Komsomol boat accident. The death of Komsomolets. Why did the Soviet nuclear submarine sank? Portable oxygen gas analyzer

The resolution to suspend the preliminary investigation, resumed on March 25, 1991 by the Main Military Prosecutor's Office, was adopted on January 26, 1998 and signed by the senior investigator for especially important cases under the Chief Military Prosecutor, Lieutenant Colonel of Justice G.V. Tselovalnikov.

The resolution is based on materials obtained over six years and ten months by the investigative group of Major of Justice G.V. Tselovalnikov, materials of the preliminary investigation of the Northern Fleet prosecutor's office, conducted from April 9, 1989 to May 22, 1990 by the investigative group of Major of Justice S.A. Lunev, and the materials of the Government Commission that conducted the investigation from April 7, 1989 to April 16, 1990.

Having examined the criminal case regarding the disaster of the Komsomolets nuclear submarine, the senior investigator for particularly important cases under the Chief Military Prosecutor, Lieutenant Colonel of Justice G.V. Tselovalnikov, established:

1. Fact of an emergency

On April 7, 1989, a fire broke out in the VII (aft) compartment of the nuclear submarine K-278 (“Komsomolets”), which was submerged in the open waters of the Norwegian Sea.

At 11.16 the emergency submarine surfaced.

The measures taken by the crew to eliminate the accident and keep the ship afloat were insufficient. At 17.08, the submarine lost longitudinal stability, capsized to the stern and sank.

Of the 69 crew members, including seconded persons, 42 people, tu. part commander captain 1st rank E. A. Vanin, senior assistant commander, deputy commander for political affairs and all commanders of combat units and divisions were killed.

2. Preliminary investigation in a criminal case

On April 9, 1989, a preliminary investigation was launched within the framework of a criminal case on the grounds of a crime under paragraph “c” of Art. 260! Criminal Code of the RSFSR, initiated by the military prosecutor of the Northern Fleet.

3. Government commission

On April 7, 1989, a Government Commission was appointed to review the circumstances of the accident and death of K-278, and under it, a working group of eight sections, which included representatives of the Navy and industry.

On April 16, 1990, the Government Commission completed its work. The final Act noted:

In terms of the level of combat training and technical condition, the K-278 with a crew of 604 met the requirements for ships of permanent readiness forces.

The 8th crew maintained strict statutory order and military discipline.

Possible reasons A fire in the VII compartment of a nuclear submarine is a fire of electrical equipment in the starting station of pumps of the steering hydraulics system or in the oil separation system due to misalignment of control and protection devices for these systems. This could have been facilitated by a possible increase in the oxygen content in the compartment atmosphere relative to the permissible level.

The personnel showed courage during the struggle for survivability, but in the current situation it was not possible to save the ship.

During the investigation of the causes and circumstances of the death of the nuclear submarine, it was established that it was equipped with certain types of serial equipment developed in the 1970s, which were not sufficiently reliable in terms of fire safety, standard fire extinguishing equipment was ineffective in conditions of high pressure in the compartments, as well as insufficiently advanced rescue equipment .

A large amount of flammable materials were used on the nuclear submarine; there were design flaws in the means of supporting the life support of personnel in emergency situation. The internal ship communication system turned out to be unreliable.

In the actions of the crew during the struggle for survivability, mistakes were made, especially in the use life-saving equipment.

The preliminary investigation established the following:

4. Design, construction and testing of K-278

The technical design of the submarine was approved by a joint decision of the Navy and SMEs.

The boat was laid down and built on the slipway of the Sevmashpredpriyatiya in Severodvinsk and launched in June 1983. Mooring tests and factory sea trials were carried out in June - December 1983.

State tests were carried out by the State Admissions Committee under the chairmanship of the authorized captain of the 1st rank B. G. Mokshanchikov.

Running factory and state tests were carried out by a commissioning team, the basis of which was the crew of captain 1st rank Yu. A. Zelensky.

On December 28, 1983, the acceptance certificate was signed, and the experimental deep-sea nuclear submarine K-278 was delivered to the Navy.

During the development of the project, as well as during the construction of the ship, technical solutions were introduced aimed at increasing its tactical and technical elements, reliability, service life of the main equipment, fire safety and unsinkability. The basis for these events were special resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers, joint decisions of the SMEs, the USSR Ministry of Defense Industry and the Navy.

5. Trial operation of a submarine

From August 1984 to June 1987, trial operation of the K-278 was carried out according to the program and schedule approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

According to the final act of the commission for trial operation, approved by the commander of the Northern Fleet, the program has been fully implemented.

In accordance with this decision, the further operation of the K-278 was to be carried out according to a special program aimed at improving the tactics of using deep-sea ships and the methods of using their weapons.

During construction and trial operation of K-278 without approval or notification design organizations MSP from 1982 to 1988. The Navy increased the size of the ship's crew from 42 to 64 people, which led to the complexity of placing personnel on board and the impossibility of ensuring the rescue of the entire crew using a pop-up rescue chamber (PSC), since its maximum the capacity was 57 people.

On August 13, 1988, the K-278 was accepted into service with the Navy and assigned the status of a combat submarine.

6. Formation and combat training of the main and second crews

The second crew of K-278 (604th crew, crew commander - captain 1st rank E. A. Vanin) was formed on August 27, 1984, three and a half years later than the main, first crew.

This circumstance excluded the participation of the second crew in the construction of the ship, factory mooring, sea and state tests. For the same reason, the 604th crew was unable to take part in the trial operation of the ship. The trial operation program did not provide for the transfer of the ship to the second crew to practice the tasks of the “Combat Training Course”.

Therefore, the training of E. A. Vanin’s crew with the transfer of the ship to practice course tasks could begin only after the completion of trial operation of the K-278 nuclear submarine.

Teachers from the Training Center were questioned as witnesses about the circumstances of crew training at the Navy Training Center, who confirmed the above-mentioned shortcomings and features of crew training.

Practical training of the crew in combating survivability at the formation was impossible due to the lack of training equipment, simulators and training grounds for combating survivability, and on the ship - due to the implementation of the program and schedule for trial operation by the first crew.

E. D. Chernov, at that time commander of the 1st nuclear submarine flotilla of the Northern Fleet (until August 1986), was questioned as a witness about the quality of combat training of the second K-278 crew in the initial period after its arrival at the place of permanent deployment:

“In October - December 1985, the second crew was ordered to work on the L-1 task without accepting the ship from the first crew. Such an order was unlawful and contradicted both the letter and logic of the “Nuclear Submarine Combat Training Course.” Having not had any training in the process of initial training practical training, the crew of the ship, which had not maintained a single day, was faced with the need to work out and pass the fundamental task L-1 (Organization of submarine service and preparation of submarines for voyage).

This flagrant violation of combat training methods was caused by a sudden demand from the Northern Fleet command to send a ship with its first crew to combat service one year earlier than planned. Having returned from vacation and having received a report from the chief of staff of the flotilla on the actions of the fleet command, I took measures that ultimately led to the return of the operation of the K-278 to the trial operation plan.

I was ordered not to count the L-1 task, “worked out” by the second crew in October - December 1985 without accepting the ship.”

V. A. Gregulev, head of the chemical service of the crew of E. A. Vanina, testifying as a witness, stated that in October 1985, their crew was tasked by the division command to work out and pass task L-1 in December of the same year:

“The ship was operated by the first crew at that time and was not handed over to us. Initially, our crew practiced the coastal elements of the L-1 task, and when K-278 was at the base, our full crew, under the guidance of the crew command, began practicing exercises in the evening (18 to 22 hours). I remember well that the command of the first crew was reluctant to provide our crew with the ship’s equipment. Captain 1st Rank O.A. Zelensky often set the condition: “Don’t go here... don’t touch this.” Of course, the fact that the ship was not handed over to our crew left a negative imprint on the quality of the work..."

Similar testimony regarding the combat training of the second crew in the initial period after its arrival at the place of permanent deployment was given by witnesses V.V. Gerashchenko, V.F. Slyusarenko, S.A. Dvorov - members of the second crew.

6.1. Combat training of the second crew after the end of trial operation of the nuclear submarine K-278

On March 14, 1987, the second crew took over the ship from the crew of Yu. A. Zelensky, who completed the trial operation of the ship with a three-month autonomous voyage. The crew of E. A. Vanin was given the task of accepting the K-278 nuclear submarine from the first crew, performing after-sea repairs of the submarine within two months and completing the L-1 task in full. 30 days were allotted for repairs, the rest of the time was spent on task L-1, which was being tested for the first time on the ship. almost two times less than prescribed by the KAPLT-75-VMF combat training course.

The first L-1 mission in the history of the second crew was accepted by the division commander and headquarters on May 13, 1987, from the first presentation with a “good” rating. For unknown reasons, emergency rescue service specialists did not participate in the acceptance of the task.

Working on the first full cycle of course problems ended on September 25, 1987. During this time, the crew sailed for the first 30 days.

The 604th (second) crew completed the second cycle of combat training in the period from December 1987 to March 1988, having sailed for 26 sailing days while performing course missions.

The nuclear submarine K-278 with 604 (second) crew captain 1st rank E. A. Vanin returned to base on March 15, 1988.

The ship was handed over to the first crew of Yu. A. Zelensky, who began preparations for the second campaign for combat service with full autonomy.

At the end of September 1988, the second crew accepted the K-278 from the crew of Yu. A. Zelensky.

6.2. Break in the voyage of the second crew

On the day the ship was accepted, the break in the voyage of the second crew was 6 months 11 days.

This circumstance required the division commander, Captain 1st Rank O. T. Shkiryatov, to allocate additional time to the crew of E. A. Vanin - at least 30 days - to carry out special combat training activities with the crew for:

Restoring lost ship control skills;

Development of service organization:

Combat coordination;

Acceptance in full of the first two tasks of the combat training course with a grade of at least “good”.

Only after this the second crew had the right to continue combat training in accordance with the annual plan and go to sea to prepare for combat service.

This was not done.

The division command, with the consent of the command of the 1st flotilla, limited itself to conducting control checks of the crew for one day on task L-1 at the base and three days on task L-2 at sea.

Going to sea in this case was illegal, since task L-1 was not completed in full. The actions of the division commander who allowed, and the flotilla commander who agreed to replace the training and acceptance problems L-I and L-2 control checks are illegal and are a violation of the requirements of Art. 16 of the “Combat Training Course”, which has the status of an order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

Thus, the skills of the 604th crew and the organization of service on the ship were not restored, and therefore, the process of their loss continued.

On November 16, 1988, the break from sailing was eight months. With such a break period, in accordance with Art. 16 of the “Combat Training Course”, the crew must be removed from among the line crew, and, accordingly, the crew had to complete the tasks of the “Course” within the time limits provided for the non-line crew.

However, this was not done either.

6.3. Testimony of witnesses O. A. Erofeev, V. K. Reshetov, O. T. Shkiryatov, B. G. Kolyada

O. A. Erofeev:

According to the former commander of the 1st flotilla of nuclear submarines of the Northern Fleet, Admiral O. A. Erofeev, the second crew was trained in accordance with the current “Combat Training Course”.

During interrogation as a witness, he stated: after the second crew serviced the equipment on the commissioned nuclear power plant K-278, which stood at the pier for five days, they completed a full course of combat training at the Training Center and worked on board the K-278 for One day of task L-1 at the base and task L-2 for three days at sea, he regained his skills in servicing the material part of the K-278, and also sufficiently worked out the organization of service on the ship.

O. A. Erofeev stated: “The second crew fully completed what was required according to the Combat Training Course, and this applies to all periods of crew training during my command of the formation.”

When asked whether he considers a violation of Art. 16 General provisions“Combat training course” failure to provide the second crew with additional time to practice tasks L-1 and L-2 due to a break in voyages of more than six months, the witness responded that it was impossible to violate the governing documents. However, in this case, he believes that the “Course” should be read in its entirety, and not “pulling out” individual articles, including taking into account the requirements of the “Course”, which give the initiative to formation commanders in assessing the readiness of the crew, as well as the training requirements of the first-line crew . In addition, it should be taken into account that the crew passed tasks L-1 and L-2 at the Naval Training Center in the summer of 1988.

When asked whether the “Naval Submarine VMF-8 Combat Training Course” contains an alternative to Art. 16 of the “Combat Training Course”, the witness replied that he did not know about this, but once again noted that, taking into account the requirements of Art. 1 of the “Course” commanders of formations are given the initiative in solving combat training tasks, taking into account Section V.

He also stated that the experts’ statement about the illegality of using control checks where the “Combat Training Course” requires accepting tasks L-1 and L-2 in full, is of a formal, unprincipled nature, since there is no significant difference between control checks and acceptance of tasks L -1 and L-2 were not present in these conditions...

He also believes that the formation commander could have designated the name of these control checks as the delivery of tasks L-1 and L-2, taking into account the worked out elements of these tasks at the Training Center.

From this testimony of the witness it follows that, in his opinion, practicing and passing tasks L-1 and L-2 can be replaced with control checks.

This statement is unfounded and untenable, since the initiative in the process of practicing the tasks of the “Combat Training Course” is given to commanders of any level to improve the quality of combat training, and not to reduce the requirements stipulated by the “Course”. The replacement of completing tasks in full with control checks is nothing more than a simplification and reduction in the quality of combat training - due to the fact that the full scope of the “Course” tasks practiced and accepted is many times greater than control checks. Wherein The training and acceptance of course tasks in full is carried out only on the ship.

V.K. Reshetov:

Regarding the combat training of the second crew, witness V.K. Reshetov, former chief of staff of the 1st flotilla, stated that there was a break in the voyage, but, in his opinion and conviction, the crew did not lose their skills in controlling the ship, systems and weapons, but on the contrary, he increased it from the moment he arrived from vacation (May 20, 1988). Further, at the Training Center, the second crew most sharply and actively began to restore its combat effectiveness. The witness believes that while the ship with the main crew of Yu. A. Zelensky was at sea, the most reasonable thing for the second crew at this time was to be at the Navy Training Center and work out the entire two-month (to the maximum) inter-cruise training program for all tasks of the “Combat Training Course” ", with passing tests and exams.

The second crew, having received, in general, a “good” rating for the tasks submitted at the Training Center, arrived at the flotilla base by the end of the fifth month of the break in the voyage. According to the entry in the combat training log and the graduation certificate of the Training Center, in the fifth month of the break from sailing, the crew had good practical and theoretical training in operating the ship.

From August 26 to September 25, 1988, the commander of the 6th division provided the 604th crew with time to practice the L-1 and coastal elements of the L-2 (30 days), which meets the requirements of the “Combat Training Course.” By the end of the crew’s six-month break from sailing, taking into account the above, he considered the division commander’s judgment that the crew had regained their lost skills to be legitimate. He also considered the decision of the division commander to conduct control checks to be legitimate. At the same time, the division commander pursued the goal of eliminating an eight-month break in the voyage of the second crew.

O. T. Shkiryatov:

Assessing the preparedness of the second crew, witness O. T. Shkiryatov, commander of the 6th division from July 1988 to 1989, explained that during the training of the crew, deviations from existing orders were indeed made. This happened due to the lack of time allotted to him, the division commander, to familiarize himself with the state of affairs in the division he had recently accepted.

Further, the witness confirmed that there was a break in the voyage of the second crew on K-278 for more than six months and that he did not provide the crew with the opportunity to work out and pass the tasks L-1 and L-2 of the Course. At the same time, the witness explained that due to a lack of time, the schedule for the actual implementation of activities by the 604th crew was violated and on December 6–7, the L-1 task was formally accepted by him.

This violation occurred due to a delay in the K-278’s exit from inter-cruise repairs, as well as due to a change in the timing of loading the battery onto the ship.

In conclusion, the witness stated that he considered the control he organized over the preparation of the crew for combat service to be insufficiently complete and deep.

B. G. Kolyada:

Witness B. G. Kolyada is the chief of staff of the division, and since July 1988 - deputy. The division commander, answering a question about the quality of preparedness of the second K-278 crew, stated that in 1988 the crew was planned for full combat training and inter-cruise training at the Training Center. A break from sailing was not planned. A break in the voyage of more than six months was caused by a delay in the transfer of K-278 from the first crew to the crew of E. A. Vanin. The witness does not remember why this happened, but it was because of her.

He admitted that in this case, he, as the chief of staff, should have reported this fact to the division commander O.T. Shkiryatov and proposed a change in the plan for further training of the second crew. But at this time, for some reason, he did not see the presence of a six-month break in the voyage of the second crew (preparing for their first trip to full autonomy), and therefore no replanning was made.

When asked whether he considered task L-1, accepted on December 6–7, 1988, to have been worked out in full, the witness replied that since there were no records in the logbooks of K-278 about the work of task L-1 by the second crew, he considered that this task was not fully developed and that the headquarters did not control the progress of its development.

When asked whether he considered the second crew to have confirmed their primacy within the deadline set by the division commander (December 1988), the witness replied:

“I believe that if the crew did not fully work out the L-1 task and it was formally accepted by the division headquarters, then in terms of the level of combat training the crew did not meet the requirements of Art. 46, Guidelines for preparation for combat service."

