"Anatomy of a Post-Communist Mafia State: The Case of Hungary." B.Magyar - Black bread and the white race - LiveJournal. Post-communist mafia state

B. Magyar, 2016
P. Borisov, trans. from Hungarian, 2016
LLC "New Literary Review", 2016

Target ideological clichés: Motherland, family, labor society

The most important ideological blocks of legitimation of power are grouped around the concepts of “God, homeland, family,” the function and method of use of which, however, show that the regime is not governed by ideology, that is, not by these principles. When critics characterize the ideological underpinnings of the Orbán regime in terms of nationalism, religion, or the conservative cult of the family, they are trying to interpret the regime within the traditional understanding of these categories. Meanwhile, this traditional understanding has nothing to do with the real nature of the mafia state.

Nationalism, anti-Semitism, racism

The nationalism of the 19th century, having given birth to political nations, led to the establishment of intra-national equality, which served as the basis for the fight against the aspirations of other nations. However, the nationalism of the mafia state is not directed against other nations, but at the exclusion from one's own nation of all those who do not belong to the adopted political family, are not part of the vassalage system, or are among the opponents of the regime. Those who do not belong to the Godfather's "household" must suffer the full consequences of this. In this understanding, a nation is nothing more than an adopted political family and its appendages, from the Head of the family down to the servants, that is, to those who are engaged in public works. To cover up their selfishness, the Hungarian adopted political family creates a national collectivist ideology under the sign of a false promise of establishing justice. The beneficiaries of the central force field easily decipher this language: a nation is nothing more than a euphemistic name for an adopted political family. In the end, they cannot say that they are simply “rowing for themselves.” At the same time, they know that if the Godfather refers to the interests of the nation, then he is talking about them, about the adopted political family. The Nation is sinless because it is identical with the Family, and those who gained access to it simultaneously received forgiveness, remission of sins and protection. Under the previous regime, he could have been an informer, a communist apparatchik or a criminal, but all this is forgiven if he is loyal to his adopted political family. The protection provided by the patron strengthens unity, and expulsion from the family is a threat. In the case of critical speech against the regime, there are no personal merits that could protect the disobedient from the destructive, criminalizing or stigmatizing power of the organs or media of the mafia state.

However, the leaders of Fidesz are not anti-Semites, their target is not a “Jew”, it’s just that for them anti-Semites also belong to the target political audience that needs to be conquered. And in connection with the banks, the problem is also not that they allegedly belong to “Jews,” but that they are not controlled by the leaders of Fidesz. In the same way, the leaders of Fidesz are not racists, but racist sentiments are observed in the audience, which needs to be attracted to the Fidesz camp, attracted consciously, pragmatically, without emotion. Concessions are made to this audience that cannot be justified from a moral point of view. In a coded anti-Semitic, but quite unambiguous context, the following can be interpreted: the language of “Fidesz”, with the help of which political opponents are stigmatized as “not our” people, “destroyers of the nation”, “government of bankers”; historical and literary figures favored by the party, such as the ruler of Hungary between the two world wars, Miklós Horthy, and anti-Semitic writers Albert Vasz, József Nyrö and Cecil Tormai; as well as symbolic gestures, such as the inclusion of the works of the mentioned writers in the National Basic Curriculum, the reburial of the remains of József Nyrö in Transylvania, the renaming and naming of public places, the awarding of state bonuses persons of right-wing radical beliefs and their appointment to leadership positions in cultural institutions. Fidesz has a utilitarian and cynical attitude towards anti-Semitism and racism, since it needs an audience of potential supporters infected by them.

A natural consequence of the ideological pyramid with the goal of attracting right-wing radical voters is the legitimation and expanded reproduction of anti-Semitic and racist sentiments and statements, and the expansion of the circle of supporters of racism and anti-Semitism. (In this, the policy of the present regime differs from the policy of István Bethlen, now accepted as a model, after the First World War, since Bethlen only insufficiently decisively and effectively opposed mass anti-Semitic sentiments and movements, but did not bring them into the political arena.) With the institutionalization and strengthening of the legal radicalism (just remember the radical right-wing Jobbik party and its first victory in a single-member constituency in the mid-term parliamentary elections in the spring of 2015), the former bipolar political space was replaced by a tripolar one, in which the party embodying the central force field, as Fidesz calls itself ” in her political communication, dances a “peacock dance” between two “extremes”, the radical left and right, while resenting the fact that the former question her commitment to democracy, and the latter her commitment to the principle of nationality. At the same time, Fidesz observes with irony the fruitless struggle of two “radical” forces, focusing their attention on each other. In turn, the “peacock dance” is a genre that is not governed by ideology: it contains dance steps that a convinced anti-Semite or racist would never perform, and there are steps that a convinced democrat would never perform. But the essence of this dance is precisely that it has not an ideological, but a purely political, tactical goal.

Those to whom the regime cannot provide any tangible benefits at least get the opportunity to envy the “Jew” and despise the “Gypsy.” These feelings connect them with the members of the Family, with its nation. Moreover, the concept of “nation” receives different meanings on at different levels hierarchy of the adoptive family: in the highest spheres of the political family it means an ideologeme that legitimizes its “national domination”; for serving nobles and court suppliers - adoption, “national powers” for activities; and for those who do not receive their share of benefits, it is a “national drug.”

Any critical intellectual can turn into a Jew alien to the nation, any poor person who innocently finds himself in a difficult situation can turn into a gypsy and become the subject of violent attacks by an anti-Semitic and racist crowd. The competitive struggle between Fidesz and right-wing radical forces for anti-Semitic and racist voters, the circle of which, incidentally, is expanding under the influence of this struggle, creates a dangerous situation, destroying barriers to the propaganda of hatred. Although the mafia state, of course, does not introduce racist laws (as a result of which parallels with fascism or Nazism are unfounded), its policies, which deliberately generate certain associations, only establish a culture of lynching as a method of defusing social tensions. Often, ambiguous police behavior only exacerbates the vulnerability of stigmatized groups in the face of anti-Semitic, racist aggression.

