive operation.
13.7. At a meeting at Hitler's headquarters, a decision was made to switch to the defense of the troops of the 9th Army in the north and to continue the offensive by the troops of the 4th Panzer Army in the south of the Kursk ledge.
5.7. At 06:00 After artillery preparation and massive air raids, the strike force of Army Group South, consisting of the 4th Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf (1,500 tanks), went on the offensive.
The enemy sent the main forces (2 SS tanks, 48 tanks, 52 ak) against the 6th Guards. the army of General I.M. Chistyakov in the Oboyan direction.
Against the 7th Guards. In the army of General M.S. Shumilov, three tank and three infantry divisions of 3 Tank Corps, 42 AK and AK "Raus" were advancing in the Korochan direction.
The intense battles that unfolded continued throughout the day and were fierce.
The counterattack launched by part of the forces of the 1st Guards. the tank army of General M.E. Katukov did not give a positive result.
By the end of the first day of the battle, the enemy managed to break into the defenses of the 6th Guards. army at 8-10 km.
On the night of July 6, by decision of the front commander of the 1st Guards. Tank Army, 5th and 2nd Guards. TK were deployed on the second defensive line of the 6th Guards. army on a 52-kilometer front.
6.7. The enemy in the Oboyan direction broke through the main line of defense of the 6th Guards. army, and by the end of the day, having advanced 10–18 km, he broke through the second line of defense of this army in a narrow area.
In the Korochan direction, the enemy's 3rd Tank Tank reached the second line of defense of the 7th Guards. army.
7.7. At night, J.V. Stalin gave personal instructions to General N.F. Vatutin to wear down the enemy on prepared lines and not allow him to break through before the start of our active operations on the Western, Bryansk and other fronts.
7-10.7. There were fierce tank battles in the Oboyan and Korochan directions. The German tank group managed to break through to the army defensive zone of the 6th Guards. army, and in the Korochan direction the enemy broke into the second line of defense of the 7th Guards. army. However, the further advance of the Germans was delayed, but not stopped. The Germans, having advanced to a depth of 35 km and unable to overcome the resistance of the front tank forces on the Oboyan highway, decided to break through to Kursk from the south through Prokhorovka.
9.7. In the created alarming situation on the Voronezh Front, the Supreme High Command Headquarters ordered the commander of the Steppe Front to advance the 4th Guards, 27th, 53rd Armies to the Kursk-Belgorod direction and transfer the 5th Guards to the subordination of N.F. Vatutin. army of General A.S. Zhadov, 5th Guards. the tank army of General P. A. Rotmistrov and a number of separate tank corps. The commander of the Voronezh Front and Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, who was on this front, decided to launch a powerful counterattack against the German group advancing on Kursk from the south.
11.7. The enemy unexpectedly launched a strong tank and air attack and pushed back formations and units of the 1st Guards. tank, 5th, 6th, 7th Guards. armies and captured the line planned for the deployment of the 5th Guards. tank army. After this, the 1st Guards. tank and 6th Guards. the armies were unable to participate in the counterattack.
12.7. One of the largest oncoming tank battles took place, which received the name “Prokhorovskoe” in history. About 1,500 tanks took part in it on both sides. The battle took place simultaneously in two areas: the main forces of the parties fought on the Prokhorovsky field - 18th, 29th, 2nd and 2nd Guards. TK 5th Guards tank army and division of the 5th Guards. army, they were opposed by the SS divisions “Adolf Hitler” and “Reich” of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps; In the Korochan direction, brigades of the 5th Guards acted against the 3rd German Tank Corps. MK 5th Guards tank army.
23.7. The defensive operation of the Voronezh Front was completed.
12.7. A turning point in the Battle of Kursk in favor of the Red Army. On this day, simultaneously with the Battle of Prokhorov, the offensive of the troops of the Western and Bryansk Fronts began in the Oryol direction. The plans outlined by the German command suffered a complete collapse.
It should be noted that as a result of intense air battles during the Kursk defensive operation, Soviet aviation firmly gained air supremacy.
Includes the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operations.
The left wing of the Western Front (commander General V.D. Sokolovsky) took part - the 11th Guards, 50th, 11th and 4th Tank Armies; Bryansk Front (commander General M. M. Popov) - 61, 3, 63rd, 3rd Guards. tank and 15th air armies; the right wing of the Central Front - the 48th, 13th, 70th and 2nd Tank Armies.