In this case, if task L-1 was worked out with violations of the methodology (working deadlines were not met), the division headquarters did not have the right to accept this task. Accordingly, one cannot talk about the linearity of the crew (i.e., consider the crew to be the first-line crew).”

O. A. Erofeev:

Witness O. A. Erofeev, answering the question during interrogation about how the progress of combat training of the 604th crew was monitored, expressed the opinion that the lack of full records in the logbooks about the crew working out both tasks Zh-1, Zh-2, and and other elements of tasks L-1 and L-2, testifies to the dishonesty of the people who kept the logbooks in 1988. He also stated that he is not aware of cases where submarine crews were idle for months, as reflected in the K-278 logbooks with a second crew.

Witness Reshetov gave similar testimony on this issue.

Witnesses Reshetov and Erofeev suggested that the investigation further examine the combat training logs of the K-278, knowing in advance that these logs sank with the ship.

It should be noted that these logs refer to documentation that reflects information about the planning of activities and makes notes on their implementation. The fact that planned activities have been carried out can only be recorded in the ship's logbooks.

As a result of a study of the K-278 logbooks, it was established that the tasks of the “Combat Training Course” were not properly practiced and were not accepted. The surviving members of the second crew and officials who were directly involved in the training of this crew testified about this.

During interrogation, they testified that in 1988, the second crew of the K-278 operated it from October until it entered combat service (February 28, 1989), with the exception that a week before entering combat service, the boat was again transferred to the first crew for 9 days (an unprecedented case!).

During this period, the crew of E. A. Vanin made three trips to sea: in December - for about 11 days, in January 1989 - for about 10 days, as well as a control trip to sea for four days. For the first-line crew, such preparation for combat service is acceptable, but for the crew, who had virtually no experience in operating such a ship project, this time for preparation is clearly not enough.

After all, if you look at the essence, the second crew did not have any real maritime experience on this nuclear submarine project. Basically, the ship was operated by the first crew, and the second crew on shore studied at the Training Center, dealt with economic issues, and carrying out duties.

There were problems in the crew: it was divided into groups, there were favorites of the commander, and some negative aspects were hidden from him. There were facts when, when returning the ship from the crew of E. A. Vanin, the first crew had to work a lot with the materiel to bring it into working condition. The presence of an unhealthy environment in the crew was also noted: cases of rudeness between officers and sailors, negligent watchkeeping.

After the accident, the ship's officers noted that the crew was not well-knit and experienced and that the ship did not have proper organization of service and control, and the struggle for survivability was not worked out.

V.V. Gerashchenko:

Witness V.V. Gerashchenko, the foreman of the team of navigational electricians of the second crew of K-278, stated during interrogation that the opinion had taken root in the crew that they would not sail on the ship, since their crew supposedly should become technical, and the nuclear submarine created not for military service, but for science.

The attitude of the members of the second crew to the study of their department, as well as the command towards the crew, was appropriate. The crew was mainly engaged in household work and carrying out outfits, and traveling to study at the Training Center.

The witness personally repeatedly heard how midshipmen of the second crew, while maintaining the ship, turning to members of the first crew, asked: “When will you take your ship back?”

A. V. Zaitsev:

The engineer of the BC-5 survivability division of the second crew, Lieutenant A.V. Zaitsev, stated during interrogation that while the ship contained the first crew, the second crew was engaged in various activities outside the ship.

B. A. Gregulev:

The head of the chemical service of the 604th crew, Lieutenant Commander V. A. Gregulev, testified that at the end of August 1984, he was sent as part of the crew to the Navy Training Center, having been assigned to the crew of E. A. Vanin, which was planned as a floating . He was supposed to become a full-fledged combat second crew of the K-278.

Initially, from September to December 1984, the crew trained at the Training Center without midshipmen; midshipmen arrived later. The first two months were spent studying general ship systems, and only in theoretical terms - using diagrams, posters and textbooks. Despite the fact that there was no training equipment for Project 685, personal protective equipment PDU-2, IP-6 and ShDA were studied. After completing the study using posters and diagrams common device K-278 took exams.

As for testing measures to combat survivability, the witness testified, this was done on a stand that was developed for a ship of a different project; We practiced issuing commands to solve various inputs and actions based on these inputs. Since the stand was not intended for the nuclear submarine pr.685, the crew could not work out all the introductory instructions for their ship, and all these exercises were, as it were, a continuation of theoretical training.

A.V. Zaitsev:

The witness believes that by the end of the training the crew received good theoretical training, but there was no practical training in interaction between individual combat units and services. In his opinion, the first crew who went through the Training Center and the ship construction school at the plant had great theoretical knowledge and practical experience.

Upon completion of training at the Training Center in July 1985, the second crew arrived at permanent place based in Zapadnaya Litsa.

In the division, the witness testified, our expectations to accept the ship and begin working out and passing the tasks of the combat training course and going to sea did not materialize, since the K-278 was intensively used by the first crew. Then the second crew realized that they would not soon be able to sail their boat.

The witness testified: “Until May 1986, we were preparing for the delivery of task L-2. Around May, the second crew, having not had time to work and pass the L-2 task, was again sent to the Training Center. This decision by the command greatly undermined the mood of the crew.

We prepared ourselves and our subordinates for the fact that we would swim, but after such a change in the combat training plan, many simply gave up. As a result of such changes in combat training plans, the crew as a whole lost authority in the formation.”

The witness remembers that at the summing up of the results of the socialist competition, the chief of staff of the division mentioned that the commander of the second crew, Captain 1st Rank Vanin, was not allowed to independently control the ship, because he did not pass the required tests. The chief of staff then said that it would be difficult for him “to find enough nannies for us to swim.”

At the beginning of February 1987, the second crew returned from vacation. There was no ship at the base, and the crew was involved in various types of garrison activities.

On February 28, 1987, K-278 with its first crew returned from a trip to full autonomy to its base in Zapadnaya Litsa.

6.4. Reception of the ship by the 604th crew from the first crew

In mid-March 1987, the second crew took over the boat from the first crew and began carrying out inter-trip repairs of the ship while simultaneously working out elements of the L-1 task.

After a 30-day inter-trip repair, in mid-May 1987, the second crew worked and passed the L-1 task.

Gregulev remembers that it was very difficult, because there was not enough time to carry out activities for task L-1 and simultaneously carry out repairs. The second crew passed the L-1 task with a “good” rating on the first try.

V. A. Gregulev:

The witness reported the following about the combat training of the second crew in 1988. The second crew arrived from the Training Center in Zapadnaya Litsa at the end of August 1988. K-278 with the first crew at that time was on its second trip to full-autonomy combat service (lasting 90 days).

The senior assistant commander of the second crew, Captain 2nd Rank Avanesov, announced to the entire crew that they needed to prepare for the delivery of task L-1, but the witness does not remember whether this training took place, since a lot of time has passed since then. However, he confidently states that the crew did not present the L-1 task to the command.

At the end of September 1988, the second crew took over the ship from the first crew and went to sea for several days.

Then the division command explained that it (the 604th crew) needed to maintain the linearity of the ship by going to sea, which was done.

6.5. Division headquarters

The investigation established that the reason for the lack of proper control over the combat training of the second crew of K-278 was also the numerous personnel movements that took place in the management and headquarters of the division in which K-278 was a member.

From August 1988 to January 1989, the following movements of officials took place in the division's management and headquarters: division commander, division chief of staff, deputy division commander and deputy. division commander - head of the electromechanical service (EMS).

Captain 1st Rank O. T. Shkiryatov, who arrived in August 1988 after graduating from the Naval Academy to the position of division commander, had previously served on first-generation nuclear submarines. He had to study and master three projects for third-generation ships. At the same time, he did not undergo retraining for new equipment at the Navy Training Centers.

The deputy division commander, an experienced and skilled submariner, captain 1st rank A.S. Bogatyrev, who was well trained in Project 685 and had experience managing it at sea on a three-month voyage, was transferred to the position of deputy. commander of a squadron of surface ships. He was replaced by Captain 1st Rank B. G. Kolyada, chief of staff of the division, who was moved to this position “horizontally” due to the unsuccessful performance of his duties.

B. G. Kolyada had less sailing experience, a less developed sense of responsibility and, as facts showed, once on board the K-278, he did not benefit the crew in the fight for survivability in the event of an accident.

Captain 1st Rank L. F. Katukhin, newly appointed to the position of chief of staff, did not take up his post until December 1988, because he was at sea in combat service on a ship of another division, and then, while on post-cruise leave for one month, went to work sporadically, for one or two days.

The duties of the chief of staff at this time were performed by the commanders of the division's submarines. They were unable to delve into the work of the headquarters and ensure proper control over compliance with the combat training plans of the ships, including the K-278 with its second crew.

7. Preparation of the GKP for the fight for survivability

On February 23, 1989, when checking the readiness of the K-278 to enter combat service, the flotilla's flagship EMS specialists revealed unsatisfactory preparation of the GKP for leading the fight for survivability.

An inspection of the readiness of the K-278 for combat service by the flotilla headquarters was scheduled for February 25. This re-inspection by the flotilla's flagship EMS specialists also showed that the comments identified during the previous inspection had not been eliminated, which was reported to the flotilla management. Despite this, an order was issued from the flotilla commander about the positive results of testing the second crew and K-278 for military service. In violation of the requirements of the “Combat Training Course”, which prohibit the submarine from going to sea with poor organization of service on the ship, poor training of personnel in their specialty and for combating survivability, K-278 with a second crew was allowed to go on combat service.

In the orders on the results of inspections of the readiness of the K-278 with its second crew for combat service, there is not a single mention of poor quality preparation of the Civil Command. However, the flotilla's EMS had serious complaints about the GKP of the second crew.

Witness I.M. Shchekotikhin, Acting Head of the EMS of the flotilla, during interrogation about ongoing checks of the readiness of the K-278 with the second crew for combat service, said that on February 22, 1989, in accordance with the daily plan of the flotilla, he arrived as part of a group of flotilla headquarters officers on K-278 for a routine check of the ship to determine its readiness for military service. At this inspection, a ship combat exercise was conducted to combat survivability with the introductory “Fire in compartment VI and gas contamination in compartment V.”

During the exercise, the following shortcomings were identified:

There was no clear interaction between the members of the GKP as a single collective management body: there were a lot of unnecessary reports, commands and fuss, which is why recommendations were unclearly given to the ship commander by the senior assistant to the ship commander and the commander of the warhead-5: some of the information was simply lost;

The actions of the State Control Committee were not focused on sealing the emergency compartment from adjacent compartments;

Maintaining a situation tablet by the senior assistant commander has not been fully practiced;

There was no clear interaction between the control center and the compartments adjacent to the emergency one.

The results of the inspection were reported to the commander of the 1st flotilla, Rear Admiral O. A. Erofeev, the report stated the need to repeat the survivability exercise. To do this, the second crew had to be given additional time to practice interaction between members of the PCU and Special attention to test the interaction of the main command post with the compartments adjacent to the emergency one. After eliminating the comments, it was necessary to conduct the survivability exercise again, under the leadership of the division command, and present it to the headquarters and electromechanical service of the flotilla.

The commander of the 1st flotilla, Rear Admiral O. A. Erofeev, ordered the flotilla headquarters to conduct a re-inspection on February 25, 1989 in order to ensure that the identified deficiencies were eliminated. In accordance with this order, the re-inspection was to be carried out again by the entire flotilla headquarters and under the leadership of the chief of staff of the flotilla, Rear Admiral V.K. Reshetov.

I. M. Shchekotikhin:

Witness I.M. Shchekotikhin, Acting Head of the EMS of the 1st Flotilla, reported that on February 25, 1989, he sent Captain 2nd Rank O.G. Gushchin and Captain 3rd to K-278 to re-check the elimination of identified comments rank of V. I. Vinogradov. After the inspection, they reported that the comments identified during the first inspection (02/22/1989) had not been completely eliminated. Gushchin assessed the actions of the GKP “with a stretch as satisfactory.”

After the report of Gushchin and Vinogradov, the witness reported on February 25 to Rear Admiral V.K. Reshetov that only two officers from the EMS carried out a re-check of the second crew’s readiness to enter combat service, while other flagship specialists, for some unknown reason, did not take part in the re-check. According to Gushchin’s report on the preparation of the State Command Committee, there are some changes for the better, but the State Committee cannot be given more than a “satisfactory” rating.

After this, the witness suggested that V.K. Reshetov carry out additional training for the second crew’s main command post in combating survivability, but he replied that he was entrusting the work of improving the training of the second crew’s main command post to the division headquarters.

V. I. Vinogradov:

Witness V.I. Vinogradov, flagship EMS specialist of the 1st flotilla, reported on the results of two inspections that from the words of Captain 1st Rank Shchekotikhin, he knew that during the inspection the crew of Captain 1st Rank E.A. Vanin and PCUs showed poor knowledge and skills. For task Zh-2, the crew was given an unsatisfactory rating and given time to correct the identified deficiencies.

Two or three days after this inspection, on the instructions of I.M. Shchekotikhin, the witness, together with Captain 2nd Rank Gushchin, arrived on the K-278 to verify that the identified comments and shortcomings were eliminated during the inspection of the second crew.

On the K-278 the entire crew was staffing table, including the commander of the ship, Captain 1st Rank Vanin, and the head of the EMS division, Captain 1st Rank Zhuk.

The emergency drill “Fire in compartment V” was announced.

In compartment V, the crew’s actions were correct and rated “good,” however, Gushchin, who was in the central command center, was not satisfied with the actions of the main command post, and on this occasion he made a remark to both the ship commander and the head of the division’s EMS. Gushchin tried to explain to them what mistakes they made during the drill.

Arriving at headquarters, Vinogradov and Gushin reported to the acting head of the flotilla's EMS, Captain 1st Rank Shchekotikhin, that the GKP of the second crew, during the emergency drill, showed poor knowledge and skills in combating survivability and that additional time was required to practice measures to combat damage. survivability.

O. G. Gushchin:

Witness O. G. Gushchin, flagship EMS specialist of the 1st flotilla, testified:

“On the 20th of February 1989, I, together with the flagship specialists of the 1st flotilla, among whom the acting head of the flotilla, Captain 1st Rank I. M. Shchekotikhin, took part from the EMS, arrived on the K-278 to check the readiness of the crew to enter combat service. Analysis of this check on the readiness of the 604th crew to enter combat service was carried out at the flotilla headquarters. From the EMS, the results of the inspection were reported by Captain 1st Rank Shchekotikhin.

I was not personally present at this discussion. I don’t know what comments Shchekotikhin reported. Two or three days after this analysis, Captain 1st Rank Shchekotikhin sent me and Captain 3rd Rank V.I. Vinogradov to K-278 in order to check how the comments he had made during the previous check on the efficiency of the Civil Command Unit on issues organization of the struggle for survivability. Vinogradov and I, during official hours, arrived on board the nuclear submarine, where the entire personnel of the 604th crew was located, as well as the head of the division’s EMS, Captain 1st Rank L.K. Zhuk.

Having distributed the responsibilities among ourselves, I remained in the central control center to observe the actions of the Civil Command, and Vinogradov went to compartment V, from where he played the introductory message: “Fire in compartment V.”

At the end of the exercise, Vinogradov and I conducted an analysis of the actions of the GKP and the personnel of the V compartment. During this analysis, I made several comments, in particular, I pointed out the need for a more precise keeping of the situation map by the senior assistant commander, and the need to maintain a complete set of rescue equipment (IDA-59) in the VSK.

The head of the division's EMS, Captain 1st Rank Zhuk, who was present at the ship's control center, did not agree with my comments and considered the comments I made to be a consequence of my biased attitude towards the personnel of the second crew.

Arriving at the flotilla headquarters, we reported the results of the inspection to the Acting Head of the EMS of the 1st Flotilla, Captain 1st Rank I.M. Shchekotikhin and, in particular, that the senior assistant ship commander, Captain 2nd Rank Avanesov, did not keep a map of the situation , the reports received by the PCU were not completely entered into the draft logbook...

I did not evaluate the actions of the State Police, but I only made a number of comments, which I showed above.”

O. T. Shkiryatov:

Witness O. T. Shkiryatov, commander of the nuclear submarine division, testified to the investigation about the readiness of the second crew to enter combat service that on February 22, 1989, after the headquarters and EMS of the flotilla checked the readiness of the K-278 to enter combat service, He was not present at the inspection. The deputy was present at this analysis. division commander, Captain 1st Rank B.G. Kolyada, who reported to him that the second survivability crew was rated “three with a stretch,” which does not meet the requirements of the survivability training rules (the rating should be no lower than “ Fine").

The witness made a decision: the division headquarters, together with the crew, should work through and eliminate the identified comments and report to the flotilla commander about their elimination.

On February 25, 1989, in accordance with the combat training plan, the witness went to sea on K-463 and remained at sea until March 1, 1989. He does not know how the crew was re-checked by the flotilla headquarters.

L.K. Zhuk:

Witness L.K. Zhuk, head of the division's EMS, when asked about the results of checking the readiness of the K-278 with the second crew to enter combat service, said that on February 22–24, 1989, the second crew was checked by the headquarters of the 1st flotilla for readiness for entering military service.