A similar function can be performed by refugees, only a few of whom chose Hungary as their final destination before 2014. The wary attitude towards refugees characteristic of large sections of the population is whipped up to the level of fear, and even hatred, by massive government propaganda that tries to divert attention from the reasons for the government's loss of popularity through stigmatizing, hate-inciting actions. What emerged from the ruins of the collapsed North African and Middle Eastern dictatorships was not democracy, but mainly chaos, poverty and violence. And Europe has not yet found a political and economic solution to the problem of the growing flow of refugees that poured into Hungary as a transit country in the spring of 2015. Orbán sensed the tension created by the fears of citizens and the impotence of the EU authorities, and in the spring of 2015, as part of a “national consultation”, he sent out a budgeted list of questions to all adult Hungarian citizens, serving as a textbook example of government incitement and instilling in people the idea that there was a “connection” between terrorism, the refugee problem and unemployment. The dramaturgy of this suggestion is as follows: the government begins the list of issues with terrorism intimidation, then links this topic to the EU's feckless migration policy, and as a next step mentions the fact that more and more illegal immigrants are crossing the Hungarian border, putting “jobs and livelihoods” at risk. existence of Hungarians,” therefore, according to the government, it is necessary to oppose the “accommodating policy of Brussels”, and illegal immigrants “need to be taken into custody” and “turned back”, but while “selfish immigrants are in Hungary, they themselves must cover the costs of its content." Finally, the last question should, with cynical populism, point to the solution to the dilemma facing Hungarians: “Do you agree with the Hungarian government that instead of helping immigrants, they should help Hungarian families and newborn children?”

Despite the government's populist campaign, according to a survey by the TÁRKI public opinion research institute, “the xenophobia rate recorded in July 2015 is again at the level of 2014 (which was lower than the level recorded before the start of the campaign), that is, high, but not grew under the influence of a national consultation, a poster campaign and an influx of migrants from Serbia, which was covered in detail in the media. But the share of respondents who believe that the issue of granting asylum or refusing it should be thought through more thoroughly has increased, and the share of xenophiles has decreased by half. Compared to previous years, the proportion of those in favor of a more thoughtful solution who oppose accepting potential asylum seekers has decreased, but still three-quarters (76%) of this group of respondents still oppose accepting Arabs. The degree of xenophobia is above average (39%) in those areas and among those people where and for whom the presence of refugees is most visible/burdensome, as well as among those who consider refugees to be suitable targets for expressing prejudice against foreigners. This includes residents of the Southern Great Plain (53%), sympathizers of the Jobbik party (54%), people in a poor financial situation (43%), people living from day to day (43%) or struggling to live on their income (40). %). The terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels led to an increase in xenophobia, as government propaganda has since deliberately identified refugees and immigrants with terrorists. The government, with the help of its entire arsenal of communication tools, persistently keeps the issue of migration on the agenda simply because the popularity of its measures in this area far exceeds the rating of Fidesz, while in other respects it systematically lags behind it. In the spring of 2016, under the influence of active government propaganda, the negative attitude of the population towards refugees and immigrants reached its climax: 78% of respondents “did not want migrants to live next door to them.” Increased xenophobia “absorbed such reserves of hatred that, compared with previous years, it even led to a slight reduction in hostility towards Gypsies, Jews, Romanians, Swabians and Chinese.”

However, if the “outsiders” are solvent businessmen or crime lords, then the political family, breaking the state monopoly on citizenship, creates private businesses for its front men, giving them the opportunity to make abundant profits from the trade in passports valid in the EU. 29 thousand of the 250 thousand euros that one “settlement bond” costs, giving the right to Hungarian citizenship and a passport, go to these shell companies as commissions, which by February 2015 brought them an income of 65 million Euro. In January 2015 minimum size The contribution was increased to 300 thousand euros, on top of which it is necessary to pay intermediary firms 40-60 thousand euros for “administration”. “The law passed in 2013 stipulates that these bonds can only be registered with the Public Debt Management Center by intermediary firms selected by the parliamentary commission on the economy, now headed by Antal Rogan (Fidesz), and foreign investors will receive valuable securities issued by these firms." Six of the seven companies selected by the parliamentary commission turned out to be offshore. It should be emphasized that in this case the government (like a criminal organization) is ceding to private offshore firms a huge income due to the state. “Investors coming from outside the European Union and purchasing government securities issued specifically for this purpose with a five-year maturity with a nominal value of at least 300 thousand euros will receive a residence permit within six months. However, intermediary firms transfer to the state only 271 thousand out of 300 thousand paid by foreigners, and keep the rest for themselves. After five years, the foreigner will receive back 300 thousand euros, approximately 29 thousand of which are paid from taxpayers' money. In addition, intermediary firms receive an administration fee of 40-60 thousand euros. According to our calculations, since 2013, when this program was introduced, intermediary firms registered in the Cayman Islands, Malta, Cyprus, Liechtenstein and Singapore have pocketed at least 74, and taking into account the higher price for services - 95 billion forints." The government’s position that “Hungary does not need economic immigrants”210 seems particularly sanctimonious in light of the fact that in 2014 Western countries there were at least 300 thousand Hungarians who went there in search of work. “According to the national accounts of the CSO, last year their labor income earned abroad reached 920 billion forints, which is 43 billion more than the level of 2013 and 236 billion more than the level of 2012.”

Inciting fear under the pretext of a “terrorist threat” from “migrants” not only serves to unite the “nation,” that is, the beneficiaries and victims of government policies, but also gives rise to the restriction of civil rights: the introduction of a special legal order, the adoption of emergency measures. The Paris attack created an emotional atmosphere that allowed the government, citing a “terrorist threat,” to try to limit civil rights and freedoms with a law granting emergency powers to the government. According to one of the most significant Hungarian human rights organizations TASZ, “according to this bill, the government, on the one hand, will receive the authority to use the army within the country in peacetime to carry out tasks to ensure internal order and national security. On the other hand, it will be endowed with special powers that will allow it not only to give instructions to government agencies, but also to restrict civil rights and freedoms. Through decrees it will be able to restrict freedom of trade, seize enterprises of individuals and legal entities and limit the proprietary rights of these persons, control Internet communications and postal movement of letters and parcels, suspend postal and electronic information services, limit and control the use of telecommunications and computer networks and equipment, confiscate premises, studios, broadcast transmitters, equipment and buildings belonging to radio, television and other media, prohibit demonstrations, impose curfews and compulsory attendance before official bodies, limit or prohibit travel and stay in certain places, as well as road, rail, water and air traffic, prohibit the entry of foreigners, as well as intercourse and contacts with foreign persons, organizations and institutions, evict the population. The restrictions include not only some rights and freedoms enshrined in the Basic Law of Hungary, but also the freedom of movement of persons, goods, services and capital in the EU, which is fundamental principle this organization." In 2016, the ruling parties, having lost their constitutional majority, no longer had the opportunity to independently change the constitution and were forced to enter into negotiations with opposition parties. (The results of these negotiations are not yet known.)

As the latest move in the ideological pyramid, Orbán elevated to the rank of government policy one of the long-standing demands of the radical right, which was supported last year by Prime Minister Janos Lazar, the head of the cabinet, declaring that “the introduction of the death penalty must be kept on the agenda in Hungary , and we also need to make it clear that we will stop at nothing.” However, Orbán is, of course, aware that compared to the decades before the death penalty was banned in 1990, the number of murders has now fallen significantly. As we also know, the demand for the restoration of the death penalty contradicts our international obligations and is therefore hardly feasible. But this does not interest him, he is simply trying to exploit common instinctive-emotional reactions, and even if he fails, he will still bring ideological profits in the campaign against the EU.

