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Wikipedia has articles about other people with this surname, see Kankrin. Egor Frantsevich Kankrin is German. Georg Ludwig Cancrin ... Wikipedia
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Currency reform
Monetary reform in Russia was carried out in 1839-1843 under the leadership of Minister of Finance Kankrin. Led to the creation of the system of silver monometallism. The exchange of all banknotes for state banknotes, exchangeable for gold and silver, began.
The reform made it possible to establish a stable financial system in Russia, which remained in place until the outbreak of the Crimean War.
The first stage of monetary reform 1839-1843. began with the publication on July 1, 1839 of the manifesto “On the structure of the monetary system.” According to the manifesto, from January 1, 1840 in Russia, all transactions were to be calculated exclusively in silver. The main means of payment became the silver ruble with a pure silver content of 4 spools and 21 shares. State banknotes were assigned the role of an auxiliary banknote. Receipts to the treasury and the issuance of money from it were calculated in silver rubles. The payments themselves could be made both in specie and in banknotes. The gold coin was to be accepted and issued from government institutions with a 3% premium on its face value. At the first stage of the monetary reform, the actual level of depreciation of the assigned ruble was recorded. Shatilova S.A. History of state and law: Short course. - M., 2003. - P. 73.
Simultaneously with the manifesto, a decree of July 1, 1839 was published “On the establishment of the Deposit Office of Silver Coins at the State Commercial Bank,” which declared the notes of the Deposit Office to be legal tender, circulating on a par with silver coins without any crap. The cash desk began operations in January 1840; it accepted deposits in silver coins for safekeeping and issued in return deposit notes for the corresponding amounts. In the period from December 20, 1839 to June 18, 1841, in accordance with a number of Senate decrees, deposit notes were issued in denominations of 3, 5, 10, 25, 50 and 100 rubles. They were manufactured by the expedition of the Deposit Office and put into circulation on September 1, 1843.
The second stage of the monetary reform was the issue of credit notes from treasuries, educational institutions and the State Loan Bank. It was carried out in accordance with the manifesto of July 1, 1841 “On the release into public circulation of banknotes worth 30 million in silver.”
The adoption of this act was not considered as a measure to streamline monetary circulation, but was caused by economic necessity. In 1840 middle lane There was a severe crop failure in Russia. Intensified withdrawal of deposits from credit institutions began. Banks were on the verge of bankruptcy. This was largely facilitated by the system of permanent “borrowing” from state credit institutions, due to which they were unable not only to open loans, but also to issue deposits. On February 26, 1841, as an emergency measure, a decision was made to issue banknotes in order to provide assistance to state credit institutions and the treasury. Tickets were freely exchanged for specie and circulated on a par with silver coins.
Since 1841, three types of paper banknotes circulated in parallel in Russia: banknotes, deposit notes and credit notes. Their economic entity was different. Banknotes were a means of circulation and payment; their real value was four times lower than their nominal value. The deposit notes were actually receipts for silver. They were in circulation in an amount equal to the amount of deposits, and the treasury had no additional income from their emissions. Rogov V.A. History of state and law of Russia. - M., 2003. -S. 112 - 114.
At the last stage, in accordance with the reform project, banknotes were to be replaced with deposit notes. But the issue of deposit notes did not bring additional revenue to the state. At the same time, stable paper banknotes, only partially covered with metal, were in circulation - credit notes. Their issue was beneficial for the treasury. Therefore, the government decided to expand the issuance of credit notes rather than deposit notes.
As a result, at the third stage of the reform, banknotes and deposit notes were exchanged for credit notes. The exchange was carried out on the basis of the manifesto “On the replacement of banknotes and other monetary representatives with credit notes” dated June 1, 1843. To produce banknotes, an expedition of state banknotes was created at the Ministry of Finance with a permanent fund of specie for the exchange of large bills. In accordance with the manifesto, the issuance of deposit and credit notes of the treasury treasuries and the State Loan Bank ceased. They could be exchanged for government credit notes. The notes were devalued.
As a result of the reform, a monetary circulation system was created in Russia, in which paper money was exchanged for silver and gold. Credit notes were backed by 35-40% gold and silver. Legislation in the field of monetary circulation, resulting from the Kankrin reform, prohibited the issuance of credit notes for trade lending.
The monetary system created as a result of the reform of 1839-1843 had a number of important features:
There was freedom to mint not only silver, but also gold.
Gold imperials and semi-imperials were minted with the inscription “ten rubles” and “five rubles,” and the government sought to consolidate through legislation the value relationship between the gold and silver rubles.
Credit notes were exchanged not only for silver, but also for gold.
In Russia in the 30-40s. In the 19th century, despite the development of commodity-money relations, subsistence farming dominated. Accordingly, the volume of consumer goods purchased was small, and money as a means of circulation was required in small quantities. Workers, officials and other persons who lived on wages did not play such important role, as in conditions of developed commodity-money relations. With a relatively undeveloped market and poor communications, food prices were very low and the level of industrial development was relatively low. Goods industrial production, often imported from abroad, were purchased by a small circle of people. Money circulation was carried out mainly with the treasury. Therefore, the monetary reform carried out in 1839-1843. ensured relatively stable monetary circulation.
"T. Semenkova Innovations of the Ministry of Finance under Emperor Nicholas 1 PAVLOVICH in the second quarter of the XIX century In the second..."
T. Semenkova
Innovations of the Ministry of Finance
under Emperor Nicholas 1 PAVLOVICH
in the second quarter of the 19th century
In the second quarter of the 19th century, under Nicholas I (1825 - 1855), financial and
The country's economic development continued to strengthen. In this period
innovative economy of Russia. was based on the fact that banks were established
railways were built, special technical
A Manufacture Council was established under the Ministry of Finance, which included factory owners and factory owners. During this period, agricultural exhibitions and exhibitions of new technical achievements were regularly held. To support and implement all innovative initiatives, it was necessary to strengthen the country’s financial system, prepare and carry out monetary reform.
The Minister of Finance Yegor Frantsevich Kankrin (1774 - 1845) successfully completed these tasks. The reason for his success and the nature of his activities were largely determined by his biography. He became Minister of Finance in 1823. under Alexander I and remained in this post under Nicholas I until 1844. For more than 20 years he sat, in his own words, on the “fiery chair” of the Russian Minister of Finance.
His father Franz Ludwig Kankrin, an architect and expert in mining, arrived in Russia at the invitation of Catherine the Great. And under Emperor Paul I, he was granted the rank of state councilor and a house in St. Petersburg.