From the electromechanical service of the flotilla, Captain 2nd Rank Gushchin took part in the inspection, and in good faith, without any concessions, expressed his opinion regarding the preparedness of the crew and their readiness to enter combat service when analyzing the results of the survivability exercises. Based on his findings, the crew received an unsatisfactory rating. But he (Zhuk), as the head of the division’s EMS, did not agree with this assessment.

The witness does not remember whether the witness spoke to any of the flotilla headquarters officials. After this check, there was a verbal order from the division commander about the arrival of all division headquarters officers on the ship and “not to leave the ship until all concerns have been eliminated.”

7.1. V. A. Gregulev, A. V. Zaitsev, V. V. Gerashchenko on checking readiness for military service

Interrogated members of the 604th crew - the head of the chemical service of the crew, captain-lieutenant V. A. Gregulev, the engineer of the survivability division of the same crew, lieutenant A. V. Zaitsev and the foreman of the team of navigational electricians, midshipman V. V. Gerashchenko - about the circumstances of checking the readiness of the crew for when entering combat service, it was explained that during the check of the readiness of the ship and crew for entering combat service, the flotilla's flagship specialists revealed the crew's poor knowledge of combating survivability, and therefore the division's flagship specialists tried for two to three days to teach the crew to act in emergency conditions.

V. A. Gregulev:

The witness reported that before entering combat service, on approximately February 21–22, 1989, during an inspection by flotilla headquarters, the second crew received a rating of “two points.”

“After the inspection, the commander of the BC-5, captain 2nd rank Babenko, and the commander of the nuclear submarine, captain 1st rank Vanin, announced that we were given a “D” due to the fact that the crew acted passively during the combat alert. I also remember that after the crew command checked our readiness, we again presented the exercise to one of the flotilla’s flagship specialists. I remember that these exercises were held literally a few days (three days) before the ship entered combat service.

Then one of the midshipmen who had served for many years said that this is not how they go into combat service. With these words, he made it clear to me that the crew was being harassed and a nervous atmosphere was created in it.”

A. V. Zaitsev:

Witness A.V. Zaitsev testified that on the 20th of February 1989, the crew was checked first by the division headquarters, and then by the flotilla headquarters, for readiness to enter combat service.

During the inspection by the flotilla headquarters, that is, a few days after the inspection by the division headquarters, the flagship specialists of the flotilla headquarters arrived on the K-278, among whom the witness especially remembered Shchekotikhin and Gushchin, who checked the warhead-5. The witness knows that the doctrine of combating survivability was not accepted. A day or two later, the ship was again checked to ensure that the defects identified during the inspection by the flotilla headquarters were corrected. He doesn’t remember how this check ended.

B.V. Gerashchenko:

Witness V.V. Gerashchenko testified that on the 20th of February 1989, the readiness of the crew for combat service was checked by the division and flotilla headquarters. When inspecting the ship, he personally heard how the inspecting captain, 1st rank Zhuk, very often scolded the mechanics and was dissatisfied with their preparation, and when inspecting the ship and crew by the flotilla headquarters, the inspecting assistant to the head of the flotilla's EMS for survivability, captain 2nd rank Gushchin, generally gave the ship " deuce."

The witness remembers that someone told him that there was a big scandal about this, Gushchin was accused of bias towards the second crew.

The fact that the training of nuclear submarine crews for tasks “Zh” (survivability) must correspond to a rating of at least “good” is directly written in RBZ-PL-82. From the above testimony it follows that when preparing the ship for entering combat service, the command of the division and the 1st flotilla violated these RBJ requirements.

An analysis of the actions during the accident on K-278 on April 7, 1989 confirms the correctness of the conclusions about the poor training of the GKP of the second K-278 crew made by the flotilla EMS officers during inspections on February 22 and 25, 1989.

7.2. Not allowed to perform duties

The investigation established that in violation of the requirements of Art. 18 of the “Nuclear Submarine Combat Training Course,” which prohibits a ship from going to sea with personnel not allowed to perform duties in their positions, six staff positions occupied by persons not allowed to perform duties in their positions. This led to the fact that their duties were forced to be performed by other crew members to the detriment of their direct responsibilities.

So, in accordance with the ship’s schedule at combat post No. KP-1/5, in the third shift, Warrant Officer Yu. P. Podgornov should have been on combat readiness watch No. 2, but he did not do this. According to the testimony of Zaitsev and Dvorov, Podgornov did not keep a watch; his duties were performed by the commander of the 3rd division, captain of the 3rd rank V.A. Yudin, combining them with the duties of a third shift mechanical engineer on watch.

According to the same schedule, at combat post No. KP-2/5 in the second shift, midshipman Zamogilny was supposed to be on duty, but instead of him at the Onega console in the second shift, his duties were performed by captain of the 3rd rank Ispenkov, combining them with the duties of a watch engineer - second shift mechanics.

From the testimony of A.V. Tretyakov, an engineer of the hydroacoustic group of the second crew, it is clear that he went to sea without passing the required tests for admission to perform the duties of his position.

Witness L.K. Zhuk, the head of the EMS division, testified on this issue that the required tests for performing the duties of his position, including combating survivability, were never passed to him by captain 3rd rank Maksimchuk - deputy . the ship's commander for political affairs, midshipman Bondar and warrant officer Podgornov. The witness considers the actions of the ship's commander E. A. Vanin, who took on military service persons who were not allowed to perform the duties of their position, arbitrariness. He includes among these actions the unauthorized replacement of midshipman Tarasenko (from the first crew), who was supposed to go on a campaign as part of the second crew, with midshipman Bondar.

According to Tarasenko, before the K-278 began preparing to go to sea, he was called to the control center by the commander of the BC-5, captain 2nd rank Babenko, and introduced him to captain 1st rank Vanin, who told Tarasenko to leave the ship, because Midshipman Bondar will go into military service.

Witness Zhuk stated that he did not know about this arbitrariness of Vanin and found out only after K-278 went to sea. He also said that he did not know at all how warrant officer Podgornov ended up on board the K-278.

Witness B. G. Kolyada, senior on board during the K-278 voyage, testified:

“I learned about midshipman Kapusta’s lack of clearance for his position during combat service. Captain 1st Rank E. A. Vanin himself admitted to me that midshipman Kapusta did not pass the required tests when I discovered that Kapusta was not fulfilling his duties for one of the combat readiness.”

The fact that the submarine entered combat service with persons not allowed to perform duties in their positions was testified by the head of the chemical service of the second crew, Lieutenant Commander V. A. Gregulev. He said that three people who were not allowed to independently manage their unit and combat post went into combat service with the crew. Among them he included midshipman Bondar, warrant officer Podgorny and lieutenant Molchanov.

Midshipman Bondar did not pass the required tests, because he was taken into the crew a week or two before the ship entered combat service. Ensign Podgornov had no desire to serve on nuclear submarines and did not know how to operate his equipment. Instead, Captain 3rd Rank V. Yudin, commander of the survivability division, worked at the Molybdenum control panel. Podgornov was taken into the crew because he had “golden hands” on various crafts.

The third person not admitted is Lieutenant Molchanov. He was formally given credits for nuclear weapons, because they planned to second him for the duration of his military service to the crew of Captain 1st Rank Lyakhov (K-276), but he was not seconded, and the test according to the documents was “worked out.”

Molchanov did not pass for admission to duty on the ship and for admission to keep a running watch as a watch officer.

During the shift, he was, as it were, a backup for the senior assistant to the ship’s commander, Captain 2nd Rank Avanesov, who was in the central command center.

Witness V.F. Slyusarenko, a navigator's electrician, testified that all tests for admission to independent control of the position held by the majority of members of the 604th crew were accepted formally by the command.

Answering the question about how the tests for independent control took place, he said that initially the crew was given a deadline for passing the tests (up to three months) and a social competition was launched in combat units with the results of the tests posted. In the initial period, this passing of tests was organized in such a way that I wanted to study and pass more than others, but when the deadlines for passing tests came and some of them remained unpassed, all of them “en masse”, they quickly collected the test sheets and “closed” all the tests without surrendering them. The witness did not pass some questions in his specialty; as for the test sheet on the design of submarines, a third of the questions remained unanswered. However, their score sheets were closed to them. Later, the witness saw these test sheets sewn into a separate folder.

7.3. Relationships within the second crew

The uncertainty of the position of the second crew (whether it should be a technical crew or a combat crew), its frequent presence in the Training Center, away from the permanent location of the ship, and the lack of proper control on the part of the division command became the reasons for the decline in discipline and the deterioration of relationships within the military team.

In the period from 1987 to 1989, cases of drunkenness, leaving the watch while on duty, engaging in extraneous activities while on duty, and dishonesty were noted among the crew. In daily activities, numerous violations of military discipline and the established order on the ship were allowed.

As follows from the testimony of the surviving crew members, flagship specialists of the 6th division and the 1st flotilla, immediately before entering combat service, the crew was drawn by the ship's command into a squabble that arose between the ship's deputy commander for political affairs, captain 3rd rank A S. Ternovsky and the commander of the warhead-5, captain of the 2nd rank V. I. Babenko.

At the party meeting, no confidence was expressed in Ternovsky, and therefore captain of the 3rd rank Yu. I. Maksimchuk was appointed instead.

The decision to replace the main official in the crew 14 days before going to sea, responsible for the formation of interpersonal relationships, moods, value orientations, and motivations for combat service, could not but affect the discipline of the crew and its attitude to the performance of combat service tasks.

Due to the poor training of the second crew and their unscrupulous attitude towards materiel, midshipman Bobrovnikov, captain 3rd rank Borovsky, and medical service major A.D. Ulitovsky avoided going into combat service with this crew for various reasons. Even before leaving, they had the opinion that under no circumstances would they go into combat service with the second crew, and they took all measures not to go.

Midshipman Tkach also did not want to go to military service on this campaign and agreed to have midshipman Polukhin replace him, but captain 1st rank Vanin insisted, and Tkach went to military service on February 28, 1989.

Witness V.V. Gerashchenko testified on this issue that even before leaving, he heard from Major Ulitovsky of the medical service that many were simply afraid to go into combat service with their crew. Ulitovsky himself said that he would not go into military service under any pretext. Midshipman Bobrovnikov said this: “Only suicides can go into military service with you. I won’t go with you.”

Witness A.D. Ulitovsky, head of the medical service of the first crew of K-278, testified that such mutual uncertainty in each other was the main reason for the numerous refusals of officers and midshipmen of the second crew to go into combat service. They looked for all sorts of reasons to avoid it. For example, captain 3rd rank Borovsky simply stubbornly said that he was sick and for health reasons could not go to sea, and did not go to military service.

8. Control exit to the sea. Monitoring the oxygen content in ship compartments

At the control exit of K-278 with the second crew before combat service, due to an increase in the oxygen content in the atmosphere of compartment VII (at least 30%), a fire hazardous situation was created. This circumstance is confirmed by the testimony of witnesses A.D. Ulitovsky, V.T. Tarasenko and V.A. Gregulev.

V. T. Tarasenko:

From the testimony of witness V.T. Tarasenko, it follows that in February 1989, as part of the second crew on the K-278, he went to the control exit as a bilge specialist and stood watch in compartment VII.

During one of his watches, he discovered that the percentage of oxygen in the compartment was increased. When measuring the oxygen content in the compartment's atmosphere using a portable gas analyzer, he discovered that the oxygen in compartment VII was more than the norm.

The rheochord handle did not allow one to accurately determine the oxygen content in the compartment, since using a portable analyzer it is possible to measure oxygen only up to 30%, and in this case it exceeded 30%.

At first he did not believe these instrument readings and decided to make a test measurement in the adjacent VI compartment. Having taken measurements, I was convinced that the device was working properly and the percentage of oxygen in compartment VI was normal. Then he returned to compartment VII and took another measurement. The gas analyzer again showed an increased oxygen content of more than 30%.

Witness A.D. Utitovsky testified that at the control exit for three days out of four, he personally reported to Captain 1st Rank Vanin about the increased oxygen content in compartment VII, reaching 29–30%.

A.V. Zaitsev:

Witness A.V. Zaitsev stated that during the control exit to the sea before combat service, the watchmen of compartment VII noted an increase in the oxygen content in this compartment to 30%. He remembers how, at the control exit, Captain 2nd Rank Babenko indignantly said that Gregulev "pumped up" There is more oxygen in compartment VII than normal.

V. A. Gregulev:

Witness V.A. Gregulev said that the reason for the high percentage of oxygen in compartment VII was that on the K-278 oxygen was distributed among the compartments by opening the valve on the oxygen distribution manifold located in compartment II.

Specifically on this issue, the witness explained: during the control exit, he personally had to tinker with the Sorbent automation system and therefore did not pay attention to what happened to the oxygen in compartment VII. At the control exit in February 1989, he was simply delayed by the command and missed the increase in oxygen in compartment VII.

In order to avoid oversaturation of compartment VII with oxygen in the future, he drew up a schedule for supplying oxygen there. As soon as the watchmen of compartment VI reported to him or to the control center that there was an excess of oxygen in the compartment, sometimes reaching 30%, he immediately turned off the oxygen supply to compartment VII and took measures to normalize the gas composition of the air in the aft compartments (by mixing it in the compartments ).

The investigation established that the watchmen of the VII compartment of the second crew were negligent in measuring the gas composition of the air in the compartment. Thus, despite the increase in the percentage of oxygen in compartment VII during the control exit, this fact was not detected by the watchmen Bukhnikashvili and Kozlov. This is confirmed by the testimony of Kozlov himself.

Witness Kozlov reported that during the control exit he did not independently stand watch in VII, since at that time he was an understudy for the watch of the VII compartment. The watch was kept by sailor N. Bukhnikashvili, who also took measurements of the oxygen content and reported the results to the central control center. The witness did not hear anything about an increase in the oxygen content in compartment VII at the control exit. During the control exit, Major Ulitovsky of the medical service was on the ship, who repeatedly came to the compartment and took control measurements. Ulitovsky did not tell the witness about the results of the measurements. The witness does not know whether he said anything to the sailor Bukhnikashvili.

8.2. Automatic gas analyzer-oxygen dispenser of compartment VII

The repair of the gas analyzer carried out in accordance with Act No. 510/46 of October 18, 1988 does not correspond in volume to its actual defect, and the gas analyzer was turned off by Lieutenant A.V. Zaitsev before combat service. The “Extract from the verification log” submitted to the Government Commission by the Northern Fleet chemical service, which states that the K-278 gas analyzers were verified on May 5, 1988, is false, since the number and serial numbers of the gas analyzers indicated in it are not correspond to the number and serial numbers of gas analyzers installed by the construction plant.

From this it follows that the K-278 entered combat service with gas analyzers that did not pass verification. In addition, the service life of these gas analyzers was completely used up (operation time was more than 14 thousand hours with a service life of 12,000 hours).

The investigation established that on February 28, 1989, K-278 entered combat service with a faulty oxygen automatic gas analyzer sensor in compartment VII.

8.3. Television complex

Inspection of the sunken K-278 in 1991–1992. deep-sea submersibles "Mir" revealed the absence of one external television camera of the television complex, dismantled in the base.

It was established that television cameras monitoring the situation in compartments VII, VI and V also did not work.

Consequently, the nuclear submarine entered combat service with a faulty television system. This is confirmed by the testimony of witnesses V.V. Aripov, V.A. Gregulev, A.V. Zaitsev, A.D. Ulitovsky and the work report for inter-trip repairs K-278.

8.4. Portable oxygen gas analyzer

Witness L.A. Zayats, a doctor of the second crew, testified that during combat service chemical technician S.I. Chernikov experienced a deterioration in his health. April 6, 1989 (he remembered the date well). At approximately 7 p.m., Chernikov approached him with complaints of irregular heart function. From the medical history, it became known that he had experienced similar attacks earlier, over the past year and a half. After taking an ECG, it became clear that he had a heart disease - paroxysmal tachycardia, which was immediately reported to the submarine commander. This attack, according to Chernikov, could be caused by physical overload. From his words it was known that on April 5, 1989, he had to work for a long time on something (but the witness does not remember what exactly). After reporting to the commander, the witness administered antiarrhythmic drugs to Chernikov and, with the permission of the nuclear submarine commander, sent him to rest.

The head of the chemical service of the second crew, captain-lieutenant V.A. Gregulev, who was interrogated about this, testified that on the evening of April 6, 1989, senior lieutenant Zayats determined that Chernikov was in poor health, and a gentle regime was recommended for Chernikov.

On the night of April 6-7, 1989, Gregulev took over duty. On April 6, at about 4 p.m., he was in compartment VII and made control measurements of the gas composition of the air. On the night of April 6-7, he went to compartments VI, V and IV, doing their radiation inspection. After the examination, he walked through all the compartments of the ship, checking the operation of the equipment for collecting and removing carbon dioxide. There were no comments on the gas composition of the air from the watch compartments.

At the beginning of April 1989, on the K-278 in compartment VII, a portable gas analyzer failed, and therefore measurements of the gas composition of the air in this compartment were carried out either by S.I. Chernikov or by V.A. Gregulev himself.