12–19.7. Breakthrough of enemy defenses by troops of the Western Front. Advance of the 11th Guards. the army of General I. Kh. Bagramyan, 1, 5, 25 Tank Tank to a depth of 70 km and expanding the breakthrough to 150 km.
15.7. The Central Front is included in the operation.
12–16.7. Breakthrough of enemy defenses by troops of the Bryansk Front - 61st (General P. A. Belov), 63rd (General V. Ya. Kolpakchi), 3rd (General A. V. Gorbatov) armies, 1st Guards, 20th Tank Army to a depth of 17–22 km.
19.7. The commander of the Bryansk Front, at the direction of the Supreme Command Headquarters, introduces the 3rd Guards into the battle. tank army of General P. S. Rybalko (800 tanks). The army, together with combined arms formations, breaking through numerous defensive lines, suffered heavy losses. In addition, it was repeatedly regrouped from one direction to another and was eventually transferred to the Central Front.
19.7. Fierce fighting in all directions. Slowdown in the rate of advance of Soviet troops.
20.7. The entry into battle by the commander of the Western Front troops of the 11th Army of General I. I. Fedyuninsky, who arrived from the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, which advanced 15 km in 5 days.
26.7. The entry into battle of the 4th Tank Army of General V.M. Badanov, transferred from the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters to the Western Front (650 tanks). She broke through along with the 11th Guards. the army defended the enemy’s defensive lines and advanced 25–30 km in 10 days. In just 30 days, the army fought 150 km and at the end of August was withdrawn for replenishment.
29.7. The troops of the 61st Army of the Bryansk Front captured a large enemy defense center in the city of Bolkhov.
3–5.8. Departure of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to the active army. He visited the headquarters of the Western and Kalinin fronts.
5.8. Liberation of Orel by troops of the 3rd and 69th armies of the Bryansk Front. By order of I.V. Stalin, who was in the active army, the first artillery salute was given in Moscow in honor of the liberation of the city by Soviet troops. Belgorod and Orel.
7.8. The armies of the Western Front went on the offensive north of the Oryol bridgehead, which forced the Germans to weaken resistance in the Bryansk direction, and Soviet troops began to pursue the enemy.
12.8. Troops of the 65th and 70th armies of the Central Front liberated the city of Dmitrovsk-Orlovsky.
13.8. The commander of the Central Front received a directive from the General Staff, which noted serious shortcomings in the use of tanks.
15.8. Troops of the Bryansk Front liberated the city of Karachev.
18.8. Soviet troops reached the approaches to Bryansk and created the conditions for a new operation. During the 37 days of the Oryol operation, Soviet troops advanced 150 km to the west and eliminated the enemy bridgehead from which the Germans had been threatening Moscow for two years.
Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive"Commander Rumyantsev" (August 3-23)
To carry out the operation, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts were involved (38, 47, 40, 27, 6th Guards, 5th Guards, 52nd, 69th, 7th Guards Armies, 5th Guards and 1st Guards Tank Armies , 5th separate TK and 1st MK).
3–4.8. Breakthrough of enemy defenses by troops of the Voronezh Front, introduction of tank armies and corps into the breakthrough and their entry into operational depth.
5.8. Liberation of Belgorod by units of the 69th and 7th Guards. armies.
6.8. Advancement of tank formations to a depth of 55 km.
7.8. Advancement of tank formations to a depth of 100 km. Capturing important enemy strongholds. Bogodukhov and Grayvoron.
11.8. The exit of tank troops to the Akhtyrka - Trostyanets area.
11–16.8. Enemy counterattack on the troops of the 1st Guards. tank army.
17.8. The troops of the Steppe Front began fighting on the outskirts of Kharkov.
18.8. Enemy counterattack from the Akhtyrka area against the 27th Army. Directive from the Supreme Command Headquarters to the commander of the Voronezh Front on shortcomings in the conduct of the operation.
23.8. By introducing new forces, the Voronezh Front managed to complete the task and liberate Akhtyrka again by August 25.
23.8. The troops of the Steppe Front, with the assistance of the Voronezh and Southwestern Fronts (53rd, 69th, 7th Guards, 57th Army and 5th Guards Tank Army) liberated Kharkov after stubborn battles. During the operation, the troops advanced 140 km in 20 days.
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