Egor Frantsevich Kankrin \son\ graduated from a university in Germany. He came to Russia in 1797 and at first helped his father in business, but was soon enlisted as an adviser to the Department of State Economy under the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. Since 1811 Kankrin served in the army as an assistant to the general provisions master.
His successful work as a quartermaster general in the field army, his energy and resourcefulness ensured his promotion. In 1829, Kankrin was granted the title of count.
Egor Frantsevich Kankrin had deep theoretical knowledge in political economy and finance, and perfectly understood the requirements real life, was extremely practical and prudent. His business qualities: organization, and extraordinary efficiency: he worked 15 hours a day. Kankrin outlined his innovative ideas in a number of theoretical works: “The Economy of Human Societies and the State of Finance”, “A Brief Review Russian finance”, “Review of noteworthy financial actions over the past 20 years.” The result of life experience of E.F. Kankrin was presented with his essays, published by him in Paris after leaving the post of Minister of Finance - “Essays political economy and finance." They appeared in Russian 50 years later, in 1894. The contribution of Finance Minister Kankrin to the development of Russia's innovative economy is inextricably linked with economic policy in the country. His innovations were aimed at strengthening the country's financial system as a whole, increasing the value of the ruble after an unprecedented fall, and improving financial and government reporting. Thanks to strict control over expenses, the use of a tax-farming system and a clear customs policy, he achieved a significant improvement in Russia's financial situation.
The development of an innovative economy at the beginning of the 19th century was facilitated by reform). This reform carried out by Kankrin Trade (guild) opened up great opportunities for the development of foreign trade and was designed to “spur” stagnant forms of Russian trade.
The reform somewhat limited the tendency to monopolize trade by merchants of the 1st guild and expanded the rights of the average urban merchants. Benefits were also received from the small trade of peasants who sold vegetables in the city on trays, in chests, in “samovars” and in cabinets. Disorderly trading “from hands” was prohibited under Catherine II, but the decree was not respected, and the streets big cities filled with unorganized crowds of small traders and speculators.
Thus, Kankrin’s innovative activities as Minister of Finance contributed to strengthening the monetary system and eliminating the budget deficit, but was inevitably accompanied by austerity in all areas of the economy.
Kankrin was held in 1839 - 1843.
The main innovation of monetary reform. Preparation for monetary reform was expressed in the drawing up of reform projects, of which there were five: projects by N.S. Mordvinov and S.A. Greig were considered impractical. The monetary reform projects of M. M. Speransky and E. F. Kankrin were similar in basis. The advantage of the project E.F.
Kankrin over the project of M. M. Speransky was that Kankrin considered it possible to carry out the reform without an external loan and actually carried it out without resorting to a loan. The peculiarity of the Kankrin monetary reform carried out in 1839 was that it was based on monometallism and, moreover, silver.
The monetary reform was opposed by landowners, for whom maintaining “cheap money” was beneficial, since they were responsible for paying taxes to the serfs. But the need to improve the country's economy persistently demanded a transformation of the monetary system.
In order to eliminate the excess of expenses over income in the Russian budget, Kankrin in every possible way prevented government loans and credits. He believed, believed that government debts do not increase people's well-being. “Strictly speaking,” he wrote, “loans should be resorted to only when they are needed in order to get the state out of a difficult situation or for generally useful measures.” (See T.G.
Semenkova, A.V. Semenkov. Monetary reforms of Russia in the 10th century. St. Petersburg 1992. Pp.
56.) On the first approaches to monetary reform in 1831. State Treasury notes were issued. This is important because treasury notes were obligations issued by the government in lieu of cash, with a specified maturity date and specified interest.
July 13, 1831 A Manifesto was published on the gradual release of the first three categories of state treasury tickets (each worth 10 million).
rub.), i.e., a total amount of 30 million. This measure was the most effective way to accelerate the receipt of government revenues.
M. M. Speransky in a letter to E. F. Kankrin dated May 27, 1831. expressed confidence in the absolute necessity of issuing new Treasury notes.
Speransky believed that it was unnecessary to pay interest on tickets, and if you did pay, then only for one last year (the fourth) - this would give the benefit that the tickets would remain in circulation until the fourth year.
The monetary reforms that were established in the 1930s also contributed to the implementation of the monetary reform. different courses: bill, tax, customs, exchange and common people. These money rates changed not only over time, but also across localities, which complicated and confused the calculations. An attempt to overcome this situation was the prohibition of transactions for coins at common rates, approved on September 29, 1837. at the meeting State Council.
At the same time, Kankrin made efforts to establish a fixed value of the assignat ruble. The silver ruble was equal to 380-350 kopecks, and in a number of places in Russia it was even higher. It was obvious that restoring the previous value of the depreciated paper ruble was unrealistic and impossible.
Therefore, it was decided to restore metal circulation through devaluation.
Manifesto of July 1839 on the structure of the monetary system.
the silver ruble was declared the main legal monetary unit, and the assignation ruble was allowed as a secondary sign. So, the basis for monetary circulation is the silver ruble, equal to 3 rubles. 50 kopecks
banknotes.
Kankrin's reform did not mean a simple exchange paper money at the established silver rate (3 rubles 50 kopecks), because this would only reduce the amount of money in circulation by three and a half times. The main thing was that it was necessary to give actual strength to money by ensuring its exchange. For this purpose, a metal fund was created in advance. Over the course of 4 years, the necessary reserves of gold and silver were created by purchasing gold and silver coins, as well as precious metal bars.
The question arises: why was silver and not gold chosen as the monetary unit? Historian V.T. Sudeikin explains it this way: firstly, most European states adhered to the double unit (only England switched to the gold unit in 1816); secondly, in Russia, by tradition, silver was always in circulation, although Russia owned mainly gold mines. (See Sudeikin V.T. Restoration of metal circulation in Russia. - M., 1891. - pp. 57 - 58).
The final stage of the reform was the complete replacement of banknotes with credit notes, exchangeable for specie upon sight.
The monetary reform of E. F. Kankrin significantly strengthened the country's monetary system. The legalized exchange of credit notes (new paper money) for metal upon presentation did not cause a stir. On the contrary, fewer credit notes were presented for exchange than the organizers of the reform expected.
The main merit of E.F. Kankrin was that he achieved a deficit-free state budget. It should be noted that this was also facilitated by the customs policy pursued, built on the basis of the theory of protectionism he preached. He introduced a protective tariff, which helped lift the ban on the import of a number of goods, thereby targeting domestic industry to improve the quality of its products.