This is confirmed by the testimony of the watchman of the VII compartment of K-278, sailor Yu. V. Kozlov. The witness testified that several days before the accident (he does not remember the exact date), he took over a shift in compartment VII from senior sailor N. Bukhnikashvili and during the shift he discovered that there was no portable oxygen gas analyzer. Having seen Bukhnikashvili during his watch, the witness asked him where the analyzer was, to which he replied that the gas analyzer had broken down and midshipman Chernikov had taken it for repair.

“Chernikov did not return this oxygen gas analyzer to me... In the absence of the gas analyzer, we continued to give the same oxygen data as before.”

From the testimony of witness V.A. Gregulev, it is known that during combat service, in cases of failure of oxygen gas analyzers, he and S.I. Chernikov carried out troubleshooting of these gas analyzers.

The witness gave the following testimony about this:

“During combat service, the fuses in the gas analyzers periodically failed, and Chernikov changed them. At the same time, he informed me. I remember the fact that we even transferred gas analyzers from compartment II to compartment VII when the gas analyzer in compartment VII failed.”

9. “Recommendations for the combat use of technical equipment in emergency conditions” for the nuclear submarine pr.685

In accordance with the established procedure and terms of reference at TsKBMT "Rubin" were developed and in 1983 transferred to the 1st Central Research Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense "Recommendations for the combat use of technical equipment in emergency conditions" for the nuclear submarine pr.685.

However, the “Guide to the Combat Use of Technical Equipment” (RBITS) for the nuclear submarine pr.685 was not developed by this institute. The command of the 1st Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense limited itself to sending “Recommendations” to the headquarters of the Northern Fleet. These recommendations were not used when training the 604th crew.

Analyzing the course of the accident on K-278, the investigation believes that the absence of RBITS predetermined the poor performance of the second crew in combating the survivability of the ship, which was manifested in the actions of the crew on April 7, 1989.

The investigation believes that as a result of the above violations by the leadership of the 1st Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense, the command of the ship, division and flotilla, simplifications, lack of control, numerous personnel movements, the second crew was not provided with the opportunity to properly work out and pass coursework tasks, to restore lost qualifications in ship management and organization of service due to a long break in navigation. The crew lost linearity and on February 28, 1989, went to sea for combat service unprepared and with faulty technical equipment.

10. Combat service

During combat service, inspections of the equipment by K-278 personnel were carried out formally, and facts of engaging in extraneous matters while on watch were noted.

Witness S.P. Bogdanov, assigned to the second crew during combat service, testified that he had to deal with a lot of violations that occurred in this crew during combat service:

“After going to sea, I saw that the senior assistant commander, Captain 2nd Rank Avanesov, was drawing up the daily routine on the ship, but this should have been done on the shore, before going on the campaign.”

15 minutes were allotted for inspection of the equipment. You can imagine what kind of inspection it was, taking into account the volume of the Project 685 nuclear submarine.

In March 1989, the witness, together with captain 3rd rank Maksimchuk, planned an inspection of how personnel inspected the equipment after a shift. It turned out that either he did not inspect him at all, or he was inspected only formally.

Such a formality as an entry in the logbook about the inspection of the submarine’s materiel by the handing over shift was often not made. He repeatedly witnessed how the assistant commander, captain 3rd rank Verezgov, did not allow the start of watching a movie until the watch shift that had passed it made a corresponding entry in the logbook about the inspection.

The witness noted that the chilling and lack of control on the part of the command began from the first weeks of sailing in combat service:

“After several contacts were recorded with submarines of a potential enemy, incentive viewings of films began, now they were watched almost every day and not once, but twice. After this, as a rule, they played dominoes. But in the morning, the majority of the watch service at the control center was dozing. Personally, I repeatedly woke up officers during my shift who were sleeping right at their consoles. Some of them practiced sports exercises in order to stay awake. In order to prepare for the seminar, the OKS console operator, midshipman Kadantsev, was busy taking notes on the primary sources of Marxism-Leninism. Acoustic engineers, as a rule, wore headphones not on both ears, but on one; during the shift they had no problem drinking coffee or tea and listening not only to the sea, but also to what was said in the compartment.”

11. Accident

On April 7, 1989 at 10.30, according to entries in the draft logbook, K-278 was moving at a depth of 386 m at a speed of 8 knots.

“11.00. Rudder 5° to port. Course - 222°. The compartments have been inspected. No comments. Hydrogen content - 0.2%. Battery ventilation system in hydrogen afterburning mode. The vacuum is 35 mm water. Art."

“11.03. Course - 222°. Give the sucker to compartment VII!”

In accordance with Art. 20 of the “Guidelines for the fight against the survivability of a submarine” (RBZh-PL-82), the first to detect a fire in the compartment or other situations that could lead to a fire, explosion, the entry of water into the pressure hull, an accident of weapons and technical equipment, is obliged to announce by voice alarm in the compartment, immediately report the location and nature of the accident to the control center and take measures to localize the accident and combat it.

In fact, as follows from the testimony of V.V. Gerashchenko, K.A. Fedotko, A.V. Tretyakov, S.A. Dvorov and V.A. Gregu-lev, the entries in the “draft” logbook do not reflect the actual development of events on a submarine on April 7, 1989 from 10.35 to 11.03.

V.V. Gerashchenko:

Thus, according to the testimony of witness V.V. Gerashchenko, at 10.35 he noticed changes in the operating mode of the ship’s main electrical network:

“On April 7, 1989, I was on duty at the gyro post in the third shift of combat readiness No. 2, submarine, i.e. from 8 to 12 o’clock. At approximately 10.35, I saw a red banner on the power system instrument, signaling that the power to the navigation complex had been turned off. I started checking the parameters for all types of power supply to the complex, and it turned out that the navigation complex switched to power from another board, and on the board to which it was connected earlier, the power supply disappeared altogether.

The switching of power to the navigation complex from board to board occurred between 10.30 and 10.40.

At approximately 10.40, the power supply parameters of the navigation complex began to change, and at approximately 10.45 I reported all this to the CPU.

After my report, Lieutenant Fedotko told me that something had happened to the electricians, watch the navigation system carefully.

After that, after about two or three minutes, the fans howled ship system ventilation, which meant voltage fluctuations in the main ship's network.

Then I thought: “What are they doing there, at the central post?” The gyropost clock showed 10.50.

Immediately after this, I went up to the CPU and saw the following picture.

Everyone was sitting in their places. The commander - captain 1st rank Vanin was dozing in his chair.

On the control panel of the electrical power system of Senior Lieutenant S.E. Markov, everything was in red, i.e., almost all of it fell out on the display alarm. At the same time, Markov very quickly pressed the buttons and keys on his remote control.

No one in the control center paid attention to this, and only Yudin tried to contact the aft compartment.

I don’t remember who else was doing what, but I remember that everyone was sitting at their jobs. Seeing such a situation, that is, the bustle that had begun between Fedotko, Markov and Yudin, I returned back to my gyro post.

At 11.02, the assistant commander, captain-lieutenant Verezgov, gave the command to raise the personnel.

After about two or three minutes, Captain 1st Rank Vanin (I remember this well) announced: “Emergency alert. Fire in compartment VII."

K. A. Fedotko:

Witness K. A. Fedotko initial period accident stated that on April 7, 1989, from 4.00 to 12.00, he was on duty as a navigator and was in the ship’s control center.

“Nothing significant happened until about 10.30. After 10.30, closer to 11 o’clock, the navigator’s electrician on watch V.V. Gerashchenko reported to me via broadcast that the parameters of the navigation complex began to change.

I quickly looked through the navigation system failure cells and found that they were being “reset to zero.” This meant that Gerashchenko was troubleshooting the navigation system.

While checking the cells of the complex, I saw that voltage dips began.

I quickly looked to the side where Senior Lieutenant S.E. Markov was on duty at the EPS control panel, and saw that he was working on the Onega in a far from calm manner. I saw that he was very preoccupied with something. I also saw the concerned face of Captain 3rd Gorang V.A. Yudin, who turned to Markov and watched his work.

Seeing all this, I immediately realized that something had happened on the ship.

After everything I saw, I contacted Gerashchenko via broadcast and told him to carefully watch the navigation system, because something had happened to the electricians.

The voltage dips continued, and this is reflected in my navigation console.

A few minutes later Gerashchenko arrived from the gyropost. He looked indignant."

S. A. Dvorov:

Witness S.A. Dvorov, commander of the turbine group of the second crew, said that at 10.40 there were no changes in the operating mode of the power plant.

“If there were any changes in the operating mode of the power plant, I would definitely make an entry about it in the logbook.

I must immediately note that there were no messages from either Markov or Yudin about any switches in the EPS (electric power system), and I remember this well. From 10.40 to 11.05 I didn’t look at my watch and therefore I can’t show anything time-bound.

Several minutes passed after the reports of Kolotilin and Bukhnikashvili. I accidentally turned my head towards the EPS control panel, where Senior Lieutenant Markov was sitting, and saw and then heard a light and sound alarm indicating abnormal operation of the electrical power system.

I saw that Markov was doing some manipulations on the remote control, pressing some buttons, but I don’t know which ones. I then realized that he needed to find out something from his remote control.

Markov continued to make switches on his remote control; I find it difficult to answer how long he made these switches, because I didn’t look at my watch, about five to eight minutes.

Then I heard the watch officer Verezgov announce over the broadcast: “Team get up, first shift get ready for lunch.”

At the same time, Yudin called midshipman Kolotilin via broadcast. I heard that Yudin found Kolotilin and through the broadcast said something to him in a normal voice. I haven’t heard what exactly.

I saw that Markov continued to press buttons on his remote control. I didn’t look at my watch and therefore I can’t say exactly how much time passed after Yudin spoke with Kolotilin, about one to three minutes when I heard Yudin loudly announce in the central control room: “The temperature alarm in VII went off.” compartment is more than +70 °C.”

I heard that Yudin immediately after this gave the command to Kolotilin to go to compartment VI or VII (I don’t remember exactly which). I didn’t pay attention to what else Yudin said to Kolotilin, but it’s for sure that he said something loudly to him.

At this time, I leaned back in my chair and looked at the control panel of the ship’s general systems. I saw that the alarm light was on in the upper right corner of the control panel, and immediately on my power plant control panel the mnemonic signs of the operation of two stern tube oil seal cooling pumps lit up, although one pump was operating normally.

My attempts to stop any of these pumps from the remote control were unsuccessful. On my console, unauthorized displays of the state of fittings and mechanisms in compartment VII began. I tried to restore the normal operation of the installation using the remote control, but no mechanisms of the VII compartment were controlled from the remote control, the lamps of the fittings and mechanisms of the VII compartment were burning without any logic.

I tried to restore the previous mode of operation of my remote control for about two minutes, and when I realized that I could not stabilize the operation of the system, I shouted to Yudin: “Nothing is controlled in my stern.”

I then saw that the sign on the control panel for general ship systems could not be removed, and the mechanisms of compartment VII were not controlled on my control panel.

I have concluded that the signal on Yudin’s control panel about the temperature exceeding 70° is not false. After that, I immediately shouted to Yudin: “Sound an emergency alarm!”

A.V. Tretyakov:

Witness A.V. Tretyakov testified about the same period that on April 7, 1989, he was on watch in the third shift of combat readiness No. 2, underwater, on combat information system devices.

“During the watch from 8.00, the situation in the control center was normal, no alarming reports were received from the aft compartment watchmen.

I didn’t look at the clock and therefore I can’t say exactly what time it was, but approximately at about 11 o’clock a bright flash of lamps on the central situation indicator occurred on my remote control.

I quickly turned off the power to the device and immediately turned towards the control panel of the electrical power system of Senior Lieutenant S.E. Markov, who was working at the control panel with a heavy load. I didn’t pay attention to what kind of alarm was on his remote control.

At the same time, Verezgov announced over the broadcast: “Team to stand up. Make the beds. First shift, get ready for lunch."

Senior Lieutenant Markov continued to work at his console in the same rhythm. I saw captain 3rd rank V. Yudin standing near Markov at that time and talking to someone over the broadcast without raising his voice. As I remember, I only heard a fragment of a phrase said by Yudin: “...Are you late?” I don’t know what else Yudin said and who exactly he spoke to.

Looking in the direction of Markov and Yudin, I saw that Lieutenant Commander Dvorov, who was sitting at the control panel of the power plant, turned his head and also looked at Markov and Yudin.

The ship's commander, Captain 1st Rank Vanin, was sitting in his chair, his head slightly thrown back, and resting. He did not take any part in the work of Yudin and Markov.

I turned towards Verezgov. Assistant commander Verezgov stood near the watch officer's place and looked in the direction of Markov and Yudin. I remember that I looked towards the navigation station, where Lieutenant Fedotko was on watch, and saw that he was looking out from behind the curtain and also looking in the direction of Markov and Yudin.

As I remember, I asked Fedotko: “What do you have?” Fedotko shrugged his shoulders and spread his arms. I realized that Markov’s actions at the control panel would also attract Fedotko’s attention.

Turning towards Markov, I continued to look first at Yudin, then at Markov, then at Verezgov. To be honest, I understood then that something bad was going on, but I couldn’t understand what.

I saw that the attention of everyone present in the CPU (except Vanin) was focused on the EES console and Markov. After a while, Dvorov spoke sharply, addressing either Yudin or Markov, but I couldn’t make out what he was saying specifically. I remember that at that moment I was in a state of some stress.

I heard and saw Markov, turning half a turn towards Yudin, shouting: “RShchN-11 short circuit in compartment VII!”

Then I saw the ship’s commander jump out of his chair with a start. Yudin, turning to Vanin, said: “There was a signal that the temperature in compartment VII exceeded 70 degrees.”

After this, the commander, abruptly running around the commander’s periscope, commanded at the central post: “Emergency alert!”

Following the broadcast commander, either Verezgov or Yudin, it was announced: “Emergency alert! Fire in compartment VII."

Simultaneously with the announcement of the emergency alarm by voice, emergency signals began to be given by calls.”

Yu. V. Kozlov:

The bilge sailor Yu. V. Kozlov, who was off duty in the VII compartment and was resting in the V compartment, testifies to the same period as follows:

“On April 7, 1989, at approximately 11 o’clock, in my sleep I clearly heard the command on the broadcast: “First shift, get up, get ready for lunch.” Since I didn’t want to go to lunch, I continued to lie in my “bed,” half asleep.

Then I heard someone being called on the broadcast, I don’t remember who. I remember well that for some reason the stern watch officer, midshipman Kolotilin, who was in compartment V at the time, began to answer. I don’t remember what he said on the broadcast.

After this conversation, I heard the stomping of Kolotilin running. He reached me with his hand in the opening between the shields and, pushing me, shouted: “Rise! We're on fire!" After these words from Kolotilin, I heard him run towards compartment VI, and then the bulkhead door between compartments V and VI slammed.

I stood up and was surprised: “There is no anxiety, why is he freaking out, why is he running?” I calmly put on my trousers and overalls jacket, rolled up my mattress and, going out to the middle passage, stood up in bewilderment: “There is no alarm, there is no one, why did he run away?”

How many minutes I stood there waiting, I don’t know, three to five minutes, no more. I rolled up my sleeves, calmly put on the remote control (portable breathing device) and after I put it on, I heard the commander’s voice over the broadcast: “Emergency alert! There is a fire in compartment VII!” The commander did not say what was burning in compartment VII. Immediately after this message from the commander, emergency alarm calls began ringing out.”

A. V. Gregulev:

“Since the situation from the beginning of the accident was unclear, I began to ask Chernikov what was on the ship before the alarm was announced.

Chernikov tell me! that at 10.20 he was in compartment VI and carried out a radiation survey. During this examination, he met in compartment V/ with Kolot or others, who told him that he had no comments on the operation of the technical means of the chemical service. At the same time, Chernikov told me that he climbed into the hold of compartment VI and took measurements of the gamma background and beta contamination there, and Chernikov told me that everything was normal.

Chernikov did not tell me anything about the sailor Bukhnikashvili and his visit to compartment VII. Apparently, Chernikov did not go to compartment VII.

I asked Chernikov what happened before the emergency alarm was announced. Chernikov told me that 15–20 minutes before the emergency alarm was announced, voltage dips were observed in the 220 volt 50 hertz network. Chernikov determined these failures by the operation of the fan in his equipment unit.

From Chernikov’s words, I learned that when the voltage dips began, no commands or warnings about switching the network came from the electricians.

In addition, Chernikov told me that he saw the fan stop at his department’s office.

From everything Chernikov said, I concluded that 15–20 minutes before the announcement of the emergency alarm, there were unauthorized voltage drops in the 220 volt 400 hertz network, because something happened to the electricians, but I don’t know what exactly it was , and Chernikov also could not explain anything to me.”

The above readings can technically only be explained in the following way: at 10.35, the “low insulation resistance” sign was displayed on the ESS control panel. In accordance with this, the operator of the EPS console, senior lieutenant S.E. Markov, under the guidance of mechanical engineer on watch Yudin, searched for a section of the network with low insulation resistance by switching the power supply to the electrical equipment. These switches were noticed at all K-278 combat posts.