Religion

No less pragmatic is the commitment to faith and religiosity of the adopted political family. Its function, firstly, is to transfer the legitimation of power from a democratic foundation, when power can be demanded to account for its actions, to the sphere of absolute authority and to present the activities of the Godfather as the result of Divine providence. Secondly, it becomes possible to ritualize all social problems using a language that cannot be involved in the space of discussion. Thirdly, with the help of religion, Fidesz’s power takes root in regions that are difficult to reach for politics and social groups. Finally, fourthly, religion serves as a means of ideological indoctrination in the field of education. The connection between the church and the authorities is of a secular, business nature.

So Orban turned from a young atheist into a Reformed believer, who no longer finds it difficult, if necessary, to take part in a Catholic procession of the cross. No matter how difficult he was in the hope of profitable business make a nod to the Azerbaijani autocratic leader and release the Muslim who killed the Christian Armenian. An ideologically unmotivated policy is also evidenced by the fact that Orban, despite the court decision and the ruling of the Constitutional Court, deprived of its former status the church that baptized his two first-born sons, since its head criticizes his policies. A case reminiscent of the story of Thomas Becket. The presence of value priority is obvious, only it is of an imperious, and not a Christian nature.

© B. Magyar, 2016

© P. Borisov, per. from Hungarian, 2016

© New Literary Review LLC, 2016

Words of gratitude

This book is a consolidated, expanded and updated version of my introductory articles to the collections Magyar polip – A posztkommunista maffia?llam 1. ?s 2. (Hungarian polyp - post-communist mafia state 1–2) (Noran Libro, 2013 and 2014). Marton Kozak provided indispensable assistance in its creation. I would also like to thank Mihaly Andor, Attila Ara-Kovács, László Bekesi, István Csillág, András Görgy Deák, Csaba Gombar, Pál Juhász, Miklós Karpaty, Julia Kiraly, János Kornai, Balázs Kremer, Tamás Lattman, László Lendel, Adam C. Nagy, Ivan Pető, Eszter Radai, Ákoš Róna-Tasz, Károly Attila Šooš, Ivan Szelenyi, Eva Várhedy and Imre Vörös for their critical comments.

1. What regime do we live under?

It is impossible to determine a personal, much less political, attitude towards the nameless regime. If we are not capable of conceptual understanding of our reality, then we become captives of someone else’s reality. After all, as Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow write in their book « Higher Purpose » , « There is no concept of reality that does not depend on the picture of the world, or on theory. Instead, we will adopt a point of view that we will call model-dependent realism…» 1
Hawking S., Mlodinov L. Higher Design. St. Petersburg: Amphora, 2013. P. 49.

Below they add: “There is no model-independent reality check. Consequently, a well-constructed model creates its own reality. (…) Model-dependent realism applies not only to scientific models, but also to the conscious and subconscious mental models that we all create to interpret and understand everyday life.” 2
Right there. pp. 194, 53.

If this is the case in nature, then this is even more true in relation to human society. The meaning of what is being studied is given by the cognitive mechanisms of our consciousness. Without the appropriate linguistic and conceptual framework, we will turn into passive extras in a reality constructed by someone else’s language, imposed on us, and denying our values. Creating a language based on our own value system is the first and inevitable step towards our gaining self-identity and freedom.

This is an elementary prerequisite for ensuring that an individual or society is not forced to drift into a reality that is alien to it, uninterpretable, constructed using a language dictated by others.

During the change in social system that accompanied the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe at the turn of 1989–1990, the formula for change seemed clear: a transition had been made from one-party dictatorship, which was characterized by a state monopoly on property, to a multi-party parliamentary democracy based on private property and a market economy. This model, exemplified by Western democracies, is called liberal democracy, regardless of whether we are talking about the presidential or parliamentary form, because the essence of both of these forms is such institutional guarantees as the separation of powers, the turnover of government and the norms of good political life. competition in the political sphere, as well as the predominance of private property, transparency of economic competition and security of property in the economic sphere.

If the system of norms liberal democracies damaged, then in the case of a well-functioning democracy, these damages are more or less successfully healed with the help of mechanisms of institutional control and separation of powers. In this case, such “deviations from the norm” do not reach a critical mass that threatens the entire system as a whole. However, if these deviations from the normal functioning of liberal democracy are not only widespread, but also embody the main values and goals of the government, then these dominant characteristics form a new system. Of course, many try to characterize it through some kind of metaphor or analogy, because new phenomena need to be identified, and for this already known examples are used. Therefore, some see the prototype of the Orbán regime in the southern European autocratic-corporatist regimes of the 20s and 30s, such as, for example, Portuguese, Spanish and Italian, or in the Horthy regime in Hungary, which is largely related to them. For others, the phenomena observed in Hungary after 2010 are reminiscent of pseudo-dictatorships and real dictatorships in Latin American countries or softened versions of communist regimes. However, the effectiveness of such historical analogies is very limited; they can give an idea of the nature of a particular phenomenon of the regime being studied, but are not able to describe the regime as a whole.

1.1. Post-communist mafia state

Currently Hungary is post-communist mafia state. In this expression, the epithet “post-communist” indicates the circumstances and initial prerequisites for the emergence of this state, that is, the fact that this regime, although belated, nevertheless arose as a result of the decomposition of a one-party dictatorship, accompanied by a monopoly of state property. The epithet “mafia” determines the nature of the functioning of the state. The processes that began during the first Fidesz government from 1998 to 2002 and have fully developed since 2010 are most akin to what is happening in most states in the territory former USSR, in Putin's Russia, in Azerbaijan or the former Soviet Central Asian republics, although the trajectory of political evolution of these states since regime change has been different. Therefore, in the case of Hungary we are not simply talking about distorted, reduced democracy or its deficit, because in this case it would still be democracy, albeit limited. However, the regime, which can be characterized as a mafia state, does not fit into the traditional framework of interpretation describing the relationship between democracy and dictatorship. In addition, it does not fit into the corruption ratings of countries around the world, which, as a rule, are compiled by international organizations, because when they are compiled, it is usually assumed that we are talking about different degrees of the same quality, which is measured by the prevalence of a certain homogeneous phenomenon. Meanwhile, the modern Hungarian political system represents a completely different quality, and the mentioned ratings only distract attention from its essence. This new quality can only be described by clearly identifying system specificity, within a new type of explanatory framework.

The explanatory model of the post-communist mafia state seeks to cover the entire system as a whole, not limiting itself to individual phenomena that could occur in other regimes, but in other respects, in essence, these historical prototypes are very different from the emerging mafia state. His main characteristic is the underlying logic of power expansion and enrichment, in which the simultaneous increase in political power and property of the adopted political family is carried out by state means, using a monopoly on violence in an atmosphere of mafia culture elevated to the rank of state policy.