The Kankrin reform fully justified itself, the monetary system was strengthened. The economic policy pursued by Finance Minister Kankrin in the 30s and 40s brought noticeable results. But his long management of the ministry ended due to illness. Kankrin died in 1845. from a stroke.
In the Ministry of Finance, when Kankrin became seriously ill, Fyodor Pavlovich Vronchenko was appointed manager of the Ministry of Finance. He worked in the Ministry of Finance for 34 years, and was appointed to the post of minister for his long service. In fact, from January 1844, he actually led the Ministry. In the spring of the same 1844 - May 1 - Vronchenko was appointed Secretary of State of His Imperial Majesty.
He became a minister in March 1845, when he was 64 years old. And he remained in this post until April 6, 1852. Although, (according to some contemporaries), he did not show great talents in the service, in this post he diligently continued the management system of his predecessor, E.F. Kankrin.
Vronchenko not only participated, but also practically carried out the monetary reform of 1839–1843, which went down in history as the Kankrin reform.
Fyodor Pavlovich Vronchenko’s assumption of the post of Minister of Finance was undoubtedly facilitated by friendly and trusting relations with his predecessor E.F. Kankrin. Vronchenko was not only E.F.’s business assistant. Kankrin, but also enjoyed his patronage. Fedor Vronchenko was 5 years younger than Kankrin.
Fyodor Pavlovich Vronchenko was born into the family of a priest in 1781. in the city of Kopys, Goretsky district, Mogilev governorship. He studied at Moscow University from 1797, and then until 1805 he served in the office of H.H.
Novosiltseva. When the war with the French began, Fyodor Vronchenko, as an official with a higher education, was taken into the sovereign’s retinue and tasked with editing state correspondence. Vronchenko was a sociable and sociable person, which contributed to his successful service.
From the memoirs of contemporaries about his habits and inclinations, it is known that he was a ladies' admirer and enjoyed the favor of young ladies in secular society. However, he was not married. His contemporaries condemned him for his bachelor life, and envied him for his success with young ladies.
Fyodor Vronchenko had a younger brother, Mikhail, an outstanding scientific researcher, a founding member of the Russian Geographical Society - RGO, as well as a talented prose writer and poet-translator. In addition, Mikhail is known as a military surveyor, geographer and intelligence officer.
Fyodor Vronchenko had close friendly relations with his younger brother Mikhail. When established in St. Petersburg in 1845. The Russian Geographical Society, apparently with the permission of Emperor Nicholas I, allocated 10 thousand rubles to the Society. silver for current expenses. And he donated several of his books to the emerging library of the Russian Geographical Society. There is information that Fyodor Vronchenko was an honorary member of the Russian Geographical Society. In the 19th century The Russian Navy included the combat ship "Count Vronchenko", named after Fyodor Vronchenko.
Upon death, Fyodor Pavlovich Vronchenko bequeathed his entire fortune to Mikhail Pavlovich, his younger brother.
Career growth of F.P. Vronchenko continued rapidly at the beginning of the 10th century. In 1809, he was appointed clerk, under the council and board of the commission for drafting laws, and in next year was appointed head of a department in the Ministry of Finance, but soon received an appointment to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which was managed by V.P. Kochubey.
Since 1820 Vronchenko again served in the Ministry of Finance and was appointed head of the third department, which in 1824 was transformed into the Special Office for the Credit Department, which he managed. The next promotion for Fyodor Vronchenko was the appointment of a fellow minister of finance in 1840. This happened during the period of completion of Kankrin’s many years (22 years) of service. Vronchenko became not only a comrade of the Minister of Finance, but also the chief manager of the Corps of Mining Engineers. The following year, 1841, Vronchenko was a member of the Committee on Credit Establishments and the Finance Committee, and from April 19, 1842 he was an active Privy Councilor.
During his long service, Vronchenko established himself as a very careful and efficient official. Vronchenko was repeatedly entrusted with the management of the Ministry of Finance during Kankrin's absence.
Kankrin E.F., before his death, compiled a special guide for Vronchenko on the main problems of financial management.
For the post of Minister of Finance F.P. Vronchenko's ball was scheduled in March 1845. In April 1849 he was elevated to the dignity of a count of the Russian Empire. It should be noted that the appointment of Vronchenko as minister caused discontent and intrigue on the part of some government officials. They believed that, after the resignation of the ill Minister Kankrin, Knyazhevich should be appointed in his place, who, like Fyodor Vronchenko, was Kankrin’s comrade-in-arms and student. In addition, Knyazhevich had a reputation as a businesslike and enterprising person. In a few years, it would be his turn to be Minister of Finance... The intrigues of court circles, accompanied by slander and scandalous rumors about bribes in the ministry, did not prevent the appointment of Vronchenko, and as history has shown, at that time, it was the right choice.
In the second half of the 40s. the situation in the country has changed.
Crop failures in 1844, 1845 and 1847 led to a significant increase in arrears to the treasury. The financial situation especially worsened due to increased expenses during the Crimean War. Internal and external public debt has increased significantly. The financial and economic situation in the country, despite the Kankrin monetary reform, remained very difficult. In Russia at that time there were no conditions for decisive transformations, and all forces and means had to be used to solve urgent economic problems and meet current needs.
As historians rightly note, the existing financial system was imperfect; the existing tax system bore the brunt of the burden on the peasants, which hampered the growth of the people's well-being. To overcome financial difficulties and the economic structure, then it was necessary to urgently take measures to strengthen the country's financial and trade system.
For this it was also necessary to increase attention to agriculture, the most important sector of the Russian economy. In conditions poor condition Agriculture, all the efforts of Minister F.P. Vronchenko’s efforts to develop and improve factory production did not bring the expected results.
State financial and credit institutions, like the entire country's economy, were experiencing difficulties. Their unsatisfactory condition did not create incentives for the emergence of private credit institutions. And government institutions were forced to take measures to cover the deficits between government revenues and expenditures. From the list of income and expenses during the period of Vronchenko’s management of the Ministry of Finance, it follows that expenses significantly exceeded income.
Minister of Finance F.P. Vronchenko remained for seven years - from March 845 to April 1952. During his activity, financial system Nicholas era, basically preserved in its original form, with all its previous features: extreme tax burden on the peasantry, unproductive spending and deficits. At the same time, he carried out innovations in the field tax system. New indirect taxes were introduced and old ones were increased, especially on drinking income. In 1847, the excise-tax-farm system was introduced; in the 50s Vronchenko introduced a new tariff, which was an innovation in customs policy. Under him, the border line between Russia and Poland was abolished.