In accordance with RBZh-PL-82, these actions by S. E. Markov were to be carried out with the permission of the ship’s main command post, at least after increasing the combat readiness of the second division and notifying the personnel via the ship’s broadcast.

However, this was not done.

According to Kozlov (“...Then I heard someone being called over the broadcast... For some reason, midshipman Kolotilin, who was on duty in the aft compartments and was in compartment V, answered”), Tretyakov (“...I saw captain 3rd rank Yudin standing near Markov at that time and talking to someone over the broadcast, without raising his voice. As I remember, I heard a fragment of a phrase said by Yudin: “Are you late?”), Dvorova (“Then I heard the watch officer Verezgov announce over the broadcast, “Team to get up, first shift get ready for lunch.” At the same time, Yudin called midshipman Kolotilin over the broadcast. I heard that Yudin found Kolotilin and over the broadcast said something to him in a normal voice.” ) indicate that at 11.00 there was no report from midshipman V.V. Kolotilin about the inspection of the aft compartment to the central post.

Kolotilin’s words spoken to Kozlov in compartment V: "Climb! We're on fire!“indicate that before the announcement of the emergency alarm, the Main Control Command knew about the fire in compartment VII and took measures to extinguish it.

The entry in the “draft” logbook for 11.03 “Submit LOX to compartment VII” is documentary evidence of this version.

Midshipman Kolotilin was sent to compartment VII to supply it with fire extinguisher from the LOX system.

The emergency alarm was announced at 11.06. This is evidenced by the entries in the “draft” logbook of the CPU, in the logbook of the main power plant, as well as the testimony of S.A. Dvorov.

According to the inspection protocol of the GEM journal, it contains the entry: “11.05. AT". About this recording, witness Dvorov explained that he made it after he shouted to Yudin: “Yes, sound an emergency alarm!” at 11.05 (according to the power plant control panel clock). He remembers that it was after this that an emergency alert was announced on the ship.

The investigation has evidence that the watch officer and the mechanic on watch discovered an emergency situation on the ship. Subsequently, they regarded the actions of the GKP as belated.

An analysis of witness testimony and documents suggests that, despite all the signs of an emergency,

The main command post, in violation of the requirements of RBZh-PL-82, did not announce an emergency alarm in a timely manner.

It was this circumstance that was the main reason that aggravated the emergency situation: the intensification of the fire, the failure of systems and devices that ensure the operation and control of the nuclear submarine, the non-arrival of personnel in compartments VI and VII and, in connection with this, their failure to perform the mandatory primary actions provided for in Art. 21 RBZh-PL-82.

12. Ascent

At 11.06, according to the entry in the “draft” logbook, a decision was made to ascend to a depth of 50 m.

Art. 89 RBZh-PL-82 in case of fire requires surfacing. The decision to ascend to a depth of 50 m was also erroneous because the information available to the GKP about the temperature in compartment VII above +70 °C, low insulation resistance, short circuit of RShchN-12, the command to supply LOX to compartment VII, as well as the absence The GKP's data on the nature and scale of the fire in this compartment required the submarine commander to surface only to the surface.

As a result, the decision to ascend to a depth of 50 m blocked the possible actions of the warhead-5 commander to deactivate the GTZA and seal the bulkhead between the VI and VII compartments, since ascent to this depth is only possible by moving under the GTZA.

12.1. Occupying emergency positions

In accordance with Art. 22 RBZh-PL-82, personnel, except for those in the emergency compartment, upon an emergency alarm signal, immediately arrive at command posts and combat posts in accordance with the schedule for combating survivability: perform actions without orders and fight for survivability under the leadership of the CPU. If it is impossible to get to their combat post, the personnel remain in the compartments adjacent to the emergency one, or in other compartments by order of the Central Command.

The investigation found that in violation of the above article on emergency alarm; two torpedomen did not arrive in compartment I - sailors A. A. Grundul and S. K. Shinkunas (remained in compartment II); the hydroacoustic group technician, midshipman A.P. Kozhanov, did not arrive in compartment III (departed for compartment I); the commander of the compartment, captain-lieutenant S.A. Dvorov, and the turbine operator, midshipman S.S. Bondar, as well as the commander of the seventh compartment, the commander of the electrical engineering group, captain-lieutenant N.A. Volkov, and the helmsman-signalman, sailor V.F., did not arrive in compartment VI. Tkachev (remained in compartment V).

Objective reasons there was no failure of some personnel to arrive in their compartments.

From the testimony of witness S.A. Dvorov, it can be seen that he stayed in the control center after the emergency alarm was announced due to the commander of the BC-5 giving him instructions. An analysis of his testimony in conjunction with other testimony of witnesses, as well as entries in the “draft” logbook and the power plant logbook gives grounds for the conclusion that, following an emergency alarm, S.A. Dvorov departed in the direction of compartment VI no earlier than 11.14.

This conclusion is confirmed by the testimony of witnesses A.V. Tretyakov, A.V. Zaitsev, A.V. Mahota and Yu.V. Kozlov.

From the testimony of witness S.A. Dvorov, it follows that after him, midshipman S.S. Bondar, sailor V.F. Tkachev arrived in compartment V, followed by lieutenant captain N.A. Volkov.

The delay of S.A. Dvorov and the untimely arrival in the VI compartment of the indicated crew members, scheduled for an emergency alert in the VI and VII compartments, entailed consequences that subsequently affected the results of the fight for survivability after the shutdown of the GTZ.

Midshipman V.V. Kolotilin (he arrived in compartment VI on time and fought for its survivability alone) did not have time to complete measures to seal the compartment and died. The fire from compartment VII spread unhindered into compartment VI.

From the testimony of witness V.V. Gerashchenko, it is known that midshipman A.P. Kozhanov, who was on alert in compartment III, ended up in compartment I for reasons unknown to him. No one gave orders to A.P. Kozhanov to leave and stay in compartment I. According to the ship's emergency alert schedule, the foreman of the hydroacoustics team was supposed to be in compartment III.

About the reason for leaving for compartment I, midshipman A.P. Kozhanov explained that he woke up at about 11 o’clock due to an emergency alarm and ran to compartment I. He believed that in the event of a fire he must maintain peripheral devices, monitor voltage, and follow the instructions of the CPU.

The above facts indicate the poor performance of the crew and the poor organization of the ship's emergency response service.

12.2. Development of an emergency situation

The investigation established that the mistake of the GKP and the submarine commander was the failure to take measures to bleed overboard the airborne reserves from the cylinders located in the aft part of the ship and connected to the jumper of the emergency compartment VII.

In accordance with the requirements of Art. 121 RBZh-PL-82, the GKP and the submarine commander had to make a decision and give the command to bleed overboard the airborne fluid from the emergency jumper (column).

At 11.13, according to the entry in the “draft” logbook, the oil pumps of the GTZA were stopped and the emergency protection of the GTZA was activated. The ship's commander decided to ascend to the surface by blowing middle group CGB with high pressure air. When ascending to the surface using this method, the GKP had the opportunity to bleed overboard the VVD from the jumper of the VII compartment or blow through the middle group of the central air tank with air from the same jumper. This was not done.

At 11.14, when the nuclear submarine was at periscope depth, the command center, not knowing the location and nature of the fire in compartment VII, also accepted wrong decision about blowing the aft group of the Central City Hospital with high pressure air from the jumper of compartment VII.

Objective data indicate that at the moment the aft central air circulation tanks began to be blown into the fire zone in compartment VII, the left side air circulation tank no. 10 ruptured, causing the bulk of the air to enter compartment VII. This led to a sharp increase in pressure in the compartment to 5–6 kgf/cm 2 and to the growth of a local fire into a high-intensity fire. Subsequently, under the influence of the damaging factors of the fire, depressurization of air pipelines for various purposes (VSD, VZU and VVD-200) located in compartment VII occurred.

Flue gases entered the oil pipeline through the seal of the main thrust bearing located in compartment VII and then into the circulating oil tank located in compartment VI. As a result, oil was released into compartment VI, which led to a fire in this compartment.

Witness A.V. Zaitsev reported on the events that took place in compartment VI that when the ship surfaced after the fall of the emergency protection of the GTZ, the ship's commander gave the command to blow high-pressure air through the central gas station of the middle group. Fulfilling this order, he (Zaitsev) gave a “bubble to the middle” at a depth of 153 m for several seconds. The boat slowly floated up. At a depth of 70 m, the ship commander again gave the command to blow through the central gas station of the middle group, which he did. When approaching the surface, the mechanic reported to the ship's commander about the increase in pressure in compartment VII.

After ascending to the position position on an even keel, on the orders of the mechanic, the witness blew out the end groups of the central air pump. After blowing out the stern groups, the boat landed with a trim of 0.3–0.5° on the bow, a list of approximately 8° on the left side.

Immediately after extinguishing the Corundum, the witness noticed that in compartment VII the pressure was 6 kg/cm3 2 , and in compartment VI the pressure was not determined by the pressure gauge of the CPU. Then the pressure in compartment VI began to increase.

The pressure in compartment VII was always ahead of the pressure in compartment VI until it equalized, at approximately 11.40, and reached 13.5 kg/cm3 2 .

The witness does not remember at what time midshipman V.V. Kolotilin reported that “hydraulics were gushing out” in compartment VI. He remembers that he discussed this issue together with Orlov and Dvorov at approximately 14:00 (April 7, 1989), and in the conversation they came to the conclusion that it was turbine oil, and not the working fluid of the hydraulic system.

From the testimony of witness S.A. Dvorov it follows that midshipman Kolotilin reported on a broadcast from compartment VI about smoke and gas leaks into compartment VI. At the same time, captain 2nd rank Babenko gave Kolotilin the command to join IP-6. Kolotilin, continuing his report, said that he observed hydraulic leaks from under the right turbogenerator.

The investigation established that throughout the entire accident on K-278, the Main Command Post did not carry out the mandatory initial actions in case of fire, prescribed by Art. 89 RBZh-PL-82, for monitoring pressure in the emergency compartment and VVD systems. Nor did he supervise the GKP in shutting down sections of these systems passing through the emergency compartment.

As a result of failure to comply with the mandatory and primary actions to turn off the high-pressure air systems passing into the emergency compartment (it was necessary to close three valves in the III compartment), in the event of a fire in the VII compartment (according to the calculations of the working group of the Government Commission) through the high-pressure air mains for various purposes (VSD, VZU and VVD-200) from the VVD cylinders, the jumpers of which were located in the I and III compartments, about 3700 kg of air came in, and taking into account the jumper No. 4 of the VVD of the VII compartment - about 6400 kg, which led to the development of a fire of high intensity, temperature and duration.

The impact of the damaging factors of this fire led to the depressurization of the pressure hull of the nuclear submarine in the area of ​​​​compartment VII and created the preconditions for the entry into it large masses water and the subsequent death of the submarine itself.

12.3. Lines of Defense

According to the entries in the “draft” logbook, the GKP assigned the following lines of defense:

at 11.13 - on the aft bulkhead of compartment III, on the bow and stern bulkheads of compartment VI;

at 11.47 - on the aft bulkhead of compartment III and on the bow and stern bulkheads of compartment IV.

However, the lines of defense in both cases (in fact) were not created, and flue gases through pipelines (oxygen and carbon dioxide - air regeneration systems, air - trim systems, air - systems remote control VVD fittings and systems for suction of steam-air mixture from pumping units) freely entered compartments II, III and V and smoked (gassed) them.

Starting at 11.21, II, III, IV and V compartments became smoke-filled.

Flue gases were supplied in the following way:

Through the oxygen pipeline of the air regeneration system - to compartments II and V;

Through the carbon dioxide pipeline - to compartments II, III and V;

Through the air pipeline of the trim system - to compartment III;

Through the air pipeline of the remote control system for high-pressure valves - to compartment III:

Through the drain pipeline of the ship's general hydraulic system - to compartment III;

Through the exhaust steam pipelines and the suction system for the steam-air mixture from the pumping units - to compartment V:

Through the pipeline of the oil separation system (until 11.45) - to compartment V.

Thus, during the accident, the State Emergency Committee did not solve one of the main tasks prescribed by Art. 87 RBZh-PL-82 - prevention of smoke and gas contamination of non-emergency compartments.

13. Ventilation of compartments

In accordance with Art. 98 RBZh-PL-82 GKP was obliged, after the submarine had surfaced, to take measures to ventilate smoke-filled compartments into the atmosphere.

At 11.22, due to the fact that when the Corundum caught fire, compartment III was de-energized (including the electrical distribution panels from which the fans received power), it turned out to be impossible to turn on exhaust fans bow and stern rings of ship-wide ventilation.

At 13.00, after connecting power to the electrical panel of the bow ring fans of the general ship ventilation, ventilation of compartments II and III was started.

At 14.57, after connecting power to the electrical panel of the fans of the aft ring of general ship ventilation, ventilation of compartments IV and V was started.

14. Cooling down of a nuclear power plant

At 11.18 am, the nuclear reactor's protection was triggered by a first-class emergency signal.

The battery-free cooling system for the nuclear reactor was automatically turned on.

At 11.19, control of the power plant fittings and mechanisms was completely lost, with the exception of the Shtil system.

The shutdown of the nuclear reactor led to the shutdown of the turbogenerators and to the de-energization of the section of switched loads of the main switchboard. All mechanisms and devices of the ship that received power from the main switchboard load sections were de-energized.

The ship's consumers, which received power from sections of non-switchable loads of the main switchboard, switched to power supply from the battery.

15. Operation of diesel generator

At 11.17, the order was written in the “draft” logbook: “Prepare the diesel generator for operation.”

The diesel generator on the K-278 had an emergency start-up system, which ensured that it could be put into operation by one trained specialist in a time not exceeding 10 minutes, even in the absence of electricity on the ship, the VVD, as well as when the hydraulic system was not working and the temperature in the compartment was low. At 11.25 the diesel generator was put into operation but at 11.47 it was stopped due to lack of cooling (the cooling pump could not be turned on).

At 11.57, senior lieutenant S.E. Markov received orders to sort out the power supply to the cooling pump

At 13.05 the diesel generator cooling pump was started.

At 13.33, the diesel generator was started and the electrical load was taken on, which subsequently ensured an uninterrupted supply of electricity to the ship.

At 11.57, sailor R.K. Filippov was unable to service the diesel generator due to carbon monoxide poisoning, and he was replaced by senior lieutenant S.E. Markov.

Witness midshipman V.F. Slyusarenko remembers that he saw sailor Filippov trying to join

IDA-59. He couldn’t do it, and Slyusarenko helped him get into the apparatus. Later, due to carbon monoxide poisoning, Filippov became ill, and he was sent (by decision of the commander) to the bridge of the ship. It should be noted that in the future, instead of sailor Filippov, the commander of the 2nd division (electrical), captain 3rd rank A. M. Ispenkov, assigned to the cruise from the main crew, was forced to handle the maintenance of the diesel generator until the end of the accident.

From the above it follows that only 2 hours 16 minutes after the order was given by the nuclear submarine personnel, the diesel generator was started and the load was taken on it. There were no objective reasons for such a long execution of the order of the Civil Police. This fact indicates insufficient training of the crew members in charge of the diesel generator.

16. Sealing compartments

The investigation also established that, in accordance with the requirements of Art. 91 RBZh-PL-82, the personnel of the compartments in the event of a fire must, without orders, seal the compartment, turn off emergency electrical equipment that does not affect the control of the submarine, and check the readiness of stationary fire extinguishing equipment.

However, the personnel of compartments II, III, V and VI did not complete the mandatory initial actions to seal the compartments, the personnel of compartment I did not check the fire extinguishing means, the operator of the power plant control panel did not close the seacock of the stern tube seal cooling system,

the operator of the rudder control panel did not de-energize the control panel, and the personnel of compartment IV did not disconnect the control and blocking cable of the primary circuit pump No. 1, going to compartment VII.

As a result, at 11.21 there was an outbreak in the low-speed launch station of the primary circuit pump No. 1, located in compartment IV, the reactor compartment became smoke-filled, and the personnel had to seek refuge in the equipment enclosure of the compartment.

17. Fire at the control center

At 11.22 a fire occurred in the transformer unit of the power supply network for the rudder indicators, located in the rudder control panel. The personnel of the III compartment were forced to join the means personal protection, which complicated the fight for the survivability of the nuclear submarine.

To extinguish the control panel fire, personnel attempted to use the VPL system and a fire extinguisher. However, stationary fire protection system The VPL, located in compartment I, turned out to be discharged, and the fire extinguisher was faulty.

According to the entry in the “draft” logbook, at 11.27 a command was given to compartment I to reload the VPL station, which was completed at 11.37.

The fire was extinguished at 11.37.

Of the fifteen minutes required to extinguish the fire, five minutes were spent dismantling the smoking console, nine minutes were spent recharging the fire extinguishing station in compartment I and attempting to extinguish the fire with a faulty fire extinguisher, and less than one minute was spent putting out the fire.

18. Who discharged the IDPs?

At 11.22 the IDP installation turned out to be discharged.

It has been established that the only reason why the IDP turned out to be discharged could be its use to extinguish a fire in compartment VII by the senior sailor N. O. Bukhnikashvili, the watchman of this compartment, in the period before the announcement of an emergency alarm on the ship.