1.2. Evolutionary types of corruption

When everyday corruption private interests are realized in an illegitimate way, through decisions on state and municipal distribution of funds, orders, concessions and powers. Thus, illegal transactions are concluded between economic players separated from each other and government officials and officials at various levels. Everyday corruption is a series of discrete phenomena: a decision-maker receives or asks for money or other benefits in exchange for a solution to a case favorable to the corrupt party. A regime is considered corrupt if there are many such cases or if the problems of citizens and business issues can be solved mainly with the help of bribes . In the years following the regime change, citizens could hardly say that the officials of a changing Hungary were incorruptible. Thanks to political connections, it was possible to obtain property, non-repayable loans, and a variety of advantages, but no matter how often cases of corruption occurred, they did not add up to a system-forming force. Of course, if in order to receive an order it is necessary to “grease up” the clerks, then this poisons the life of society, but, remaining within the framework of a personal transaction between the briber and the bribed, it does not undermine the foundations of the democratic system, does not yet affect the essence of the regime, since it is absolutely clear that speech It is about a violation of generally accepted, legitimate norms of behavior. (Corruption related to party funding, which is not uncommon even in established democracies, and corruption among officials are equally considered deviance.) In addition to protective and punitive measures on the part of the state, anti-corruption services are used to combat such deviance, through the whistleblowing activities of the press and Other methods try to reveal manifestations of corruption and transfer them from the secret sphere to the public, assuming that as a result of exposure the culprit will suffer a worthy punishment.

Under the socialist system, before regime change corruption was not a system-forming element, but a typical accompanying phenomenon of the system. Within the framework of a planned economy, three economies coexisted:

Based on state ownership "first economy" , which as a result of nationalization in the late 40s. had a decisive role in the country's economy.

? "Second Economy" , formed by the variety of forms of private enterprise associated with the public sector, filled the market cracks of the general shortage generated by the central planning system in small trade, in the service sector and in family farms in agricultural cooperatives, the so-called household plots.

A term "third economy" One could characterize many trade “loopholes” in the field of high-demand goods, which arose against the backdrop of an economy of general shortages and functioned in the mode of corrupt transactions. The most varied forms of corruption and mutual corruption almost uniformly permeated the entire society, from watchmen to officials and party secretaries. Under the state monopoly of the economy of scarcity, at almost all points of economic ties, someone had goods, services, or decision-making competences offered for sale, for which one could receive tips, “grease,” or corruption rent. Household Hungarian names, such as greasing, simultaneously indicated that if the mechanism is not greased, then the entire system of planning directives will be paralyzed. The nature of mutual favors, which oscillated between legal and illegal, required for the functioning of the regime, made this tangle of corrupt transactions morally permissible. After all, this system operated on the principle of pseudo-equality, since in an economy based on the monopoly of state property, the possibility of illegitimate enrichment senior managers were also very limited, while hundreds of thousands of people at the lower levels of the system could collect “rent” thanks to the mini-monopolies they had.

However, with regime change created unprecedented inequality not only in material terms, but also in terms of positions that open up opportunities for corruption. After the economy of scarcity ceased to exist in relations between private market players, the space of corruption moved into the economic channel of relations between the state-municipal and private sectors. But in this exchange trade, the customers were increasingly no longer the small consumers of the Kadara regime, but a circle of wealthy entrepreneurs from small tenants of municipal retail premises to big tycoons ordering the legal regulation they needed. As part of the everyday corruption that developed after the regime change,

Firstly, the circle of those who are corrupt has narrowed, corruption has lost its nationwide character and affected mainly employees of the public administration and the political class in in a broad sense this concept;

Secondly, the structure of decision-making subject to corruption has changed: instead of advantages associated with everyday consumption, state support has come to the fore, providing advantages in the competition for enrichment, for example, in privatization, obtaining state and municipal orders, successful participation in tenders, changing the status of real estate, issuing official permits;

Thirdly, the profit received from individual corrupt decisions has increased significantly: now for a certain bribe one could get not just a white porcelain toilet from under the counter, but an entire toilet production plant along with its chain of stores, and even through a government loan ;

Fourth, the roles in corrupt transactions were clearly divided: it was no longer possible to say that “everyone” is corrupt and corrupt in the wide social space generated by scarcity; the initiators of corruption deals from the economic and civil spheres themselves approached government officials with proposals.

TO anomalies in the field of party financing and the corruption infestation of this area resulted from erroneous assumptions and inaccurate perceptions. Based on Western models during the process of regime change, the belief arose that membership fees and legal donations will provide parties with significant income. Although it was obvious that the party regimes operating after the change, even in aggregate, would not be able to reach the record number of members of the former communist party, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP), numbering 800 thousand people, as well as the amount of mandatory membership fees paid by them, no one I thought that even at the peak of 1990-1991. the total number of members of the new parties will reach only a tenth of this record figure. Subsequently, the actual number of party members continuously declined. Moreover, due to the reduction in public activity between election campaigns, the deterioration of the financial situation of citizens, the growth of unemployment and inflation, it was necessary to limit oneself to only symbolic membership fees, since otherwise those who could not contribute them would be excluded from the parties, and the organizational and the communication damage would significantly exceed the profit from the forced collection of membership fees. The decline in membership in new parties was inevitably accompanied by a reduction in the amount of membership fees, resulting in difficulties in maintaining even a minimal organizational infrastructure.

At the same time, the annual budget system of state financing of parties did not take into account the real needs election campaigns Since 1994, the share of growing campaign expenses covered by the state budget has been insignificant. At first, the amount of party spending on the election campaign was not limited. It was only in 1996 that the limit of 1 million forints per candidate, which was in force until 2013, was established. It became problematic not only because it did not change in accordance with the then double-digit inflation, but also because the costs associated in one way or another with the election campaign went beyond both the legally established time frame of the campaign and the events directly related to it . All this together led to an escalation in the costs of running the company and the inability to control these costs. In addition, the State Accounting Chamber had the right to control only the election expenses declared by parties, that is, the ability to verify the correctness of the summation of individual expenditure items.

As a result of the insufficient official party funding, the all-Hungarian parties, trying to support their activities only through membership fees and state subsidies, were doomed to ineffectiveness in advance, although the mayor's office of a small town had more employees than the all-Hungarian apparatus of the largest parties involved in the regime change. The need for additional sources of funds and the practical lack of control over unofficial, non-budgetary financing led to the “blurring” of the budget barrier of party management. The limit or incentive for attracting material resources became the real and expected political influence, as well as the assertiveness of the parties, but in reality - only their ability to self-restraint.