The economic measures carried out by Vronchenko were also due to military-political reasons - increased costs for maintaining troops as a result of military operations in the Caucasus, the uprising in Krakow and the war in Hungary.
The desire to limit spending on military purposes and the measures taken for this did not lead to the desired results. Under these conditions, the Ministry of Finance, in order to cover increasing expenses, had to resort to increasing existing taxes. In 1846, the auxiliary zemstvo tax from peasants, townspeople and merchants was doubled, and since the tax-paying capabilities of the peasants were already strained, it remained to introduce new or increase old indirect taxes. In addition, a drinking regulation was introduced. The following year, 1847, was followed by the abolition of benefits in many provinces and regions for the sale of lower grades of tobacco; and at the same time the parcel fee for tobacco was increased. An excise tax was also introduced on beet sugar production.
Among the positive measures taken by Minister Vronchenko was the introduction in 1850 of a new tariff, which provided for a reduction in tariff rates.
The final abolition of banknotes was also carried out, although this measure was only of a formal nature. At the same time, a number of significant issues, namely, improvements in tax technology, have not received due attention.
To cover the deficit, Finance Minister Vronchenko focused on the development of the factory industry. He practiced concluding external loans and borrowing part of the amounts from state-owned credit institutions. Under him, the issue of State Treasury notes was undertaken. Vronchenko sometimes resorted, in order to hide the deficit, to crediting uncovered expenses to the income of future years. To cover costs, Vronchenko undertook a constant increase in direct and indirect taxes.
But, despite all these measures taken by Vronchenko, the amount of public debts, by the end of his management of the Ministry of Finance, increased from 299 million (in 1844) to 400 million rubles. (in 1852).
In 1851, Vronchenko fell ill, and the ministry was virtually left without a minister; only in the spring of 1853 was P.F. Brock appointed. He began work under Nicholas 1 two years before the death of the emperor in the spring of 1853.
He was buried in the Annunciation tomb of the Alexander Nevsky Lavra. In 2012, Goal celebrated exactly 260 years since his passing into another world.
It must be said that inflation, which began during the Crimean War, dragged on for several decades. But the financial system of Russia, its monetary economy, was able to withstand all these tests only thanks to the order into which they were brought by the Ministers of Finance E. Kankrin and Vronchenko F.P., who went down in history as prominent statesmen of the Russian Empire.
L I T E R A T U R A:
1. Bozheryanov I.N. Count Egor Frantsevich Kankrin. 1897
2. Geits F.F. Efimki. M., 1913
3. Gorelov Iv. Theory of finance. Kazan. 18..g.
4. Count Kankrin and his essays on political economy and finance in 3 parts. St. Petersburg. 1894
5. History of Russian economic thought. T. 1, part 2, M., 1958 \notes\
6. Ryndzinsky P.G. Reform E.F. Kankrina //Historical notes. T.40, M., 1952
7. Semenkov A.V., Semenkova T.G. Monetary reforms of Russia in the 19th century.
9. Semenkov A.V. Semenkova T.G. Ministers of Finance during the reign of Alexander II. Zh. Banking, N2, 1995 PROCEDURES FOR PROOF OF THE SAFETY OF INNOVATIVE BRAKE EQUIPMENT DEVICES FOR ROLLING STOCK OF RAILWAY TRANSPORT AND METROPOLITAN TRANSPORT First draft draft Moscow NP "OPZHT" STO OPZHT -2014 Preface Goals and principles of standardization in Russian Federation installed Federal law dated December 27, 2002 No. 184-FZ “On technical...”
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Doctor of Historical Sciences M. RAKHMATULLIN
The tsar's penchant for play and masks determined by the situation is noted by many contemporaries. In the early 30s, Nicholas I even made excuses to the world: “I know that I am considered an actor, but I am an honest person and I say what I think.” Perhaps this was sometimes the case. In any case, he acted in strict accordance with his guidelines. Reflecting on what he heard during the interrogations of the Decembrists, he said to his brother Mikhail: “The revolution is on the threshold of Russia, but I swear it will not penetrate it as long as the breath of life remains in me, while, by God’s grace, I will be emperor.”
"CLEARED THE FATHERLAND FROM THE CONSEQUENCES OF INFECTION"
Saint Petersburg. English Embankment - view from Vasilyevsky Island.
Spit of Vasilievsky Island - from the descent to the Neva on Palace Embankment. Watercolor by Benjamin Paterson. Beginning of the 19th century.
Nicholas I - All-Russian autocrat (1825-1855).
Literary lunch in the bookstore of A.F. Smirdin. A. P. Bryullov. Sketch of the title page for the almanac "Housewarming". The beginning of the 30s of the XIX century.
Science and life // Illustrations
Science and life // Illustrations
Science and life // Illustrations
No sooner had the wave of public upheaval calmed down after the cruel sentences against the Decembrists than new unrest swept through St. Petersburg and Moscow. The wives of the Decembrists began to leave for their husbands in Siberia. Among the first were M. N. Volkonskaya, A. G. Muravyova, A. V. Rose
Ball at Princess M. F. Baryatinskaya. The drawing was made by Prince G.G. Gagarin, a famous amateur artist in his time. 1834
Alexander Khristoforovich Benkendorf - head of the Third Department. 1839
Sergei Semenovich Uvarov - Minister of Education. 1836
Minister of Foreign Affairs Karl Vasilyevich Nesselrode. 30s of the XIX century.
Uniforms (colets) of privates of the Life Guards Horse Regiment (left), Life Guards Grenadier Regiment (right) and Life Guards Moscow Regiment. In this form, this form passed from Alexander I to Nicholas I.
It was under the impression of the day of December 14 and the circumstances that emerged during the interrogations of the Decembrists that Nicholas I was doomed to take on the role of the “strangler of revolutions.” His entire subsequent political line is a justification of the thesis proclaimed in the manifesto, published at the end of the trial of the Decembrists, that their trial “cleansed the fatherland of the consequences of the infection that had been lurking among it for so many years.” But in the depths of my soul, there is still no confidence that he has “purified”, and one of the first steps at the beginning of the reign of Nicholas I was the establishment (June 25, 1825) of the Corps of Gendarmes and the transformation of the Special Chancellery of the Ministry of Internal Affairs into the Third Department of its own chancellery. It was headed by the devoted A.H. Benckendorff. The goal is to protect the regime and prevent any attempts to change the autocratic system. The scope of activity of the newly formed secret police body covered almost all aspects of the country's life; nothing could pass by the watchful eye of the chief of gendarmes and the emperor himself, who, as he admitted, loved denunciations, but despised informers.