There is not a single mention of the use of VDPs by midshipman V.V. Kolotilin to extinguish the fire in compartment VI, either in the “draft” logbook or in the testimony of witnesses who were in the central control center during the accident.

The “draft” logbook contains the following entries:

11.46 - “Report the temperature in compartment V”;

11.47 - “Defense lines in compartment IV - bow and stern bulkheads, in III - aft bulkhead”;

11.58 - “There is no communication with the fourth (compartment). There are approximately nine people in compartment IV.”

18. Flash in compartment V

These records clearly indicate that the outbreak in compartment V occurred no earlier than 11.46, and the VPL could not be discharged to extinguish the consequences of the gas mixture outbreak in compartment V, which caused burns to seven of the eight crew members in the compartment.

Gas mixture in compartment V reached a fire hazardous concentration due to the fact that the personnel of the BC-5 turbine group did not return the system to its original position after oil separation.

Flue gases from compartment VII, through the pipeline of the oil separation system that was not brought into its original position, entered the circulating oil tank of the turbopump units, located in the aft part of compartment V, and heated and foamed the oil in it. Oil vapors and aerosols were discharged into compartment V through the oil vapor suction system.

When the oil pump stopped (apparently from a spark in the switching equipment), a fire (flash) occurred in compartment V on the upper deck, in the area of ​​the central passage.

The blue color of the flash indicates an increased oxygen content in the compartment and confirms the oxygen cause of the fire in compartment VII.

19. The main direction of the fight for survivability

According to Art. 38 RBZh-PL-82, the submarine commander had to choose the main direction in the fight for survivability. In these specific circumstances of the accident, the commander was obliged to concentrate all the forces and capabilities of the crew and the ship on localizing and extinguishing the fire, as well as control the pressure in the emergency compartments and in the air pressure system, and subsequently monitor changes in the longitudinal stability and unsinkability of the ship.

Instead, according to the entries in the “draft” logbook, the GKP, without finding out the reasons for the resulting list to the left side, was engaged in straightening it in the period from 11.34 to 13.57.

At the same time, as a result of filling the central gas tank, the reserve of buoyancy decreased and the reserve of airborne fluid, necessary to maintain the longitudinal stability of the ship, was consumed.

At 13.57, after straightening the list to the left side, as a result of spontaneous flooding of Central City Hospital No. 10 on the starboard side, the list moved to the starboard side and, according to the entry in the “draft” logbook, at 16.40 this list was 6°.

Thus, the fight against the roll turned out to be not only useless, but also harmful. Time, the high-pressure air (VVD-400) required for the ship, and buoyancy reserve were lost.

An inspection of the sunken K-278 established that there was no damage to the light hull in the stern area. At the same time, there is no rubber coating in the area of ​​Central City Hospital No. 10 on the starboard side. There is no damage to the rubber coating on the field side.

This is explained by the fact that hot flue gases from the emergency VI compartment only entered Central City Hospital No. 10 on the starboard side, causing heating of the light hull and peeling of the rubber coating.

This circumstance confirms that Central City Hospital No. 10 on the left side was filled with water and was not purged when the submarine surfaced, which was the reason for the formation of a list to the left side.

20. Fire products in the ShDA

Since compartments II, III and V were filled with smoke, the personnel of these compartments were wearing personal protective equipment, including stationary breathing system apparatus (SBR).

The GKP knew about this, however, wanting to avoid the loss of air supply from the cylinders of the VVD jumpers Nos. 1, 2 and 3, at 11.58, without warning, he ordered the closure of the subgroup valves of the cylinders of these VVD jumpers and thereby blocked the access of air to the stationary respiratory system.

These actions of the GKP were erroneous, because to stop the loss of air from the VVD jumper cylinders Nos. 1, 2 and 3, it was enough to close three valves on the VVD-200, VZU and VSD lines located in the third compartment.

As a result of these erroneous actions of the GKP, flue gases from compartment VII entered the stationary respiratory system through the VSD line and then into the SDA apparatus. The personnel of the II and III compartments, included in the SDA devices, received poisoning of varying degrees.

In compartment V, two - midshipman S.S. Bondar and sailor V.Yu. Kulapin, included in the ShDA, died from carbon monoxide poisoning.

In addition, as a result of the disconnection of a subgroup of VVD jumper cylinders Nos. 1, 2 and 3, the nuclear submarine was deprived of means of combating survivability: it was impossible to recharge the VPL station in compartment I and use air reserves to maintain buoyancy and longitudinal stability.

21. Reconnaissance in the aft compartments

At 11.10 (entry in the “draft” logbook) an emergency party of eight people was prepared, not counting the scouts.

Since 11.21 there was no communication with the stern. But only at 12.06 a group of scouts was sent to compartment IV.

The commander of the BC-5 survivability division went on reconnaissance missions - to the detriment of his direct duties, which he was not involved in practically throughout the entire accident.

At 12.33, two people were removed from the IV compartment by an emergency party from the equipment enclosure - Lieutenant A.V. Mahota and Midshipman M.N. Valyavin.

At 13.05, six people were removed from the V compartment by an emergency party - captain-lieutenant N.A. Volkov, midshipman V.F. Tkachev, sailor Yu.V. Kozlov, captain-lieutenant S.A. Dvorov, midshipman S.V. Zamogilny and lieutenant A. A. Shostak.

At 13.27, sailor V.Yu. Kulapin was evacuated from compartment V, and at 13.41, midshipman S.S. Bondar. Both were unconscious, they were using the ShDA for breathing, they were the last to be evacuated from compartment V.

11 people took part in the emergency parties and reconnaissance, while the commander of the survivability division, Captain 3rd Rank V.A. Yudin, went to the aft compartments eight times during the accident.

During the evacuation of personnel from the IV and V compartments, emergency parties and the main command post showed perseverance, courage and, despite some mistakes, skill, and the main credit for this belongs to the commander of the survivability division, captain 3rd rank V. A. Yudin.

22. Reducing pressure in compartments VI and VII

According to the entries in the “draft” logbook, at 12.35 the flow of smoke into the hold of compartment III stopped. This meant that the pressure in the emergency compartments dropped from 13 kg/cm 2 , which was noted at 11.50, up to 3 kg/cm 2 .

The main volume of flue gases exited through the destroyed blowing pipeline of Central City Hospital No. 10 on the starboard side (into the tank) and heated the light body of this tank. As a result, the rubber coating of the light hull in the area of ​​Central City Hospital No. 10 on the starboard side was damaged. This violation was noted during the inspection of the nuclear submarine by the Mir deep-sea submersibles in 1991–1992.

At approximately 2 p.m., the pressure in the emergency compartments decreased and became equal to about 0.5 kg/cm3 2 redundant. From this moment, as follows from calculations, sea water began to flow into compartment VII of the K-278.

In accordance with Art. 72 RBZh-PL-82 GKP was obliged to announce an emergency alarm “Water ingress into compartment VII” and take measures to preserve the buoyancy and longitudinal stability of the ship.

This was not done.

23. Water flow into compartment VII

Due to the fact that defense lines were not created during the fire, the water entering the VII compartment continued to displace smoke gases into the ship's compartments, exiting through the oxygen pipeline of the air regeneration system, through the pipeline for remote control of the high pressure valves and through the labyrinth seals of the TCNA pumping units and in SDA system.

Starting from 11.42, the GKP repeatedly made attempts to relieve pressure from emergency compartments VI and VII to reduce the intensity of the fire in these compartments. These attempts were justified in the initial period.

According to the entry in the “draft” logbook, at 11.50 the pressure in the emergency compartments reached 13 kg/cm 2 , with a design strength of the bulkhead between V and VI compartments equal to 10 kg/cm 2 .

24. Pressure drop in compartments VI and VII

At 11.56 a spontaneous drop in pressure began in the emergency compartments. From that moment on, the GKP's attempts to relieve pressure from the emergency compartments led to their earlier flooding and earlier death of the ship.

Such attempts were made, according to the entry in the “draft” logbook and the testimony of crew members, at 13.33 (testimony of Lieutenant Commander S.A. Dvorov), at 13.44 and at 13.55.

It cannot be ruled out that an attempt to relieve pressure from the emergency compartments was carried out by the Civil Command at about 16.20.

Witness V.V. Gerashchenko said during interrogation that actions to relieve pressure from compartments VI and VII were taken by the commander of the warhead-5, captain 2nd rank V.I. Babenko. The witness stated this:

“At the same time, Captain 3rd Rank A. A. Volodin reported that the plane was asking about casualties on the boat, and what kind of help we needed. Vanin told Volodin: “Report that we have four dead.” At this time, Babenko shouted to Vanin: “Why are you burying them ahead of time, they may have hid behind the pump in the sixth and are alive, there a good place, I taught this to Kolotilin. Bukhnikashvili is probably there too. You just need to bleed the air from compartment VI.”

After this, Babenko told Volodin: “Tell the plane that we have two dead.”

At approximately 16.20, Yudin, who returned again from compartment V, reported that the bulkheads were cooling down, that he tried to bleed air from VI into compartment V, but (from compartment VI) fumes and smoke poured out...

Commander Vanin, as if asking Babenko, said, “How to bleed off the air? Let's gas the boat again. We have to somehow throw it overboard.”

Babenko replied to Vanin: “I know how to relieve the pressure from the sixth overboard.” After that, I personally saw and heard how Babenko, through the speaking tube, shouted to Captain 3rd Rank Ispenkov, who was servicing a working diesel generator: “Do what you want, but so that I have 220/400.” Then Babenko went to the remote control and began pressing buttons on it. At the same time, he ran away from the remote control somewhere several times, then returned and continued to press the buttons.

I saw the green and yellow lights on the remote control light up. ...Babenko continued to work on the remote control, and suddenly the boat began to shake violently. There was a feeling that it was as if the Central City Hospital was being purged.

Vanin, who was sitting in his chair, jumped up and shouted at Babenko: “...! What did you do!?!". After that Vanin ran upstairs...

At this time Babenko shouted: “Kadantseva to me,” and ran to the stern of compartment III...

Seeing that everyone was suddenly running around, I quickly went down to the gyropost. I remember exactly (I looked at my watch) - the time was 16.40...

I ran to the second compartment to remove power from the shields to all navigational instruments.

In the corridor of compartment II, I met midshipman S.I. Chernikov and senior lieutenant S.E. Markov, and shouted to them: “What are you doing here? The boat is sinking! They were surprised, and one of them said: “Why would she drown?”

At the same time, the commander, Captain 1st Rank Vanin, appeared again. He ran into his cabin in compartment II, grabbed the “diplomat” and shouted: “Everyone up!” The boat is sinking!

Witness A.V. Zaitsev, during the same period of time, which V.V. Gerashchenko testified above, felt, while in the corridor of compartment II, how the stern part of the boat was winding from side to side.

About this period he reported:

“Somewhere around 16.15, with the permission of the commander, I again went to the cabin in order to dress even warmer, because it became much cooler in the central station than it was before due to the operation of the diesel generator and exhaust ventilation. The commander of the BC-5, Captain 2nd Rank Babenko, remained at the OKS control panel instead of me again.

I stayed in the cabin for about 10 minutes. Coming out of the cabin and being in the corridor of compartment II, I felt the stern of the boat twisting from side to side. What it was, I still don’t know. At that time I thought it was a large wave.

I immediately went to the CPU. When I arrived at the CPU, I saw that the commander of the ship, Captain 1st Rank Vanin, was not there. I don't know where he was. Babenko looked confused. Yudin was next to him.

I went up to the OKS control panel - it attracted my attention with its unusual condition. Along the way, I looked at the roll and trim instruments. I clearly remember that the trim at that moment increased, during my absence, from 1.5° to 3.5–4.0° aft, which I immediately reported to the commander of the warhead-5.

I don’t know the reason for the rapid increase in trim in such a short period of time, and no one explained anything to me.”

25. The commander of the crew of the Il-38 aircraft about the situation of the damaged nuclear submarine

G.V. Petrogradskikh, commander of the crew of the Il-38 aircraft, reported on the position of the emergency K-278 in the period from 16.27:

“The position of the emergency submarine from the moment we observed it until 16.26–27 changed practically little. In the period from 14.40 to 16.26–27, the boat had a slight trim. I didn’t determine how many degrees it was until 16.26–27. At the same time, I remember well that until 16.26–27, the nuclear submarine’s stabilizer was constantly above the water, and we observed it well.

Until 16.20 we observed a slight seething of water in the stern area. We didn’t see any oil stains on the water around the boat, that’s for sure...

At 16.20 I decided to once again direct my plane to the floating base “A. Khlobystov" to adjust its course to the emergency boat. ... Having flown up, at approximately 16.23, to the floating base and adjusting its course to the emergency boat, I again returned to K-278. We had already flown up and observed it visually.

At the same time (16.27) a report was received from the boat that they were observing periodic explosions in the stern. I thought that debris was about to fly away from the boat, but instead I saw that it had noticeably sank to the stern. Its stabilizer went under water, and I never saw it again.

In the felling area there was a noticeable bubbling of water, like a whirlpool. Visually it seemed that air was being released into the spinning water. All this happened from both sides of the boat behind the wheelhouse.

Immediately after this, at about 16.30, from the boat, when I asked if they would need evacuation, they answered that they would.”

27. Actions of the PCU

The investigation has not reliably established what specific actions were carried out by the State Police.

From a technical point of view, these could be:

Opening from the OKS console the bulkhead flaps of the aft ring of general ventilation, the hydraulic drive of which is located in compartment VI;

Opening from the same remote control the ventilation valves of the Central City Hospital Nos. 8, 9 and 10, the hydraulic machines of which are located in compartment VI. In this case, the working fluid reserves of the ship's general hydraulic system could be used.

Due to the relatively low intensity of the fire in compartment VI, which is confirmed by the low temperature of the bulkheads between compartments V and VI (+115 °C at 15.57), according to entries in the “draft” logbook, control of the fittings of this compartment associated with the fight is carried out from the OKS console for survivability, it could have been preserved.

The implementation of one of these measures could sharply worsen the situation of the nuclear submarine in terms of maintaining its buoyancy and longitudinal stability.

28. Analysis of the development of the accident on K-278

The analysis gives grounds to conclude that on April 7, 1989, the boat’s main command and control team and its crew untimely and improperly carried out actions to combat survivability.

The fire on the ship, in compartment VII, was not detected and localized in a timely manner, as a result of which it reached high intensity and proceeded for a long time at high pressure. This led to depressurization of the devices sealing the durable hull and the entry of sea water into compartment VII. And due to the fact that the crew did not take steps to seal the compartments, water entered all compartments of the nuclear submarine, which led to its flooding.

29. The death of the ship and the rescue of personnel

In accordance with Art. 20 of the “Combat Training Course for Nuclear Submarines” (KAPL-VMF-87), upon acceptance of the L-1 task from the crew in full, the flagship specialists of the search and rescue service of the fleet check the readiness of rescue equipment and the ability of personnel to use them.

It was established that before entering combat service, the L-1 mission was not accepted from the combat units and services of the second crew by its commander on the nuclear submarine.

The flagship specialists of the fleet search and rescue service did not take part in the acceptance of this task by the formation headquarters.

As a result, the K-278 entered combat service with untested life-saving equipment in terms of readiness for use and with untrained personnel in terms of the ability to use these means.

Thus, the assistant commander of the nuclear submarine, Lieutenant Commander A.G. Verezgov, who was in charge of the PSNL-20 life rafts, did not know how to prepare these rafts for release and use. When questioned by members of the Government Commission, he stated that he had not read the operating instructions for the VSK, on ​​the body of which there were sealed containers with rafts.

It was also established that when the K-278 went under water, five people found themselves in the pop-up chamber (VSK) (1st rank captain E. A. Vanin, 3rd rank captain V. A. Yudin, midshipmen A. V. Krasnobaev, S.I. Chernikov and V.F. Slyusarenko), of whom only midshipman V.F. Slyusarenko survived.

To return the VSK, it was necessary to initially close the lower conning hatch located on the durable hull of the K-278. Closing this hatch was possible only after dismantling the air supply hose to the VSK, connected by midshipman Kadantsev on the orders of the Civil Command to carry out oxygen barotherapy during the initial period of the accident, then removing the ladder, and then performing all those actions that were performed by captain 3rd rank Yudin during stay in VSK.

Due to the hasty abandonment of the ship, the personnel did not remove either the hose for supplying air to the VSK or the ladder. Under these conditions, the VSK could separate only when the pressure inside the strong hull of the ship equalized with the outboard one, i.e., only when the ship was on the ground. It was established that the VSK gave way after the ship hit the ground.

As a result of failure to take measures to combat survivability while in the VSK after the ship was sunk, Captain 1st Rank E. A. Vanin, Captain 3rd Rank V. A. Yudin and Midshipman A. V. Krasnobaev died.

Due to ignorance of the rules for opening the upper deckhouse hatch of the VSK, midshipman S.I. Chernikov died.

The statement of witness V.F. Slyusarenko that when the VSK surfaced, the latch of the top cover of the top hatch of the VSK was immediately torn off by excess pressure does not correspond to reality.