The parties' expected income from membership fees and budget subsidies did not cover expenses beyond the scope of ensuring their basic functions. In addition to opaque income, which could be guessed based on the huge costs of elections, significant loans became part of the financing system. When receiving loans, the party leadership expected in advance that it would be able to repay the debt through the sale of real estate, which was received, as a rule, for free, or on preferential terms, or through the capital of connections formed when taking over positions of power. While selfless support for parties based on political sympathies gradually disappeared, party debt grew, and corruption associated with party financing inevitably expanded. The center of gravity of income received outside of government subsidies has not just shifted from membership fees to other income coming from the economic sphere. In these receipts, direct economic interest and a calculation for reciprocal services that went beyond the limits of possible political sympathies were more and more clearly observed.

Now the initiative had become two-sided, not only economic actors were looking for connections with members of the new political class, but also vice versa. This mutual assistance was provided in wide space oscillating between legal and illegal. Such connections carried not only the prospect of party management by circumventing the laws, but also the possibility of personal corruption of members of the political class.

The danger of intertwining interests increased where resources from the center did not reach. Since the election campaigns of members of local municipalities and burgomasters also required significant expenses, anomalies of party financing from the center penetrated into all corners of the country. In addition, when funds were used locally, the circle of potential party sponsors coincided even more directly with the circle of persons receiving benefits on the basis of reciprocity. Although the spread of corruption has largely led to a loss of confidence in the political elite, its routine functioning still hasn't turned into system functioning , which mainly determines political goals. Rather, this corruption produced a loosely centrally controlled world in which positions of power provided chaotic autonomy and internal competition often flared up. Parties, with the exception of the Union of Young Democrats (Fidesz), did not create their own profitable business, but only seized rent, pumped money out of economic enterprises. True, they did this extremely systematically.

Appearance organized criminal underground, mafia , means a qualitative change compared to the world of everyday, “freely competitive” corruption. Now organized criminal groups are trying to methodically establish their influence over the bearers of state power. If they succeed, then we can say that the organized criminal underground has found approaches to the higher, political sphere of state power and is trying to influence not just individual decisions in the field of distribution of funds and access to them, but also the regulatory mechanism itself, legislation. In such cases, it is very difficult to draw a clear line between legitimate lobbying and pressure exerted by the organized criminal underground through bribery and blackmail. Unlike everyday corruption, the activities of this underground are based not simply on the voluntary consent of the parties, on the mutual provision of illegal advantages. It seeks to force his will to be carried out with the help of threats and violence: blackmails, collects protection fee, is trying to establish control over business sectors promising large profits. Trying to monopolize certain areas of illegal economic activity, it operates in a market that is segmented both territorially and sectorally, that is, it is not able to extend its influence to the entire economy or the entire country. The fact that the division of markets is achieved through war-interrupted agreements between mafia families, which sometimes take the institutional form of a council of family heads, does not abolish the hierarchical nature of intra-family, intra-clan relations. (In overseas, updated forms of the mafia, that is, the organized criminal underground, the “collective” functions inherent in traditional forms are gradually being eliminated.)

The mafia no longer just creates economic opportunities for illegal profits through bribes, but also imposes tribute, forcing them to pay for “protection protection.” It incentivizes government officials with bribes, and forces economic actors to pay for protection. A classic example of this is the Sicilian mafia, whose polyp-shaped tentacles wrap around the world of politics from below. The organized criminal underground is already a dangerous, difficult to eliminate phenomenon, but it changes the attitudes characteristic of the rule of law state only if its representatives gain access to political power. Even with the presence, and in considerable numbers, of corrupt officials and politicians, an unshakable belief may remain that the state is fighting the mafia. In other words, individuals may stumble, but state institutions are fighting against criminal groups of the organized criminal underground. In such cases, the situation is even more clear: the methods of the organized criminal underground, the mafia, do not serve in the eyes of the political bearers of state power as a model for systematic imitation. However, if the infiltration goes beyond a certain border for a long time and some responsible politicians find themselves recruited by the economic mafia, that is, not taking on a public political role, then the state is captured, or in English - state capture . In such cases it may be accepted whole line laws, legal norms and decisions for the implementation of illegitimate private interests.

Balint Magyar

Anatomy of a post-communist mafia state using the example of Hungary

Words of gratitude

This book is a consolidated, expanded and updated version of my introductory articles to the collections Magyar polip – A posztkommunista maffiaállam 1. és 2. (Hungarian polyp - post-communist mafia state 1–2) (Noran Libro, 2013 and 2014). Marton Kozak provided indispensable assistance in its creation. I would also like to thank Mihaly Andor, Attila Ara-Kovács, László Bekesi, István Csillág, András Görgy Deák, Csaba Gombar, Pál Juhász, Miklós Karpaty, Julia Kiraly, János Kornai, Balázs Kremer, Tamás Lattman, László Lendel, Adam C. Nagy, Ivan Pető, Eszter Radai, Ákoš Róna-Tasz, Károly Attila Šooš, Ivan Szelenyi, Eva Várhedy and Imre Vörös for their critical comments.

1. What regime do we live under?

It is impossible to determine a personal, much less political, attitude towards the nameless regime. If we are not capable of conceptual understanding of our reality, then we become captives of someone else’s reality. After all, as Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow write in their book « Higher Purpose » , « There is no concept of reality that does not depend on the picture of the world, or on theory. Instead, we will adopt a point of view that we will call model-dependent realism..." Below they add: “There is no model-independent reality check. Consequently, a well-constructed model creates its own reality. (…) Model-dependent realism applies not only to scientific models, but also to the conscious and subconscious mental models that we all create to interpret and understand the everyday.”

During the change in social order that accompanied the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe at the turn of 1989–1990, the formula for change seemed clear: a transition had been made from one-party dictatorship, which was characterized by a state monopoly on property, to a multi-party parliamentary democracy based on private property and a market economy. This model, exemplified by Western democracies, is called liberal democracy, regardless of whether we are talking about the presidential or parliamentary form, because the essence of both of these forms is such institutional guarantees as the separation of powers, the turnover of government and the norms of good political life. competition in the political sphere, as well as the predominance of private property, transparency of economic competition and security of property in the economic sphere.

If the system of norms liberal democracies damaged, then in the case of a well-functioning democracy, these damages are more or less successfully healed through the mechanisms of institutional control and separation of powers. In this case, such “deviations from the norm” do not reach a critical mass that threatens the entire system as a whole. However, if these deviations from the normal functioning of liberal democracy are not only widespread, but also embody the main values and goals of the government, then these dominant characteristics form a new system. Of course, many try to characterize it through some kind of metaphor or analogy, because new phenomena need to be identified, and for this already known examples are used. Therefore, some see the prototype of the Orbán regime in the southern European autocratic-corporatist regimes of the 20s and 30s, such as, for example, Portuguese, Spanish and Italian, or in the Horthy regime in Hungary, which is largely related to them. For others, the phenomena observed in Hungary after 2010 are reminiscent of pseudo-dictatorships and real dictatorships in Latin American countries or softened versions of communist regimes. However, the effectiveness of such historical analogies is very limited; they can give an idea of the nature of a particular phenomenon of the regime being studied, but are not able to describe the regime as a whole.