According to reports from the masses of “listening and eavesdropping” (A.I. Herzen), throughout the vast territory of the country, the head of the Third Department, with the blessing of the Tsar, “judged everything, overturned court decisions, intervened in everything.” As an observant contemporary wrote, “it was arbitrariness in all the broad meaning of this word... In general, if Russian society treated something with unanimous censure, then it was to the Third Department and all persons ... involved in it." Society began to disdain even simple acquaintance with those who wore a blue uniform.
The Censorship Statute of 1826, called “cast iron” by contemporaries, fits organically into the series of protective measures. The severity of its 230 (!) paragraphs, according to some censors, is such that “if you follow the letter of the charter, then you can interpret the “Our Father” in Jacobin dialect.” And there is no exaggeration here. Thus, when approving an ordinary cookbook for publication, the censor demanded that the compiler remove the words “free spirit,” although this spirit did not go further than the oven. Such absurd quibbles are countless, because the censors are afraid to make the slightest mistake.
The next step towards protecting society from the “harm of the revolutionary infection” was the appearance in August 1827 of a tsar’s rescript limiting the education of serf children. From now on, only parish schools remained for them, while access to gymnasiums and “places equal to them in teaching subjects” was now completely closed to peasant children. Don't become another Lomonosov! As the historian S. M. Solovyov wrote, Nicholas I “instinctively hated enlightenment, as raising people’s heads, giving them the opportunity to think and judge, while he was the embodiment: “Do not reason!” He remembered for the rest of his life how “at the very entrance When he came to the throne, he was greeted with hostility by people who belonged to the most enlightened and gifted."
With the revolutionary events of 1830 in European countries, and especially with the Polish uprising of 1830-1831, the seditious “infection”, which the Tsar swore not to allow into Russia, again approached its threshold. New preventive measures are being taken. At the behest of Nicholas I, a note “On some rules for the education of Russian young people and the prohibition of educating them abroad” is submitted to the State Council - a wild act from the point of view of respect for basic individual rights. And in February 1831, a resolution was adopted: under threat of deprivation of the opportunity to enter the public service, children from 10 to 18 years old should be trained only in Russia. “Exceptions will depend solely on me for one of the most important reasons,” Nikolai warns.
Meanwhile, the tsar is constantly drilled by the thought of the harmful influence of Polish society on the Russian army stationed in Poland - the stronghold of the regime. And in December 1831 he sent a panicked letter to the commander of the troops in Poland, Field Marshal I.F. Paskevich: “Our youth, between their temptation and the poison of free thoughts, is definitely in a dangerous situation; I beg you, for God’s sake, look at what is happening and don’t whether the infection is being accepted among us. This observation now consists of both yours and all the commanders' very first, important, sacred duty. You must preserve a loyal army to Russia; in a long stay, the memory of former enmity may soon disappear and be replaced by a feeling of condolences, then doubts and, finally, the desire to imitate. God save us from this! But, I repeat, I see extreme danger in this."
For such concerns there is specific reason. During the uprising, the Poles received many secret documents that belonged to Grand Duke Konstantin, who fled Warsaw in a hurry, and his adviser N.N. Novosiltsev. Among them is the so-called “State Charter” - a draft constitution for Russia. The Poles published it in French and Russian, and it was sold in all bookstores in the city when the Russian army entered Warsaw. “The printing of this paper is extremely unpleasant,” Nicholas I writes to Paskevich. “Of 100 people, 90 of our young officers will read, not understand or despise, but 10 will be remembered, discussed, and most importantly, will not be forgotten. This worries me most of all. For this reason, I wish it was less possible to keep the guard in Warsaw... Commanders should be ordered to pay the most vigilant attention to the judgments of the officers.”
This is what turned out to be the enthusiasm expressed in society about the fact that with “the new reign there was something new in the air, which Baba Yaga would call the Russian spirit,” that “the turn of Russian life to its own origins began.” This notorious “Russian spirit” gradually acquired the character of an ideological curtain, increasingly separating Russia from Europe.
TWO WORLDS: RUSSIA AND EUROPEThe reign of Nicholas I, writes the famous historian late XIX- the beginning of the twentieth century A.E. Presnyakov, - the golden age of Russian nationalism." And there is every reason for this, because in the Nikolaev era "Russia and Europe were consciously opposed to each other, as two different cultural and historical worlds, fundamentally different in their foundations political, religious, national life and character." The investigation was not slow to appear. In the early 30s, the so-called theory of "official nationality" was presented to society. Its creation is traditionally associated with the name of the Minister of Public Education S.S. Uvarov, the author of the famous triad - "Orthodoxy, autocracy, nationality", which was supposed to become the "last anchor of salvation" from the "revolutionary infection". It is on these concepts, Uvarov believed, that the education of the younger generation must be built, subordinating literature, art, science and education to them. Nikolai I accepted Uvarov’s idea with satisfaction and began to actively implement it.
You can be sure how much the autocrat liked the words of N. M. Karamzin, who sang in his work “On Ancient and New Russia” “the good old Russian autocracy”: “We are not England, for so many centuries we have seen the judge in the monarch and the good his will was recognized as the highest charter... In Russia, the sovereign is a living law: he pardons the good, executes the evil, and the love of the former is acquired by the fear of the latter... All powers are united in the Russian monarch, our rule is paternal, patriarchal.”
Nicholas I is sincerely convinced: autocracy, without which there is no true power, was given to him from above, and he does everything to preserve it. In order to slow down the “mental movement” in Russian society, the emperor first of all limits the possibility of Russians traveling to “foreign lands.” In April 1834, the period of stay abroad for Russian citizens was established: for nobles - five years, and for other classes - three years. A few years later, the fee for issuing foreign passports was significantly increased. Then, in 1844, an age limit was introduced - from now on, persons under 25 years of age could not travel abroad. The sovereign took this last measure for a long time. Back in the fall of 1840, he had a remarkable conversation with Baron M. A. Korf, who had just returned from a trip abroad:
How many of our youth have you met in foreign lands?
Extremely few, sir, almost no one.
Still too much. And what should they learn there?