An inspection of the VSK located on the ground revealed that the latch of the top hatch cover is in good condition and has no damage. This circumstance indicates that the latch of the top hatch cover was opened by Chernikov in a normal manner, without first releasing the pressure.

January 30, 1992, which provides for the implementation of more than a hundred measures to improve the fire protection and unsinkability of submarines, as well as the implementation of more than a hundred additional studies in the same direction. In addition, Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated August 23, 1990 No. 883–117 provided for the implementation by enterprises of other ministries of thirty-three research and development work and nine activities aimed at increasing the reliability and fire resistance of equipment and improving the means of life of personnel in emergency conditions and fire extinguishing means.

32. At the same time, the investigation established:

The Navy leadership did not inform the submarine crews of the actual circumstances of the accident and death of K-278.

The leadership of the Navy has made adjustments to the “Combat Training Course for Nuclear Submarines” (KAPL-87), entailing a reduction in the requirements for the level of combat and professional training of crews.

The commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral O. A. Erofeev, formed a commission, which, based on unreliable and false information, created a document called “Analysis of preparation and expert review preparedness of the second crew of the nuclear submarine K-278, analysis of the accident, actions of personnel to combat survivability, rescue of personnel of the nuclear submarine “Komsomolets”, giving a distorted idea of ​​the circumstances and causes of the disaster.

The 1st Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense has not yet developed “Guidelines for the combat use of technical equipment” (RBITS) for nuclear submarines of the latest projects.

In response to the above shortcomings and violations of the requirements of the Law, governing documents and orders of the Navy, a proposal was submitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy “On eliminating the causes and conditions that contributed to the disaster of the Komsomolets nuclear submarine.”

33. The investigation examined the materials of the Government Commission to investigate the causes and circumstances nuclear submarine disaster"Komsomolets"

It was established that the act of the Government Commission does not reflect the actual circumstances of the disaster.

Thus, the act of the Government Commission states that on February 28, 1989, K-278 went to sea for combat service in good condition.

The investigation established that the K-278 entered combat service with two faulty oxygen automatic gas analyzer sensors in compartments VII and V.

The accident revealed that the fire extinguishers installed on the nuclear submarine were unsuitable for use.

When surfacing, the submarine surfaced with a list to the left side. The ascent was carried out by blowing through the Central City Hospital of the middle group and end groups using an emergency method. The presence of a 6° roll to the left side indicates a malfunction of the purge system.

The act of the Government Commission states that “in terms of the level of combat training and technical condition, the K-278 submarine with its second crew met the requirements for ships of permanent readiness forces.”

This statement is not true.

The investigation established that on February 28, 1989, the second crew of K-278, which had lost its linearity, set out to sea. This crew was prohibited from going to sea in accordance with RBS-76.

The statement in the act of the Government Commission that “firm statutory order and military discipline were maintained in the crew” is far from being fully true.

Since there is no actual data about true reasons the working group did not have a fire, then sections of the working group in the process of work put forward and considered numerous options and hypothetical causes of the fire... The versions put forward should have made it possible to more or less plausibly explain the cause of the fire, even with minimal chances of a fire starting in certain emergency conditions. Among these versions is the version about the unauthorized switching on of the oil heater, which satisfied the above approach.

The version about the “ringing mode of operation of the steering hydraulic pumps” as the cause of the fire in compartment VII, from which the accident on K-278 began on April 7, 1989, had grounds for inclusion among the probable versions for the same general reasons as the version about unauthorized activation of the oil heater...

The said letter stated that the version of the “bell mode” has not been confirmed in the practice of many years of operation of all third-generation nuclear submarines, which are equipped with the same steering hydraulic pumps and their control system as on the Komsomolets nuclear submarine.

34.3. The statement in the act of the Government Commission that a short circuit “recorded” by personnel in the distribution board of compartment VII can be considered as a consequence of the fire of the specified launch stations is not true, as it is technically unfounded.

If these starting stations caught fire, the protection in the distribution board of the non-switchable load would be activated, and the circuit breakers of this board would turn off the faulty stations. A short circuit on the switchboard occurred for a reason that had nothing to do with it, fully and to the greatest extent meeting the requirements for reliability and fire safety that were in force during the design, construction and delivery of the nuclear submarine. The fulfillment of these requirements at all stages of the creation of the nuclear submarine was controlled by representatives of the customer from the Navy.”

According to the conclusion of the commission of forensic technical examination dated December 9, 1997, “... the level of reliability of the electric power system and its elements specified and implemented in the Komsomolets nuclear submarine project did not affect the escalation of an emergency situation into a catastrophe.”

34.5. The statement in the act of the Government Commission that the K-278 was equipped with “...standard fire extinguishing means that are ineffective in conditions of high pressure in the compartments, as well as insufficiently advanced rescue equipment” is not objective.

The Navy's requirements for fire and explosion protection of submarines require that fire-fighting equipment and systems must perform their functions, maintain technical characteristics within established standards, and not allow false alarms under certain specific operating conditions. Navy requirements provide for the use of a certain brand of refrigerant as a fire extinguisher, its consumption rate and other system parameters.

The LOH system on the nuclear submarine was made in accordance with the above requirements and ensured fire extinguishing in no more than 60 seconds at any stage of its development with normal oxygen content in the compartment atmosphere and normal pressure before the fire.

The inspection of the fire extinguishing properties of the VOC system conducted by the working group of the Government Commission gave positive results.

Due to the late announcement of the emergency alarm and the non-arrival of personnel in compartment VI, there is no reason to assert that the LOX system was used to extinguish the fire in compartment VII.

In addition, due to the failure of the Civil Code to comply with the mandatory primary actions provided for in Art. 89 and 121 RBZh-PL-82 to disconnect the main lines of the high-pressure engine system passing into the emergency compartment, and to bleed air reserves from the emergency jumper of the high-pressure engine in the VII compartment, a pressure of up to 13 kg/cm was created 2 , which excluded the possibility of using the LOX system.

During the construction of the K-278, there were no standard fire-fighting means effective under pressure conditions above 2 kg/cm3 and to this day have not been created. 2 , which is confirmed by a letter from TsKBMT "Rubin" dated January 21, 1998. The LOH system is still the most effective means fire fighting, as evidenced by the following statistics from the 1st Central Research Institute of the Moscow Region as of 1989:

Over twenty years, out of 50 fires and ignitions on submarines, 16 fires (32%) were extinguished by the LOX system, two fires (4%) by the VPL air-foam system, two fires (4%) by sealing the compartments, two fires (4%) - water. The remaining fires were stopped by de-energizing the electrical equipment or extinguished after an explosion of the air-hydrogen mixture.

The joint decision taken by the SMEs of the USSR and the Navy on October 17, 1975 to replace the remotely controlled electromagnetic valves of the LOX system with manually controlled valves on all third-generation submarines was not technically justified, since at the time the decision was made on submarines of one of the projects an LOX system with valves that had a pneumatic drive and manipulators with electric and manual control was installed and tested. The adoption of this decision, as well as the long production time of new fittings for the LOX system, led to a significant reduction technical characteristics systems, which could not but affect the fight against the fire on K-278.

The investigation established that:

During the construction of the Komsomolets nuclear submarine, there were no standard fire-fighting means that would be effective under high pressure conditions (over 2 kg/cm 2 );

During the construction of the Komsomolets nuclear submarine, the Navy did not have more advanced life-saving equipment than those used on this nuclear submarine. By 1989, K-278 was the only nuclear submarine on which two PSPL-20 life rafts were placed on the VSK hull, i.e., outside the pressure hull compartments, for ease of access and operational condition. The preparation of these rafts for use on the Komsomolets nuclear submarine could be done faster than on other submarines, and without significant effort, using reliable and very easy-to-use devices.

34.6. Of the diving suits and rescue bibs (PSU) on board K-278 for all personnel, 15 life jackets for the mooring crew, two LAS-5M rescue boats, two PSNL-20 life rafts with a capacity of 25 people each and allowing overload during the evacuation of the crew due to poor training of personnel and poor organization, only one life jacket and one life raft were used, which was the main reason for the mass death of submariners 8 .

34.7. The statement in the act of the Government Commission that the K-278 had design deficiencies in the means of supporting the life of personnel in an emergency is also untrue.

The K-278, like other third-generation nuclear submarines, has the following means ensuring the life of personnel in an emergency:

Ship's stationary breathing system (SDS) with hose breathing apparatus (SHDA), ensuring the presence of personnel in emergency compartments No. 1 and No. 2 when ready;

Insulating gas masks (IP-46) for respiratory protection at normal pressure in the emergency compartment for all personnel with a 10% reserve:

Self-contained breathing apparatus (IDA-59M) for respiratory protection at high pressure in the emergency compartment for all personnel with a 10% reserve.

For the indicated means there are no specific design flaws The government commission did not identify it.

34.8. The investigation established that K-278 entered combat service on February 28, 1989 with a set of self-contained breathing apparatus (IDA-59) of an old design, to be replaced by the Navy's content authorities with apparatus of the new design IDA-59M in accordance with a joint decision of the Navy and the USSR SME dated September 19, 1983

According to the conclusion of the commission of forensic technical examination dated December 19, 1997, “during the operation of the SDS system, the entry of polluted air into the SDA is structurally excluded.”

From the letters of I. D. Spassky and Yu. N. Kormilitsin addressed to the investigation, it follows: “The introduction of new rescue equipment of the SSP type with the IDA-59M apparatus on the Komsomolets nuclear submarine should have been carried out in accordance with the decision of the Navy and SMEs dated September 19, 1983 G.

In pursuance of this decision and within the established time frame, the Rubin Central Design Bureau of Marine Engineering in 1984 issued and sent out an order sheet according to a standard order, which provided for the replacement of the Komsomolets nuclear submarine ISP-60 with IDA-59 devices with the SSP with IDA-59M devices.

According to the same decision, in 1984 the supply sheet was adjusted to include SSP equipment.

The replacement of equipment had to be carried out by the Navy's supply organizations in accordance with the specified order list and within the time frame determined by the directives of the Navy, of which the Rubin Central Design Bureau of Medical Technologies is not aware."

34.9. The statement in the act of the Government Commission that “a large amount of flammable materials were used” on the K-278 is not objective.

In accordance with working documentation The third generation nuclear submarine, the developer of which is the Rubin Central Design Bureau, the amount of flammable materials used for finishing the premises of submarines is characterized by the amount of flammable materials in kilograms and the percentage of flammable materials from the normal displacement of the nuclear submarine.

A comparison of these data for three third-generation nuclear submarine projects shows that the K-278, in terms of the level of flammable materials used for interior decoration, does not differ from other third-generation nuclear submarines developed by the Rubin Central Design Bureau.

The same level of flammable materials is used on submarines designed by other design bureaus. And this is understandable, because when designing bureaus, they are guided by the same regulatory and technical documents and use the same non-metallic materials. Some discrepancies in the percentage of combustible materials on nuclear submarines of different projects can be explained by design features these submarines.

Thus, the level of flammable materials used on submarines reflects the real state of the country’s industry in terms of the production of materials used for finishing premises.

In addition, due to the increase in the number of K-278 crew to 69 people (with a design strength of 57 people), part of the stored provisions and supplies was placed in the provision rooms due to the lack of free space, in violation project documentation, in compartment VII, which increased the flammable load and reduced the fire resistance of this compartment.

From the conclusion of the commission forensic technical examination dated December 19, 1997, it follows that the layout and placement of electrical equipment, oil tanks, and turbine oil separation unit were carried out in accordance with the requirements of regulatory and technical documentation. The conclusion further states:

“The use of materials for finishing premises during the design and construction of the nuclear submarine pr.685 was determined by the Regulations on the selection of non-metallic materials for thermal insulation, finishing and equipment of nuclear submarine premises”, taking into account their fire resistance and toxicity. Due to the lack of polymer non-flammable adhesives produced by the domestic industry, flammable putties and flammable polyamide film were used on the nuclear submarine pr.685.”

In their responses, the Deputy Chairman of the “Shipbuilding” section of the working group of the Government Commission, the Head and General Designer of the Rubin Central Design Bureau, I. D. Spassky, and a member of this section, General Designer Yu. N. Kormilitsin, evaluate the work of the section and representatives of the Navy of the working group as follows:

“...It should be noted that the “Shipbuilding” section in its work, firstly, experienced certain difficulties in obtaining reliable information about some of the actions of personnel and, secondly, had to take into account the official publication of May 11, 1989 in the Pravda newspaper " messages about awarding crew members of the nuclear submarine "Komsomolets", which contained an assessment of the actions of the personnel: "In a critical situation, the crew acted with utmost courage and technical competence, fighting to save the ship."

This publication, apparently, became an orientation for representatives of the Navy in the working group of the Government Commission, and therefore the consideration of the circumstances and versions of the accident took place mainly in a “technogenic” direction, without in-depth analysis and taking into account the human factor.

It must be assumed that for this reason, in the combined act of the two sections, the actions of personnel in the fight for the survivability of the submarine are reflected briefly and one-sidedly, in contrast to the “technical aspects of the accident.”

According to the expert opinion dated December 19, 1997, the design of the nuclear submarine’s devices and systems was not the cause of the mass loss of people and the ship.

35.2. Most probable cause The fire in the VII compartment of K-278 on April 7, 1989 is the spontaneous combustion of flammable materials under conditions of uncontrolled oxygen supply to the compartment from the electrochemical air regeneration system - the investigation came to this conclusion after analyzing all the evidence collected in the case.

The government commission and Navy specialists rejected the oxygen version as the cause of the fire.

The specified procedure for distributing oxygen is a violation of the operating instructions for the ERV-M system, according to which, if the gas analyzer MH-5134 fails, the supply of oxygen must be carried out by the compartment watch by opening the oxygen distribution valve.

A few days before the fire, a portable gas analyzer for oxygen in compartment VII failed, and during these days the oxygen content in the compartment was not monitored, although UII regularly reported that the oxygen content in the compartment was normal (testimony of witness Kozlov).

Before the accident, 10–20 liters of turbine oil was spilled in compartment VII, which was cleaned up over several days. The oil was removed using a rag.

According to the entries in the “draft” logbook, on April 7, 1989 at 14.07 in the hold of compartment II, the content of carbon monoxide in the compartment atmosphere was 5–6 g/m 3 and a source of smoke was detected located on the starboard side in the area of ​​the reversible converter and the 400 Hz current converter.

In this area of ​​compartment II there was an oxygen distributor, which, according to Gregulev’s testimony, was also constantly open. This fact suggests that before the start of the fire, the oxygen supply valve to compartment VII on the oxygen manifold of the electrolyzer was open and oxygen was supplied to the compartment.

During a fire in compartment VII, due to an increase in pressure in it, flue gases through the oxygen distributor in compartment VII entered the oxygen pipeline, then into the oxygen manifold and exited through the open valve on the distributor of compartment II into this compartment.

The entry in the “draft” logbook for July 14 is actual confirmation of the oxygen version of the fire.

36. Thus, the investigation established:

1. The design of the devices and systems of the K-278 Komsomolets nuclear submarine was not the cause of the death of it and its crew.

2. Violation of the requirements of the Navy guidelines on combat training led to the fact that on February 28, 1989.

5. The nuclear submarine K-278 is located at a depth of 1655 meters in the Norwegian Sea. Its lifting and inspection to determine the causes of the fire and flooding is currently impossible for technical reasons.

It is this circumstance that does not allow us to conclude that the evidence collected in the case is sufficient to provide grounds for bringing charges of a crime.

Taking into account the above, guided by paragraph 3 of Part I of Art. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR, ruled:

Criminal case No. 2697-89 regarding the disaster of the nuclear submarine Komsomolets is suspended.

A copy of the resolution should be sent to the Chief Military Prosecutor.

Senior investigator

on particularly important matters

under the Chief Military Prosecutor

Lieutenant Colonel of Justice G.V. Tselovalnikov.

REFERENCE

TsKBMT "Rubin" has the technical ability, with the participation of an investigator, to inspect the position of the ventilation valves of the aft main ballast tanks and the main ballast tank of the K-278 submarine with deep-sea manned underwater vehicles.

This will make it possible to find out the reason for the flooding of the emergency compartments of the submarine and confirm or refute the version of “explosions” and the actions of the State Control Committee on final stage and will make it possible to draw a conclusion about the sufficiency of the evidence collected in the case to provide grounds for bringing charges of a crime.

Senior investigator for particularly important cases

under the Chief Military Prosecutor, Lieutenant Colonel of Justice G.V. Tselovalnikov

Notes:

A submariner in rescue equipment with an IDA-59 or IDA-59M individual breathing apparatus climbs through the open back cover into the empty tube of the torpedo tube, then the back cover closes, the tube is filled with water, after which the front cover opens, and the submariner exits the tube and floats to the surface in compliance with the decompression regime. Note ed.