1.1. Post-communist mafia state

Currently Hungary is post-communist mafia state. In this expression, the epithet “post-communist” indicates the circumstances and initial prerequisites for the emergence of this state, that is, the fact that this regime, although belated, nevertheless arose as a result of the decomposition of a one-party dictatorship, accompanied by a monopoly of state property. The epithet “mafia” determines the nature of the functioning of the state. The processes that began during the first Fidesz government from 1998 to 2002 and have fully developed since 2010 are most akin to what is happening in most states in the former USSR, in Putin’s Russia, in Azerbaijan or former Soviet Central Asian republics, although the trajectory of the political evolution of these states since regime change has been different. Therefore, in the case of Hungary we are not simply talking about distorted, reduced democracy or its deficit, because in this case it would still be democracy, albeit limited. However, the regime, which can be characterized as a mafia state, does not fit into the traditional framework of interpretation describing the relationship between democracy and dictatorship. In addition, it does not fit into the corruption ratings of countries around the world, which, as a rule, are compiled by international organizations, because when they are compiled, it is usually assumed that we are talking about different degrees of the same quality, which is measured by the prevalence of a certain homogeneous phenomenon. Meanwhile, the modern Hungarian political system represents a completely different quality, and the mentioned ratings only distract attention from its essence. This new quality can only be described by clearly identifying system specificity, within a new type of explanatory framework.

The explanatory model of the post-communist mafia state seeks to cover the entire system as a whole, not limiting itself to individual phenomena that could occur in other regimes, but in other respects, in essence, these historical prototypes are very different from the emerging mafia state. Its main characteristic is the underlying logic of power expansion and enrichment, in which the simultaneous increase in political power and property of the adopted political family is carried out by state means, using a monopoly on violence in an atmosphere of mafia culture elevated to the rank of state policy.

1.2. Evolutionary types of corruption

“I learned that when you have a chance to destroy your opponent, you don’t think about it, you do it.” Viktor Orban, then not yet prime minister (for the second time), but the leader of the Hungarian opposition, spoke so openly in 2007, speaking at one of the meetings. Vladimir Putin and many other authoritarian leaders who have shown an inclination towards just such a policy would most likely subscribe to these words. Its result is the omnipotence of these leaders themselves and the creation in the countries they rule of what the Hungarian political scientist and former politician Balint Magyar calls a “mafia state.”

Balint Magyar's book "Anatomy of a Post-Communist Mafia State" caused a lot of noise in Hungary: few people opposed the current authorities of the country with such extensive and scientifically substantiated accusations. The list of violations of Viktor Orbán and his supporters against the written laws and unwritten rules of democracy, presented to him by his opponents, is extensive. This is the reshaping of the Hungarian constitution and laws to suit the needs of the ruling Fidesz party, the provision of lucrative contracts for government orders to businessmen “related” to the government, the persecution of opposition and independent media and “unfriendly” NGOs, the actual subordination judicial system ruling party, flirting with Russian, Turkish and other authoritarian regimes, etc. However, Balint Magyar sees in all these actions a system aimed at creating a state model that would perpetuate the power of the current prime minister and his political clan.

Anatomy of a Post-Communist Mafia State has been translated into several languages. The Russian edition, published by the publishing house NLO, was presented by the author this week in Moscow and Yekaterinburg. In an interview Radio Liberty explains what a “mafia state” is, why it arose in Hungary and Russia, and what it promises for both countries.

– Let's start with the definition. You describe in your book the phenomenon of a “post-communist mafia state.” What are its main features?

Cover of the Russian edition of Balint Magyar's book "Anatomy of a Post-Communist Mafia State"

– It is generally accepted that after the collapse of communist regimes, the transition to democracy began in the former Soviet bloc. Of course, the situation is different in different countries. Countries that fall into the orbit of the European Union theoretically have a greater chance of becoming Western-style democracies. The further you go to the east, the fewer prerequisites for successful transformation, and political systems have more and more authoritarian features. In some cases, which I write about, we need to recognize the bitter reality: the current government is not a transitional stage between communist authoritarianism and democracy, but new type authoritarianism, which is not going to go anywhere and transform into anything democratic. Thus, the regime that was established in Hungary after 2010 (return to power after the election victory of the Fidesz party led by Viktor Orban; his first reign dates back to 1998 - 2002 - RS), differs in specific features. The concentration of political power and wealth in the hands of the ruling clan occurs simultaneously, these processes go hand in hand. These regimes are not ideologically motivated; their “trademark” is precisely the concentration of power and wealth. Another feature of this regime is the displacement of the former political and business elite.

– Who is displacing them and how?

The concentration of political power and wealth in the hands of the ruling clan occurs simultaneously

- This is very important question: who is important actor? This is not the ruling party, in our case Fidesz. She went through her transformation: at first it was an ordinary Political Party transition period, later - a strictly centralized party, and then it turned into a vassal party. This means that the party establishes a patron-client relationship between the party leader and its leadership and between this leadership and the rest of the party. But that's not all. After 2010, there is a shift in the center of decision-making from formal institutions to informal ones. It is not the ruling party that makes decisions, not the government, not parliament...

– ...And the leader’s “inner circle”?

– Somewhere like that, but I call it differently, because the situation here is different than it was with the “inner circle” of Stalin or other communist leaders. In the communist Politburo there were also different people and at times there was a sharp internal struggle. But regardless of this, in order to have any real power, one had to be a member of the Politburo, that is, be part of some formal institution. Now there arises what I called "Polypburo" , remembering the popular 80s series “Octopus” about the Italian mafia: in Hungarian “octopus” is poplip. “Polipburo” is an informal group that has formed around Big Boss. There are people in it who do not have a formal status and do not hold government or party positions. These are “just citizens”, on whom, however, a lot depends. This determines the entire structure of the mafia state, which is a system of “patron-client” relations. Collectively, they form something of a clan or, as I call it, an “adopted political family.” This is a kind of huge patriarchal family, although its members are not - or not always related - to each other by blood. This is our current ruling elite.

"Polipburo" is an informal group formed around Big Boss

Why do I call this system a “mafia state”? Because this is an illegitimate structure. If we take, for example, the monarchies in the Persian Gulf region, then there is also a clan structure of the elite. But there the nature of government and its legitimacy are closely linked, while in Hungary, Russia and other post-communist autocracies there is a gap between the two. The Saudi prince takes his place in the hierarchy thanks to his birth and the existing state-political tradition, everything is quite transparent here. In a mafia state, the bearer of legitimate political power is closely connected with the owners of illegitimate, informal influence, political and economic. Oligarchs in such a system cease to be entrepreneurs; they are bearers of visible economic influence and invisible political power. Here the relatively clear separation of political and economic sphere. There the relations between them are formalized, and here what is described by the term “power-property” arises. This means that in such a state there is no power without property and no property without power.