The motive of dissatisfaction with the fact that “there is still too much” is terrible in its frankness - to separate the nation from the pan-European culture. “What should they learn there?” the king asked deliberately. “Our imperfection is in many ways better than their perfection.” But this is just a cover. In fact, Nicholas I was afraid of reintroducing into the country that “revolutionary spirit” that inspired “villains and madmen” who had become infected “in foreign lands with new theories” with the dream of a revolution in Russia. Again and again, Nicholas faces the shadow of the events of December 14, 1825. That is why every time “when the matter of foreign holidays was discussed,” people close to the emperor noted that he was “in a bad mood.”
And again news of the revolutionary events of 1848 in Europe comes to St. Petersburg. The information so stunned the sovereign that he furiously attacked the Empress’s valet F.B. Grimm for daring to read Goethe’s Faust to her at that moment: “Goethe! This vile philosophy of yours, your vile Goethe, who does not believe in anything - this is the reason for Germany’s misfortunes! ... These are your domestic heads - Schiller, Goethe and similar scoundrels who prepared the present mess.”
The emperor’s anger is understandable; he fears such a “commotion” in Russia. And in vain. The overwhelming majority of the population of the Russian Empire reacted to the events in Europe with absolute indifference. And yet, in April 1848, the tsar gave instructions to establish “silent supervision over the actions of our censorship” - the main barrier to the penetration of revolutionary sedition into the country. At first, double supervision - before and after printing - is established over one periodical, but then it is extended to all book publishing. Here are the lines from the tsar’s parting words to the specially created secret committee chaired by D.P. Buturlin: “As I myself have no time to read all the works of our literature, you will do it for me and report to me about your comments, and then my business will deal with guilty."
Censor A.V. Nikitenko, distinguished by his share of liberalism, writes at that time in his “Diary”: “Barbarism triumphs in a wild victory over the human mind.” Russia is entering a seven-year period of gloomy reaction.
The matter is not limited to censorship. From May 1849 for everyone Russian universities a “set of students” is established - no more than 300 people each. The result is impressive: in 1853, out of a population of 50 million, there were only 2,900 students, that is, almost as many as in the University of Leipzig alone. The new university charter, adopted even earlier (in 1835), introduced “the order of military service... rank of rank” at universities and sharply limited the autonomy of universities.
When in May 1850, Prince P. A. Shirinsky-Shikhmatov, who was reputed to be a “limited man, a saint, an obscurantist,” was appointed Minister of Public Education, this caused displeasure even among “the most well-intentioned people.” The wits immediately changed the name of the new minister to Shakhmatov and said that with his appointment, the ministry and education in general “were given not only check, but also checkmate.” What prompted the king to choose such an odious person in the eyes of society? It was a note submitted by Shikhmatov to the highest name, on the need to transform teaching at universities in such a way that “from now on, all the provisions and conclusions of science will be based not on speculation, but on religious truths, in connection with theology.” And now, in universities, lecturing on philosophy and state law is prohibited, and the teaching of logic and psychology is entrusted to professors of theology...
To avoid “mental fermentation” in society, progressively oriented magazines are being closed one after another: “Literary Newspaper” by A. A. Delvig, “Moscow Telegraph” by N. A. Polevoy, “European” by P. V. Kireevsky, “Telescope” by N. I. Nadezhdin (after the publication of “Philosophical Letter” by P. Ya. Chaadaev). There is no talk of opening new publications. Thus, to the petition of the “Westernizer” T. N. Granovsky for permission to publish the journal “Moscow Review” in the summer of 1844, Nicholas I answered briefly and clearly: “It’s enough without something new.”
During his reign, Nicholas I destroys the religious tolerance achieved with such difficulty by his predecessors on the throne, and organizes unprecedented persecution of the Uniate and schismatics. A police state was being built.
"EVERYTHING SHOULD GO GRADUALLY..."IN historical literature It is widely believed that during the 30-year reign of Nicholas I, the peasant question remained at the center of his attention. In this case, they usually refer to nine secret committees on peasant affairs created at the will of the autocrat. However, the strictly secret private examination of the most pressing issue for the country obviously could not and did not produce any positive results. At first, hopes were still pinned on the first secret committee, later called the Committee of December 6, 1826. Its members are important statesmen: from the moderate liberal M. M. Speransky to the ardent reactionary P. A. Tolstoy and unyielding, die-hard conservatives - D. N. Bludov, D. V. Dashkov, I. I. Dibich, A. N. Golitsyna, I. V. Vasilchikova. The committee was headed by the Chairman of the State Council, V.P. Kochubey, who was ready to please the tsar in everything.
The goal of this synclite was high: to study a considerable number of projects found in the office of the late Alexander I to change the internal structure of the state and determine what “is good now, what cannot be left and what can be replaced with.” It is curious, but the guide for the members of the Committee, on the direct orders of Nicholas I, was supposed to be the “Code of Testimonies of Members of a Malicious Society about internal state state", compiled by the ruler of affairs Investigative Committee over the Decembrists A.D. Borovkov. The code reflected the main criticism of the existing system by the Decembrists: the preservation of serfdom, which was destructive for Russia, the lawlessness happening in the courts and other public places, widespread theft, bribery, chaos in the administration, legislation, and so on, so on.
The legend, launched by V.P. Kochubey and then developed by the historian N.K. Schilder, has been living in literature for a long time that the Code became almost an everyday guide to the actions of the emperor. “The Emperor,” Kochubey said to Borovkov, “often looks through your curious collection and draws a lot of useful information from it; and I often resort to it.” The result of the activities of the Committee of 1826 is known: it quietly “died” in 1832, without carrying out a single project. In fact, the committee ceased its activities at the end of 1830 - then, against the background of alarming events in Poland, it “suddenly” became clear that Russia and its new emperor did not need reforms at all.
By the way, his elder brother, who was liberal at first, did not want to seriously solve the peasant question. “Alexander,” notes A. I. Herzen, “has been thinking about the liberation plan for twenty-five years, Nicholas has been preparing for seventeen years, and what did they come up with in half a century - the ridiculous decree of April 2, 1842 on the obligated peasants.” “Ridiculous” primarily because the decree, eliminating the “harmful principle” of Alexander’s law of 1803 on free cultivators, read: “All land, without exception, belongs to the landowner; this is a holy thing, and no one can touch it.” What kind of reforms are there! But it is “ridiculous” for another reason: its implementation is left to the will of those landowners who themselves wish it... During the reign of Nicholas I, another stillborn decree appeared (dated November 8, 1847), according to which peasants were sold with auctions of estates could theoretically buy them back and thus become free, but due to their extreme poverty they could not really do this.