The chief of staff of the flotilla is responsible for the organization of service in the flotilla and, naturally, for the strict implementation of the requirements of the Ship's Charter as the basis of this organization. The clearance of submarines to go to sea on the basis of combat training plans, control over their actual training, inspections and reports from flag specialists of formation headquarters on their readiness are organized by the chief of staff of the flotilla. Note auto

The standard for the “Combat Training Course” for practicing tasks L-1 and L-2 sets a period of at least 24 hours. Note auto

Only one submarine in the world sank 1000 meters under water

Remember this date: August 4, 1984. It was on this day that the nuclear submarine K-278, which five years later became infamous as the Komsomolets, made an unprecedented dive in the history of world naval navigation - the needles of its depth gauges first froze at the 1000-meter mark and then crossed it. Not a single combat submarine in the world could take shelter at such a depth - it would have been crushed soft-boiled. But the K-278 crew was protected by a super-strong titanium shell.

The former boss talks about what kind of ship it was Technical management Northern Fleet Rear Admiral-Engineer Nikolai Mormul:

In 1983, the nuclear submarine K-278 joined the USSR Navy. Myths later developed about this ship, the only one in the series. Thus, the Western press wrote that this is the largest submarine in the world: length - 122 meters, width - 11.5 meters, displacement - 9700 tons. She was considered the fastest. Neither of these were true. And yet the ship was a real miracle. Its ultra-strong titanium hull allowed diving to a depth that no boat in the world had ever reached - 1000 meters.

By the way, only on August 15, 1936, humanity was able to reach a depth of one kilometer. This achievement belongs to the French hydronaut - Professor Beebe and his colleague Barton. They plunged into the Atlantic near Bermuda in a bathysphere, each porthole of which was pressed by a force of 19 tons... But that was scientific experiment. We were building a combat boat, which was supposed to become the ancestor of a series of ultra-deep-sea atomics, a new subclass of submarines...

The boat took a long time to build. The case was made of pure titanium, and during the development of this metal many difficulties arose. It is aggressive to other metals, and the interfacing of titanium structures with serial equipment required new technical solutions. When titanium was saturated with hydrogen, cracks formed, so welding was carried out in a special gas environment. However, when the boat underwent deep sea testing at such staggering depths, all the efforts were worth it.

The unique titanium ship was compared to an orbital space station. Its main purpose was to study a complex of scientific, technical and oceanological problems. It was at the same time a laboratory, a test bench and a prototype of the future civil submarine fleet - faster than surface merchant and passenger ships, more reliable than aviation, because the operation of submarines does not depend on the season and weather.

On board the K-278 there was one nuclear installation and weapons: missiles and torpedoes, two of which had nuclear heads. However, the boat was not intended to be painted nuclear strikes along the coast: its combat mission was to protect against enemy submarine missile carriers - “city killers”.

So, on August 4, 1984, the Komsomolets reached the dive point, which was located in one of the deep-sea basins of the Norwegian Sea. The ship was commanded by Captain 1st Rank Yuri Zelensky, the senior on board was Hero of the Soviet Union Rear Admiral Evgeniy Chernov, commander of the 1st Flotilla of Nuclear Submarines, also Chairman of the State admissions committee. The main designers of the unique ship, Yuri Kormilitsyn and Dmitry Romanov, were also in the compartments.

Before the dive, all systems with outboard communication, torpedo tubes, weapons were carefully checked... - Evgeniy Dmitrievich Chernov talks about that memorable day. - We understood that from such a depth we might not emerge.

They went into the abyss slowly - along invisible hundred-meter steps, lingering at each of them to inspect the compartments. The testing program was extensive. They checked not only the tightness of the durable hull, but also the capabilities of firing torpedoes from great depths, and the Iridium emergency ascent system, which made it possible to purify the ballast tanks with gases from burnt powder bombs.

The kilometer-long dive took several tedious hours. Any minute could be the last in the life of the crew. It’s one thing when a test pilot risks himself and only himself, and also has a parachute, and another thing when you lead almost a hundred people to mortal risk and no parachutes behind your back...

The foreman of the team of navigator electricians K-278, reserve midshipman Veniamin Matveev, says:

That day, a black piece of paper was torn from the depth gauge at the central post, covering its secrecy scale for the sake of the maximum depth figure. We gasped: 900, 1000, 1100 meters... This is twice as much as an ordinary one can dive nuclear submarine!

Matveev and I are sitting on the main street of Voronezh, opposite the Captain Nemo cafe. Above the entrance, a model of the fantastic Nautilus, invented by Jules Verne, gleams in sea bronze. Next to me is a real person from a fantastic action: walking a thousand meters, beyond three maximum depths for ordinary atoms. And he talks about this as if it were an ordinary naval affair. Or rather, he tries to tell it like this, no, no, and breaking into enthusiastic patter, although more than a quarter of a century has passed. This is not forgotten.

When torpedo firing was announced at a depth of 800 meters, recalls Veniamin Matveev, my friend, midshipman Solomin, a torpedo technician, called me from the torpedo compartment: “Venya, come to us. If anything, then we’ll be together right away...”

Came to the bow compartment. The commander of the mine-torpedo warhead, Senior Lieutenant Trushin, was at the central post.

I stood next to my friend...

When they opened the front covers of the torpedo tubes, we saw how the rear ones trembled from the pressure of the depths. They trembled, but held back the monstrous outboard pressure. The torpedo came out fine... But the pressure grew. The propeller shafts suddenly bent, then resumed their shape. The stern tube seals were knocked out with sledgehammers. The linoleum on the decks was heaving.

K-278 navigator, captain 3rd rank Alexander Borodin:

The hydroacoustic, who ensured our dive from a surface ship, then shook his head: “Because of you, I almost turned gray. There was such a creaking sound, such a grinding sound...” But our strong body held out. His compression was such that my iron bed was bent like an onion...

At a working depth of 700 meters, the reactor was brought to 100 percent power. Finally, the boatswain, who controlled the horizontal rudders, reported:

Depth - a thousand meters! Roll - zero, trim - zero.

The depth gauge needle stopped at the four-digit number - 1000. There is a depth of one kilometer!

Rear Admiral Chernov got in touch with the compartments along the battle line and, looking at the depth gauge, in a trembling voice uttered the immortal phrase into the microphone of the intra-submarine communication: “Stop, just a moment!” Then he congratulated everyone, and the ship’s flag was carried through the compartments. Chernov took out a bottle of cognac and poured it into ten glasses, everyone clinked glasses with the chief designers. We drank and hugged.

There was no hurry to surface.
“The success must be consolidated,” said Chernov and turned to the chief designers of the boat, who were in the central post, Yuri Kormilitsyn and Dmitry Romanov:

If we dive another twenty meters, will we survive the possible failure?

“We must withstand it,” answered the creators of the titanium record holder. The chief builder of the ship, Mikhail Chuvakin, also nodded - he won’t crush it.

And they went to a depth of 1027 meters, to a place where they had never rotated before propellers submarines.

By an evil whim of fate, five years later the underwater record holder will forever go into this basin at the bottom of the Norwegian Sea. But then they were at the peak of victory...

The minutes of ultra-deep swimming dragged on unbearably. It was as if the monstrous pressure not only compressed the durable body, but also compressed time itself within it. One could live for a good hour at such a moment... And alarming reports were received from the compartments - a flange was leaking, a wooden panel was cracking due to a sharp decrease in the diameter of the body...

Chernov hesitated with the command to ascend. I had to try everything to the end. Then, like bullets, the titanium bolts, cut off by unimaginable compression, began to fly off. But in general, all the mechanisms worked without any problems, the ship was perfectly controlled both in depth and along the horizon. And most importantly, he could shoot from this abyss, remaining invulnerable to depth charges and enemy torpedoes, which would be crushed halfway to the target.

I couldn’t stand it and hugged the shipbuilders tightly one by one,” recalls Chernov. - Thank you, guys... Just think, they conceived this titanium miracle 25 years ago! In 1969... And as if by order, we dived just on the birthday of “Plavnik”. (This is the factory name of K-278, and there was no need to change it to please our politicians.) To be honest, I didn’t want to leave such depths. Who else would come and when? Nobody else came...

On that historic day, the boatswain of the atomic marine, midshipman Vadim Polukhin, sat on the rudders of the depths. It was, obeying his hands, that the atomarina went to a record depth. He sat in a helmet so that, God forbid, some bolt cut off by pressure would not hit his head.

On that dive we checked everything that could be checked. Including a powder blowing system for ballast tanks. From such a depth you cannot blow through with any compressed air - only with the force of powder gases. They surfaced, or rather, ascended from a depth of 800 meters in 30 seconds.

Rear Admiral Chernov raised the periscope and cursed - everything around was gray and impenetrable.

Navigator, what's wrong with your periscope? Raise the anti-aircraft!

They raised the anti-aircraft periscope - everything was the same, pitch black.

They cleaned the top deckhouse hatch and they sneezed. Everything is covered in powder smoke. The boat surfaced in a cloud of smoke. But it surfaced! From a hitherto unimaginable depth. Using the latest ascent system. Everything was confirmed, everything was justified.

The completion of the most important test was reported to the Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Navy, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei Gorshkov, and members of the government. This unprecedented and still unsurpassed record was not trumpeted in the newspapers. They learned about it only when the nuclear submarine K-278 disappeared forever into the depths of the Norwegian Sea, perhaps in the very place where the main world record for underwater shipbuilding was set in the 20th century.

Well, okay - secrecy... But the fact that the crew was not rewarded for such an achievement - that’s what I can’t wrap my head around. Why?

Reserve midshipman Veniamin Matveev:

Before the dive, Admiral Chernov said: either everyone will be awarded, or no one. That's how it turned out - no one. But the fact is that we received a radio in the Norwegian Sea - to return to the base and take the Moscow admirals on board. Chernov did not want to return, he wrote in the logbook: “I will take control of the submarine” - and ordered to dive. “We don’t need riders,” he said.

True, later our commander, Captain 1st Rank Zelensky, received the Order of the Red Star, and Chernov - the Order of the October Revolution. But this was a degree lower than what was imagined. The commander was going against the Hero...

Colonel of the Medical Service Evgeny Nikitin, author of the book “Cold Depths,” spoke more clearly on this matter:

The ship returning from testing was visited by the commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral Ivan Matveevich Kapitanets. He congratulated everyone on the successful completion of the main tests, called the crew in front of the formation a “crew of heroes” and ordered all its members to be nominated for state awards.

Award certificates for the crew members were issued and handed over to the fleet commander. However, the awards for the submarine heroes did not take place. The political department of the fleet objected, which did not see the merit of the crew in conquering a thousand-meter depth with a combat submarine. I didn’t see it, perhaps because, apart from political worker V. Kondryukov (full-time political officer K-278 - N. Ch.), there was not a single political officer on the list of those nominated for awards. The political department workers did not understand that a qualitatively new subclass of submarines was being born...

And then no one wanted to talk about awards at all - “Komsomolets” forever went into the abyss in which he once set his world record...

Alas, TASS did not report this unique achievement. And the name of the commander who made this unthinkable dive did not become widely known. I will name it as an archival discovery in the hope that one day it will be included in all maritime history textbooks and monographs - Captain 1st Rank Yuri Zelensky.

To my shame, at our first meeting with him, I could not tell him words worthy of his feat. We argued... This was in the first days after the death of Komsomolets. In complete despair from such a loss (there, in the Norwegian Sea, my good comrade, captain 1st rank Talant Burkulakov, also died), submariners and engineers, journalists and rescuers converged wall to wall. They argued about everything - whether Vanin’s crew was to blame, whether the boat was reliably designed and built, whether the fishermen arrived on time, why the Navy rescue service did not work properly... They broke spears in the same way as ten years later they will have to break them in the days of the tragedy “ Kursk". Are they spears? More like an old rake, stepping on which is maddeningly painful and offensive... On such a note we parted. “Horseless” Zelensky soon left for Severodvinsk, his career was put to rest because he began to contradict the conclusions of the Government Commission and dared not only to have his own special opinion, but also to express it publicly.

Quietly and joylessly, he ended his naval service as captain-dispatcher of the factory harbor in Severodvinsk...

And his name should be in the Pantheon of the Russian submarine fleet. The national hero, alas, is unrecognized and unknown to anyone, like most of the heroes of our fleet. They suffered the fate of the heroes of the First World War. Then the October revolution broke out and a new countdown of time began, a new account of merits and exploits. Something similar happened after August 1991. Before that there was a regime of secrecy, after that there was a regime of uselessness...

And yet, captain 1st rank Yuri Zelensky was the first submariner in the world to take his ship beyond the kilometer depth mark. Let's remember this forever.

Fortunately, I had the opportunity to meet Yuri Zelensky again. This time not in a hurry, but thoroughly - in the St. Petersburg club of submariners. This was in 2005. The entire elite of the Russian submarine fleet gathered in the club's wardroom: combat admirals and submarine commanders. They applauded the elderly, modest man in a civilian jacket. It was very similar to how Alexander Marinesko was once greeted in Kronstadt, who emerged from the deep shadow of everyday life to his brothers in arms.

Zelensky spent 27 years in Severodvinsk. In those years, people were exiled to these parts for serious crimes for such a period. And him - for the feat. However, Zelensky did not consider his Severodvinsk service a punishment: he received and tested the latest nuclear submarines there - as many as eight “hulls,” as the shipbuilders say. With his light and experienced hand they began to plow the ocean depths.

Instead of an afterword to this story, I will quote the words of Hero of the Soviet Union, Vice Admiral Evgeny Chernov: “Concerning the situation that has arisen with the assessment of the service of the main crew of the deep-sea submarine K-278 of the Northern Fleet and its commander, Captain 1st Rank Yu. A. Zelensky, with testing a submarine by diving and swimming at a maximum depth of 1000 meters.

The crew of the nuclear submarine K-278 (“Komsomolets”) was formed in 1981 from the best professionals- volunteers of the 1st flotilla of nuclear submarines of the Northern Fleet, underwent training according to a specially developed program, took an active part in the completion of the submarine, its mooring, factory and state tests.

At the 1st flotilla of the Northern Fleet, the crew of K-278 was introduced into the first line of ships of constant combat readiness, fully completed the “Trial Operation Program” and was prepared for testing by diving and swimming at the maximum diving depth.

On August 4, 1984, for the first time in the history of world diving, a combat-ready nuclear submarine K-278 with a displacement of 8,500 tons dived to a depth of 1,020 meters in the Norwegian Sea to test it at this depth and check the operation of the power plant, technical means, systems, devices and weapons ship. There were 80 people on board the deep-sea nuclear-powered vessel. It was a collective feat and a world record.

The boat was operated by a full-time crew of 57 people. The test results were recorded by representatives of design bureaus and shipbuilders. For the first time, a submarine reached the axis of the ocean deep-sea sound channel, tested a new emergency ascent system from a depth of 800 meters, and torpedo tubes were tested for their intended purpose at the same depth.

The commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral I.M. Kapitanets, ordered the preparation of award documents for all crew members, which was done immediately...

The submarine with its full-time crew continued its intensive voyage... The issue of awarding the commander and crew of the deep-sea submarine “for courage and courage in testing and mastering a new deep-sea ship” was postponed. Commander-in-Chief Chernavin was replaced by commanders-in-chief Gromov, then Kuroyedov. The latter wanted to find the award documents: “If I find it, I’ll present it,” but he didn’t have time - the Kursk was lost.

At the end of the 80s, captain 1st rank Zelensky was appointed to a dead-end position in Severodvinsk and was transferred to the reserve there. He was hired as a dispatcher for tugs by SMP General Director D. G. Pashaev. Zelensky is “guilty” for not giving offense to his ship when establishing the causes of its disaster. Commander-in-Chief Kuroedov allocated him an apartment in the Vsevolozhsk district of the Leningrad region...”

PROJECT 685 nuclear submarine "FIN"

The TTZ for the design of an experimental combat submarine with an increased diving depth in order to study its operating conditions was issued in August 1966. The experience gained during the creation of this submarine was supposed to be used to create a project of deep-sea boats suitable for serial construction. The design process took almost eight years and technical project was approved only in 1974. The increased immersion depth led to the choice of titanium alloys as a material for a durable housing.

To urgently (within 20-30 sec.) create positive buoyancy at great depths when seawater enters the boat, a system was installed for blowing the ballast of one of the middle group tanks using powder gas generators. Retractable bow horizontal rudders. It was decided to abandon the torpedo-loading hatch and durable deckhouse. The boat was entered through the VSK (pop-up rescue chamber). All this made it possible to minimize the number of holes in the robust housing.

The boat had six bow 533 mm TAs with a quick loading device. Each TA had an autonomous pneumohydraulic firing device. Shooting could be carried out at all diving depths.

The ammunition load consisted of 22 units (torpedoes and rocket torpedoes). A typical TA loading option was as follows: 2 SAET-60M torpedoes, 2 RK-55 rocket torpedoes, 2 VA-111 Shkval rocket torpedoes. There were six missile torpedoes and ten torpedoes on the racks. The issuance of target designation for the use of missile-torpedo weapons was carried out by the Skat State Joint Stock Company.

The boat received the tactical number K-278. Built at SMP (serial number 510). The laying took place on April 22, 1978. On May 9, 1983, she was launched and after completing state tests on October 20 of the same year, she became part of the Northern Fleet. In October 1988 it was renamed Komsomolets. This unique ship, the pride of the Russian submarine shipbuilding industry, perished on April 7, 1989 at 17:08 in the Norwegian Sea.