– But why Hungary? Speaking about Russia or some other countries of the former USSR, we can say that there were almost no parliamentary, democratic traditions there; you can also find a lot of arguments explaining why the current autocracies developed there. But Hungary is definitely a European country, a member of the EU... What happened?

– You are absolutely right: Hungary has become an exception in the European Union. This was not at all predetermined; a number of negative factors coincided here: the corruption of the liberal and socialist governments that preceded Orban’s return to power, the total loss of confidence in the Socialist Party after several scandals in the last decade, the collapse of the liberal parties, which began after 2008, the economic crisis. And, of course, disproportionate electoral system, according to which the winning party in the elections receives an additional “bonus” when distributing seats in parliament. As a result, after the elections in 2010, when the Fidesz party won 53% of the votes, it received 67% of the seats in parliament, and Orban and his supporters found themselves with unlimited political power. It is very important. In EU countries such as Romania or Bulgaria, politics also has clanism and mafia-type groups, but the competitiveness of the political system has been preserved there, and there has been no monopolization of power, as in Hungary, Russia and most post-Soviet countries. Let's return to what a mafia state is. The classic mafia is based on the power of the pater familias, the father of the family, or, in mafia parlance, the “godfather.” But within society, the mafia is forced to confront the institutions of the state - sometimes bribe, corrupt officials, police officers, judges, politicians, and sometimes fight them. In a mafia state, the mafia “takes prisoners” government agencies and puts the coercive functions inherent in the state at its service. As a result, the state begins to behave like a criminal group, acting in the interests of the ruling clan.

In a mafia state, the mafia “captures” state structures and puts the coercive functions inherent in the state at its service.

- Can we say that in Russia in the 90s, during the Yeltsin era, there was competition between oligarchic groups fighting for proximity to state power, but under Putin a “full-fledged” mafia state emerged?

– The history of the last 25 years in Russia and Hungary has been different, although the results were similar. I would describe Yeltsin's times as oligarchic anarchy: the struggle for power of various groups - despite the fact that the state as such remained weak. This can be described as a combination of several pyramidal systems, largely mafia-like and paternalistic in nature. Under Putin, a single pyramid of power was built - or a “vertical of power”, to use his own terminology. It was different here in Hungary. In the 90s, we formed, albeit imperfect, liberal democracy. It existed for 20 years, until after 2010 it was scrapped by the forces that created the mafia state. In Russia, this happened through the evolution of the previous oligarchic system. In countries Central Asia, let's say, mafia states grew almost directly from the previous communist system, which the new autocrats, who became presidents from first secretaries, “closed” on themselves. An example of a different kind is Ukraine. There, attempts to create a single pyramid of mafia power - the largest such attempt was made by Yanukovych - were unsuccessful, they were swept away by revolutionary uprisings. But the result so far has not been a transition to a somewhat normally functioning democratic system, but rather an unstable balance between oligarchic groups.

– The government of Viktor Orban announced a policy of “openness to the east” a couple of years ago, which includes rapprochement with Putin’s Russia. Is this a purely geopolitical maneuver or something more? Orban feels his political “twin” in Putin and seeks to enlist his support?

Viktor Orban and Vladimir Putin: two “autocratic brothers”?

– Autocrats tend to support each other a good relationship, if they have no direct reasons for rivalry. This can be, among other things, financially beneficial. There is no need to comply with the rules of transparency of transactions inherent in democratic societies. For example, a contract with Russia for the construction nuclear power plant in Hungary was concluded in the spirit of a “family business”, without a tender carried out according to all the rules. In general, the rules of the game here are simple: oligarchs, “close to the body,” enjoy all possible benefits, concentrating more and more economic and financial power in the hands of the ruling clan. In this sense, the policy of “openness to the east” is a path to the formation of an alliance beneficial for this clan, an opportunity to conclude new uncontrolled deals. And this, in turn, means everything greater concentration power, because in a mafia state there is no power without property.

– Be that as it may, the current regimes, both Hungarian and Russian, look quite stable. The majority of the population supports them - under the influence of the populist policies of the authorities, propaganda or for other reasons, is another question. What weaknesses do mafia states have? What can await them - an unexpected collapse, long-term stagnation - or even longer stability?

– Back in 2011, a year after the establishment of the current regime in Hungary, we had a discussion about whether this regime was capable of being stable. I then argued that yes, I am capable. Such regimes are not essentially ideological, but they cleverly use ideology to their advantage. For example, the Orban regime presents itself as national-patriotic. But his nationalism is not really directed against any other nations, but against those within the country who do not belong to the ruling clan, the “adopted political family,” as I call it, and even more so against its opponents. If we take the ideology of the Putin regime, it is a strange mixture of imperial thinking and nationalism. But all this also has its pragmatic basis. For example, in Europe, including in countries such as Hungary or the Czech Republic, the Kremlin is not limited to diplomacy or propaganda - it also involves “gas pipeline diplomacy” (or, in the case of Hungary, nuclear reactors), providing opportunities for mutual enrichment ruling clans on both sides. Well, populist ideology is needed by mafia states to ensure unity in society - between those who benefit from the existence of such a regime, and those who lose or remain with their own. This again is typical both for Hungary and for Russia and other post-Soviet countries. Those who benefit, who belong to the ruling clan or its servants, express their satisfaction with the help of ideological symbols. Those who remain strangers at this holiday receive a dose of ideological “anesthesia”: they are explained that they are part of a nation or a great state, heirs of certain traditions, etc. At the same time, it is very beneficial to find a common enemy - in Hungary, refugees were used in this role by the government, which launched a massive xenophobic campaign.

Those who remain strangers at this holiday receive a dose of ideological “anesthesia”: they are explained that they are part of a nation, or a great state, heirs of certain traditions

– But what about the weak points of the mafia state?

In 2010, the Hungarian right-wing Fidesz party received more than 66% of the votes in the parliamentary elections and became not just the party in power, but also formed a constitutional majority sufficient to change the constitution - which it immediately took advantage of. Main Law the country was completely redrawn - in order to strengthen the position of the new government, make the opportunities for enrichment of its most prominent representatives practically unlimited and, in the future, turn the whole of Hungary into a personal fief of the Fidesz party, its leader Viktor Orban and his so-called. "adopted political family."

Officially, Hungary remains a democratic republic that respects fundamental human rights, regularly holds elections, and cooperates with the institutions of the European Union. But behind the facade of a beautiful media picture lies a country in which oligarchs close to the ruler control everything, in which there is a lawless redistribution of property, and all those dissatisfied with this situation are either squeezed out abroad or are reduced to the level of the poor, envious and losers, whose opinions must be ignored . The author of the book, Hungarian politician and sociologist Balint Magyar, introduces a new definition to refer to this phenomenon: “post-communist mafia state.”