Therefore, we can only talk about the indirect influence of such measures on preparing public opinion for the decision peasant question. Nicholas I himself was guided in this matter by the postulate that he clearly formulated on March 30, 1842 at general meeting State Council: “There is no doubt that serfdom, in its current situation with us, is an evil, tangible and obvious to everyone, but touching it now would be an even more disastrous thing.” He only advocated “preparing the way for a gradual transition to a different order of things... everything must go gradually and cannot and should not be done at once or suddenly.”
The motive, as we see, is old, originating from his grandmother, who also limited herself to condemning “universal slavery” and also advocated gradualism. But Catherine II had every reason to fear her dignitaries in order to take real steps to eliminate slavery. It is hardly legitimate to seriously explain the position of Nicholas I at the time of his greatest power by the same “powerlessness in the face of the serfdom beliefs of the highest dignitaries” (as if things were different under Alexander II).
So what's the big deal then? Did Tsar Nicholas lack political will and ordinary determination? And this while A.H. Benckendorff never tired of warning his patron that “serfdom is a powder magazine under the state”? Nevertheless, the sovereign continued to repeat his message: “Giving personal freedom to a people who are accustomed to long-term slavery is dangerous.” Receiving deputies of the St. Petersburg nobility in March 1848, he stated: “Some people have attributed to me the most absurd and reckless thoughts and intentions on this subject. I reject them with indignation... all the land, without exception, belongs to the noble landowner. This is a holy thing, and no one can touch her." Nikolai Pavlovich, notes Grand Duchess Olga Nikolaevna in her memoirs, “despite all his power and fearlessness, he was afraid of the changes” that could occur as a result of the liberation of the peasants. According to many historians, Nicholas became furious at the mere thought “that the public would not perceive the abolition of slavery as a concession to the rebels” with whom he dealt with at the beginning of his reign.
LAWS OF THE RUSSIAN STATEBut here is an area of activity that, perhaps, Nikolai was successful in. It’s the third decade of the 19th century, and in Russia the code of laws adopted under Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, the Council Code of 1649, is still in force. Nicholas I correctly saw the main reason for the failure of previous attempts to create normative civil and criminal legislation (most likely, from the voice of M. M. Speransky) in the fact that “they always turned to the creation of new laws, whereas it was necessary first to base the old ones on new principles” . Therefore, Nikolai writes, “I ordered to first completely collect and put in order those that already existed, and took the matter itself, due to its importance, under my direct leadership.”
True, here too the autocrat does not go all the way. Of the three inextricably linked stages of the codification of laws outlined by M. M. Speransky, who actually headed the work, Nicholas I left two: to identify all laws published before 1825 after the Code of 1649, arranging them in chronological order, and then on this basis to publish the “Code current laws" without introducing any significant "corrections and additions". (Speransky proposed to carry out a genuine codification of legislation - to create a new Code developing the law, weeding out all outdated norms that do not correspond to the spirit of the times, replacing them with others.)
The compilation of the Complete Collection of Laws (CCL) was completed by May 1828, and the printing of all 45 volumes (with appendices and indexes - 48 books) was completed in April 1830. The grandiose work, rightly called “monumental” by Nicholas I, included 31 thousand legislative acts. The circulation of PSZ was 6 thousand copies.
And by 1832, the “Code of Laws” of 15 volumes was prepared, which became the current legal standard of the Russian Empire. When compiling it, all ineffective norms were excluded from it, contradictions were removed and quite a lot of editorial work was carried out. Thus, in the first half of the 19th century, a system developed Russian law(in its main part it functioned until the collapse of the empire in 1917). The work on the Code was constantly supervised by Nicholas I, and the necessary semantic additions to the laws were made only with the highest sanction.
The code was sent to everyone government agencies and from January 1, 1835, they were guided only by him. It seemed that now the rule of law would prevail in the country. But it only seemed so. Colonel Friedrich Gagern, who visited Russia in 1839 as part of the retinue of Prince A. of Orange, writes about the almost universal “corruption of justice”, that “without money and influence you will not find justice for yourself.” One of the memoirists of that time described a typical incident from the life of the 40s. The Mogilev governor Gamaley was told that his order could not be carried out, and they referred to the corresponding article of the law, then he sat down on that “Code of Laws” and, poking his finger in his chest, growled menacingly: “Here is the law for you!”
Another important event in the life of the country was the construction and opening of the St. Petersburg - Moscow railway in 1851. And in this we should pay tribute to the will of the emperor. He decisively suppressed the obvious and hidden opposition of many influential persons, among them ministers E.F. Kankrin and P.D. Kiselev. Nicholas I correctly assessed the importance of the road for the economic development of the country and fully supported its construction. (True, as knowledgeable contemporaries testify, with the funds spent during construction it would have been possible to build a road all the way to the Black Sea.)
Russia needed further rapid development of the railway network, but the matter ran up against the stubborn reluctance of Nicholas I to attract private capital to this - joint stock. All sectors of the economy, he believed, should be in the hands of the state. And yet, in the fall of 1851, there was a royal order to begin construction of a railway connecting St. Petersburg with Warsaw. This time the sovereign proceeded from security considerations. “In the event of a sudden war,” he said, “with the current general network of railways in Europe, Warsaw, and from there our entire West, could be flooded with enemy troops before ours manage to reach from St. Petersburg to Luga.” (How greatly the king made a mistake in determining the location of the invasion of enemy troops!)
As for the state of the Russian economy as a whole and its individual sectors, they developed according to their own laws and achieved certain successes. The emperor, who did not have sufficient economic knowledge and experience, did not particularly interfere in the economic management of the state. According to P. D. Kiselev, when discussing a particular issue, Nicholas I honestly admitted: “I don’t know this, and how can I know with my poor education? At the age of 18 I entered the service and since then - goodbye, learning! I passionately love military service and devoted to her soul and body. Since I have been in my current position... I have read very little... If I know anything, I owe it to these conversations with smart and knowledgeable people." He is convinced that it is precisely such conversations, and not reading books “the best and most necessary enlightenment” is a controversial thesis, to say the least.
And how “well-versed” the sovereign was in economic issues is shown by the fact that, when approaching, for example, financial issues, he considered it sufficient to be guided by a purely philistine idea: “I am not a financier, but common sense tells me that the best financial system is thrift.” , this is the system I will follow." What this led to is known: after the death of Nicholas I, the state was saddled with huge debts. If E.F. Kankrin, who took over the ministry in 1823, succeeded in the most difficult internal and external conditions maintain a balanced budget until he left office due to illness - in 1844 - then under the mediocre F.P. Vronchenko who replaced him (in fact, he was only a secretary under the emperor), the very next year the deficit amounted to 14.5 million rubles, and five years later - 83 million. In response to the concerns of the Chairman of the State Council and the Committee of Ministers, I.V. Vasilchikov, Nicholas I was sincerely perplexed: “Where does the prince come from with the eternal thought about the difficult situation of our finances,” saying that it is “not his business, but the emperor’s” to judge this. It is noteworthy that the Minister of Education S.S. Uvarov and the Minister of Justice V.N. Panin remembered him in the role of “chief financier” for the fact that he “constantly cut the budgets of their ministries to the minimum.”
PRIEST OF AUTOCRAWYNicholas I is firmly convinced: the state is omnipotent! It is this that is capable and should express the interests of society - all that is needed is a powerful centralized management apparatus. Hence the exceptional position in the system of government bodies occupied by the personal office of the monarch with its five branches. They, historians note, “have crushed under themselves and replaced with themselves the entire executive structure of power in the country.” The essence of the relationship between society and the autocrat is best defined by the resolution of Nicholas I on one of A. S. Menshikov’s notes: “I doubt that any of my subjects would dare to act in a direction other than that indicated by me, since my exact will is prescribed to him.” These words accurately express the general tendency towards the militarization of the state apparatus, starting from the very top, from the Committee of Ministers.
In the early 40s, out of thirteen ministers, only three had civilian ranks, and Nicholas I tolerated them only because he did not find an equivalent replacement for them among the military. At the end of his reign, out of 53 provinces, 41 were headed by the military. The Emperor likes people accustomed to strict subordination, people for whom the worst thing is to even inadvertently violate army discipline. “After the accession of Nicholas,” wrote S. M. Solovyov, “a military man, like a stick, accustomed not to reason, but to execute and capable of teaching others to perform without reasoning, was considered the best, most capable commander everywhere; experience in business is for this "no attention was paid. The Fruntoviks sat in all government places, and ignorance, arbitrariness, robbery, and all kinds of disorder reigned with them."
The expansion of military education also corresponded to the general militarization: under Nicholas, eleven new ones were opened educational institutions Three military academies were founded for the children of nobles - cadet corps. And all from the belief that a disciplined army is an example of an ideally organized society. “Here there is order, strict unconditional legality, no know-it-all and no contradiction, everything follows from one another,” Nicholas I admired. “I look at human life only as a service, since everyone serves” (it is important to note that “knowing everything” meant independence of thought or activity).
Hence the unprecedented passion of the ruler of a huge empire for determining the cut and color of uniforms, the shape and colorfulness of shakos and helmets, epaulettes, aiguillettes... During the almost daily reports of P. A. Kleinmichel (in 1837-1855 - chairman of the Special Committee for compiling a description forms of clothing and weapons) they spent hours happily discussing all this wisdom. Such amusements (there is no other way to call them) are endless. For example, the autocrat himself chose the colors of horses for cavalry units (in each of them, horses must have only one color). To achieve “uniformity and beauty of the front,” Nicholas I personally distributed recruits to regiments: in Preobrazhensky - with “solid faces, purely Russian type”, in Semenovsky - “beautiful”, in Izmailovsky - “swarthy”, in Pavlovsky - “snub-nosed”, what suited the “Pavlovian hat”, in Lithuanian - “pockmarked”, etc.
Immersed in such absurd trifles, the emperor saw in his ministers not statesmen, but servants in the role of tailors, painters (with the Minister of War A.I. Chernyshev, the tsar decides what color to paint the soldiers’ beds), couriers or, at best, secretaries . It couldn’t have been any other way, because in the minds of the “All-Russian corps commander” a persistent idea had formed: smart idea can only come from him, and all others only obey his will. He could not understand that the movement of true life should not come from top to bottom, but from bottom to top. Hence his desire to regulate everything, to prescribe for immediate execution. This, in turn, determined his passion for surrounding himself with obedient and uninitiative performers. Here is just one of many examples that perfectly confirm what has been said. When visiting a military school, he was introduced to a student with outstanding inclinations, capable of foreseeing the development of events based on an analysis of heterogeneous facts. According to normal logic, the emperor should be glad to have such a servant of the fatherland. But no: “I don’t need those, without him there is someone to think and do this, I need these!” And he points to “a burly fellow, a huge piece of meat, without any life or thought on his face and the last in success.”
The diplomatic representative of the Bavarian kingdom in Russia, Otto de Bray, who carefully observed the life of the court, notes that all state dignitaries are only “executors” of the will of Nicholas I, from them he “willingly accepted advice when he asked for them.” “Being close to such a monarch,” the memoirist concludes, “is tantamount to the need to renounce, to a certain extent, one’s own personality, one’s self... Accordingly, in the highest dignitaries... one can only observe varying degrees of obedience and helpfulness.” .
“There are no great people in Russia, because there are no independent characters,” the Marquis de Custine bitterly noted. Such servility fully corresponded to the royal conviction: “Where they no longer command, but allow reasoning instead of obedience, discipline no longer exists.” A similar view followed from Karamzin’s thesis: ministers, since they are needed, “should be the sole secretaries of the sovereign on various matters.” Here, the side of autocracy condemned by Alexander I (when he was a liberal) was especially clearly manifested: the tsar’s commands follow “more on occasion than on general state considerations” and, as a rule, have “no connection with each other, no unity of intentions, no constancy in action."
Moreover, Nicholas I considered government by personal will to be the direct duty of the autocrat. And it did not matter whether the cases were of national importance or related to a private individual. In any case, decisions on them depended on the personal discretion and mood of the sovereign, who could sometimes be guided by the letter of the law, but more often still by his personal opinion: “The best theory of law is good morality.” However, in public, the monarch liked to declare his adherence to the laws. When, for example, when personally addressing the sovereign, the petitioners said that “one word of yours is enough, and this matter will be decided in my favor,” Nicholas usually replied: “It is true that one word of mine can do everything. But there are such cases, which I do not want to decide arbitrarily."
In fact, he reserved the right to decide any matter, delving into the smallest details of day-to-day management. And he was not joking at all when he recognized himself and the heir to the throne as the only honest people in Russia: “It seems to me that in all of Russia only you and I do not steal.”
(The ending follows.)