Post-communist - because it was a product of the decomposition of the 40-year socialist dictatorship, although the softest in the entire Department of Internal Affairs, but still irreparably spoiled the mentality of the population with an active civic position, which taught him to perceive phenomena such as nepotism, corruption, populism and sabotage as something acceptable for politics. Mafia - because the new Hungarian regime was an “organized criminal underground”: a fully legalized Family, the Godfather of which no longer acts by gangster methods, but by completely “legal” ones, such as prosecutorial checks or sudden changes in laws - but for the same gangster purposes of enrichment and complete elimination of economic and political competition.

Magyar admits that Fidesz came to power with such triumph because the previous governments, liberal and socialist, did not live up to the hopes of the nation: they were too stubbornly committed to outdated ideas, too meticulously observed certain rules arising from these ideas, and squabbled too fiercely between themselves - as a result, they mutually exhausted each other and were unable to resist the arrival of the “young predators”. Originating in the late 80s, a tiny party of “Young Democrats” (that’s how FIDESZ is abbreviated), students and graduate students of the Law Faculty of the University of Budapest - mostly from the provinces, living in the same dormitory and united by the holy idea of the need to unite ranks in opposition to “these urban” “these communists”, “these foreigners” by the end of the 90s turned into a fairly serious political force, which even managed to form a government for 4 years, in 1998-2002. Initially perceived as a liberal, modern movement of the Westernized type; small, but extremely disciplined and effective, regularly obstructing the work of parliament, actively using populist slogans of a social and nationalist orientation, Fidesz by 2010 was able to completely reformat the political landscape and ensure the collapse of the liberal “third Hungarian Republic.”

As a result, the current Hungarian regime was formed, headed by Viktor Orban’s “political foster family” - Godfather mafia state. His associates quickly become oligarchs - this is not just a provision of a “business plan”, but also a matter of principle and status. For example, when the eldest daughter of the Hungarian Prime Minister wanted to become the wife of a modest 27-year-old official, Orban immediately “threw him a piece”: he allowed him to “win” several rich tenders, which he did not even have to pay for, all losses were covered by preferential government loans . At the same time, the position of the oligarch does not provide any special guarantees: if the Godfather wants, he will be able to dispossess even the richest man in Hungary. This is evidenced by the conflict between Orban and Lajos Simicka - former dorm roommates and best friends, co-founders of the Fidesz party, who subsequently quarreled and are still fighting behind the scenes.

Those “fidesists” who do not reveal a business streak in themselves, but demonstrate sincere devotion to the Godfather, are also useful for the family business - they become figureheads on whom property that needs to be concealed from the audit authorities is registered, receiving some rent from it. Here, too, principle plays a role - for example, having become a ruler, Orban, regardless of any costs, became the sole owner of his native village of Felcsut - of course, in order to avoid official claims, property rights were transferred to other people, say, the former locksmith Lerinc Meszáros, after the victory Fidesz party instantly became one of the richest Hungarian oligarchs.

At the same time, the regime remains completely democratic (by the standards of the Russian Federation): there are no political assassinations, “landings” are relatively rare, even property is taken away, so to speak, delicately - first government emissaries come to the owner with an offer to sell the business at a price slightly higher than the market price, and only in case of refusal, the security forces are involved... An ordinary Hungarian may well not come into contact with the authorities and even feel some satisfaction from the fact that the regime is fighting against illegal migrants, gypsies, homosexuals and “godless communists”. To further strengthen the foundation of popular support, Orban adopts a number of populist decrees - for example, he freezes the growth of housing and communal services receipts, bans the operation of hypermarkets on Sundays (to protect the small shopkeeper), sabotages the EU directives on the resettlement of refugees... Against the backdrop of “pacification of the masses” they pass unnoticed such initiatives as the strangulation of local self-government, the transformation of the cultural and educational system into a mechanism of “fidesist” propaganda, the profanation of lawmaking in the form of issuing lexes, “special laws” with the help of which selective justice is carried out - or, on the contrary, issuing unlawful privileges and awards.

But all this requires money, and where to get it? Take money from the “family”? It's funny to even imagine. So there is a targeted ruin of disloyal businessmen, extortions from foreign companies, theft of funds from private pension funds and recalcitrant banks. However, these sources are also depleted over time: now all the Hungarian rich have either left the country or sworn allegiance to Orban; foreigners also left the market or bought a “safe-conduct” from the regime, and “nobody’s” money has already come to an end. Therefore, Orban and his SGP will have to either stop the attraction of unheard-of generosity, or try to earn money in more risky ways. Both are fraught with erosion of the regime. And if the “human factor” contributed to the rise of Fidesz, it will also contribute to its fall: the appetites of the oligarchs are growing, and the amount of money in the country is decreasing; Western allies are already seriously dissatisfied with Hungary and are applying sanctions against it, and you will not receive any special money or help from the “socially close” eastern governments (especially the Lyuba Orbans as partners Putin, Aliyev and the Turkmen dictator Berdymukhamed Gurbangulyev). What this will lead to is generally clear. Already in 2015, Fidesz lost its constitutional majority in parliament, and a year earlier admitted defeat in its attempt raider takeover the large private television channel RTL Klub, which fought off all attacks and turned into harsh opposition to the regime.

Balint Magyar did a difficult job - he collected, classified and commented in detail on the main criminal techniques used by the post-communist mafia state. They are, in principle, universal, and are used not only in Hungary, but also wherever one family disposes (disposed) of all national property: in the Russian Federation, in Azerbaijan, in Montenegro, or earlier - in Serbia, Macedonia, Croatia. Of course, this story is not identical to what is happening in the Russian Federation. But you can learn some lessons from it:

1) even the physical removal of the Godfather will not lead to the collapse of the regime - his place, perhaps, after some struggle, will be taken by the “heir” and everything will go further along the well-trodden track;
2) even a powerful economic crisis will not lead to an immediate fall of the regime, but only to its sluggish decomposition with many years of budget drying, price inflation and strengthening of the repressive apparatus - until the oligarchs launder and transfer most of their capital to a safe place;
3) until society has realized the collective responsibility for its future, such populist regimes will be reproduced again and again - and each time in an increasingly caricatured and sick form.

So, in order for the Russian Federation to turn into Russia, free, prosperous and respected in the world, it will not be enough for fighters for national liberation to execute Kuzhuget, Ramzanka and old man Kabaev; It is not enough to put the personnel behind bars; it is not enough to deprive everyone of voting rights last years I consciously voted for them. This is about 5% of the total amount of work that needs to be done, everything else is much more difficult.